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Introduction: Representing Revolts across 




Since the heyday of research on late medieval and early modern social unrest in the 
1960s-1980s, historians have referred to the fact that contemporaries had already 
considered the manifold revolts (and revolutions) of their epoch as a phenomenon 
transcending particular countries and reigns.1 Stating thus researchers tried to 
release their own approach from the limitations of 19th century national 
historiographies. Both Soviet-Marxist and Western historiographies sought to 
embed early-modern expressions of protest into a broader analysis of historical 
structures. Accordingly, they examined them as symptoms of a deeply-rooted 
societal crisis that characterized the problematic process of transition from the 
middle Ages to modernity.2 Boris Porshnev and Soviet historiography alongside 
him interpreted revolts in terms of “class struggles” between peasants and feudal 
lords, whereas Roland Mousnier and his successors perceived them as an 
interrelation of “challenge and response” between a modernizing state and the 
purely reactive, conservative estates, or else the population at large.3 In spite of the 
                                                 
1  Winfried Schulze, “Europäische und deutsche Bauernrevolten der frühen Neuzeit – 
Probleme der vergleichenden Betrachtung”, in Europäische Bauernrevolten der frühen 
Neuzeit, ed. Winfried Schulze (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), 10–60, 12; Wolfgang Rein-
hard, “Theorie und Empirie bei der Erforschung frühneuzeitlicher Volksaufstände”, in 
ibid., 66–99; John Elliott, “Revolution and continuity in early modern Europe”, Past and 
Present 42 (1969): 35–56; Yves-Marie Bercé, “Troubles frumentaires et pouvoir centrali-
sateur. L'émeute de Fermo dans les Marches (1648)”, Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histo-
ire 73 (1961): 471–505; Andreas Suter, Der schweizerische Bauernkrieg von 1653: Poli-
tische Sozialgeschichte – Sozialgeschichte eines politischen Ereignisses, Frühneuzeit-
Forschungen, ed. Peter Blickle et al., vol. 3 (Tübingen, 1997), 320. 
2  Hagen Schulze, Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte, Europa bauen (Mün-
chen, 1994). 
3  Roland Mousnier, Fureurs paysannes. Les paysans dans les révoltes du XVIIe siècle: 
France, Russie, Chine, (Paris, 1967); Yves-Marie Bercé, Histoire des Croquants. Etude 
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significant differences, however, both interpretations observed a structural 
similarity between the manifestations of social upheaval in different countries. 
Nevertheless did the contemporaries’ own perceptions and their cross-border 
comparisons – if quoted at all – remain mere illustrations.  
 
 
HISTORICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND  
TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY 
 
Two trends in present day historiography seem to have paved a way for a 
revaluation by now: 1) the increasing influence of anthropological approaches and 
2) the growing awareness of “transnational” dimensions.  
Firstly, the turn to cultural history, historical anthropology and renewed political 
history made the historical agents’ views, interpretations and semantics themselves 
an object of enquiry. Although revolts have become less popular in scholarly 
research since the fall of the Soviet empire and the concomitant marginalization of 
Marxism, concepts such as “moral economy”, “language of the crowd”, or 
symbolical orders have ousted the prevalence of external structural models. For this 
reason, the common reference to economic factors and other measurable items 
shaping the social actors’ behavior however unconsciously was given a new 
framework.4 Ricoeur characterized such structuralism as an “interpretation of 
suspicion”, thus criticizing a perspective which had devalued the agents’ views 
solely as surface phenomena that would hide deeper and more significant social, 
economic, psychological etc. mechanisms – mechanisms that were said to be the 
true determination or at least a profound instigation of human behavior.5 This shift 
                                                                                                            
des soulèvements populaires au XVII siècle dans le sud-ouest de la France (Genève, 
1974). 
4  On moral economy see Edward Palmer Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English 
Crowd in the 18th Century”, Past and Present 50 (1971): 76–136; on the language of the 
crowd see especially idem, “Eighteenth Century English Society. Class Struggle without 
Class?”, in Social History 3, 2 (1978): 133–165.  
5  This includes all interpretations seeking for invisible driving forces behind the phenome-
na, forces that are considered to be more real than phenomenal reality. In the “interpréta-
tions du soupçon” the protagonists' own arguments are mainly rationalisations that they 
might believe in themselves, but that are superficial for serious observers because they 
hide more than they reveal. Compared with this, Ricoeur's phenomenological approach 
pleads for taking seriously the protagonists' statements, similar to what is often champi-
oned in historical anthropology. Paul Ricoeur, Du texte à l'action. Essais d'herméneu-
tique II (Paris, 1986). 
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to a more balanced view of contemporary accounts has gradually triggered 
innovation in the study of social unrest and uprisings, which goes into opposite 
directions. On the one hand the focus on the contemporaries’ voices, 
representations and “worldviews”6 has led to an emphasis on the peoples’ struggle 
for the “old right” or the topos of the “good king and his bad councillors”, which 
supported Mousnier’s or Charles Tilly’s hypotheses on the “backward” role of the 
peasantry or of the larger population. On the other hand, this new focus has enabled 
important studies questioning such images of one-sided re-activity in order to claim 
that the population’s protest was in fact the engine of many innovations and a 
hitherto neglected source of the emergent idea of “human rights”. In opposition to 
Habermas’ influential Theory of communicative action that had located the genesis 
of a public sphere in urban (bourgeois) Enlightenment reasoning through the 
written word, historians of pre-modern revolts observed the subalterns’ potential to 
create such public spheres well before.7 Andreas Würgler has therfore argued that a 
recurrent element of revolts had been to insist upon the publication of acts 
guaranteeing privileges and rights to the population, documents that the authorities 
systematically tried to conceal. In this light the focus on “old” rights inherent in the 
insurgents’ rhetoric rather seems to be a disguise for change and is in any way 
superseded by the novelty of the call for publicity.8 
Secondly, and simultaneously to the cultural turn, historical research has 
become increasingly attentive to transnational dimensions. This is certainly due to 
present day entangled world economy as well as the ever growing importance of 
transnational organisations and agencies while the national ones loose momentum. 
Probably first and foremost, however, the transnational outlook is due to the process 
of European integration, which is, unlike the aforementioned phenomena of 
globalization, (still) regarded as a politically desired aim rather than an automatic 
process that cannot be halted anyways. For that reason efforts to ideologically and 
                                                 
6  Cf. on “moral economy” Edward Palmer Thompson, Plebeische Kultur und moralische 
Ökonomie. Aufsätze zur englischen Sozialgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, trans. 
Günther Lottes, intro. Dieter Groh (Frankfurt am Main, 1980). 
7  Winfried Schulze, “Der bäuerliche Widerstand und die 'Rechte der Menschheit'“, in 
Grund- und Freiheitsrechte im Wandel von Gesellschaft und Geschichte, Veröffentli-
chungen zur Geschichte der Grund- und Freiheitsrechte, ed. Günter Birtsch, vol. 1 (Göt-
tingen 1981), 41–56. 
8  Andreas Würgler, “Das Modernisierungspotential von Unruhen im 18. Jahrhundert. Ein 
Beitr. zur Entstehung der politischen Öffentlichkeit in Deutschland und der Schweiz”, 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 21 (1995): 195–217. See also David Zaret, Origins of de-
mocratic culture. Printing, petitions, and the public sphere in early-modern England 
(Princeton, New Jersey, 2000) for the particularly ample case of the English Civil war. 
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scientifically foster Europeanization by exploring historical roots of a common 
European culture often receive privileged funding. Many studies and projects on the 
closely intertwined European history have thus taken shape. Europe is often 
conceptualized as an overlapping communicational space. Among other key 
developments the printing revolution and, even more so, the emergence of regular 
newspapers during the 17th century are identified as stepping-stones of European 
integration.9 For a long time studies on the press have apparently lived in the 
shadows, and maybe they are still to a certain extent marginalized within the field 
of historical research; but historians begin to revise their views and to take the wide 
range of early-modern media more seriously. There has been done considerable 
work in order to digitalize early-modern newspapers, and this provides new 
facilities for research.  
An important genre that combines both the transnational dimension and the 
anthropological interest for contemporaries’ perceptions and world-views is the 
travelogue. In literary studies it has been popular for decades, but historians 
followed suit. The perception and description of foreign and particularly exotic 
peoples made authors sensitive to what was normally taken for granted in one’s 
own culture. Even if this was not explicitly reflected, the descriptions often focused 
on what was perceived as unfamiliar. Much profit can be drawn from post-colonial 
studies that examine the interactions between colonizers and the colonized, for in 
these circumstances the cultural difference was particularly huge  or at least incited 
strong presentations of contrast and discord. What is sometimes overlooked within 
the emphasis on difference is that travellers, when comparing and juxtaposing 
different countries and cultures, also drew parallels. They registered parallels 
between countries they knew, sometimes referring to home and host country only, 
but sometimes even reflecting upon a series of countries they had visited 
consecutively. One example, for instance, was Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), 
who travelled to India, South-East Asia and Japan via Russia and Persia.10 In 
middle and Western Europe whose kingdoms and principalities were certainly less 
                                                 
9  Die Entstehung des Zeitungswesens im 17. Jahrhundert. Ein neues Medium und seine 
Folgen für das Kommunikationssystem der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Volker Bauer and Holger 
Böning, Presse und Geschichte – neue Beiträge, ed. Holger Böhning et al., vol. 54 (Bre-
men, 2011); Asa Briggs and Peter Burke, A social history of the media. From Gutenberg 
to the Internet (Cambridge, 2010); The dissemination of news and the emergence of con-
temporaneity in early modern Europe, ed. Brendan M. Dooley (Farnham, 2010). 
10  Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716). Ein Gelehrtenleben zwischen Tradition und Innovati-
on, [Vorträge, gehalten anläßlich eines interdisziplinären Arbeitsgespräches am 20. und 
21. September 2001 in der Herzog August Bibliothek], ed. Detlef Haberland (Wiesbaden, 
2004). 
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divided in terms of nationality/ ethnicity than religiously and even more so socially 
and legally), many parallels simply imposed themselves on the observers (and those 
who wrote were generally not peasants). Ethnographic alienation and analogy have 
thus to be seen as complementary forms of representation. Observers pre-selected 
information more or less consciously when writing down their experience and 
observations for the reading public at home that generally judged on the basis of 
what was familiar. But even the very perception of foreign reality was a genuine 
process of filtering that obeyed patterns of both identization and alterization, which 
we might rather call assimilation and dissimilation.11 
Maybe the strong (anthropological) focus on dissimilation in recent 
investigation of trans-cultural perception has contributed to the researchers’ 
preference for contemporaries’ descriptions of unfamiliar and seemingly strange 
customs, manners and everyday practice – at the expense of the narration of 
extraordinary events. Of course, wars have always been treated: and because all of 
them indisputably involved different countries, mutual perception and depiction 
have finally lent themselves to transnational approaches.12  
 
 
REGARDING REVOLTS ACROSS BORDERS:  
FOREIGNERS AS PRIVILEGED OBSERVERS 
 
Events like social unrest and revolts, however, which were seemingly beyond the 
ordinary and of purely local or regional character, have rather been disregarded. 
The two underlying assumptions (held by historians) obviously were 1) that revolts 
were indeed rare events, and 2) that they did not really have an impact on other 
countries. Our objective is not so much to question these assumptions about what 
revolts actually were, but to examine how contemporary observers depicted and 
conceptualized them. If we take metaphors comparing the people (populus) to the 
                                                 
11 Even though Wolfram Lutterer, Identitäten, Alteritäten – Normativitäten? Die Bedeutung 
von Normativität für Selbst- und Fremdbilder, in Normen, Ausgrenzungen, Hybridisie-
rungen und 'Acts of Identity', ed. Monika Fludernik and Hans-Joachim Gehrke (Würz-
burg, 2004), 23–43 already employed the German terms Identisierung and Alterisierung, 
they are no current concepts in theoretical debates. But in contrast to the polar opposites 
identity/alterity they emphasize the ascriptional aspect and show to what extent sameness 
and otherness are discursively constructed. Even more appropriate seems to be the con-
ceptual duality of assimilation and dissimilation (although the latter is also used in biolo-
gy in order to describe metabolic processes).  
12  Cf. for instance Kriegsniederlagen: Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen, ed. Horst Carl, 
Hans-Henning Kortüm, et al. (Berlin, 2004). 
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ocean and defining the task of rule as the (captain’s) art of steering the ship of state 
through tempests into account, this equation of social unrest and bad weather rather 
implies that revolts were regarded as periodically occurring phenomena. And a 
didactic poem from as early as the 13th century suggests the same when advising 
nobles to put up with their peasants’ hate.13 It seems as if the etiological question 
why revolts happened, coexisted and often combined with the question how they 
were to be prevented, the latter implying at least a certain degree of normality. 
Concerning the allegedly local character of revolts, other recurrent metaphors in 
contemporary writings on seditions might similarly lead to doubts: when revolts 
were compared to a wildfire, a contagion or epidemic it was clear that they had no 
reason to come to a halt at borders, at least if their spreading was not actively 
prevented. 
Without any doubt, cases where insurgents themselves referred to foreign 
models are rather rare; on some occasions rebels would have quoted or tried to 
imitate the examples of the Swiss Confederacy or the Dutch Republic, for 
instance.14 Such cases occurred mainly in the Italian seaports that were nerve 
centres of a vivid flow of information, with merchants bringing in information from 
around the Mediterranean. Thus, during the revolts of the mid-17th century in 
Southern Italy one can find references to the insurgents in Catalonia, Portugal and 
the Netherlands, all of them having previously rebelled against the Spanish 
Habsburgs. Especially the successful secession from Spanish rule by the Portuguese 
and the Dutch nourished hopes when the inhabitants of the Italian seaports saw 
themselves unjustly overburdened with taxes since they had to pay the bill for the 
extensive warfare (similar to the subjects of other European monarchies in and 
                                                 
13  On representations of the people as “stormy sea” cf. A. Collurafi, Le Tumultuationi della 
Plebe in Palermo (Palermo 1651), 12-20, quoted from Peter Burke, “Some Seventeenth-
Century Anatomists of Revolution”, in Storia della Storiografia 22 (1992): 23–35. In this 
vein the state is often compared to a ship that has to be steered through the open sea. Cf. 
for instance Philipp Andreas Oldenburger, Tractatus iuridico-politicus de rebuspublicis 
turbidis in tranquillum statum reducendis, in eoque conservandis (Geneva, 1677), 21, 70, 
390. On the didactical poem cf. http://www.litde.com/das-hfische-gesellschaftsideal/das-
ritterliche-tugendsystem.php, consulted August 29, 2011. 
14  The Swiss model of the Eidgenossenschaft (Confederacy) was most notably followed in 
the German Peasants’ war, where the insurgents founded their Upper-Swabian Eidgenos-
senschaft. On the Venetian and the Dutch model see Eco O.G. Haitsma Mulier and 
Gerard T. Moran, The Myth of Venice and Dutch Republican Thought in the Seventeenth 
Century (Assen, 1980). 
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around the 30-Years War).15 When a rebellion reached a certain level and attracted 
influential and internationally connected groups or individual personalities, 
insurgents often even forged transnational alliances. This applies to the well-studied 
case of the English Civil war against Charles I and the ensuing republic whose 
principal agents entertained diplomatic relations well before the kingdom was 
abolished. This pattern recurs in many revolts in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, where both the Ukrainian Cossacks under Khmel’nyts’kyi and the 
dissenters under Lubomierski relied on foreign partners, not without having some 
difficulties in justifying these alliances as Frank Sysyn’s and Angela Rustemeyer’s 
papers show. 
Far more frequent, though, was the explicit or implicit comparison between 
different revolts by contemporary observers. Their search for comprehensive 
explanations shows to what extent revolts were seen as interrelated and a coherent 
phenomenon. The contributions of this volume draw on such contemporary 
observations and subsequently try to combine a general focus on transnational 
dimensions with the quasi-anthropological attention to historical actors’ perceptive 
and conceptual patterns, their way of seeing and interpreting the world. The volume 
is a first attempt to examine the “transnational representation” of pre-modern 
revolts, to explore perceptions and descriptions of revolts across borders. It cannot 
claim to be systematic as yet. But it shall give a fresh impetus in order to inspire 
further research in this direction, an undertaking that requires intense cooperation of 
specialists with different regional, linguistic, disciplinary and methodological 
competences. The first step has been taken at a conference at the Centre of 
Interdisciplinary Studies (Bielefeld) in June 2009 and most contributions of the 
present book are elaborations of what we have discussed there.  
To be sure, explicit juxtapositions and comparisons of revolts are not 
innumerable in early modern times.16 It is, however, not for this reason alone that in 
the present study implicit comparisons have often been privileged. Considering 
contemporary awareness of the ubiquity of revolts, one of my leading hypotheses is 
that many descriptions of uprisings in foreign countries were at the same time, or at 
least to some extent, reflections on analogous phenomena at home, even more so 
since revolts were an extremely delicate matter to deal with for a writer. However 
                                                 
15  Wayne Te Brake, Shaping History. Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500 - 1700 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1998), 129-137, for quotations see especially 109-110. 
16  Burke, Anatomists gives a list of contemporary histories of revolt, many of them explicit-
ly comparative. Focusing mainly on 17th century Italian authors writing on revolts and 
what they often called revolutions, Burke examines their use of metaphors for describing 
phenomena of unrest. He claims that these metaphors are more than decorations, but were 
supposed to contribute substantially to the explanation of contemporary phenomena.  
14 | MALTE GRIESSE 
 
far-reaching or narrow-minded their concrete aims had been, revolts were generally 
registered as a broadside towards the authorities and treated as crimen laesae 
majestatis in court. Such classifications considerably limited the scope of 
interpretation for an observer, especially if he himself was subject to the contested 
authority. He could not but paint the rebels in rather dark colours if he wanted to 
avoid a serious conflict of loyalties. Intimate knowledge of internal matters was 
thus outweighed by a somewhat biased view, whereas foreign observers, less 
familiar with political and cultural specificities of the country they were writing 
about, were freer in their interpretation and in their quest for explanations.  
Therefore did the Muscovite envoy to England in 1645-46, serving at a time 
when the civil war was in full swing, rather sympathize with Parliament in its 
conflict with Charles I (1645-46). He was certainly influenced by his English 
merchant-interlocutors,17 but he did not in the least bother to conceal this attitude in 
his report to the ambassadorial office, i.e. for the tsar and the Muscovite governing 
elite concerned with foreign affairs.18 Inversely, the foreign residents in Moscow 
showed much sympathy for the plight of the urban population that rose to rebellion 
at the same time as in many other European countries. The correspondents did not 
mince matters in depicting the authorities’ corruptive practices and deliberately 
contrasted them with the rebels’ common good-oriented argumentation and their 
considerable efforts to avoid any exploitation of the general chaos for personal 
enrichment; and thus they steered clear of bringing into discredit the legitimacy of 
their actions and objectives.19 This is even more remarkable for observers who 
personally suffered from the uprisings, whenever their residences were devastated 
or further harm was done by the insurgents who seemed to regard them as unduly 
privileged. Foreigners, indeed, would not dare present the insurgents as heroes, but 
often they depicted them as pityable victims of misery and abuse, whose actions 
were at least understandable if not to a certain extent legitimate. 
                                                 
17  Cf. M.A. Alpatov and L. V. Cherepnin, Russkaya istoriceskaya mysl' i Zapadnaya Evro-
pa XII-XVII vv. (Moskva, 1973), 335-342. 
18  The Russian chronicles that relate the extraordinarily ferocious events in Moskau, Pskov 
and Novgorod (1648-51) are written with big temporal delay. The accounts on Moscow 
are inexact to a degree, that it is even hard to identify the uprising; the simultaneous up-
risings in many other towns are practically not represented at all.  
19  See numerous references to sources in Volksaufstände in Rußland. Von der Zeit der 
Wirren bis zur “Grünen Revolution” gegen die Sowjetherrschaft, ed. Heinz-Dietrich Lö-
we, Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, ed. Holm Sundhaussen, vol. 65 (Wies-
baden, 2006), where the insurgents' motives are identified as being oriented towards le-
gality and the reestablishment of the “old law”, but the external standpoint of the authors 
is never considered on the background of their original cultural baggage and experience.  
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Beyond the tricky question of legitimacy Peter Burke has pointed to the 
problem of literary genre conventions that many authors of Renaissance and 
Baroque faced when writing on popular rebellions in particular. On the one hand, 
tragedy seemed the most appropriate genre. On the other hand, were people of low 
status worthy of being represented in tragedy, the most respected genre of the 
Antique tradition which had so far been reserved for personalities of high status? 
Comedy was not a convincing solution, neither. Sometimes writers recurred to 
tragicomedy. The question remained an object of debate.20 In any case, foreigners 
had a larger scope to ponder on the motives and grievances that moved people to 




READING CROSS-BORDER ACCOUNTS 
OF EARLY-MODERN REVOLTS 
 
With respect to the exploitation of such transnational sources Russian studies – 
frequently labelled as backward as is (labelled) their object of enquiry – can provide 
new insights. Historians of medieval and early modern Russia have always been 
obliged to rely heavily on foreigners’ accounts, simply because of the scarcity of 
domestic narrative sources.21 The writings of Sigismund von Herberstein, Adam 
Olearius or the above-mentioned Engelbert Kaempfer are only the most famous 
accounts of Russia in the 16th and 17th centuries, well-known also among non-
specialists. The trustworthiness of their testimonies, as well as the prejudices and 
limitations of their knowledge on Russian culture have been debated at length. But 
just like the writings of less known foreigners – mercenaries of the Time of 
Troubles (the civil war at the beginning of the 17th century), physicians at court, 
                                                 
20  See Peter Burke, The renaissance sense of the past, Documents of modern history (Lon-
don, 1969). 
21  This makes the situation of early modern Russia to some extent comparable to the coloni-
al world that has been authoritatively described and interpreted by the colonizers who 
thus (by the use of the written word) imposed their own categories of evaluation and 
made the natives regard themselves with European eyes. In postcolonial theory this epis-
temological conquest is considered much more profound and long-lasting than political 
rule and military oppression. To be sure, in the Russian case the story is much more com-
plex. There has been neither military colonialism, nor Western political rule. But the 
emergent Russian historiography in the 18th and 19th centuries had to draw on foreigners’ 
descriptions. This could actually make Russia the litmus test for the validity of epistemo-
logical hypothesis.  
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diplomats, travellers and others –, their descriptions constitute bedrocks in our 
record of late medieval and early-modern Russian history in general, and of revolts 
in particular, be they town uprisings, or large-scale rebellions occurring in the 
vastness of the Cossack peripheries.22  
However, a shift of perspective is required in the use of these documents. We 
should not consider them primarily as sources of facts anymore, as it has been done 
for ages of historical research. Instead of focusing exclusively on the objects of 
description, i.e. the revolts on Russian soil, we should have a closer look at the 
people who put pen to paper and explore their role as transcultural mediators. Their 
accounts have thus to be read as both 1) representations of the events in the foreign 
culture they describe, and 2) as more or less implicit reflections of the authors’ own 
cultural backgrounds and often their domestic (direct or indirect) revolt experience. 
From this point of view these representations are mediation acts. The lacking 
comprehension of Russian culture that is often deplored in historiography of 
Muscovite revolts can be put to an advantage, if we adopt the idea of the authors as 
cross-border commuters who (more or less consciously) compared and juxtaposed 
their two (or sometimes more) cultures of reference. What has traditionally been 
dealt with as a shortcoming turns out to be a gain when viewed from the perspective 
of contemporaries’ transnational comparisons of revolts or revolt-cultures. The 
testimonies should accordingly be read on this double ground leading into a 
connected history or a histoire croisée of revolt-perceptions and -representations.23 
Similar to Russian studies, researchers of West- and central-European revolts 
suspected representations from abroad to be ignorant of national or regional 
specificities and therefore less reliable than internal descriptions. And since 
domestic sources including chronicles, court records and others are abundant 
despite constraints and conflicts of loyalty, foreign descriptions and interpretations 
of revolts have hardly been taken into account. Apart from the different level of 
writing and print culture, this prolificacy might be attributed to the rulers’ attempts 
to rapidly launch their hegemonic interpretations of these challenges wherein they 
focussed on punishment and the spectacle of suffering; quite on the contrary, the 
Russian government rather tended to silence revolts and would have them narrated 
only with considerably hindsight, often decades after they had happened. 
Furthermore, most of these official chronicles were designed to preserve the 
medieval style for long, almost until the end of the 17th century. This circumstance 
                                                 
22  The classical bibliographical survey of these foreigners' writings on pre-petrine Russia is 
Friedrich von Adelung, Kritisch-literärische Übersicht der Reisenden in Russland bis 
1700, deren Berichte bekannt sind (St. Petersburg, Leipzig, 1846). 
23  Cf. Michael Werner, Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Penser l’histoire croisée. Entre empirie et 
réflexivité”, Annales 58 (2003): 7-36.  
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of a deliberately continued pre-Gutenberg Age connects the case of Muscovy and 
the available sources in some respect to medieval France and England, treated by 
Bettina Bommersbach and Helmut Hinck in this volume. 
Winfried Schulze, one of the most distinguished scholars of early modern 
revolts in the Holy Roman Empire, raised the question whether “revolt and uprising 
have inspired new and salutary laws”, taking up the question posed by the early-
modern political scientist Neumair von Ramsla, who specifically dealt with the 
phenomenon of sedition.24 Thinking along these lines, one has to consider that the 
adjustments and learning processes that generally evolved in the long term were 
hardly ever the result of the immediate revolt experience made by the authorities, 
but were in fact mediated by complex detours, by multiple forms of reception and 
representation that must be retraced and examined with respect to their agents and 
(af)filiations in time and space – including the transnational level. If we think of 
Schulze’s far-reaching hypothesis that a process of increasing legal consolidation 
(Verrechtlichung, “juridicazation”) has taken place as a result of the experiences of 
social upheaval in early modern times25, the development of legal systems and 
criminal justice gains particular significance. This development has to be regarded 
in a process of close transnational interaction. Growing penal awareness often drew 
on public and secret representations of uprisings, which were generally classified as 
treason, lèse-majesté or political crime.26  
It shall not be denied that the governments did everything in their power to 
monopolize the representation of revolt in support of their official version, which 
commonly aimed at thoroughly discrediting the insurgents. But from revolt to 
revolt, or from country to country, this denigration could be launched with very 
diverging thrusts. If in some cases revolts were politicized as attempted coups and 
                                                 
24  Winfried Schulze, “'Geben Aufstand und Aufruhr Anlaß zu neuen, heilsamen Gesetzen'. 
Beobachtungen über die Wirkungen bäuerlichen Widerstands in der frühen Neuzeit”, in 
Aufstände, Revolten, Prozesse: Beiträge zu bäuerlichen Widerstandsbewegungen im 
frühneuzeitlichen Europa, ed. Winfried Schulze (Geschichte und Gesellschaft, vol. 27, 
1983), 261–285. 
25  See Peter Blickle, “The Criminalization of Peasant Resistance in the Holy Roman Em-
pire: Toward a History of the Emergence of High Treason in Germany”, Journal of Mod-
ern History 58 suppl. (December 1986): 88-97. 
26  Fabrizio Dal Vera's contribution to this volume deals with this question. See also the 
classical study by Mario Sbriccoli, Crimen laesae maiestatis. Il problema del reato poli-
tico alle soglie della scienza penalistica moderna (Milano, 1974) and Angela Rustemey-
er, Dissens und Ehre. Majestätsverbrechen in Rußand (1600-1800), Forschungen zur ost-
europäischen Geschichte, ed. Holm Sundhaussen, vol. 69 (Wiesbaden, 2006), who gives 
a large comparative view of the criminalization of revolt in different countries.  
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high treason, the common-good-oriented claims and practices of the insurgents 
were presented as banditry, lawlessness and pursuit of egoistic self-interest and 
enrichment in other cases.27 But the more multifarious and complex the public 
spaces were, the more fragile was the authorities’ representational monopoly. It 
should not be forgotten, though, that the surviving written records are nothing but 
the tip of the iceberg, since public spheres were essentially based on oral 
communication in the pre-modern societies of presence.28  
 
 
CONCERNING THE STRUCTURE OF THIS VOLUME 
 
Cross-border descriptions of social upheaval existed well before print, even though 
their scope was significantly inferior to what was to come with the printing 
revolution and especially with the age of regular newspaper-circulation in the 17th 
century. The first section “Representing Revolt Before the Advent of the 
Gutenberg-Galaxy: A question of dissemination?” therefore deals with revolts 
that occurred at times and/or in regions where the Gutenberg era had not yet started. 
This is definitely the case of the Hundred Years War, but also partially applies to 
early-17th century Muscovy. Bettina Bommersbach and Helmut Hinck focus on the 
times of the Hundred Years War (1337-1454). As England and France found 
themselves in an almost constant state of war and contemporary observers were 
particularly attentive to what was going on in the adversary’s realm and took 
special interest in bigger uprisings that might weaken the ennemy’s forces. Even 
though the evidence is rather scarce, there are some notable exceptions, among 
them the Anonimalle Chronicle in England and Jean Froissart’s famous chronicle in 
                                                 
27  These reversals have been observed by Bettina Bommersbach, “Gewalt in der Jacquerie 
von 1358”, in Gewalt im politischen Raum. Fallanalysen vom Spätmittelalter bis ins 20. 
Jahrhundert, ed. Neithard Bulst, Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Histor-
ische Politikforschung, vol. 15 (Frankfurt am Main, New York, 2008), 46–81; Helmut 
Hinck, “Obrigkeitliche Gewalt bei der Niederschlagung der englischen Erhebung von 
1381”, in ibid., 82–133 with respect to the French and English uprisings during the Hun-
dred Years' War on the example of the two biggist revolts, the Jacquerie of 1358, and the 
Peasants' revolt of 1381. 
28  Talk and rumour can only be retraced when occurring in files of investigation, generally 
occasioned by denunciation. See Würgler, Modernisierungspotential, 195-202. On the 
society of presence see Rudolf Schlögl, “Kommunikation und Vergesellschaftung unter 
Anwesenden. Formen des Sozialen und ihre Transformation in der Frühen Neuzeit”, in 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 34, 2 (2008): 155–224. 
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France, which actually do depict the events of the French Jacquerie (1358) and the 
English Peasants’ Revolt (1381) respectively.  
On the one hand, the cross-border accounts tend to reproduce internal narrative 
patterns. This mainly seems to owe to a scarcity of sources. Chroniclers copied  
their colleagues when they had the possibility to read the manuscript or one of the 
rare copies. On the other hand, foreign authors appeared to be more sympathetic (or 
less hostile) to the insurgents than native writers, a tendency that we can observe 
throughout the whole pre-modern period. The most balanced – or even neutral – 
account, however, is to be found in Thomas Gray’s description of the Jacquerie 
because he as an English soldier in France was able to collect his evidence on the 
spot and therefore ignored the French model-narratives. More striking is the 
example of Thomas Walsingham, a monastic chronicler from St. Albans: while 
offering one of the most hostile descriptions of the insurgents in his account of the 
English Peasants’ Revolt, he almost takes sides with the rebels in his representation 
of the Parisian tax revolt of the early 1380s and demonizes the French king for his 
cruelty.  
Nevertheless has most attention been paid to those riots wishing to enfore the 
election of an Italian pope in Rome; this event clearly outweighed the revolts in the 
adversary’s realms since papal elections were of unquestionable importance to the 
whole Christian world. For the so-called “cluster of revolts” at the beginning of the 
1380s (with the Peasants’ Revolt in England, the Parisian tax uprising, the revolts in 
Flanders and the Ciompi in Italy) contemporaries seemed to assume common 
causes: Jean Froissart feared that the peoples all over Europe were trying to get rid 
of their nobility. And a prominent explicative pattern for the accumulation of heavy 
social unrest was cross-border imitation, which implies the observers’ assumption 
that insurgents in different countries knew of each other – a remarkable observation 
for the pre-Gutenbergian era.  
In Russia the printing revolution arrived only at the turn of the 17th to the 18th 
century. Many historians hence consider prepetrine Muscovy as a medieval country. 
And indeed, internally the country had much in common with medieval France and 
England. But we will see to what extent 17th century Muscovy and the major revolts 
it experienced were affected by the intrusion of revolt-representations from abroad. 
In early-modern times, communication at distance through print always overlapped 
with oral face-to-face communication and participation in print culture was socially 
limited. If we look at 17th century Muscovy and Ukraine from a transnational 
perspective, we can realize how pre-Gutenbergian regions were challenged by the 
printing revolution. Foreign representations of revolt could have an increasing 
impact on the protagonists of major events of social protest in Muscovy.  
Thus Maureen Perrie explores how the First False Dmitrii, who conquered the 
Muscovite throne in the Russian Time of Troubles in 1605, was portrayed by 
foreign eyewitnesses, historians and dramatists. She shows to what extent the belief 
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or non-belief in the pretender’s royal identity were determined by concrete interest. 
Since Dmitrii, supported by Polish magnates and their entourage, was believed to 
have converted to Catholicism, his ascension to the throne was applauded by 
writers like the Italian Barezzo Barezzi (alias Possevino) or the Spanish Siglo de 
oro dramatist Lope de Vega, who nourished hopes of Russia’s conversion to 
Catholicism. In contrast to that, protestant writers such as the Swedish agent in 
Muscovy Petrus Petreius, fervently denounced him as an impostor and a puppet 
mastered by Polish and Vatican interests. Exceptions are British diplomats like 
William Scott, or the French Huguenot mercenary Jacques Margeret, who served 
Boris Godunov until the overthrow of 1605 and then became commander of the 
False Dmitrii’s troops. Though Protestants, these writers regarded Dmitrii as the 
real authentic heir to the throne. As Perrie argues the attitude of the British 
ambassadors, who actually were merchants, was in the first place pragmatic: they 
were interested in smooth commercial relations with Muscovy and wanted to 
conserve privileges for English merchants, i.e. for themselves. Therefore they 
decided to support whoever detained the throne. For Margeret, if he wanted to be 
credible, it was even a basic necessity to dispel doubts about his master’s 
legitimacy. It apparently was mainly a question of culture how far the foreigners 
referred to international precedents of royal imposture. But as soon as they referred 
to antique examples, and to Tile Kolup, the false Frederick II (in the Holy Roman 
Empire), Lambert Simnel or Perkin Warbeck in England, or the false Sebastians of 
Portugal, the foreign authors had a concept of imposture at hand,29 whereas Russian 
contemporary sources indiscriminately spoke of the “villain” or the “heretic”. So 
Perrie demonstrates that Dmitrii’s back-story, his pretence to have escaped from his 
murderers by placing a substitute (in 1592), did not draw on internal Russian folk-
tales, as it has formerly been claimed by Soviet historians, but it essentially built on 
a historical and literary narrative circulating across borders among European elites. 
Only gradually, through Dmitrii’s self-portrayal was it assimilated in Russia where 
                                                 
29  The classical book on Sebastianism in Portugal is O sebastianismo. Breve panorama dum 
mito português. (Colecção Portugal ontem, Portugal hoje.). Lisboa 1978. Yves-Marie 
Bercé, Le roi caché. Sauveurs et imposteurs: mythes politiques populaires dans l'Europe 
moderne (Paris 1990) has compared royal pretenders in Portugal, France and Russia. 
Maureen Perrie herself has worked on the phenomenon of tsarish imposture in Muscovy 
and Russia throughout the early-modern period, see Maureen Perrie, Pretenders and pop-
ular monarchism in early modern Russia. The false tsars of the time of troubles (Cam-
bridge 2002) and Tobias Hug, Impostures in early modern England. Representations and 
perceptions of fraudulent identities (Manchester 2010) has studied imposture in medieval 
and early-modern England, not restraining himself to pretenders to the throne, but also 
including alleged officials and others. 
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it became a veritable success-story, a major cultural topos often taken for a Russian 
specificity. 
 
Well beyond Russia and the Time of Troubles the absence of a legitimate heir to the 
throne was a crucial factor that fuelled major revolts and civil wars. Contemporaries 
became increasingly aware of this factor. They particularly feared periods of 
questionable legitimacy and dubious recognition of a sovereign.30 In the end David 
Hume acknowledged that “on opinion only” government was founded – and this 
would become the practical maxime of the founding fathers in the American 
Revolution where Madison asserted that “all government rests on opinion”. This 
was a “revolutionary” insight against the background of medieval and early-modern 
concepts of divine right as the source of a sovereign’s legitimacy. In political theory 
this mindset emerged only gradually and over the centuries, going along with the 
continuously growing importance of the print media. Of course, governments had 
always depended on their subjects’ belief in the legitimacy of their rule, which 
included amongst others the recognition of a single ruler’s divine rights. Beliefs 
also shaped movements of protest – and this is the focus of the second section 
“Transgression of boundaries as a feat of liberty: Early-modern 
anthropologies of revolt” that deals with revolts as transgression of customary 
boundaries and the representation of these transgressions as markers of early-
modern or even transhistorical anthropologies of revolt. Beliefs could be rather 
stable and a purported anthropological constant, as Yves-Marie Bercé shows for the 
popular ideas of archaic original freedom returning during a vacancy of central 
power. But they could also be highly dynamic, related to a more or less spontaneous 
emotional eruption, borne by the enhancement of communicative space and 
bringing to the fore a particular mass psychology that made social actors take the 
initiative – and the concomitant high risk – of joint violent action, as André 
Berelowitch demonstrates. 
In this sense Yves-Marie Bercé deals with the vacuum of power as a major 
trigger of unrest and revolt. The ancient tradition of suspending law and order in 
times of dynastic uncertainty or transition can be observed in many countries. This 
is hardly astonishing in regard to elective monarchies like Poland-Lithuania, where 
succession was reputed to be a source of ferocious struggle between different 
Szlachta factions and often brought the country to the margin of civil war. At the 
Holy See succession was defined by the conclave in a highly regulated procedure, 
but during almost every sede vacante the “anthropological utopia of a primitive free 
status of humanity” broke through in the towns of the Papal State – with 
                                                 
30 On early-modern ideas on Fama see Andreas Würgler, „Fama und Rumor. Gerücht, 
Aufruhr und Presse im Ancien Régime”, in WerkstattGeschichte 15 (1996): 20–32. 
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plundering, riots and the expectation of the newly nominated Pope’s largesse. In 
contrast to such examples of riotous freedom and self-rule, the French dynasty 
seemed to be firmly established after the religious wars had ended and the 
Bourbons had acceded to the throne. Succession seemed to work smoothly, at least 
until the Revolution of 1789. But Bercé shows that the minority of Louis XIV has 
to be interpreted in a similar way as the events in Poland or Rome, as an almost 
complete eclipse of central power. A closer look reveals how coherent the protest 
movement actually was and how provincial parliaments as well as local peasant 
resistance opposing elite- and popular actions in the capital were choreographed by 
a unique urge of a return to archaic freedom. Once Louis XIV had taken over the 
reigns his ideologists systematically launched an incoherent and rather ridiculous 
picture of elite and popular resistance, while preaching the ineluctability of 
absolutism. This narrative was reproduced approvingly by national historiography 
that was mainly concerned with depicting the glory and might of the French 
monarchy and the teleological story of its emergence. The story seems to have been 
extremely successful as early as in the 1660s when French observers had apparent 
difficulty understanding the Magnates’ rebellion in Poland-Lithuania of 1665-66 
(analysed by Angela Rustemeyer). So they did not find a translation for the Polish 
term Rokosz and the concomitant idea of a “legal rebellion”. It obviously did not 
even come to their mind to call the events a Polish “Fronde”. Turning a blind eye to 
the more or less distinct parallels, they dissimilated the events in Poland from their 
own domestic experience.31 
Like Ingrid Maier and Stepan Shamin, André Berelowitch also deals with the 
representations of the Razin uprising (1770-71) that affected huge parts of the 
Cossack periphery and also included other social strata of Muscovy’s population. 
The uprising was a major challenge to the Muscovite state and encountered a huge 
media response throughout Europe. This was fuelled by Muscovite authorities’ 
propaganda, but also by the rare foreign eye-witnesses such as the Dutchman 
Ludwig Fabritius, who had fallen into the rebellious Cossacks’ hands. Foreign 
revolt reports often tended to paint rebels in a much more favourable light than the 
concerned authorities did. To some degree, this is even true of the Ukrainian 
Cossacks. As Frank Sysyn demonstrates, in the case of most Cossack revolts in 
Russia during the 17th and 18th centuries dissimilation was a leading perceptional 
                                                 
31  This might already go along with a sense of cultural superiority that tended to repudiate 
“the East” as barbarian and backward, and to include Poland into this general notion, alt-
hough for a long time it had been a topos referring to Russia/Muscovy as a “Northern” 
(not an Eastern) country. On the shift from a South-North to a West-East civilizational 
gradient in early-modern mental maps see Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. The 
map of civilization on the mind of the enlightenment (Stanford, California 1994). 
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pattern. Muscovy was generally described as a barbarian (or backward) country. 
Furthermore, Cossacks and other warrior-populations of the Military Frontier 
further to the West (Uskoks, Kuruc, etc.) were highly mobile, partly lived on raids 
and significantly differed from the sedentary norms and moral standards of Middle 
and Western Europe. Muscovite Cossacks (or the Cossacks in Muscovy) rising up 
in revolt were thus a favourite projection surface for dissimilative representations.  
As Berelowitch points out, both in official records and in foreigners’ relations 
Razin and his followers were labelled as “rabble”, “riff-raff”, “curs”, “scoundrels”, 
etc. Even though one can sense some observers’ understanding for serfs and slaves 
who had to suffer their lords’ “tyranny”, the revolt was unmistakably vilified. The 
deeply negative judgments generally extended to anybody who would join the 
movement, notwithstanding particular motives and grievances. Refugees from 
serfdom in the black-earth regions, who gained the steppes, rapidly adapted to a 
Cossack way of life; and in major revolts the insurgent Cossacks proclaimed they 
wanted to impose their own political structures upon the rest of the population. 
Naturally the revolts with their large-scale military campaigns were particularly 
brutal. Therefore the revolting Muscovite Cossacks were easily considered as 
“inhuman”, leading a lifestyle marked by looting, plundering and murdering. The 
foreigners are unanimous in describing the whole Razin movement as an uprising of 
the “populace” that was associated with the Cossacks. Along with the 
representations of the insurgents’ social appearance Berelowitch is interested in the 
trigger of revolt, i.e. the crucial moment that made hitherto loyal subjects join the 
camp of the rebels. People were perfectly conscious of the painful consequences of 
revolt. Making the decisive step implied taking enormous risks. Both mechanist 
explanations like the powder-keg-metaphor, and rational-choice arguments of 
weighing pros and cons seem incongruous. In foreigners’ accounts of the Razin 
uprising, and in representations by the rebels or the authorities themselves, one 
cannot find a really satisfactory answer to the question what mysterious force had 
often made thousands of people change sides in only a few minutes or even 
seconds. “Seduction” and “lure” figure prominently in contemporary 
representations; and often the observers ascribe irrational conduct or even 
“madness” to the insurgents. This incites Berelowitch to more global 
anthropological considerations on the human psyche and the trance-like condition 
individuals assume when fusing with a rebellious mass. Mass psychology à la 
Canetti can instantaneously eclipse rationality, which does not prevent people from 
alleging rational motifs for their acts in retrospective. Early-modern analysts of 
revolt frequently speak of “contagion” to explain the tremendous speed with which 
revolt can spread. In this mass psychological fever Berelowitch sees both an 
ennobling aspect of taking destiny into one’s own hands, and an extremely 
destructive force that was likewise an integral part of these mass-actions: 
bloodthirstiness and mordlust, as the eye-witnesses describe it. With his ambivalent 
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appraisal Berelowitch is not too far from Ortega y Gasset’s ideas as exposed in his 
Revolt of the Masses.  
 
In Poland-Lithuania, where central power was weak, the insurgents were able to 
mobilize considerable communicative resources. Bigger uprisings were not only a 
privileged item of representations abroad, insurgents also activated far-ranging 
contacts and forged international alliances, which played an active role within the 
very uprisings. The third section “Insurgents as Diplomates: Cross-border 
alliances and their Representations” thus focuses on the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. 
Frank Sysyn analyses foreign accounts of the Cossack uprising under the 
leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi in Ukraine (1648-1657). The revolt 
was propelled by one of these classical vacuums of power within the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. Wladislaw IV had more and more retreated from an 
active regiment and then died in May 1648. This provided fertile terrain for 
factional struggles among the aristocratic elites of the country – and factional 
struggle paralyzed the countermeasures against the rebellious Cossacks. Sysyn does 
not limit himself to rather dissimilative standard narratives written by core-
European observers. His contribution centres on two clergymen, the Catholic 
Venetian Alberto Vimina, who visited Ukraine in 1650, and the Syrian Orthodox 
Paul of Aleppo, who was there twice, in 1654 and 1656, together with his father, 
Patriarch Makarios III of Antioch. Especially the Syrian perspective is rather new. 
Both observers, Catholic and Orthodox, embrace the idea of Ukraine as a country of 
abundance and a realm of liberty, though probably for different reasons. 
Remarkably enough, they both acknowledge the movement as legitimate. This is 
not only due to the assumption of a general right to resist against oppression (in this 
case mainly by Polish nobles), but also to the perception of Ukrainian Cossacks as a 
nation of its own, an idea that can be traced back to the 16th century, when the 
Zaporozhians had already been the destination of diplomatic missions. Vimina and 
Paul of Aleppo came to Khmel’nyts’kyi’s Ukraine with diplomatic missions, too. It 
was both the particular nature of their missions and their cultural and confessional 
backgrounds (as well as those of their readers) that made their accounts differ. 
Vimina’s confessional sympathy was naturally rather with the Catholic Poles than 
with the “schismatic” Orthodox Cossacks. Furthermore, to a cultivated Venetian the 
Eastern European people and their manners might have appeared barbarian. But the 
Venetian Republic entertained intense intercultural relations. It was in close contact 
with the Muslim world of the Ottoman Empire, not only through constant warfare, 
but also through economic competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the 
Indian Ocean. Ottoman power inspired awe to Venitian ambassadors. This respect 
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included cultural aspects, too, but the Muslim Empire was definitely regarded as a 
place of difference.32 Orthodox Ukrainian Cossacks were classical allies in the 
struggle against the awesome Sublime Porte. Vimina was charged with rallying 
support against the Ottomans from both the Polish king and the Ukrainian 
Cossacks. This was apparently the main reason why he sought to downplay the 
Cossacks’ religious allegiance as a means of enlisting them in a purported alliance 
with Catholic powers. At the same time, this has certainly inspired his positive view 
of the Cossack polity that he likened to antique Sparta. Thus he revaluated what he 
had sometimes perceived as uncultured crudeness and ascribed native ingenuity and 
wit to the people. This was, of course, an ambiguous undertaking, since Sparta was 
associated with both exemplary soldierly discipline and despotism.33 Paul of Aleppo 
(with his father) tried to raise funds for the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman 
Empire. For him religious purity was a crucial trait of the Cossack realm as a model 
Orthodox society. He drew a clear dividing line between Cossack freedom and 
Polish servitude, between the Polish elites’ anarchy and Ukrainian justice, thus 
partly taking over Western European stereotypes about the Polish elites’ unruliness 
and the Commonwealth’s decline, and partly contradicting prejudices against 
Cossack savagery by idealizing Cossack institutions. Curiously enough, he 
contrasted severe oppression of the Orthodox faith by Poles, Armenians and Jews in 
pre-revolt Ukraine with the religious tolerance he experienced in his homeland, 
where the Ottoman rulers would content themselves with extracting taxes. He rather 
ignored the massacres perpetrated by the Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants against 
Jews, though. What is even more noteworthy, he also expressed his distinct 
preference for Ukraine over Orthodox Muscovy where “a padlock had been set on 
our hearts” during their two-year stay. Whereas Muscovites are described as 
ignorant subjects deliberately complying with their dull fate of servitude, Cossack 
Ukraine under Khmel’nyts’kyi is depicted as blossoming, with a whole population 
striving for literacy and culture. Both, Vimina’s and Paul of Aleppo’s accounts give 
a positive image of the Hetman himself, whom the writers have met personally. But 
if Vimina recommended a military leader as a potential ally to his Venetian 
                                                 
32  On the struggle for supremacy in the Indian Ocean see Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman 
age of exploration (Oxford 2010). On European reverence for Ottoman might before the 
unsuccessful siege of Vienna (1683) see for England Gerald M. MacLean, Looking East. 
English writing and the Ottoman Empire before 1800 (Basingstoke [England], New York 
2007), more particularly for Venetian diplomatic staff cf. Palmira Brummett, „Classifying 
Ottoman Mutiny. The Act and Vision of Rebellion”, in The Turkish Studies Association 
Bulletin 22 (1998): 91–107. 
33  Cf. Paul Cartledge, “Spartan Traditions and Receptions”, Hermathena 181 (In honour of 
George Huxley) (Winter 2006): 41-49. 
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compatriots and furthermore acknowledged his despotic traits and his penchant to 
alcohol, Paul of Aleppo praises him also as an irreproachable monarch with 
unlimited moral qualities.  
For the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising ended 
with the loss of Left-Bank-Ukraine to the Moscovite tsar, who guaranteed the 
Cossacks their hard-won privileges. In the following, the depleted kingdom was 
haunted by further wars, first against Sweden and then against Russia, so that Jan 
Kazimierz’ reign is generally considered as the age of decline for Poland-Lithuania. 
Angela Rustemeyer examines the transnational dimensions of Jerzy 
Lubomirski’s aforementioned rokosz (1665-66) that divided the nobility (szlachta) 
into supporters and adversaries of the reigning king and thus paralyzed the Diet, 
where every member had the right to a liberum veto. Even though she highlights 
foreign observers’ difficulty understanding the very idea of “legal rebellion”, 
Rustemeyer is not in the first place concerned with representations of the 
phenomenon abroad. She rather focuses on how the conflicting parties themselves 
appealed and variously referred to transnational entanglements in the course of their 
inner confrontations. On the one hand foreign support was an important resource; 
on the other hand it could eventually be used as a discrediting argument. However, 
Lubomirski benefited from wide-ranging support, also within the szlachta. He was 
one of the highest-ranking nobles of the realm and could easily have been a 
candidate to the throne himself. It was merely impossible to accuse him of treason 
simply because he enjoyed backup from the Brandenburg elector, since at the same 
time the king drew on support from the elector’s adversary, the noble opposition of 
Brandenburg-Prussia. In the end Jan Kasimierz tried to fight out the conflict on 
juridical ground and accused his adversary of lèse-majesty. This was not less 
problematic, since the Sejm had significantly restricted the extension of this major 
crime in the 16th century. But as Rustemeyer demonstrates, the crucial argument 
brought to the fore by the king’s party was based on a transnational comparison. 
The anti-centralist oppositional confederation was accused to have planned a 
regicide and Lubomirski himself to have been aiming at the office of Lord 
Protector, similar to Cromwell in England. Curiously enough, this allegation echoed 
major propaganda-battles during the French Fronde, where Mazarin’s party accused 
the Frondeurs of imitating the English Parliament’s treason against King Charles. 
Similarly, in his History of the Cossack War against Poland (1663), the Frenchman 
Pierre Chevalier had compared Khmel’nyts’kyi to Cromwell, i.e. at a moment when 
the memory of the Fronde was already neatly disentangled from the English civil 
war. All this shows the enormous impact of the English Revolution on the 
continent, but as an appalling spectre and a ready-made pattern of accusation rather 
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than as a model for real imitation.34 Interestingly, Jan Kazimierz’ party invoked the 
spectre of the English regicide even in its propaganda addressed to the peasants of 
the Podhale region, who were known to be particularly rebellious. This agitation of 
Polish peasants against Lubomirski shows to what extent transnational motifs 
apparently mattered (or were believed to matter) even among the rural lower 
classes, which are generally imagined to have been confined to a narrow local 
horizon. But the very fact of this risky address to the peasants also drew on the 
precedent of the fight against Swedish invasion in 1655 and it is not a coincidence 
that simultaneously the term “civil war” was thrown into public debate. Public 
debate in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth played a crucial role in the conflict 
and it included major players abroad: Apart from Lubomirski himself, who acted 
mostly from his exile in Silesia, Rustemeyer draws attention to the Anti-Trinitarian 
Lubieniecki who offered a particularly “modern” analysis of what was going on 
from his Prussian exile. Instead of interpreting the events in terms of conflicts of 
honour, he emphasized economic aspects and the problem of the Commonwealth’s 
financial dependency upon foreign powers. Sensitive to transnational 
entanglements, he also distinguished clearly between Cossacks and their Tatar 
allies, who were often tarred with the same brush by contemporary observers. 
However, he would not reveal his “heretical” identity: here the “modernity” of the 
Polish-Lithuanian public spheres would have reached its limits. Taking into account 
the high degree of publicity channelled by political communication and negotiation, 
Rustemeyer comes to the conclusion that it was rather its modernity than the 
frequently quoted anachronism of medieval-style noble prerogatives that weakened 
the Polish-Lithuanian state in a period where absolutist tendencies were the 
dominant paradigm in the European environment.  
 
The forth section “Governments struggling with foreign representations of 
internal revolts” introduces a dimension of double reflexivity. Governments were 
not only concerned with suppression of their internal revolts but also feared the 
dissemination of news on the events abroad, which might be damaging to their 
country’s image in international relations. This preoccupation is particularly salient 
in Russia, where the government registered coverage on its internal affairs in 
                                                 
34  On the arguments drawn from the English Civil war during the Fronde see Philip A. 
Knachel, England and the Fronde. The impact of the English Civil War and Revolution 
on France. (Ithaca N.Y. 1967). On Chevalier’s comparison of Khmel’nyts’kyi with 
Cromwell see Christopher Hill, „The English Revolution and the Brotherhood of Man”, 
in Puritanism and Revolution. Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 
17th Century, ed. idem (London 2001), 112–138.  
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Western newspapers and sometimes reacted immediately to representations of 
major revolts.  
Ingrid Maier and Stepan Shamin take the Razin uprising as an initial point. 
Unlike Berelowitch who examines foreigners’ accounts of this uprising as such, 
they analyse the reflection of Western revolt-reports in Russian kuranty of this 
period, i.e. in translations from mainly German and Dutch newspapers for the 
Tsar’s court.35 The kuranty indicate how the Muscovite government wanted, and 
how it did not want to have its country presented to a European public in this period 
of major internal crisis. At the same time the translations mirror a particular interest 
in contemporary events of contestation abroad. Since the translations for the end of 
1670 and the beginning of 1671 are entirely lost, Maier and Shamin focus on the 
period between March and July 1671, for which the kuranty seem to be complete. 
At that time the uprising had almost come to an end: in April Razin was handed 
over to the authorities by his closest Cossacks followers. But this did not stop 
rumours and many Western newspapers continued to report on the movement’s 
alleged successes. Much of the Russian reception of these reports was motivated by 
a preoccupation with the possible abasement of the Tsar’s might. Apparently the 
Muscovite government specifically collected erroneous foreign reports on Razin, in 
order to use them as a means of pressure in diplomatic negotiations, particularly 
towards Sweden. Translators even omitted insertions qualifying the related news-
item as “rumours” that were “not believed to be true”. Occasionally, though, Maier 
and Shamin have discovered detailed and astonishingly accurate accounts that 
betray considerable insider knowledge. Due to the noticeable delay with which the 
events are reported, they presume that these accounts must have been delivered to 
the foreign newspapers by Muscovite authorities in order to actively correct current 
misrepresentations. With regard to revolts abroad, those of concern for Russian 
foreign policy were apparently the activities of the Ukrainian Cossacks under 
hetman Doroshenko that figured prominently in translations. Their alliance with the 
Ottoman Porte was of immediate importance, not only for Poland-Lithuania, but 
                                                 
35  Both Ingrid Maier and Stepan Shamin are major specialists in these handwritten transla-
tions. Maier has coedited the last published volume to date. In contrast to the preceding 
ones, it consists of two parts, one with the translations from the Moscow state archives, 
the other one with the text of the original Western newspapers reports, from which the 
translations/paraphrases have apparently been drawn from. Since the sources were neither 
indicated nor conserved together with the translations, she had to search for the original 
newspapers in innumerable libraries and archives throughout Europe. Thanks to this tre-
mendous work she is able to compare the texts and thus follow the translators’ choice, 
preferences, omissions, errors, biaises. See Ingrid Majer and Sergej I. Kotkov, Vesti-
Kuranty. 1656g., 1660-1662gg., 1664-1670gg. (Moscow 2009). 
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also for Muscovy that risked losing Left-Bank Ukraine anew. Further away was the 
Magnate conspiracy in Hungary against Habsburg rule (1670/71). Since the rebels, 
however, also tried to mobilize Ottoman support for their aims, the kuranty 
diligently covered the events. Ottoman engagement in Poland-Lithuania and/or in 
Hungary was likely to deflect military ambitions from Muscovy. Other revolts that 
were farther away from Muscovite immediate interests showed to be items of 
curiosity, but were covered in a more stereotyped manner that did not allow a 
precise conception of what was actually happening. In the case of the Braunschweig 
citizens’ desperate resistance against the Duke of Lüneburg’s encroachments 
against their city’s traditional liberties, the kuranty only reproduced the Duke’s 
medial propaganda that presented the commoners as rebelling against their lawful 
sovereign. According to Maier and Shamin this misconception of the situation in 
the Reich rather corresponded to the legal status of Muscovite towns since the 
extinction of Novgorod’s and Pskov’s autonomy in the late 15th and early 16th 
century.  
In my own contribution I follow up Muscovite/Russian preoccupation with its 
image abroad and with foreign representation of its internal revolts. I try to view 
foreign accounts of Russian revolts in a long-term perspective, in order to point out 
a major shift of paradigms that apparently occurred in the early years of Peter’s I 
reign. The abundance of such accounts of Russian revolts in the 17th century 
contrasts glaringly with their scarcity in the 18th, which is even more astonishing 
since in general the Russian Empire of Peter the Great and his successors was much 
more a focus of Western interest than the pre-Petrine Muscovite state. This 
observation makes the diplomatic scandal revolving around the publication of 
Johann Georg Korb’s diary in Vienna (1701) a cornerstone of my investigation. 
Korb depicts the last strel’tsy rebellion and narrates subsequent mass repressions in 
great detail because he had witnessed them during the embassy’s journey to 
Moscow in 1698/99. As soon as Russian diplomats and Peter I got wind of the 
book, they tried everything they could to have it prohibited. When diplomatic 
pressure failed, they staged a book-burning with all the copies they could get hold 
of. On the one hand I analyse the reasons and context of this harsh reaction. Since 
central descriptions of the mass repressions had been previously published in 
newspapers and journals that were systematically screened by the translators of the 
Foreign office, I argue that the visual representation of torture and mass executions 
(on a copperplate enclosed in the book) was a major bone of contention. Therefore 
the conflict also needs to be regarded as a clash of two fundamentally different 
visual cultures and, in a way, as a cultural misunderstanding, since author, 
illustrator and publisher were hardly aware of provoking the Muscovite 
government. On the other hand, the exchange of letters between Russian officials 
and the head of the imperial embassy (which was held responsible for the book) 
reveals a considerable revaluation of (foreign) public opinion by the Russian 
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government. From that time on it was not only the foreign policy-makers’ image of 
Russia that mattered, but also the broader public’s views. This shift led to a new 
media policy with the creation of the Vedomosti (the first so-called newspaper in 
Russia) and the installation of Russian agents abroad, whose task was both to 
intervene against undesirable coverage (at best before publication) and to provide 
the foreign press with “correct” information about Russia. Even though Emperor 
Leopold I had not succumbed to diplomatic pressure concerning Korb’s book, the 
scandal and accompanying measures had a long-lasting effect on foreign writings 
on Russia. Traces of social unrest became scarce and authors tended more and more 
to distort and minimize the few events they continued to mention. Once threatening 
and dreadful, revolts were increasingly interpreted as manifestations of 
backwardness contrasting with the progressive civilizing mission propelled by 
enlightened tsars.  
 
The depiction of punishment that plays a crucial part in the case of the Korb scandal 
is also at the heart of the fifth section “Revolts as political crime: Legal concepts 
and public representation”, which analyses representations of revolts from a legal 
perspective.36 Therefore Fabrizio Dal Vera’s and Karl Härter’s contributions deal 
with the emergent concept of political crime in contemporary legal thinking and 
with visual representations of retribution as an integral part of legal representation.  
Fabrizio Dal Vera investigates the elaboration of the early-modern concept of 
political crime referring to collective violence against political authorities. Since the 
escalation of unrests in the late 14th century, we witness an ongoing process of 
criminalization of seditions that led legal scholars to systematize the legal questions 
involved. Under the immediate impression of such collective violence, jurists 
developed the legal tradition in order to define a crimen seditionis functional to the 
actual turbulent situation. Embracing the methodological approach suggested by a 
legal history based on evolutionary theory, Dal Vera traces the development of the 
term seditio in legal and political treatises and dissertationes published on this 
problem from the beginning of the 16th until the end of the 17th century. During the 
16th century jurists elaborated an extensive definition of crimen seditionis – strongly 
                                                 
36  Another volume on the reactions of legal systems to revolts, going back to a conference 
at the Max-Planck Institute for legal history in Frankfurt is currently in print. See Re-
volten und politische Verbrechen vom 12.-19. Jahrhundert. Reaktionen der Rechtssyste-
me und juristisch-politische Diskurse/ Rivolte e crimini politici tra XII e XIX secolo: 
Reazioni del sistema giuridico e discorso giuridico-politico. (Studien zur europäischen 
Rechtsgeschichte.). (Frankfurt am Main forthcoming). I have contributed an article deal-
ing with the thesis of juridicization (Verrechtlichung) as a long-term consequence of re-
volts. 
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associated with proditio and rebellio – and understood any form of collective 
violence as a violation of maiestas. In the following century, they developed a more 
nuanced representation of crime that differentiated between a wider range of violent 
behaviors in order to classify them with respect to the extent of their dangerousness 
for inner stability. Consequently, jurists defined different gradi of sedition that were 
not always related to crimen laesae maiestatis. They also applied to minor unrests 
punished as cimen vis. The study of legal doctrine shows how the definition of 
crimen seditionis was embedded in more general political conjunctures and closely 
related to broader political theory. In contrast to that, previous doctrine had 
provided legal justifications of ad hoc-measures toward ongoing episodes of urban 
and agrarian unrest. The advent of political realism and new theories on ratio status 
in Machiavelli’s footsteps largely influenced the legal understanding of seditions: to 
prevent disorders jurists made greater efforts to precisely analyse the organization 
of dissent. For that they built on examples of revolts both at home and abroad. This 
realist approach partially modified and enriched the definition of crime, which had 
a long-lasting impact on practical implementation of both repressive and preventive 
strategies with regard to concrete unrests. The taxonomies of collective violence 
and the recommended remedies are inscribed in an international development of 
legal doctrine on political crimes. Jurists in different countries shared a common 
legal background, used the same concepts and quoted the works of their 
predecessors, regardless of territorial borders or even confessional allegiances. 
Moreover, they continuously referred to insurrections all over Europe and their joint 
efforts produced a common representation of inner turbulences in early-modern 
times. 
If jurists in their academic ivory-towers were able to discuss revolts more or 
less freely, the authorities concerned were much more reluctant to commemorate 
the events that challenged their rule. This is reflected in the brutal scenes of public 
retribution and their dissemination through the print media. Descriptions of 
punishment tended to eclipse the actual revolt, which was classified as a political 
crime. 
Karl Härter explores the representations of early modern revolts in illustrated 
broadsheets, a genre that could even be “read” by the illiterate and thereby 
constituted an important addition to purely textual representations. Both pictures 
and the accompanying texts focused on punishment, whereas the revolt itself was 
often ignored or summed up in a very short and distorted version. In this sense the 
broadsheet-representations are part of a whole juridical arsenal of condemnation. 
Prosecution of political crime went along with damnatio memoriae of the very 
event of the revolt. Especially the authorities tried to obliterate memory of any just 
causes of the revolt. Härter studies broadsheet-coverage of exemplary revolts of 
three different categories and presents the Fettmilch-uprising in Frankfurt/Main in 
1614-16 as an implementation of urban revolt. The resistance of the Bohemian 
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nobility against the Emperor in 1621 and the Magnate conspiracy in Hungary are 
shown as examples of aristocratic revolts; and the Bavarian upheaval of 1705 
against the Habsburgs and the uprising led by Horea and Kloska in Hungary in 
1785 demonstrate common patterns of peasant revolts. Interestingly, these different 
social classes and their quite different resources in terms of societal weight and 
access to public space are hardly reflected in the representation of their crimes in 
the media. Broadsheet production seems to be dominated by the authorities and 
their interpretation of the events as political crimes, at least as far as 
commemoration or retrospective representation is concerned. Often the verdict is 
related to the accusation of conspiracy and collaboration with foreign powers, in the 
case of the revolts in the Reich mainly collaboration with France and/or the 
Ottoman Empire. This important transnational feature in representation of revolts 
underlined the idea of treason and made brutal execution with loss of personal 
honor and property an ineluctable consequence that was deemed necessary to re-
establish public order and justice. However, representational patterns were not 
identical: while the revolt was still going on, it was described in a different way 
than after it had been suppressed and the ringleaders publicly executed. When the 
rebels themselves managed to issue broadsheets, these prints naturally differed 
significantly from those issued by the authorities. But in this phase the authorities’ 
broadsheet-propaganda, too, conveyed a certain flexibility that suggested scope for 
compromise, negotiation and by the same token for reinterpretation of the situation. 
People were more or less invited to change sides. This changed fundamentally once 
the revolt had come to an end and ringleaders publicly executed. Now the revolt 
was being described in black and white: former flexibility was erased. It was 
exclusively the point of just punishment that was put to the fore. In this sense, the 
illustrated broadsheets analysed by Karl Härter correspond to Yves-Marie Bercé’s 
observation made for the Fronde in France, where all former attempts to come to an 
arrangement, also through public representation of what was going on, were 
ignored after the defeat of the Frondeurs.37 However, besides authoritarian 
censorship Härter also hints at the commercial interests of the publishers who had 
to sell their production and were dependent on the curiosity of the readers and 
spectators.  
This commercial aspect was probably more developed in the Reich than it was 
in France under Louis XIV, where the political imperative was paramount and 
printers independent of the state’s domain of control could only be found abroad 
                                                 
37  Commemoration under Louis XIV.'s reign was paradigmatically symbolized by Gilles 
Guérin's statue of the king crushing underfoot a Frondeur, or rather the Fronde as such. 
For a reproduction and interpretation see Peter Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV 
(Yale 1994): 54. 
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(mainly in the Netherlands and partly in Geneva and Neufchatel). In spite of the 
emperor’s overarching position in the Reich, censorship was mainly exercised on 
the level of the principalities. For this reason, publishers from cities or realms that 
had not been struck by a revolt would sometimes depict the events in adjacent 
territories differently, as it was the case for a broadsheet on the Fettmilch uprising 
published in Darmstadt, where one of the ringleaders had sought refuge. What 
broadsheets from Frankfurt depicted as a dangerous revolt spurred by four 
demonized ringleaders was represented as a quarrel for the true Christian faith 
elsewhere (the uprising was largely directed against the Frankfurt Jews). In the pro-
revolt accounts, the leaders are portrayed as respectable burghers and ordinary 
sinners.  
The cross-border perspective is thus an important dimension which has 
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1) REPORTING FROM ABROAD 
Pointing to the Hundred Years’ War and its manifold political, social and cultural 
consequences, one could easily argue for an albeit hostile but nonetheless strong 
connection between the kingdoms of England and France in the later Middle Ages. 
Since 1337 English kings were trying to take hold of the French crown and to 
secure their possessions on the continent, which led to more than a century of 
interrupted warfare and deeply affected the societies on both sides of the channel. 
As the war more than once lay at the roots of popular unrest in these countries,1 
there should have been a good deal of cross-border reporting of insurgency in Eng-
land and France, making the period an ideal field of research for the transnational 
representation of pre-modern revolts. 
The findings, however, are surprisingly few in number. They are almost 
exclusively restricted to chronicle sources and even there cannot be said to abound.2 
                                                 
1  This has been pointed out for the Jacquerie, the 1380s' tax rebellions, the Peasants' Revolt 
and for the rising of Jack Cade and will hold for even more revolts in the period; see, for 
example, R. W. Kaeuper, War, Justice, and Public Order. England and France in the La-
ter Middle Ages (Oxford, 1988), 349-60; L. Mirot, Les insurrections urbaines au début 
du règne de Charles VI (1380-1383): Leurs causes, leurs conséquences (Paris, 1905), 7-
9; I. M. W. Harvey, Jack Cade's Rebellion of 1450 (Oxford, 1991), 53-64. 
2  Outside the chronicles we know of only a single case from England or France, namely an 
allusion to the French Jacquerie in a petition of the English Commons in 1377; see The 
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Combing through more than eighty chronicles from the late fourteenth and early 
fifteenth century, we have only been able to find some fifteen examples of popular 
revolt in England and France being reported by authors from the other side of the 
channel. English accounts have survived for the Jacquerie of 1358,3 the urban tax 
revolts of the early 1380s4 and the risings in Normandy fifty years later;5 French 
texts include the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381,6 the risings against the Ricardian Earls 
in 14007 and the disturbances surrounding the Kentish rebellion of 1450.8 As none 
of these movements has been recorded by more than three chroniclers from the 
other country, we can speak of a fairly even distribution of transnational coverage 
                                                                                                            
Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., 16 vols. 
(London, 2005), 6: 47. Further examples are from the German Hanse [two letters report-
ing the English risings of 1381 and 1450] and from Venice [a decree of the senate con-
cerning the 1450 revolt]; cf. F. Pedersen, “The German Hanse and the Peasants' Revolt of 
1381”, BIHR 57 (1984): 92-98; Hanserecesse von 1431-1476, ed. G. von der Ropp, 7 
vols. (Leipzig, 1876-1892), 3: 506-10; Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 38 vols. (Lon-
don, 1864-1947), 1: 74. 
3  Sir Thomas Gray, Scalacronica 1272-1363, ed. A. King (Woodbridge, 2005), 152-5, 164-
165, 168-169; The Anonimalle Chronicle 1333 to 1381, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Manchester, 
1927), 41-43. 
4  The St Albans Chronicle: The Chronica Maiora of Thomas Walsingham, ed. J. Taylor, 
W. R. Childs and L. Watkiss, Oxford Medieval Texts, ed. J. W. Binns et al. (Oxford, 
2003), 1: 390-395, 652-655; Historia Vitae et Regni Ricardi Secundi, ed. G. B. Stow 
(Philadelphia, 1977), 60; John Capgrave, The Chronicle of England, ed. F. C. Hingeston, 
Rolls Series (London, 1858), 235-236. 
5  Chronicles of London, ed. C. L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1905), 137-140. 
6  Œuvres de Froissart, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 26 vols. (Brussels, 1867-1877), 9: 386-
424; Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, ed. M. L. Bellaguet, 6 vols. (Paris, 1839-
1852), 1: 132-135, 256-259; Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de 
la France, ed. J. F. Michaud and J. J. F. Poujoulat, 32 vols. (Paris, 1836-1839), 2: 348, 
358. 
7  Chronicque de la Traïson et Mort de Richart Deux Roy Dengleterre, ed. B. Williams 
(London, 1846), 77-103, 229-261; Religieux de Saint-Denys, 2:734-738; Œuvres de 
Froissart, 16: 221-219. Jean Creton, “French Metrical History of the Deposition of King 
Richard the Second”, ed. J. Webb, Archaeologia 20 (1824): 1-423, 209-216, 400-407 
does not mention popular agency here. 
8  Thomas Basin, Histoire de Charles VII, ed. C. Samaran, 2 vols. (Paris, 1964-1965), 
2: 60-64, 166-168; Histoire de Charles VII. Roy de France, ed. D. Godefroy (Paris, 
1661), 448-449, 602-604. 
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in our period.9 Such numbers, to be sure, are quite considerable compared to the 
reports from or about other countries like Italy or the Empire,10 but the interest in 
Flemish insurgency, both in England and in France, appears to have been a good 
deal higher than any mutual notice of revolt in the two kingdoms.11 To understand 
this relative scarcity of findings we first have to consider the conditions of cross-
border representation in late medieval chronicles and annals. 
Putting aside the traditional distinction between ‘chronicles’ and ‘histories’, 
which had lost most of its strictness by the fourteenth century anyway,12 a 
chronicler in the late Middle Ages was primarily concerned with recording events. 
He usually provided the continuation of an older chronicle and relied on other 
writers for what happened before living memory, so that his major contribution, 
apart from collecting the sources, was to relate contemporary history.13 The focus of 
medieval historiography varied to a considerable degree, ranging from domestic or 
urban history to regional and national history, all of which could include passages 
                                                 
9  The French accounts, however, outnumber those from England by nine to six. 
10  See, for example, Chronicon Adæ de Usk A.D. 1377-1421, ed. E. M. Thompson, 2nd edn. 
(London, 1904), 99-100, 276-277 [Rome 1405]; Capgrave, Chronicle of England, 242 
[Austria 1386]; Matteo Villani, Cronica. Con la continuazione di Filippo Villani, ed. G. 
Porta, 2 vols. (Parma, 1995), 2: 185, 214-216, 274-275 [Paris 1358]; Mercanti Scrittori. 
Ricordi nella Firenze tra Medioevo e Rinascimento, ed. V. Branca (Milan, 1986), 383-
385 [Paris 1381]. 
11  Thus, a single Flemish rising like the rebellion in Ghent led by Philip de Artevelde could 
get the attention of at least nine chroniclers from England and France; see Œuvres de 
Froissart, 9: 158-236, 341-378, 431-445; 10: 1-175; Religieux de Saint-Denys, 1: 108-
119, 168-231; Chronique des quatre premiers Valois, ed. S. Luce (Paris, 1862), 284-290, 
294, 302-308; Chronique du Mont-Saint-Michel (1343-1468), ed. S. Luce, 2 vols. (Paris, 
1879-1883), 1: 14; Nouvelle Collection, 2: 346-348, 351-356; St Albans Chronicle, 
1: 314-317, 376-379, 604-609, 650-653; Historia Vitae et Regni, 55, 60, 71, 76; The 
Westminster Chronicle 1381-1394, ed. L. C. Hector and B. F. Harvey, Oxford Medieval 
Texts, ed. C. N. L. Brooke et al. (Oxford, 1982), 24-27; Eulogium (Historiarum Sive 
Temporis), ed. F. S. Haydon, Rolls Series, 3 vols. (London, 1858-1863), 3: 355.  
12  B. Guenée, “Histoire, annales, chroniques. Essai sur les genres historiques au Moyen 
Age”, Annales ESC 28 (1973): 997-1016, 1008, 1015; cf. J. Taylor, English Historical 
Literature in the Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1987), 37-39; N. Bulst, “›Jacquerie‹ und 
›Peasants' Revolt‹ in der französischen und englischen Chronistik”, in Geschichts-
schreibung und Geschichtsbewußtsein im späten Mittelalter, ed. H. Patze (Sigmaringen, 
1987), 791-819, 795. 
13  Cf. Taylor, Historical Literature, 40-42; C. Given-Wilson, Chronicles: The Writing of 
History in Medieval England (Hambledon & London, 2004), 59-60. 
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on what may be called “general” or even “international history”.14 Even more 
versatile in their outlook were biographers and chivalric historians, for they wrote 
about the deeds of people, and these moved freely through regions and countries. 
Nevertheless, the internal history of foreign countries was not on top of the list of 
medieval historiography. With a few notable exceptions, it focused on events at 
home and only occasionally looked for news from across the borders. 
But what made medieval chroniclers write about an incident from abroad? This, 
it appears, was a question of attention as well as of interest. First of all, the author 
must have got wind of the event and been sufficiently impressed not to dismiss it 
without further consideration. The incident, in other words, must have caught his 
attention. Arguing from the cases in our sample, there often seems to have been 
some kind of impulse, like first-hand experience or personal shock, which led to the 
insertion of foreign material into an account. The monk of St. Denis probably 
would not have noted the rising of 1381, if not for his presence in England at the 
time of the revolt and the indignation he felt when he learned about the way the in-
surgents had treated their archbishop’s head.15 Closer still to the revolt he recorded 
was Adam of Usk, for when in 1405 the people of Rome rose against Pope Innocent 
VII, he was working for the papal see and therefore barely escaped the public anger 
himself.16 Eyewitnesses, then, seem to be the most likely candidates for the cross-
border representation of insurgency.  
However, attention was not the only condition for a popular revolt to be 
reported abroad. There had to be interest as well, in those involved in the incident, 
in its background and consequences, in the implications of the episode. This goes 
beyond the mere focus of a text, for a chronicler will only be interested in a foreign 
event if it can be useful for his narrative, if it has entertaining, explanatory or 
                                                 
14  Cf. Given-Wilson, Chronicles, 93-97 for the focus of institutional writers. A distinctly 
universal outlook can be found in universal chronicles, but these were mainly concerned 
with earlier periods of history; Taylor, Historical Literature, 40. 
15  Religieux de Saint-Denys, 1: 134: “Michi causam ecclesie nostre in hoc regno 
promoventi, cum indignanter audirem ipsa die per ville bivia illius archiepiscopi capud 
sacratum plebem pedibus huc illucque projecisse, unusque assistencium diceret: “Scias 
in regno Francie abhominabiliora futura et in brevi,” hoc solum subjunxi: “Absit ut Gal-
lie continuata fidelitas tanto monstro deformetur!”. For an English translation see S. K. 
Cohn, Popular Protest in Late Medieval Europe: Italy, France, and Flanders (Manches-
ter, 2004), 277. 
16  Chronicon Adæ de Usk, xxv, 99: “Que dies illa presencium compilatori dies erat ire, 
calamitatis et miserie, quia, usque ad ligulas spoliatus, vix cum vita, in habitu fratrum 
predicatorum per octo dies latitans, vix eorum tirannidem evasit.” He was, in fact, a per-
sonal friend of the pope. 
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rhetorical potential. The Jacquerie must have been a “good story” to the compiler of 
the Anonimalle Chronicle, a story related to the world of chivalry like most of the 
other foreign accounts he included in his narrative.17 Thomas Basin had other 
reasons to write about the English rebellion of 1450, for he regarded the 
disturbances as a result of the expulsion of the English from Aquitaine and his 
native Normandy.18 Of course, the revolts in these examples had also caught the 
attention of the authors, but it was a combination of attention and interest that was 
decisive for their transnational representation.  
These considerations might help to explain the relative dearth of cross-border 
representation in our sources. In his study of popular protest in medieval Europe, 
Sam Cohn has pointed out that there was hardly any international coverage of the 
now most famous late medieval risings – the Ciompi, the Jacquerie and the 
Peasants’ Revolt. By contrast, at least fourteen non-Roman authors recorded the 
riots in Rome in 1378 to enforce the election of an Italian pope.19 As it comes as no 
surprise that writers all across Europe should be informed of as well as interested in 
the forced election of a pope, it must have been mainly interest that was lacking for 
the other risings. A parliamentary petition of 1377 proves that the Jacquerie was 
well-known in England at the time,20 but only two English chroniclers bothered to 
report this event from abroad.21 Others obviously saw no reason to do so, either 
because it did not fit in or because it was of no use for their narratives. And this, it 
appears, will have been primarily due to the fact that the Jacquerie did not affect 
European politics the same way the Roman rising did, and that the Jacques were not 
established political players like the Flemish rebels contemporary historians so 
loved to write about.22 
However, neither their prevalence in contemporary chronicles nor the 
conditions for their being included make for the real significance of these cross-
border reports of revolt. To fully appreciate their transnational character in our 
                                                 
17  Cf. Anonimalle Chronicle, xxxiii, xxxviii; see also A. Gransden, Historical Writing in 
England, 2 vols. (Ithaca, 1974-1982), 2: 112. 
18  Basin, Histoire, 2:166: “Quales autem quantique civiles et domestici tumultus atque 
motus, postquam Normannia primum deinde Aquitania pulsi fuerunt, inter Anglos in suo 
regno oborti sint, non ab re fuerit neque impertinens si hoc loco aliquid de rebus hujus-
cemodi retulerimus.” 
19  S. K. Cohn, Lust for Liberty. The Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200-
1425: Italy, France, and Flanders (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 2. 
20  Parliament Rolls, 6: 47; cf. R. B. Dobson, The Peasants' Revolt of 1381, 2nd edn. (Lon-
don, 1983), 75, 77. 
21  Gray, Scalacronica, 152-155; Anonimalle Chronicle, 41-42. 
22  Cf. Cohn, Popular Protest, 4, 265-266 for the Flemish rebels and their political standing. 
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considerations, we have to look at the particularities of their representation of 
foreign insurgency, both compared to the picture of those risings painted by native 
chroniclers and to their own depiction of insurgency at home. In this way it should 
be possible to shed some light on the influence an author’s origin had on the way he 
wrote about popular revolts in another country. And, since in our case the country 
he was writing about was at war with the country he was coming from, there could 
well emerge some alternating sympathies for rebels and authorities at home and 
abroad. 
2) ALTERNATING SYMPATHIES 
The depiction of popular insurgency in medieval chronicles was usually 
characterized by a strong hostility towards the rebels and their causes. Most of the 
authors were coming from – and writing for – the social elite, which held the 
agitated populace with contempt and greatly feared the frenzy of the insurrectionary 
crowd. This general attitude was shared by chroniclers all across Europe, and one 
will hardly find any narrative source openly siding with the insurgents. 
Nevertheless, there could still be significant differences in the representation of 
revolt. Comparing the chronicle pictures of the Jacquerie and of the Peasants’ Re-
volt in England and France, Neithard Bulst has pointed to different traditions of 
perceiving and portraying social conflict in these countries. French chroniclers 
tended to fall back upon stereotypes and tropes, even denying the rebels any sense 
of reason in some cases, while their English counterparts gave much more attention 
to an accurate and detailed description of what they were writing about, and were 
much more interested in the causes of the events.23 
These contrasting ways of representing revolt are also reflected in the cross-
border reports of the Jacquerie and the Peasants’ Revolt. There is one chronicle in 
each country covering both of them, the Anonimalle Chronicle in England and Jean 
Froissart’s Chroniques in France. Rather surprisingly, both texts seem to follow the 
French model for the French revolt and the English pattern for the English rising. 
Thus, the Anonimalle Chronicle has a detailed and fairly balanced account of the 
                                                 
23  Cf. Bulst, ›Jacquerie‹ und ›Peasants' Revolt‹, 813-819. For the chronicle representation of 
these risings see also M.-T. de Medeiros, Jacques et chroniqueurs: Une étude comparée 
de récits contemporains relatant la Jacquerie de 1358 (Paris, 1979); Bommersbach, 
Gewalt in der Jacquerie, 46-81, 71-79; P. Strohm, Hochon's Arrow: The Social Imagina-
tion of Fourteenth-Century Texts (Princeton, 1992), 34-51; H. Hinck, “Das zeitgenössi-
sche Bild der englischen Rebellen von 1381 und ihres aufständischen Handelns” (MA 
thesis, Bielefeld University, 2005). 
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Peasants’ Revolt, but its report of the Jacquerie is primarily focused on the 
atrocities of the rebels, showing no interest whatsoever in their motives or in the 
causes of their rising.24 With Jean Froissart it is just the same: he offers an albeit 
prejudiced but nonetheless valuable account of the English rising, but is only 
concerned with the rebels’ cruelty and beastliness in his influential version of the 
French revolt.25 However, this curious manner of following the representational 
conventions of the country written about is not shared by a third cross-border 
reporter of these risings, the Englishman Sir Thomas Gray. His brief account of the 
French Jacquerie is an essentially English one: despite reproducing some of the 
stereotypes it takes a much more sober approach and does not try to vilify the 
insurgents beyond measure.26 
But how can we account for these different ways of representing revolt at home 
and abroad? In the cases at hand it will have been largely a matter of sources. Both 
Froissart and the author of the Anonimalle Chronicle seem to have drawn on 
sources from abroad for their cross-border reports of revolt, importing the “foreign 
style” of representation in this way. The account of the Jacquerie included in the 
Anonimalle Chronicle has much in common with the so-called “chivalric version” 
found in the chronicles of Jean le Bel and Jean Froissart,27 but it also provides some 
distinctive new material not known from any other text on the rising. It therefore 
appears that the English compiler had access to an unknown report of the Jacquerie 
which was in some way related to the chivalric texts from abroad.28 Froissart 
himself, by contrast, relied on oral evidence for his account of the Peasants’ 
Revolt.29 That he, almost exclusively among the chroniclers, cared to distinguish 
between an essentially good-hearted majority of insurgents and the “great venom” 
                                                 
24  Anonimalle Chronicle, 41-42, 133-151; cf. Bulst, ›Jacquerie‹ und ›Peasants' Revolt‹, 807; 
Cohn, Popular Protest, 144, 172-173. Cohn's translation, however, has to be approached 
with caution. 
25  Œuvres de Froissart, 6: 44-58; 9: 386-424; cf. Bulst, ›Jacquerie‹ und ›Peasants' Revolt‹, 
812-813. Most of the account of the Jacquerie was copied from Jean le Bel, but Froissart 
introduced some variants in the second and third redactions of his chronicles; cf. Cohn, 
Popular Protest, 143, 150-158; Gransden, Historical Writing, 2: 89-92. 
26  Gray, Scalacronica, 152-155, 168-169; cf. Bulst, ›Jacquerie‹ und ›Peasants' Revolt‹, 815. 
27  For the “version chevaleresque” see Medeiros, Jacques et chroniqueurs, 26–27, 45–46. 
28  Cf. Anonimalle Chronicle, xxxviii; Bulst, ›Jacquerie‹ und ›Peasants' Revolt‹, 807-808. 
For the chronicle in general see Gransden, Historical Writing, 2: 110-113; Taylor, Histor-
ical Literature, 133-147. 
29  Cf. Gransden, Historical Writing, 2: 91; Taylor, Historical Literature, 321; Given-Wilson, 
Chronicles, 11. 
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leading the rebel forces,30 for the most part may have been a literary decision. But it 
also shows his closeness to the English government, for this had adopted a similar 
perspective by pardoning all but the “principal leaders and exciters” of the rising.31 
No such connections were entertained by Thomas Gray, who based his account 
of the Jacquerie on oral testimony as well. Taking part in an expedition to France 
just a year after the events, he will have collected his evidence on the spot and thus 
was able to produce a relatively independent version of the revolt for his 
chronicle.32 The independence of his report becomes apparent in the lack of any 
overstated attempt to scandalize the Jacques or to idealize their opponent, the 
French nobility. Gray’s account is remarkably balanced and favours neither the 
nobles, who were his peers and shared the chivalric values of his writing, nor the 
rebels, who had risen against those he was fighting as an English soldier. It must 
have been his position as an outsider to the conflict that enabled him to maintain 
such a neutral view. Had he been directly involved in the events, either as a victim 
of the rising or as a participant in its suppression, the tenor of his report might have 
turned out quite differently. It is most unfortunate that he did not live to see the 
English commons rise against their betters in 1381, so that we will never know how 
Gray would have portrayed the insurgents in his own country.33  
This we do know in another case, and a comparison of the reports of insurgency 
at home and abroad reveals some fundamental differences that cannot be explained 
by the sources. The author in question is Thomas Walsingham, a monastic 
chronicler from St. Albans, who wrote about the Peasants’ Revolt as an eyewitness 
and is famous for his strong hostility towards the English rebels.34 What is less 
well-known, however, is that he also included an account of the Parisian tax 
disturbances in his chronicle.35 The difference between these reports could not be 
more striking. While heaping abuse after abuse on the English rebels, Walsingham 
                                                 
30  Œuvres de Froissart, 9: 404-406; for the “great venom” (li grans venins) see ibid., 406. 
Apparently, Froissart even had some sympathy for the simple ones; see ibid., 397, 400. A 
similar distinction can be found in the Anonimalle Chronicle, 137; cf. Hinck, Das zeit-
genössische Bild, 22, 37-38. 
31  Cf. Parliament Rolls, 6: 222-224, 240-247; Dobson, Peasants' Revolt, 325-333. 
32  Gransden, Historical Writing, 2: 96; Bulst, ›Jacquerie‹ und ›Peasants' Revolt‹, 806-807. 
33  For Gray and his work in general see Gransden, Historical Writing, 2: 92-96; Taylor, 
Historical Literature, 171-174. 
34  St Albans Chronicle, 1: 410-563; cf. ibid., lxxxv-xcii; Bulst, ›Jacquerie‹ und ›Peasants' 
Revolt‹, 809-10. 
35  St Albans Chronicle, 1: 390-395, 652-655. Cohn should have included this account in his 
collection. 
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completely refrains from judging the insurgents in Paris.36 He may not be too 
comfortable with the fury and the violence of the crowd, but this is nothing 
compared to the indignation he expresses at the attacks occurring in England. The 
villain of his account, therefore, is not the rebellious people of Paris, it is the King 
of France, who is “proud and arrogant” after his victory in Flanders and resorts to 
deceit and cruelty to regain control of the city.37 The distribution of sympathy in 
this cross-border report and in the account of the rising at home is completely 
reversed: Walsingham clearly despises the English rebels but apparently favours the 
French ones. 
Walsingham’s account of the Parisian disturbances is significant for yet another 
reason. The author pays much attention to the grievances of the rebels, the 
recapitulation of which even dominates his report. Starting with the usual reference 
to royal taxation, the complaints then move into a rather unexpected direction not to 
be found in any French version of the events. They focus on the country’s defences, 
for in the eyes of the protesters these had not improved despite all the money 
collected from the people. Most importantly, the taxes had been wasted on a useless 
nobility, which, with the English rampant in the kingdom, was shamefully hiding in 
its castles instead of fighting the enemy.38 Walsingham’s emphasis on the 
cowardice and futility of the French nobles is curiously misplaced in this context, 
for it rather belongs to the background of the Jacquerie than to the situation of the 
early 1380s. And when the author in the end even has his rebels threatening to 
defect to the English, “whom they knew would rule them more gently than their 
natural French lords,”39 it becomes clear that this list of grievances is English war 
propaganda laid into the mouths of French insurgents.40 
To indicate that a king had lost the favour of his people was not an uncommon 
form of propaganda in the Middle Ages. Lancastrian authors also employed it 
against Richard II, and they did not fail to notice that it was by popular agency that 
                                                 
36  For his attacks on the English rebels cf. Hinck, Das zeitgenössische Bild, 39-50. 
37  St Albans Chronicle, 1: 652-655. 
38  St Albans Chronicle, 1: 390-393. 
39  St Albans Chronicle, 1: 392: “quin pocius, relictis suo rege et proceribus, qui continue 
eorum apporiacioni studebant, ad Anglos se conferrent, quos sciuerunt magis placide 
dominaturos super eos quam Gallicos suos dominos naturales.” 
40  For French and English war propaganda in the 15th century see P. S. Lewis, “War Propa-
ganda and Historiography in Fifteenth-Century France and England”, TRHS 5.15 (1965): 
1-21; N. Pons, ”La propagande de guerre française avant l'apparition de Jeanne d'Arc”, 
Journal des Savants (1982): 191-214. 
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the earls trying to restore him were stopped in early 1400.41 But Richard had been 
on good terms with the French, and his deposition by Henry of Lancaster was 
perceived as an outrageous act of treason across the channel.42 French accounts of 
the deposition therefore paint a different picture of the Earls’ Revolt. They tend to 
play down the popular element in its failure, one of the texts ignoring it altogether, 
two others indicating that the commoners involved were primarily acting on or-
ders.43 Thus, it is the Countess of Hereford who in one of the French reports 
assembles the country people of Essex to put to death the Earl of Huntingdon. But 
the rustics are extremely sympathetic to the former king’s partisan, and it takes a lot 
of curses and threats from the countess to make the executioner strike off his head.44 
Lancastrians like Walsingham or Usk, by contrast, do not mention the countess at 
all and simply state that the earl was captured and beheaded by the common 
people.45 Keeping in mind how strongly the same commoners were condemned by 
Walsingham in 1381, and that French texts sometimes described the English as 
“evil and foolish people,”46 it is ironic that elitist writers like these should consider 
the English populace as a narrative asset useful for propagandistic purposes. 
But to minimise popular agency was but one way to treat opposition to the 
favoured faction in the other country. Another was to emphasise it, and to use the 
representation of revolt for a general attack against the enemy and his character. 
The monk of St. Denis actually gives two reports of the Peasants’ Revolt in his 
chronicle, the first expressing his shock at the rebels’ atrocities in a short aside to 
his account of the urban tax disturbances in France,47 the second recounting the 
                                                 
41  The Chronica Maiora of Thomas Walsingham 1376-1422, trans. D. Preest (Woodbridge, 
2005), 315-317; Chronicon Adæ de Usk, 41-43, 197-203; Historia Vitae et Regni, 163-
165.  
42  See C. Taylor, “›Weep thou for me in France‹: French Views of the Deposition of Rich-
ard II”, Fourteenth Century England 3 (2004): 207-222. 
43  See Creton, Metrical History, 209-216, 400-407; Traïson et Mort, 77-103, 229-61; Reli-
gieux de Saint-Denys, 2:734-8. Froissart is less sympathetic to Richard and his followers. 
For these accounts in general, see J. J. N. Palmer, “The Authorship, Date and Historical 
Value of the French Chronicles on the Lancastrian Revolution”, BJRL 61 (1978-1979): 
145-181, 398-412. 
44  Traïson et Mort, 96-100, 253-256; but cf. Palmer, French Chronicles, 409. 
45  Chronica Maiora, 317; Chronicon Adæ de Usk, 42, 198. The Historia Vitae et Regni, 
165, however, has a version not unlike the French one: “Et non multum post dominus Io-
hannes Holand comes Huntindonn, frater Regis Ricardi ex parte matris, apud Plasch' in 
Estsex' per comitissam Herford' captus et decollatus est.” 
46  See Metrical History, 222, 410: “gent mauvaise et folle.”  
47  Religieux de Saint-Denys, 1: 132-135. 
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events in retrospect as background to the English expedition into Flanders in 
1383.48 In this latter passage, the author describes the populace of England as being 
bent on renewing the war and indicates that it had been their efforts to establish a 
lasting peace that the archbishop and other royal councillors had lost their lives for 
in the recent rising.49 Since public opinion was rather concerned with the kingdom’s 
defences in the early 1380s and serious resistance to an agreement did not show up 
until about a decade after,50 this reading of the revolt is an essentially anachronistic 
one and primarily serves to polemicise against the English in general: holding an 
“inveterate and expiable hatred” for the French, they were “unable to endure peace” 
and even massacred their own government when this dared to work for recon-
ciliation.51 The rising of 1381 thus is turned into another proof of English wicked-
ness here and as such appears to foreshadow the deposition of Richard II eighteen 
years later. 
In all the cases of cross-border representation discussed so far we have been 
dealing with foreign authors writing about revolts of the common people against 
their own native betters. In Caux and Caen, however, the situation was different, for 
the risings of 1435 in these Norman regions were directed against an occupying 
authority, i.e. the English forces holding the duchy since 1415.52 An English version 
of the events is included in one of the London Chronicles, but, instead of vilifying 
the rebels, the text maintains a rather neutral stance. It describes the revolts and 
their suppression like other military affairs on the continent and only blames the 
Duke of Burgundy, who is said to have incited the rising in Caux after his 
                                                 
48  Religieux de Saint-Denys, 1: 256-259. Cf. also the expanded translation of this in Nou-
velle Collection, 2: 358, which curiously omits the reference to retrospectivity and there-
fore describes an independent rising in 1383 here: “En l'an mille trois cens quatre-vingt 
et trois, en Angleterre y eut de grandes séditions et commotions”. 
49  Religieux de Saint-Denys, 1: 256: “archiepiscopum Cantuariensem, virum utique in 
cunctis commendabilem, regis cancellarium, nonnullosque consiliarios regales ferali ra-
bie agitati nequiter interemerant, occasionem addentes quia pacem perpetuam inter 
reges componere conabantur.” 
50  See E. Searle & R. Burghart, “The Defense of England and the Peasants' Revolt”, Viator 
3 (1972): 365-388; N. Saul, Richard II (London, 1997), 205-225. 
51  Cf. Religieux de Saint-Denys, 1: 4, 256 (more suo quietis impacientes), 290 (odio invete-
rato et inexpiabili stimulante). For the “hatred between nations” in the monk's chronicle 
see B. Guenée, L'opinion publique à la fin du Moyen Age d'après la Chronique de 
Charles VI du Religieux de Saint Denis (Paris, 2002), 68-70. 
52  For the occupation of Normandy in general see C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy 
1415-1450: The History of a Medieval Occupation (Oxford, 1983). 
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betrayal.53 More passionate than this is the account of Thomas Basin, a prominent 
Norman bishop much affected by the war and its devastations.54 Even though he is 
not viciously hostile towards the English, Basin leaves no doubt that the insurrec-
tion was caused by English oppression and that the rebels were fighting for their 
natural lord, the King of France. The latter’s inactivity, therefore, is all the more 
reprehensible in Basin’s eyes, and it is at the French monarch’s feet that he lays the 
ultimate responsibility for the plight of the faithful Norman people.55 Despite 
showing different attitudes toward rebels and authorities in this conflict, the English 
and the Norman account have one thing in common: they put the real blame on a 
third party – the treacherous Duke of Burgundy in the English case, the indifferent 
King of France in the Norman one. 
The distribution of sympathy certainly is one of the most interesting aspects of 
the transnational representation of revolt in late medieval England and France. The 
war had a strong influence on the way authors were reporting from abroad and in 
several of our cases the insurgents in the other country were used to slander the 
authorities there or even vilify the enemy in general. Naturally, this partisan 
approach to foreign insurgency was more interested in the national dynamics of a 
rising than in possible cross-border connections to other revolts, so that most of the 
writers betray a rather limited view of revolt in their chronicles. There are, however, 
some notable exceptions to this, and we will finally turn to the question of how con-
temporaries were linking insurgency across the borders, either unconsciously or 
deliberately. 
3) LINKING THE INCIDENTS 
To draw connections between historical events was definitely not the main concern 
of medieval chroniclers. Instead of explaining the incidents to their audience, they 
usually contented themselves with a simple account of what had happened, trying 
above all to tell the truth and to present examples, as they themselves frequently 
asserted.56 Thus, it is not too surprising that we have found only a few chronicles in 
our sample that directly link occasions of insurgency in different countries. But 
such linking did not necessarily have to be explicit. An unconscious form of this 
                                                 
53  Chronicles of London, 137-140. 
54  For a comprehensive study of Basin's life, work and attitudes see M. Spencer, Thomas 
Basin (1412-1490): The History of Charles VII and Louis XI (Nieuwkoop, 1997). 
55  Basin, Histoire, 1: 196-227; cf. Spencer, Thomas Basin, 104-105. 
56  Guenée, Genres historiques, 1008, 1010-1012; Bulst, ›Jacquerie‹ und ›Peasants' Revolt‹, 
795-796; Given-Wilson, Chronicles, 1, 166. 
CROSS-BORDER REPRESENTATIONS OF REVOLT IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES | 49 
 
appears when the description of foreign insurgency is notably shaped by the 
author’s experiences of revolt at home. The Florentine Matteo Villani, for example, 
portrayed the Jacquerie of 1358 like one of the urban risings he knew from his 
Italian home town, merging this originally rural revolt with the rebellion of Etienne 
Marcel in Paris and completely passing over any peasant participation in the 
movement.57 Froissart will have been influenced by his personal experiences in 
Flanders when he ascribed to the Londoners a major part in exciting the rising of 
the English counties in 1381.58 The link between different manifestations of revolt 
is not an open and intentional one in these cases, but it nevertheless indicates that 
the author perceived something familiar in what he had heard or read about a rising 
in the other country.  
Authors explicitly linking revolt across the borders were few, but there are some 
examples related to the so-called “cluster of revolts” in the 1380s, involving the 
rebellion in Flanders, the urban tax revolts in France, the English Peasants’ Revolt 
and in one case even the Florentine rising of the Ciompi. A simple way to connect 
these revolts was to compare them or their participants. The Florentine writer Pitti, 
for example, remarks that the commoners rioting in Paris were people just like the 
Ciompi insurgents in his home town.59 Froissart compares the French rebels to 
those in Ghent, pointing out that the very year the latter rose against their lord in 
Flanders the Parisians did the same in France.60 More important than such compari-
sons, however, are connections attributed to the rebels themselves. These could 
have been inspired or even incited by insurgents from abroad, so that the rebellion 
in one country had been imported from another and therefore was derived from a 
“parent rising” there. According to the monk of St. Denis, public opinion had it that 
the people of France not only had received messengers and letters from Flanders 
but also was following the example of the English when almost all of it rose against 
the king in 1382.61 Froissart even describes how the Parisians decided to await the 
                                                 
57  Villani, Cronica, 185, 214-216, 274-275; translated in Cohn, Popular Protest, 173-176. 
Cf. ibid., 144; Bulst, ›Jacquerie‹ und ›Peasants' Revolt‹, 815. 
58  Œuvres de Froissart, 9: 389-390; cf. Dobson, Peasants' Revolt, 7, 137; Hinck, Das zeitge-
nössische Bild, 67. 
59  Mercanti Scrittori, 384: “Il popolo grasso, ciò è i buoni cittadini che si chiamano borge-
si, dubitando che 'l detto minuto popolo che si chiamarono i Maglietti, ch' erano gente ta-
li quali furono i Ciompi che corsono Firenze”; translated in Cohn, Popular Protest, 303. 
60  Œuvres de Froissart, 9: 394: “cheux de Gand et de Flandres qui se rebelloient contre leur 
signeur, et en celle propre anée li Parisyen le fissent ossi et trouvèrent à faire les mailles 
de fier.” 
61  Religieux de Saint-Denys, 1: 132: “Sic temerarium ausum malignandi […] fere totus 
populus Francie assumpserat, nec minori agitabatur furia, et ut fama publica referebat, 
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outcome of the conflict in Flanders before embarking on further insurrection of 
their own.62 As it appears, at least those contemporaries with a broader outlook 
noticed a wave of insurgency in the early 1380s and tried to make sense of this 
clustering by ascribing transnational connections to it. Whether these really existed 
is another question, but it is highly unlikely that the rebels themselves were not 
aware of popular insurgency in other countries.  
Of the writers explicitly linking revolt across the borders, Froissart was the only 
one to draw a connection across time as well. Thus, he not only linked the French, 
English and Flemish risings of the 1380s,63 but also included the Jacquerie of more 
than twenty years before, comparing it to the English Peasants’ Revolt as well as 
alluding to it in a passage about the rebellion in Flanders.64 In fact, his chronicle 
contains more explicit linkings than any other text in our sample, which suggests 
that he maintained a somewhat specific view of popular insurgency. His general 
outlook was the most comprehensive to be found in the historiography of his day, 
for he was writing what amounted to a pan-European history of chivalry and 
included nearly all of western Europe in its scope.65 The revolts he was recording 
therefore were more to him than just incidents occasionally linked to one another: 
they were part of a transnational phenomenon in his eyes, a “great devilry” which 
threatened to destroy the nobility in many European countries. This danger first 
appears in his account of the Jacquerie, and is repeated several times in the further 
course of the chronicle, arguably being one of the underlying themes of his narra-
tive.66 But thankfully, he asserts, God had always provided a remedy in time, so that 
the prospect of an annihilation of the nobility remained just a hypothetical one.67 
Froissart, then, is exceptional among the cross-border reporters of revolt. He had 
changing patrons and loyalties in England, Flanders and France, but due to his 
distinctly chivalric outlook he painted an almost universal picture of popular 
                                                                                                            
per Flamingos, qui peste similis rebellionis laborabant, nunciis et apicibus excitatus, 
exemplo quoque Anglorum, qui eodem tempore contra regem et magnates regni rebel-
lantes”; cf. ibid., 230, where the chronicler reports the rumour of a letter sent from Paris 
to Courtrai proposing an alliance between the cities. For English translations see Cohn, 
Popular Protest, 277, 287.  
62  Œuvres de Froissart, 10: 146-147. 
63  Œuvres de Froissart, 9: 394, 449; 10: 146, 185. 
64  Œuvres de Froissart, 9: 386; 10: 147. 
65  For Froissart's historical perspective see, for example, the different contributions in J. J. 
N. Palmer, ed., Froissart: Historian (Woodbridge, 1981). 
66  Œuvres de Froissart, 6: 45, 46, 47; 9: 394, 403; 10: 147, 185. For the “great devilry” 
(grant déablie) see ibid., 9: 449; 10: 147. 
67  Œuvres de Froissart, 6: 46, 47, 56; 9: 391; 10: 147. 
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insurgency in the later Middle Ages. And this proved to be a lasting one still 
shaping our perception today. 
SUMMARY 
The Hundred Years’ War should have encouraged the mutual cross-border 
reporting of popular insurgency in England and France, but we have only been able 
to find some fifteen examples of revolt being reported by chroniclers from the other 
country. To understand this scarcity of findings it is helpful to consider the 
conditions of transnational representation in late medieval chronicles: these were 
not normally concerned with events from abroad, so that an incident had to catch 
the attention of an author and to be of interest for his narrative to be recorded in 
another country. Thus, it is not surprising that there was more transnational 
coverage of events like a riot in Rome to enforce the election of an Italian pope than 
there was of the ordinary risings of the populace, which for the most part did not 
affect other countries too much. 
The transnational character of cross-border reports becomes apparent in the 
particularities of their representation of foreign insurgency, both compared to the 
picture of revolt painted by chroniclers abroad and to their own depiction of distur-
bances at home. In general, there was little sympathy for popular rebels in medieval 
historiography, even though the representation of revolt could differ considerably 
from country to country. Cross-border reporters sometimes imported a foreign style 
of representation with their sources, but they could also develop an independent 
approach, maintaining the neutrality of an outsider or even siding with the rebels in 
the other country. These were ideal to voice propaganda against enemy authorities 
and served well to question a government’s legitimacy, so that insurgents from 
abroad were more likely to be favoured than their counterparts at home. Violent 
opposition to a faction rather well-disposed towards the author’s country, however, 
could also be utilized for a cross-border polemic against the enemy in general. 
Only a few transnational reporters cared to draw connections between 
individual incidents of revolt in their narratives. Some did so unconsciously, so that 
their description of foreign insurgency was shaped by their experiences of revolt at 
home. An explicit relation was created by comparing revolts or their participants, 
but more important than this were connections ascribed to the rebels themselves. By 
pointing out that these were inspired or even incited by insurgents from abroad, 
some of the authors were trying to make sense of a wave of insurgency in the early 
1380s. The most inclusive perspective, however, was adopted by the chivalric 
historian Jean Froissart: to him, the late medieval uprisings were part of a 





Trans-national Representations of Pretenders 




Pretenders (samozvantsy) played a part in most of the major popular revolts in early 
modern Russia that were characterised in Soviet Marxist historiography as “peasant 
wars”.1 In particular, false descendants of Ivan the Terrible were prominent 
throughout the “Time of Troubles” of the early 17th century; Sten’ka Razin, who 
headed the cossack-peasant revolt of 1669-1671, was reportedly accompanied by a 
false Tsarevich Aleksei Alekseevich; and Emel’ian Pugachev, the leader of the 
similar uprising of 1773-1774, depicted himself as Peter III, the murdered husband 
of Catherine the Great. Pretenders were not, of course, an exclusively Russian 
phenomenon. False claimants to a royal identity can be found in most hereditary 
monarchical systems. Ancient history provides the examples of the Pseudo-Smerdis 
                                                 
1  The only one of the four so-called “peasant wars” which had no trace of pretenderism 
was the Bulavin revolt of 1707-1708. The term “peasant war” was of course highly mis-
leading, based on a (false) analogy with the Peasant War in Germany of 1525, on which 
Karl Marx's collaborator Friedrich Engels had written. The revolts led by Razin, Bulavin 
and Pugachev were primarily cossack (or cossack-led) popular uprisings. The Time of 
Troubles was a much more complex and heterogeneous series of events, involving for-
eign military intervention as well as civil war and social conflict. Soviet historians them-
selves disagreed on whether the whole period described by pre-revolutionary historians as 
the “Time of Troubles” (smutnoe vremia, smuta) constituted a “peasant war”, or whether 
the term should be applied only to the episode of most acute social conflict within it, the 
Bolotnikov revolt of 1606-1607. The main common factor throughout the period c.1603-
1614 was in fact the presence of pretenders claiming to belong to the old Moscow dynas-
ty and thereby challenging the legitimacy of the elected tsars Boris Godunov, Vasilii 
Shuiskii and Michael Romanov. See Maureen Perrie, Pretenders and Popular Monar-
chism in Early Modern Russia. The False Tsars of the Time of Troubles (Cambridge, 
1995). 
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of Persia and the False Agrippa of Rome; the medieval period offers the False 
Count Baldwin of Flanders and the False Emperor Frederick II. The closest 
parallels and the most immediate precedents for the Russian pretenders of the Time 
of Troubles, however, can be found in early modern Europe. England had known 
the impostors Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck in the late fifteenth century; and 
in the last decades of the sixteenth century a number of royal pretenders appeared in 
Moldavia, as well as a series of impostors claiming to be Don Sebastian, the King 
of Portugal who had died on the battlefield of Alcazarquivir in 1578.2 But from the 
beginning of the seventeenth century the pretender phenomenon is particularly 
associated with Russia, and with Russian popular revolts. 
THE TIME OF TROUBLES 
Foreigners’ accounts have long been regarded by historians as a valuable source of 
evidence about the Time of Troubles. In this article, however, I am concerned not 
so much with the factual information which these contemporary observers provide, 
or its reliability, but rather with the broader narratives through which they interpret 
the phenomenon of pretendership. As we shall see, there are two rival narratives 
concerning pretenders. The first is that of the pretender as impostor, which places 
the Russian examples in the context of a tradition of such fraudsters, dating back to 
antiquity. The second is that of the persecuted royal heir who miraculously escapes 
from death, eventually reveals his true identity and reclaims his ancestral throne. 
This theme, which was popular in adventure romances in medieval and early 
modern Europe, recurred in the “back-stories” (fictional autobiographies) of many 
Russian pretenders. Most foreign observers were sceptical about the pretenders’ 
stories, but some took them at face value, and their accounts of the career of the 
First False Dmitrii, in particular, often resemble the romances of the age of 
chivalry. 
The First False Dmitrii 
The First False Dmitrii was the best known pretender of the Time of Troubles. This 
man appeared in Lithuania in 1602, claiming to be Ivan the Terrible’s youngest son, 
who had died as a child in mysterious circumstances at Uglich in 1591. The old 
                                                 
2  On the Moldavian pretenders, see N.A. Mokhov, Ocherki istorii moldavsko-russko-
ukrainskikh sviazei (s drevneishikh vremen do nachala XIX veka) (Kishinev, 1961), 40-
69; on the False Sebastians see, for example, Yves-Marie Bercé, Le roi caché. Sauveurs 
et imposteurs. Mythes politiques populaires dans l'Europe moderne (Paris, 1990), 17-81. 
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dynasty of the Moscow rulers came to an end in 1598, with the death of Dmitrii’s 
elder half-brother, Tsar Fedor Ivanovich. The throne passed to Boris Godunov, Tsar 
Fedor’s brother-in-law, who was widely believed to have plotted against the heirs 
of Ivan the Terrible in order to obtain the throne for himself. The pretender invaded 
Russia in 1604, defeated Boris’s armies and became tsar in 1605. He was 
overthrown in 1606 by the boyar Prince Vasilii Shuiskii, who acceded to the throne. 
Both Russian and foreign accounts provide various versions of the explanation 
which the pretender offered of his supposed escape from death at Uglich and his 
subsequent life until he revealed his “true” royal identity to Prince Adam 
Vishnevetskii (Wi niowiecki) on his estate at Brahin in Lithuania in 1603.3 The 
research of the Jesuit scholar Paul Pierling, published in the early 20th century, has 
definitively established that the earliest version of the pretender’s back-story is the 
account which Adam Vishnevetskii transmitted to the Polish king, Sigismund III, in 
October/November 1603. According to Vishnevetskii, the account represented the 
pretender’s own version of his biography, but modern scholars have suggested that 
Vishnevetskii himself may have played a part in its composition.4 
The story began with some historical background about Ivan the Terrible, his 
wives and sons. It then proceeded to the reign of Tsar Fedor, and described how 
Boris Godunov had plotted to obtain the throne for himself. Having gained power 
by killing his fellow regents, Boris conspired against Dmitrii’s life, and hired 
assassins to cut his throat while he was asleep in bed at night. One of his tutors, 
however, intervened. He substituted another boy, a relative of the tsarevich, of a 
similar age, who was killed in his stead while the tutor helped Dmitrii to escape. In 
the ensuing tumult a further 30 boys were killed, and the substitute victim’s body 
was so badly bruised that the tsarevich’s mother failed to realise that he was not her 
son. Soon after this the tutor fell gravely ill, but before he died he entrusted Dmitrii 
to the care of a faithful friend, a nobleman, who brought the boy up. When this 
protector in turn was about to die, he advised Dmitrii to enter a monastery. The 
tsarevich became a monk, and wandered from one monastery to another. One day a 
fellow monk recognised him as Dmitrii, “because of his way of walking and heroic 
                                                 
3  For references to these explanations see, for example, K.V. Chistov, Russkie narodnye 
sotsial'no-utopicheskie legendy XVII-XIX vv (Moscow, 1967), 42-46; Maureen Perrie, 
“'Popular Socio-Utopian Legends' in the Time of Troubles”, Slavonic and East European 
Review 60 (1982): 224-33; Perrie, Pretenders and Popular Monarchism, 37-43, 64-69, 79-
81. 
4  P. Pierling, La Russie et le Saint-Siège; études diplomatiques, 5 vols. (Paris, 1897-1912), 
3 [1901, reprint The Hague, 1967]: 42; Wac aw Sobieski, Szkice Historyczne (Warsaw, 
1904), 82-86; P. Pirling [Pierling], “Nazvannyi Dimitrii i Adam Vishnevetskii”, Russkaia 
Starina 117 (1904): 123-128. 
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manners”. Fearing danger, he fled to Poland, where he eventually came to Prince 
Vishnevetskii’s house, and declared himself to be the Prince of Moscow.5 
Not surprisingly, when the news of Dmitrii’s appearance began to circulate in 
Poland, some scepticism was expressed about the young man’s story. The Polish 
chancellor, Jan Zamoyski, in response to a letter from Adam Vishnevetskii 
informing him of Dmitrii’s arrival on his estate at Brahin, remarked: “As for the 
Muscovite staying with Your Lordship, who calls himself the son of the Muscovite 
Prince Ivan Vasil’evich, then very often such matters turn out to be true, but often 
also to be inventions.”6 Later, at a session of the Sejm on 1 February [20 January 
Old Style] 1605, Zamoyski compared the episode in Dmitrii’s story in which a 
substitute victim was killed in his stead to “a comedy by Plautus or Terence”. What 
sort of plotter, he asked, did not check to make sure that the assassin he had hired 
had killed the right person?7 Albert Baranowski, the bishop of P ock, in a letter of 6 
March 1604 to the king, had also expressed scepticism about elements in Dmitrii’s 
story: “First of all, how did his mother not recognise her murdered son? Secondly, 
why were another 30 children killed? Thirdly, how could a monk recognise 
Tsarevich Dmitrii, whom he had never seen?”8 
Suspicions were soon expressed that Dmitrii was an impostor. In Rome, on 
receiving his first report about Dmitrii from Claudio Rangoni, the Papal Nuncio in 
Cracow, Pope Clement VIII wrote in the margin: “Sarà un altro Rè di Portogallo 
resuscitato”.9 The analogy with the false Don Sebastians was also made in Poland: 
according to a later report by Rangoni to Rome, the Vice-Chancellor [Piotr Tylicki] 
had compared Dmitrii to the false Agrippa of ancient Rome and to the false King of 
Portugal.10 The bishop of P ock, in the letter to the king which we have already 
cited, also referred to the precedent of “the adventures of the so-called Sebastian”, 
and to the pretenders who appeared in Wallachia whenever the throne was vacant 
                                                 
5  F.K. Nowakowski, ed., ród a do dziejów Polski, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1841), 2: 65-70. No-
wakowski wrongly dated the text 1606: see Pierling, La Russie et le Saint-Siège, 3: 42, 
399. 
6  Zapiski Getmana Zholkevskogo o Moskovskoi Voine, ed. P.A. Mukhanovym, 2nd edn. (St 
Petersburg, 1871), prilozheniia, no.3, col.9. 
7  Russkaia Istoricheskaia Biblioteka, ed. Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, 39 vols. (St 
Petersburg, 1872-1927), 1: col.16. 
8  P. Pirling [Pierling], Iz smutnogo vremeni: stat'i i zametki (St Petersburg, 1902), 6-7. 
9  Pierling, La Russie et le Saint-Siège, 41. 
10  P. Pierling, Rome et Démétrius, d'après des documents nouveaux, avec pièces justifica-
tives et facsimile (Paris, 1878), 12, 178 (Rangoni's despatch of 13 March 1604). 
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there. The phenomenon of pretence, he added, was even known in Poland, “among 
the nobility, when an inheritance is divided”.11 
Information about Dmitrii quickly spread throughout Europe, especially after he 
embarked on his successful campaign to obtain the Russian throne. As a result of 
his secret conversion to Roman Catholicism in Poland, there was particular interest 
in his story in the Catholic hierarchy and among the Catholic monarchs of Europe. 
The Polish Jesuit chaplains Nikolaj Czyrzowski and Andrzej Lawicki, who 
accompanied the pretender on his march from Poland to Moscow, sent reports back 
to Cracow, and Rangoni forwarded them to Rome. From Cracow news of Dmitrii 
also reached Venice, where it was enthusiastically received by the veteran Jesuit 
Antonio Possevino, who had visited Moscow in 1581 to negotiate the end of the 
Livonian War, and had engaged in debate about religion with Ivan the Terrible. 
Possevino in turn passed on the information to his contacts in Florence and Paris. 
News of Dmitrii was spread through other channels too. The French captain Jean La 
Blanque, who was based in Cracow, corresponded with Philippe Canaye de 
Fresnes, the French ambassador to Venice, who reported back to the court of King 
Henri IV in Paris; while in Prague the Emperor Rudolph II obtained information 
directly from his agents in Moscow and indirectly from those in Cracow and 
Venice.12  
The earliest published version of Dmitrii’s story to appear in Western Europe 
was the account issued in Venice in 1605 by Barezzo Barezzi, and generally 
attributed to Possevino.13 The details it contains of Dmitrii’s campaign for the 
throne are based on the letters of Czyrzowski and Lawicki. The earlier chapters, 
which describe the events at Uglich, the tsarevich’s escape from Boris’s assassins 
and his eventual revelation of his true identity in Poland, bear some resemblance to 
the account in Vishnevetskii’s report to the king.14 This indicated to Pierling that 
the author was familiar with that document,15 but there are also some differences 
                                                 
11  Pirling, Iz smutnogo vremeni, 7. The analogy with the Wallachian (Moldavian) pretend-
ers was one which was likely to be made in Poland, since these pretenders had been sup-
ported not only by the Zaporozhian cossacks but also by the Vishnevetskii family. It is 
perhaps not surprising that the bishop warned the king that Dmitrii should not be allowed 
to flee to the cossacks (ibid., 7). 
12  Pierling, La Russie et le Saint-Siège, 3: 192-201. 
13  Baretstso Baretstsi [Barezzo Barezzi], Povestvovanie o Dimitrii Samozvantse, sobrannoe 
Baretstso Baretstsi [translation of the Florence edition of 1606], Inostrannye sochineniia i 
akty, otnosiashchiesia do Rossii, comp. K.M. Obolenskii, vol. 4 (Moscow, 1847), iii-iv; 
Pirling, Iz smutnogo vremeni, 205-220.  
14  Baretstsi, Povestvovanie, 5-6, cf. Nowakowski, ród a do dziejów Polski, 2: 68-70. 
15  Pirling, Iz smutnogo vremeni, 208. 
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which suggest the additional use of unknown independent sources, probably – 
Pierling suggests – of Jesuit origin.16 
The author of the Barezzi account accepts that the man who became Tsar 
Dmitrii in 1605-1606 was the true Tsarevich Dmitrii of Uglich, and he adopts a 
highly triumphalist attitude towards his hero’s success (the account ends with 
Dmitrii’s accession to the throne in Moscow) and the enticing prospects which it 
presented for the conversion of Russia to Catholicism. Although it has a 
recognisably historical Russian setting, in many respects the narrative resembles 
those fictional literary texts in which long-lost royal heroes, after many vicissitudes 
and adventures, eventually regain their ancestral thrones and punish the usurpers 
who had unjustly deprived them of their inheritance (see below). But the author’s 
Jesuit perspective also means that the story is presented as the working out of 
Divine Providence on behalf of Dmitrii and in the interests of the Roman Catholic 
Church. 
There are, however, indications in the Barezzi narrative that Dmitrii was 
regarded by some as an impostor. The author notes that while Dmitrii was in 
Poland, Boris sent an envoy to the king, claiming that the self-styled tsarevich was a 
deceiver, the son of a priest, and demanding that he be returned to Russia, dead or 
alive. Boris had also spread the rumour in Russia that Dmitrii was a well-known 
magician.17 The author adds that subsequently, during Dmitrii’s occupation of the 
town of Putivl’ en route to Moscow, his men captured “Grishka Otrep’ev, that 
notorious magician and wizard, about whom the tyrant [Boris] had spread the 
rumour that it was not Dmitrii, the son of Ivan Vasil’evich, but this magician, 
known through all Muscovy as a bad person, who had come with Polish cossacks to 
take the throne from him.” Barezzi then piously observes, “Thus God’s just 
judgment, which always brings down on the heads of slanderers their own slanders, 
clearly revealed that this magician was a completely different person from Dmitrii 
the lawful sovereign.”18 
Barezzi’s account was phenomenally successful in transmitting news about 
Dmitrii to the wider public in Western Europe. After the Italian editions of 1605 
and 1606, published in Venice and Florence respectively, versions in Latin, French, 
Spanish, German and Czech were published in Madrid, Munich, Valladolid, 
Lisbon, Grätz and Prague.19 Thus the earliest narrative of Dmitrii’s story to spread 
                                                 
16  Ibid., 211.  
17  Baretstsi, Povestvovanie, 8. 
18  Ibid., 11. On this incident, which is described in one of the Jesuits' letters, see Perrie, 
Pretenders and Popular Monarchism, 70. 
19  See Baretstsi, Povestvovanie, v-vi; Pierling, La Russie et le Saint-Siège, 3: 196-197. See 
also the editor's introduction to the Russian translation of the Czech version: “Is-
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throughout Europe presented him as the true heir returning to claim his father’s 
throne from the usurper Godunov.  
In addition to the first edition of Barezzi, another account published in 1605, i.e. 
before Dmitrii’s death, was the report of the embassy of Sir Thomas Smith, who 
was sent from James I to Boris Godunov to negotiate new privileges for English 
merchants. News of Dmitrii’s invasion reached the diplomatic party in October 
1604, when they were in Moscow. They left Moscow in March 1605, but continued 
to receive information about events in the capital until their departure for home 
from the White Sea at the beginning of August. The account mostly takes the form 
of a chronological report of the embassy, incorporating news of Dmitrii’s campaign 
as it was received in Moscow, often in somewhat garbled form. The final section, 
however, is a kind of appendix that summarises events in Russia since the death of 
Ivan IV. This provides a slightly different version of Dmitrii’s story from that 
which the pretender himself had related to his patrons in Poland, and which is 
reflected in Barezzi’s account. According to the English author, the substitution of 
another child for Dmitrii took place at Uglich long before the fateful night of May 
1591.20 Thus, like Barezzi, the author of the Smith report accepts that Tsar Dmitrii 
was the real Dmitrii of Uglich, but he provides a new variant of his story. 
Dmitrii’s own proclamations to his Russian subjects had been notoriously 
reticent about the details of his supposed escape from death at Uglich,21 and the 
English account records a version, evidently current in Moscow at the time of the 
pretender’s first entry into the capital, which is more credible – and more consistent 
with the real events at Uglich – than the earlier “Poland” version, repeated by 
Barezzi, in which both the substitution and the murder took place on the same night. 
In Smith’s ‘Moscow’ version, the substitution took place in advance, and the 
substituted child was killed by one of his playfellows who cut his throat with a 
knife when they were “disporting themselves” together, evidently in the daytime.22 
William Scott, another member of the English diplomatic party, provided a variant 
to this version in a letter to Lord Salisbury (undated, but written before Tsar 
Dmitrii’s death). According to Scott, Dmitrii was “changed” before being sent to 
Uglich, and another child was “kept and killed in his roome”. The real tsarevich 
was then “conveyed” to Poland by some loyal Russians. Scott is, however, sceptical 
about whether the new tsar is “the true heire”. He hints strongly to Salisbury that 
                                                                                                            
toricheskoe i pravdivoe povestvovanie o tom, kak moskovskii kniaz' Dimitrii Ioannovich 
dostig otsovskogo prestola. Cheshskii tekst 1606 g., s predisloviem i perevodom V.A. 
Frantseva”, Starina i Novizna 15 (1911): iii-iv. 
20  Sir Thomas Smithes Voiage and Entertainment in Rushia (London, 1605), f.M2v-[M3]. 
21  See Perrie, Pretenders and Popular Monarchism, 64-65. 
22  Sir Thomas Smithes Voiage, f.M2. 
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Dmitrii is “Suppositio[u]s and Imposter”, but that it is politic to recognise him as 
the legitimate ruler.23 
A similar version to Smith’s is provided by the mercenary soldier Jacques 
Margeret in his account published in French in Paris in 1607. Margeret, who had 
been in service to Boris Godunov, switched his allegiance on Boris’s death and 
became commander of Tsar Dmitrii’s palace guard. Margeret remained in Moscow 
until September 1606: like the author of the English account, he believed that 
Dmitrii really was the son of Ivan IV. According to the French captain, Dmitrii was 
saved by his mother and “some of the high nobles”, who suspected that Boris was 
planning to kill him. They substituted another child for the tsarevich and brought 
Dmitrii up secretly; the “changeling prince” was subsequently murdered in his 
stead. After Boris succeeded Fedor as tsar, Dmitrii, “in a monk’s habit, was sent to 
Poland”, where he revealed his true identity.24 Margeret, like Barezzi, knows that 
Boris and others claimed that Dmitrii was the unfrocked monk Grishka Otrep’ev 
(the English author, however, does not mention this), but Margeret asserts that 
Grishka was a different person, who had accompanied Dmitrii from Russia to 
Poland, and then returned with him.25 Since Margeret, like the English writers, 
dates the substitution of the tsarevich earlier than the night of 15 May 1591, it 
seems likely that they are conveying a new variant of Dmitrii’s story, devised in 
1605 by his Russian backers in Moscow, who realised that the version he had used 
in Poland was unlikely to withstand scrutiny in Russia, where the events at Uglich 
were well known.26  
A very different perspective on the pretender is provided by Petrus Petreius 
(Peer Persson), a Swedish crown agent in Russia, in his Relation, published in 
Swedish in Stockholm at the end of 1608. Petreius is convinced that the First False 
Dmitrii was the renegade monk, Grisha Otrep’ev, who fled to Poland and entered 
the service of Prince Adam Vishnevetskii, where he acquired all kinds of knightly 
accomplishments. Grisha subsequently came to the attention of the Jesuits, who 
noticed that he bore a strong physical resemblance to Dmitrii of Uglich, and 
decided to make use of him for their own purposes. They offered to supply him 
with everything he needed in order to become tsar, provided that he agreed to marry 
the Polish noblewoman Marina Mniszech and introduce Catholicism in Russia. 
                                                 
23  V.N. Aleksandrenko, comp., “Materialy po Smutnomu vremeni na Rusi XVII v.”, Starina 
i Novizna 14 (1911): 246-247. 
24  Jacques Margeret, The Russian Empire and Grand Duchy of Muscovy: a 17th-Century 
French Account, trans. Chester S.L. Dunning (Pittsburgh, PA, 1983), 17, 81. 
25  Margeret, The Russian Empire, 81-82. 
26  Cf. Perrie, Pretenders and Popular Monarchism, 79-81. 
TRANS-NATIONAL REPRESENTATIONS OF PRETENDERS IN RUSSIAN REVOLTS | 61 
 
Grisha soon acquired the patronage not only of the Jesuits but also of the Papacy 
and the Polish king.27 
Petreius was not the first foreign observer to represent Dmitrii as a tool of the 
Jesuits. William Scott in his letter to Lord Salisbury had stated that when news of 
Dmitrii’s invasion first reached the English envoys in Moscow, they had assumed 
“this interprise to be a jesuitisme (that broode so swarminge in Polande) likelie to 
vanishe quickly”.28 A Dutch merchant’s account, first published in Dutch and 
French in 1606 and in English in 1607, claims that the main reason for Dmitrii’s 
overthrow in May 1606 was the influence which he allowed the Poles to have in 
Moscow, and adds: “but I beleeue that the Pope, with his Seminaries, and Jesuites, 
were a principal cause of his ruine, and totall subuersion.”29 Even in the Catholic 
world, similar views were expressed by the enemies of the Jesuits: in August 1606 
Francesco Soranzo, the Venetian ambassador to Prague, blamed the Order for 
provoking Dmitrii’s murder by encouraging him to marry a Polish Catholic.30 
Petreius is, however, the most strongly anti-Catholic of all the contemporary 
foreign visitors to Russia. His entire account is based on the view that the First 
                                                 
27  Reliatsiia Petra Petreia o Rossii nachala XVII v., comp. Iu.A. Limonov (Moscow, 1976), 
82-84. Petreius' Relation of 1608 was probably based on his reports of 1601-1605 to 
Charles IX. In his Introduction to the text (ibid., 17-18) Iu.A. Limonov notes that Petrei-
us' information (possibly in the form of his reports to Stockholm) was used by the French 
historian Jacques-Auguste De Thou (Thuanus), who refers to him as “Peter Paterson of 
Uppsala”, and shares his hostility to the Jesuits. See “Skazaniia De-Tu o Dimitrii Samo-
zvantse”, in Skazaniia sovremennikov o Dmitrii Samozvantse, ed. N.G. Ustrialov, 3rd corr. 
edn., 2 vols. (St Petersburg, 1859), 1: 329-331. De Thou's History, published in 1619, al-
so made use of the accounts of other foreign observers such as Margeret. In its turn, it 
was used as a source by others, including Samuel Purchas in his compilation of travel 
writings, first published in 1625. See, for example, Samuel Purchas, comp., Hakluytus 
Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes. Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages 
and Lande Travells by Englishmen and Others, 20 vols. (Glasgow, 1905-1907), 14 
[1906]: 158-163. 
28  Aleksandrenko, Materialy po Smutnomu vremeni, 245.  
29  Sonia E. Howe, ed., The False Dmitri; a Russian Romance and Tragedy, Described by 
British Eye-Witnesses, 1604-1612 (London, 1916, reprint Cambridge, 1972), 60. For the 
publication history of this account (“The Reporte of a Bloudie and Terrible Massacre 
[…]”), see, for example, Moskovskaia tragediia, ili rasskaz o zhizni i smerti Dimitriia, 
trans. from Latin A. Braudo and I. Rostsiusa, ed. S.D. Sheremetev (St Petersburg, 1901), 
xi-xii. 
30  Pierling, La Russie et le Saint-Siège, 3: 330. On accusations about the Jesuits' role in the 
affair of the First False Dmitrii, see Bercé, Le roi caché, 352-359. 
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False Dmitrii was the instrument of the Pope, the Jesuits and King Sigismund.31 In 
many ways, it represents an inversion of the Barezzi account. Both authors agree 
that Dmitrii received important support in his campaign for the throne from the 
Catholic hierarchy, the Jesuits and the Polish King: Barezzi, however, claims that 
Tsar Dmitrii was the true Dmitrii of Uglich; whereas Petreius believes him to be an 
impostor, who was justifiably killed by the Russians because of his patronage of the 
Poles and the Jesuits.32 The contrasting attitudes of Barezzi and Petreius reflected 
the religious and great-power divide in East-Central Europe in the early seventeenth 
century: Catholicism versus Protestantism, Poland versus Sweden. The Protestant 
Swedish agent Petreius rejected the claims of the pro-Polish Catholic convert Tsar 
Dmitrii, and wrote approvingly of the pretender’s nemesis, Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii, 
who was later to seek Swedish military aid against the Polish threat. 
The Protestant/Catholic divide does not, however, explain the support for 
Dmitrii’s authenticity expressed by the author of the report of Sir Thomas Smith’s 
embassy and by Jacques Margeret – both of whom were apparently Protestants.33 
For the English diplomats, in search of the renewal of their trade concessions in 
Russia, it was clearly expedient to recognise Tsar Dmitrii’s legitimacy, even if 
some, like William Scott, as we have seen, were privately sceptical.34 The 
mercenary Margeret, who entered Dmitrii’s service, had a personal self-interest in 
asserting that his new royal master was the true son of Ivan IV. Chester Dunning, in 
the Introduction to his translation of Margeret’s account, suggests that he may have 
been willing to serve the new tsar well “in part because Dmitrii’s career reminded 
him of King Henri’s”.35 (Margeret had fought for Henri IV during the French Wars 
of Religion.) This must remain pure speculation, although it is true that there were 
some similarities between Dmitrii and Henri, who had to wage war for recognition 
of the legitimacy of his claim to the French throne. It is also interesting to note that 
in his argument in favour of Dmitrii’s authenticity Margeret states that his personal 
qualities were such that 
 
                                                 
31  Reliatsiia Petra Petreia, 73. 
32  Ibid., 93-97. 
33  On Margeret's religion, see Margeret, The Russian Empire, XVI; and Zhak Marzheret 
[Jacques Margeret], Sostoianie Rossiiskoi imperii. Zh. Marzheret v dokumentakh i issle-
dovaniiakh (Teksty, kommentarii, stat'i) ed. An. Berelovicha, V.D. Nazarova and P.Iu. 
Uvarova (Moscow, 2007), 453-454. 
34  On the pragmatic considerations which led the English government to recognise Dmitrii, 
see Geraldine M. Phipps, Sir John Merrick: English Merchant-Diplomat in Seventeenth-
Century Russia, Russian Biography Series, vol. 13 (Newtonville, MA, 1983), 57-64. 
35  Margeret, The Russian Empire, XVIII. 
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[…] he could not be less than the son of a great prince. He had an eloquence which charmed 
all the Russians. There even shone in him a certain inexpressible majesty not seen before 
among the lords in Russia, much less in one of low quality as he would necessarily have been 
had he not been the son of Ivan Vasil’evich.36 
 
The notion that the legitimacy of a true monarch might be revealed through his 
personal nobility of spirit was part of the political philosophy of the age,37 and 
Margeret may genuinely have held this view. The idea that a true monarch 
possessed such qualities might also, of course, have been an indirect form of 
flattery of King Henri, who had commissioned the publication of Margeret’s 
account,38 and who had taken a keen interest in Dmitrii since he first received news 
of his campaign for the crown in 1605. 
As far as the hostile foreign observers are concerned, it is perhaps surprising 
that none of their accounts of the career of the First False Dmitrii draws parallels 
with the Portuguese and Moldavian pretenders, although, as we have seen, these 
precedents were well known in Poland. As the responses of Pope Clement VIII and 
the Polish sceptics suggest, invoking the European tradition of pretendership was a 
convenient weapon to discredit a supposedly long-lost heir. Perhaps the type of 
foreigners who were in Russia in 1604-1606 (merchants, mercenary soldiers etc.) 
were not sufficiently familiar with the history of pretenders in Western Europe to 
recognise these precedents. But it may also be relevant that the early sceptical 
responses were made in Poland before the Russian government had issued a clear 
identification of the pretender as Grisha Otrep’ev: thereafter, the issue became more 
specific: was Dmitrii who he said he was; was he Grisha; or someone else? Starting 
with Margeret and Petreius, the foreign observers’ accounts often included lists of 
arguments, sometimes in the form of numbered points, why Tsar Dmitrii was or 
was not Dmitrii of Uglich.39 As we have already noted, however, the decisions of 
                                                 
36  Ibid., 88. On Dmitrii's princely qualities, see also ibid., 70, 91. 
37  Bercé, Le roi caché, 379-381. 
38  The editors of the recent Russian edition of Margeret's account plausibly suggest that he 
had drafted his text before returning to France in 1606, so that the king authorised only its 
publication, rather than its composition, as Margeret claimed in his dedication: 
Marzheret, Sostoianie Rossiiskoi imperii, 16. 
39  Margeret, The Russian Empire, 80-91; Reliatsiia Petra Petreia, 98-102; Petr Petrei de 
Erlezunda [Petrus Petreius], Istoriia o Velikom Kniazhestve Moskovskom (Moscow, 1867 
[translation of the German version published in Leipzig in 1620]), 241-244; Conrad Bus-
sow, The Disturbed State of the Russian Realm, trans. G. Edward Orchard (Montreal, 
1994), 81-83. Much of Bussow's material, which remained unpublished until the 19th cen-
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foreign participants in the Time of Troubles whether or not to recognise Dmitrii as 
the son of Ivan IV were probably based not on logical deductions from the evidence 
about his identity, but rather on considerations of self-interest – as, indeed, were the 
attitudes of most Russians. 
Two non-Russian writers who had not themselves visited Russia, however, did 
make comparisons between the First False Dmitrii and earlier pretenders. In the 
Muscovite Tragedy published by Gerhard Grevenbruch in Cologne in 1608, the 
author concludes that it is still unclear whether Dmitrii was the true tsarevich or not 
(Verus an supposititius). He adds: “I know, it is true, that in history there are several 
examples of people who have aspired to a kingdom or a throne by similar deceit 
and lies”, and goes on to cite the examples not only of the Sebastians of Portugal 
but also of Perkin Warbeck. He notes, however, that “these and many others, before 
attaining the kingdom, were executed when their deceit was detected”, and that 
“few of these people, as is well known, achieved what Dmitrii did”.40 Thus for the 
author of the Tragedy, Dmitrii’s relative success distinguished him from his 
unsuccessful predecessors and, by implication, left open the question of whether or 
not he was an impostor.41 
The other writer who invokes earlier pretenders is the Spanish dramatist Lope 
de Vega in his play, El Gran Duque de Moscovia y Emperador Perseguido. Lope 
places the analogy in the mouth of Boris Godunov, who compares Dmitrii to 
pretenders of antiquity and to the Portuguese Don Sebastians.42 Lope himself, 
however, considers that Dmitrii was the true tsarevich, although the Portuguese 
Sebastians were false.43 By attributing the reference to previous pretenders to the 
villainous Boris, the would-be murderer of Tsarevich Dmitrii, the dramatist 
undermines the relevance of the parallel.  
                                                                                                            
tury, was “borrowed” by Petreius for his History, which was first published in Swedish in 
Stockholm in 1615, and is a distinct work from his Relation of 1608. 
40  Moskovskaia tragediia, 69-70.  
41  Grevenbruch's account is a compilation based largely on Barezzi in its first part, and on 
the anonymous 'Reporte of a Bloudie and Terrible Massacre […]' in its second part. The 
author's information about Perkin Warbeck focuses on the assistance which Perkin ob-
tained from the Scottish king, and is based on [George] Buchanan's 'History of the Scots' 
– which no doubt explains why he does not mention Warbeck's immediate predecessor, 
Lambert Simnel. 
42  Lope de Vega, El Gran Duque de Moscovia y Emperador Perseguido (Alicante, 2002), 
Acto II, ll.190-198. As far as I am aware, no “real” native Russian sources refer to earlier 
examples of pretenders elsewhere. 
43  Ervin C. Brody, The Demetrius Legend and its Literary Treatment in the Age of the 
Baroque (Rutherford, N.J., 1972), 130-131. 
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Even if most foreign authors were unaware of specific historical precedents for 
the phenomenon of pretence, however, they were undoubtedly familiar with the 
concept of imposture, so that a trans-national perspective is implicit in their 
accounts: most foreigners had words for an impostor available in their own 
languages, whereas their Russian contemporaries used more generic terms such as 
vor (villain, criminal) or eretik (heretic) to describe the First False Dmitrii.44 
The foreign authors may also have been familiar with literary and folkloric 
narratives which incorporated the type of motifs that were found in Dmitrii’s back-
story. Such narratives may have influenced both the production of Dmitrii’s 
fictional autobiography, and its reception and re-telling by foreign observers. 
The distinguished Russian folklorist K.V. Chistov has argued that the rumours 
and tales about Dmitrii which circulated in early 17th-century Russia constituted a 
“popular socio-utopian legend about a returning royal deliverer”. Chistov considers 
that these legends existed in Russia from the 17th to the 19th centuries; they included 
motifs such as the attempted murder of the true tsar or tsarevich, his miraculous 
escape, lengthy wanderings incognito, eventual recognition and restoration to the 
throne; and they constituted a genre of folklore.45 Dmitrii’s legend, he suggests, 
“was not the fruit of an individual’s devising, but arose naturally, and was devised 
by the collective consciousness of the peasant, cossack and urban masses”.46 The 
accounts of contemporary foreign observers, Chistov claims, convey the legend of 
Tsarevich Dmitrii “in the form in which it reached them from Russians’ 
accounts”.47 But the foreigners’ accounts, as we have seen, can mostly be traced 
back to the version of Dmitrii’s back-story which Adam Vishnevetskii reported to 
King Sigismund in 1603. Far from originating among the Russian masses, it was 
devised by Dmitrii himself, or his backers, and it first circulated at the highest 
levels of the European culture of the day. The Polish king, and princes of the 
Catholic Church such as Rangoni and Possevino, appear to have taken the 
pretender’s fantastic story quite seriously.  
Chistov notes that most of the motifs of the deliverer legends can be found in 
other genres of folklore, in particular in plots about unjustly persecuted heroes, 
                                                 
44  The term samozvanets does not seem to be used for a pretender (impostor) until the 
second half of the 17th century. 
45  Chistov, Russkie narodnye sotsial'no-utopicheskie legendy, 24-33. I am sceptical about 
the extent to which these “legends” can be described as “socio-utopian”, in relation to the 
Time of Troubles, at least. See my critique of Chistov in: Perrie, 'Popular Socio-Utopian 
Legends' in the Time of Troubles. 
46  Chistov, Russkie narodnye sotsial'no-utopicheskie legendy, 40-41. 
47  Ibid., 43. 
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where the motif of a substitute victim is common.48 These plots and motifs, 
however, are not exclusive to folklore: they can be found in most genres of world 
literature at all periods. In many fictional narratives, royal heirs are saved from 
conspiracies against them, and live incognito for many years before eventually 
asserting their true identity and regaining their ancestral throne. Such narratives, 
which were popular in chivalric adventure romances in medieval and early modern 
Europe, have parallels with the tales told by pretenders such as the First False 
Dmitrii in order to provide themselves with a fictional autobiography. The very 
nature of pretence, of course, makes miraculous escapes from death, or concealment 
or substitution at birth, a necessary ingredient in any pretender’s back-story.49  
If the story which Dmitrii or his sponsors devised at Brahin had fictional 
influences, they were likely to have been derived not only from folklore but also 
from the chivalric romances, or even from classical literature (remember Jan 
Zamoyski’s reference to “a comedy by Plautus or Terence”).50 To take one 
example: the medieval romance later known in Russia as ‘Bova korolevich (Prince 
Bova)’ (“Bevis of Hampton” in England, ‘Buovo d’Antone’ in Italy) had spread 
eastwards as far as Lithuanian Belorussia by the end of the 16th century: in the 
earliest Belorussian version of this tale, the young hero’s father, King Kgvidon, is 
deposed and murdered by his mother and her lover; they conspire against Bova, 
who is saved by the servant girl who was ordered to poison him; Bova travels 
incognito for many years and has various exciting adventures; eventually he returns 
to his father’s kingdom, kills his mother and the usurper and becomes king 
himself.51 There is a marked similarity between the first part of this plot and the 
                                                 
48  Ibid., 227. 
49  For example, those of Perkin Warbeck and François de La Ramée (the False François de 
Valois): see Bercé, Le roi caché, 172, 361. 
50  A later example of a Russian pretender who was aware of – and was perhaps influenced 
by – earlier historical and literary precedents is Timofei Ankudinov, the False Ivan 
Shuiskii, who in his writings of 1646 drew a parallel between his own case and that of 
Tsar Dmitrii (whom he considered to be the true son of Ivan the Terrible). He also com-
pared himself to two pseudo-historical monarchs who had wandered unrecognised by 
their subjects: Apollonius of Tyre and the Emperor Ovian (Jovinian) of Rome, both of 
whom featured in the medieval Gesta Romanorum, which Ankudinov probably knew in 
its Polish version (Historye Rzymskie). See Iu.B. Simchenko, “Lzhe-Shuiskii II. Pra-
voslavnyi, musul'manin, katolik, protestant”, in Russkie: Istoriko-etnograficheskie ocher-
ki, ed. S.V. Cheshko (Moscow, 1997), 36-37, 39; and A.M. Panchenko, ed., Russkaia sil-
labicheskaia poeziia XVII-XVIII vv. (Leningrad, 1970), 88, 366. 
51  A.N. Veselovskii, Iz istorii romana i povesti: materialy i issledovaniia, 2 vols. (St Peters-
burg, 1886-8) 2 [suppl./prilozheniia]: 129-172. 
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story which Dmitrii told in Poland-Lithuania;52 and the happy ending is echoed in 
Barezzo Barezzi’s account of Dmitrii’s triumph.   
Dmitrii’s career in its turn subsequently served as the subject of literary 
treatments, notably by Lope de Vega in his play, probably written within a few 
years of the pretender’s death, and based on the Spanish version of the Barezzo 
Barezzi account.53 Although Lope undoubtedly knew about Dmitrii’s death and 
official unmasking as an impostor,54 he ended his drama with the hero’s victory 
over Boris on the battlefield. In Lope’s dramatic concept, poetic justice is 
implemented: the virtuous hero triumphs and the villain is punished.55 Dmitrii’s 
story on the Spanish stage – unlike historical reality, but in line with the 
conventions of romances such as Bova – has a happy ending, and the true heir is 
restored to his rightful throne.56 
Thus Dmitrii himself, or his patrons, may have been influenced not only by the 
examples of earlier historical pretenders, but also by literary narratives when 
producing his back-story. Subsequently, the availability and popularity of such tales 
in early modern Europe may have influenced the reception and re-telling of his 
story by foreign writers. It is perhaps because it was so often told like a real-life 
version of familiar and well-loved fictional tales that the story of Tsarevich Dmitrii 
became such a fashionable theme in literary and historical writings in early 17th-
century Europe. 
Sometimes a later author, unsure of the details of Dmitrii’s story, improvised 
parts of the narrative. The Dutchman Elias Herckmans, in an account written in 
1625, describes the events at Uglich as follows: 
 
When a boyar who was ordered to kill the tsarevich in a certain way came to the town, 
Dmitrii learned of his intention (it is not reliably known whether this was because he himself 
was devoted to Dmitrii, or because this boyar was afraid to carry out his mission and told the 
                                                 
52  i.e. in the region in which the story of Bova had been recorded in the late 16th century. 
53  Brody, The Demetrius Legend, 54-78. I am unconvinced by Brody's argument (ibid., 
141-216) that John Fletcher's play, The Loyal Subject, is also based on the Demetrius 
theme. 
54  Brody, The Demetrius Legend, 59-68. 
55  Ibid., 68-70.  
56  Other versions of Lope's play subsequently appeared in 17th-century Catholic Europe: see 
Brody, The Demetrius Legend, 131-132, 217, 275. In one of these, published in Cesena 
in 1651, Dmitrii's murder is shown, but the hero is depicted as a martyr for the Catholic 
faith: Bercé, Le roi caché, 358. In Germany and Russia, by contrast, from the late 18th 
century, Dmitrii was invariably depicted on the stage as an impostor: Brody, The Deme-
trius Legend, 217-273, 275-276. 
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tsarevich’s favourites about it, or because the tsarevich had his spies at the court of Boris 
Godunov, whose evil disposition was known to the tsarevich).57 
 
Thus Herckmans offers his readers a choice of variants to one of the motifs in his 
plot, no doubt drawing on his own store of knowledge of similar tales involving 
unsuccessful assassination attempts. Herckmans believes that Dmitrii escaped death 
not only at Uglich in 1591 but also in Moscow in 1606, in the latter case as the 
result of temporarily transferring power to a double – an episode which he contrasts 
with the legend of King Ninus of Babylon, who was killed by his concubine 
Semiramis when he allowed her to become monarch for a day.58 
The Second and Third False Dmitriis 
The Second False Dmitrii did not appear in Russia until the summer of 1607, but 
rumours were rife in Moscow from the very day of Tsar Dmitrii’s murder that he 
had escaped death. In many of these rumours, in an echo of the First False Dmitrii’s 
back-story, a substitute victim had been killed, and the tsar had fled from the 
capital.59 Jacques Margeret, who was in Moscow at the time of the uprising against 
Dmitrii, recorded the rumours but expressed doubts about their veracity.60 Petreius 
left Russia at the end of 1605, but came back in 1607/1608 on a mission from 
Charles IX to Vasilii Shuiskii. He assures his readers that on his return to Russia he 
was informed by “Russians and foreigners who can be believed” that Grishka had 
indeed died.61 Petreius is very scathing about those who thought that Dmitrii had 
again escaped death, a rumour for which he blames the Jesuits, the main villains of 
his narrative.62 In his Relation of 1608 Petreius does not provide any specific 
information about the Second False Dmitrii, but in his History of 1620 he discusses 
                                                 
57  Skazaniia Massy i Gerkmana o smutnom vremeni v Rossii (St Petersburg, 1874), 264. 
58  Skazaniia Massy i Gerkmana, 285-286. 
59  One variant of these rumours – that “a German named Artsykalus” had been killed in his 
stead – was incorporated into the back-story of the Second False Dmitrii: D. Buturlin, Is-
toriia smutnogo vremeni v Rossii v nachale XVII veka, 3 vols. (St Petersburg, 1839-
1846), 2 [1841]: Prilozheniia, no.7, p.51. 
60  Margeret, The Russian Empire, 75-77. For various versions of the rumours, see Perrie, 
'Popular Socio-Utopian Legends' in the Time of Troubles, 239-242; Perrie, Pretenders 
and Popular Monarchism, 109-115. The accounts of foreigners present in Moscow at the 
time of Dmitrii's overthrow provide the main evidence of the content of these rumours.  
61  Reliatsiia Petra Petreia, 103. 
62  Ibid., 73, 97. The Jesuits were also accused of spreading these rumours by Philippe de 
Canaye, the French ambassador to Venice: see Bercé, Le roi caché, 355. 
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both the Second and Third False Dmitriis, preceding this part of his account with 
the comment that, although both Dmitrii of Uglich and Grishka Otrep’ev were 
really dead, 
 
other Dmitriis were invented in the very same way, causing much evil and much blood to be 
shed. The Poles and the cossacks played a big vulgar joke and comedy with the Russians, 
because as soon as one Dmitrii died, another immediately appeared in his place, so that there 
was no end to the Dmitriis.63 
 
In relation to the Third False Dmitrii, who appeared in north-west Russia in 1611, 
after the murder of the Second False Dmitrii at Kaluga, Petreius notes sarcastically 
that “he, like the others, called himself the true son of Ivan Vasil’evich, Dmitrii, 
who had now three times been subjected to such great mortal danger, first at Uglich, 
then in Moscow and finally at Kaluga, but had always avoided death”.64 
Other foreign observers, too, subsequently mocked the proliferation of Dmitriis. 
Samuel Purchas notes that when the body of the First False Dmitrii was burned, the 
ashes were “throwne into the aire, the seeds, as the sequele seemed to show, of 
many Demetris after”.65 When the same author reports the appearance of the 
Second False Dmitrii (“another revived Demetrius”) he adds, “yea many pretending 
that Name and Title did after arise, as out of his dispersed ashes”, and later refers to 
“that Demetrius new risen from the dead (not to mention the others of inferiour 
note)”.66 Jerome Horsey, in his account written in the 1620s, claims that the Polish 
crown “had many Dmitriis in store to maintain the same title”.67 Lope de Vega – 
perhaps thinking of the proliferation of Portuguese Sebastians – attributes to Boris 
Godunov’s ambassador to King Sigismund the idea that the appearance of one 
pretender was likely to give rise to “a thousand” others.68  
The appearance of multiple pretenders, however, undermined the credibility of 
each of them. None of the later pretenders of the Time of Troubles was a plausible 
claimant to the throne. Unlike the First False Dmitrii, whose authenticity continues 
                                                 
63  Petrei, Istoriia, 244. 
64  Ibid., 297.  
65  Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 14: 197. Howe wrongly attributes the quotation to “Cap-
tain Gilbert's report” (The False Dmitri, 63). 
66  Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 14: 198; cf. Howe, The False Dmitri, 65, 66. 
67  L.E. Berry and R.O. Crummey, eds., Rude and Barbarous Kingdom: Russia in the Ac-
counts of Sixteenth-Century English Voyagers (Madison, WI, 1968), 365. 
68  Lope de Vega, El Gran Duque de Moscovia, Acto III, l.552; Brody, The Demetrius Leg-
end, 65, 131, 279. 
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to be considered possible by some credulous historians,69 the claims of the Second 
False Dmitrii were accepted by only a few contemporary foreign observers, such as 
the Poles in his camp at Tushino, who had a vested interest in doing so.70 Charles 
IX sent Petreius to Ivangorod to inspect the Third False Dmitrii, but the Swedes 
were soon disillusioned with this new pretender.71 As we have seen, the critics of 
the First False Dmitrii in 1603-1604 had cited the precedents of earlier pretenders 
such as the Portuguese Sebastians in order to discredit his claims; in its turn, the 
precedent of Tsar Dmitrii, officially “unmasked” by Shuiskii as an impostor, was 
used by hostile foreign observers to mock his various reincarnations. 
Tsarevich Petr and the Other Cossack Tsareviches 
Samuel Purchas, as noted above, had referred to the Second False Dmitrii and other 
pretenders “of inferiour note”: since there was only one other False Dmitrii, we may 
assume that these included the multitude of cossack “tsareviches” who appeared in 
1606-1608, all claiming to be relatives of Tsar Dmitrii. With the exception of 
“Tsarevich” Petr Fedorovich, who was a major ally of Ivan Bolotnikov in 1606-
1607, information about these pretenders is very scarce, in both Russian and foreign 
sources, but they all seem to have acted in Dmitrii’s name, as his supporters against 
Shuiskii, rather than as his rivals or opponents.72 
The earliest foreign evidence about Tsarevich Petr is provided by Margeret, 
who notes that at the end of April 1606 Tsar Dmitrii had received news that about 
4000 cossacks had assembled between Kazan’ and Astrakhan’, and that they 
                                                 
69  Philip L. Barbour, Dimitry, Called the Pretender, Tsar and Great Prince of All Russia, 
1605-1606 (Boston, MA, 1966; London, 1967); Chester S.L. Dunning, Russia's First Civ-
il War. The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty (University 
Park, PA, 2001). 
70  See, for example, Dnevnik Mariny Mnishek, trans. V.N. Kozliakov (St Petersburg, 1995); 
“Dziennik Jana Piotra Sapiehy (1608-1611)”, in Polska a Moskwa w pierwszej po owie 
wieku XVII, ed. Aleksander Hirschberg, ( wow, 1901), 167-332. Those who believed that 
the Second False Dmitrii was Tsar Dmitrii generally also continued to believe that Tsar 
Dmitrii was Dmitrii of Uglich; for this reason, versions of the First False Dmitrii's back-
story are particularly common in Polish sources. 
71  Petrei, Istoriia, 297-300, 307-308. 
72  On these pretenders, see Perrie, Pretenders and Popular Monarchism, 90-97, 131-49, 174-
81; Maureen Perrie, “Pretenders in the Name of the Tsar: Cossack 'Tsareviches' in Seven-
teenth-Century Russia”, in Von Moskau nach St. Petersburg. Das russische Reich im 17. 
Jahrhundert, ed. Hans-Joachim Torke, Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, vol. 
56 (Wiesbaden, 2000), 243-256, 244-249.  
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“caused harm along the Volga” because they felt that they had not been adequately 
rewarded by Dmitrii.73 The cossacks were said to have with them a young prince 
called Petr, who was supposedly the son of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich and his wife Irina. 
His back-story was a variant of Dmitrii’s: the boy had allegedly been replaced at 
birth by a girl (the real Tsarevna Feodosiia, who died as an infant). According to 
Margeret, the cossacks’ story was untrue, and “it was well known that this was only 
a pretext to pillage the land”. Dmitrii wrote to Petr inviting him to Moscow, but the 
tsar was assassinated before the cossacks could reach the capital.74 
The Dutch merchant’s account, however, states (somewhat improbably) that it 
was Dmitrii who had created the new pretender: that after his murder Dmitrii had 
been condemned by the new government of Vasilii Shuiskii for inviting Tsarevich 
Petr to Moscow to help him: 
 
[…] he was accused to haue beene the Authour, and occasion of a great spoyle, and domage, 
which fell out vppon the riuer of Volga, causing himselfe by false markes to be proclaimed 
the sonne of Fender Iuanuitz, whom under this pretext he had suborned to come to his 
succour, with many thousand Cosaques, to be the more secured of the countrey.75 
 
Like Margeret, the Dutch author describes the looting committed by Petr’s 
cossacks: “[…] he was the cause of marueilous ruine to the country, for all the Ports 
of Astracasses were sacked, and all the goodes and marchandize there, robbed, and 
pilled”.76 
Petreius at the time of writing his Relation knew something of the later history 
of Tsarevich Petr, since he notes that he was captured at Tula in 1607 and hanged in 
Moscow in 1608.77 Like Margeret, he regards Petr as a pretender created by the 
                                                 
73  Margeret, The Russian Empire, 70-71, cf. 71: 'These Cossacks were discontented with 
Dmitrii, reckoning that they had not been recompensed by him as they had hoped to be'. 
74  Ibid., 71. For other versions of Tsarevich Petr's back-story, mostly taken from Polish 
sources, see Perrie, 'Popular Socio-Utopian Legends' in the Time of Troubles, 236-239; 
Perrie, Pretenders and Popular Monarchism, 140-142. 
75  Howe, The False Dmitri, 58-59; cf. Isaac Massa,  A Short History of the Beginnings and 
Origins of These Present Wars in Moscow under the Reign of Various Sovereigns Down 
to the Year 1610, trans. G. Edward Orchard (Toronto, 1982), 148: “[…] they accused him 
of having provoked the appearance of an impostor who was to come and lend him assis-
tance in case of danger.” On the relationship between Massa's work and the anonymous 
Dutch merchant's 'Reporte', see Massa, A Short History, xxiii. Massa was a Dutch mer-
chant whose contemporary account was first published only in the 19th century. 
76  Howe, The False Dmitri, 59. 
77  Reliatsiia Petra Petreia, 99. 
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Cossacks,78 although his only mention of him is very brief, and it is situated in his 
list of arguments why Grishka Otrep’ev was not the real Dmitrii of Uglich: “In the 
fifth place, if Grishka were alive and were the true Dmitrii, the cossacks would not 
have chosen someone else in his place, as they did with Prince Petr, who claimed to 
be his relative and cousin”.79 Petreius also knows about two other cossack 
pretenders: he continues: “In the sixth place, if Grisha were the real Dmitrii, the 
cossacks and other renegades after the death of Prince Petr would not have chosen 
two others as their rulers and would not have made them sons of Fedor Ivanovich, 
whom he never had […]”80 
Samuel Purchas also knows about these Cossack tsareviches. He cites a Russian 
source which states that in addition to the Second False Dmitrii there were other 
pretenders (“Wors”) who “did name and call themselves sonnes of the slaine 
Emperour, as Ivan, Peter, Pheodor, and by many and divers other names: and under 
the same names, did consume the State, and shead much blood.”81 Purchas himself 
describes Russia after the deposition of Shuiskii and death of the Second False 
Dmitrii as a many-headed monster, which he equates both with the Biblical beast of 
the Apocalypse and with the Hydra of classical mythology.82 The image of the 
many-headed monster to represent the multitude was a commonplace of English 
conservative political discourse in the mid-16th to mid-17th centuries, when it was 
deployed in response to popular revolts.83 Purchas too uses it in this pejorative 
sense to describe the situation which prevailed in Russia in the later stages of the 
Time of Troubles: “a popular government happened, or if you will, a Confusion of 
the multitude bare sway”; “the whole Body became Heads in the worst of tyrannies, 
                                                 
78  In his History, however, Petreius describes Petr as Tsar Fedor's illegitimate son, who had 
fled to the cossacks and lived among them for several years in order to avoid an attempt 
on his life by Boris Godunov, but when his uncle Dmitrii became tsar, Petr had planned 
to approach him to request a princely remuneration. Petrei, Istoriia, 253. This version of 
Tsarevich Petr's story appears to have been borrowed by Petreius from Bussow, cf. Bus-
sow, The Disturbed State, 96. 
79  Reliatsiia Petra Petreia, 99. In fact Petr claimed to be Tsar Fedor's son, and hence 
Dmitrii's half-nephew. The logic of Petreius' argument is rather obscure.  
80  Reliatsiia Petra Petreia, 99. In his History of 1620, however, Petreius does not mention 
these cossack pretenders, probably because they are not mentioned by Bussow, who is his 
main source for this part of the History. 
81  Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 14: 247. 
82  Ibid., 14: 230, 252. 
83  Christopher Hill, “The Many-Headed Monster in Late Tudor and Early Stuart Political 
Thinking”, in From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation, ed. Charles H. Carter 
(London, 1966), 296-324. 
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a popular (government shall I say? or) confusion.”84 He contrasts the anarchy 
represented by the many-headed monster with monarchies, which “(how ever 
excessive and tyrannical)” were depicted “in divine Visions” as “simpler and more 
uniforme beasts”.85 But Purchas adapts the image of the Hydra to incorporate not 
only mob rule but also the existence of pretenders: the monster’s heads included the 
“many Wor’s after the first and second Demetrius”, and Purchas laments the 
fragmentation to which they contributed.86 The use of this striking imagery to 
represent the chaos which pretenders could create indicates the fear which 
conservative thinkers of the age experienced in the face not only of social unrest but 
also of multiple sources of political legitimacy. 
STEN’KA RAZIN’S TSAREVICH ALEKSEI ALEKSEEVICH 
The generally hostile and sceptical attitude which foreign observers expressed 
towards Tsarevich Petr and the other Cossack pretenders of the Time of Troubles 
can also be found in foreigners’ accounts of the revolt of Sten’ka Razin. Two of 
these provide unique information about the ‘Tsarevich Aleksei Alekseevich’ who 
supposedly accompanied Razin on his voyage up the Volga: the anonymous 
Relation, first published in German and Dutch in 1671 and in English and French in 
1672; and the 1674 dissertation, written in Latin, of the German writer Johannes 
Justus Martius (Merz, Mertz).87  
The real Tsarevich Aleksei Alekseevich, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich’s eldest 
son, had died in January 1670 at the age of 16.88 According to the Relation, 
                                                 
84  Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 14: 231, 252. 
85  Ibid., 14: 230. Of the Biblical references which Purchas provides, the most relevant for 
beasts representing monarchies is Daniel 7 and 8. Thomas Hobbes was later to use the 
image of the Biblical monster Leviathan (cf. Job 41) as a metaphor for his ideal Com-
monwealth and its monarch. See John M. Steadman, “Leviathan and Renaissance Ety-
mology”, Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (1967): 575-576. 
86  Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 14: 252. 
87  Zapiski inostrantsev o vosstanii Stepana Razina, ed. A.G. Man'kova (Leningrad, 1968), 
84-126; Inostrannye izvestiia o vosstanii Stepana Razina. Materialy i issledovaniia, ed. 
A.G. Man'kova (Leningrad, 1975), 15-79. 
88  At an earlier stage in the rising, in his speech to the cossacks at Panshin Gorodok in May 
1670, Razin had cited the recent deaths of Tsarevich Aleksei, his younger brother Simeon 
and their mother, Tsaritsa Mariia Il'inichna Miloslavskaia, as evidence of the treason of 
the boyars. Martius knows this: he states that Razin initially blamed the boyars and pro-
claimed himself the avenger for the death of Aleksei Alekseevich (Inostrannye izvestiia, 
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however, as Sten’ka sailed up the Volga he had two ships, one lined with red and 
the other with black velvet, in which, he claimed, were Tsarevich Aleksei and the 
recently deposed Patriarch Nikon, respectively.89 On the first vessel, Razin kept in 
the role of Aleksei Alekseevich a young Circassian prince whom he had earlier 
taken prisoner and whom he “compelled to act such a person”. Razin 
 
spred abroad, that this Lord Czarawitz had made an escape from the violent hands of the 
Bojars and great Lords, and taken his refuge to him; adding, that he, Stenko, was come by 
order of the Great Czar to put to death all the Bojars, Nobles, Senators, and other great ones, 
(that were too near to his Majesty), as Enemies and Traytors of their Countrey.90 
 
Martius repeats and amplifies this version of the Razinites’ tale: 
 
Now they began to assert everywhere, that the son of the tsar had not died after all, but had 
fled from the plots which were being prepared against him and – safe and sound – was with 
Razin. The rumour was also spread that the boyars, hatred towards whom was irreconcilable, 
had tried to take all the power into their hands, had planned to kill the tsarevich […] and […] 
are wickedly causing tumult in the realm.91 
 
Razin “persuaded everyone who wanted to have revenge and not to submit to the 
boyars, to join him and punish them for their lawlessness, recognising that this was 
the only way to save the realm from its decadent condition and to restore the true 
heir.”92 Martius notes that Razin displayed both Nikon and Aleksei standing in full 
                                                                                                            
67). On the Tsarevich Aleksei affair, see Perrie, Pretenders in the Name of the Tsar, 249-
252. 
89  Zapiski inostrantsev, 97-98. Martius describes the ships as draped in red and black silk 
respectively (Inostrannye izvestiia, 70). 
90  Zapiski inostrantsev, 98. The wording here is similar to that in the text of Razin's death 
sentence, reproduced as an Appendix to the Relation: “Thou didst also send to many oth-
er Towns some of thy villanous Companions, by false Writings bearing them in hand, 
that the Eldest Son of our Great Czar […] was yet living, and that thou by Order of his 
Majesty, wast come to put to death as Traytors, all Bojars, Councellors, Noble-men and 
Officers, being in his Majesties service” (ibid., 104-105). The death sentence, however, 
did not accuse Razin of setting up a pretender, but simply of spreading the rumour that 
Tsarevich Aleksei was still alive.  
91  Inostrannye izvestiia, 67. 
92  Ibid., 67. Neither account tells us how (or whether) Razin explained the tsarevich's escape 
from death, but presumably the motif of a substitute victim, familiar from the Time of 
Troubles, was known in the cossack milieu. The False Simeon Alekseevich, who ap-
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view on the ships; Sten’ka claimed that they had both fled to place themselves 
under his protection, and that they were now quite safe from the conspiracies of the 
boyars.93 
Neither Martius nor the author of the Relation has any doubt that the “Tsarevich 
Aleksei” on Razin’s red-draped vessel was an impostor. According to the Relation, 
Razin “boldly pretended” that Aleksei was still alive, and “to colour this lye the 
better” he kept the Circassian prince on board the ship in the role of the tsarevich, 
and disseminated the story about his escape from death, in order “to ruine the 
Russian Empire and to seduce the common people”. The writer describes the entire 
scenario in terms such as “mischievous devices” and “Artifices”, and concludes that 
“By these base practises invented and push’t on by Stenko, the ignorant people was 
inflamed to fight furiously”.94 Martius too identifies the false Tsarevich Aleksei as 
the captive Circassian prince, and claims that the vessel on which Nikon was 
supposedly sailing contained only an image of the patriarch.95 He describes the 
business with the two vessels supposedly carrying the tsarevich and the patriarch as 
a “cunning ploy” (dolum) and a “shameless fraud” (impio simulacro), which 
nevertheless succeeded in gaining and retaining support for Razin’s enterprise.96 
Both authors, and the author of the Relation in particular, present Razin as a 
skilful demagogue, who made use of the grievances of the ordinary people in order 
to further his own aims of revenge for his brother’s death and his thirst for power. 
The author of the Relation recognises that the people had grievances and aspirations 
of their own which might motivate them to rebel, but he does so only implicitly and 
indirectly. He states, for example, that Razin did “much mischief” by sending out 
his “Emissaries from Astrakhan”, who “stirr’d up the people to insurrection”, and 
                                                                                                            
peared in Zaporozh'e in 1673 in the company of some of Razin's former cossack support-
ers, told an elaborate tale in which the courtier who was ordered to poison him had poi-
soned a choirboy instead, dressed his victim in the tsarevich's clothes, and organised the 
real Simeon's escape: S.M. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, 15 vols. 
(Moscow, 1960-65), 6 (1961): 462. 
93  Inostrannye izvestiia, 70. These two foreign accounts are the only sources to describe the 
mystification with the red- and black-draped vessels, and the presence of a false Aleksei 
aboard the red ship. 
94  Zapiski inostrantsev, 97-98.  
95  Inostrannye izvestiia, 67, 70. 
96  Ibid., 46, 70. Compare the wording of the death sentence, on Razin’s claim that Aleksei 
Alekseevich was still alive: “But Thou Traytor didst devise this with a designe to dis-
compose the people, and to occasion the shedding of innocent blood.” And on Nikon: 
“Thou hast also craftily given out, as if the Monk Nikow was with thee” (Zapiski in-
ostrantsev, 105).   
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adds that: “Every where he promised Liberty, and a redemption from the Yoak (so 
he call’d it) of the Bojars and Nobles, which he said were the oppressors of the 
Countrey’. In Moscow, the author continues, “men began to speak openly in his 
praise, as if he were a person that sought the publick good and the liberty of the 
people […]”.97 
And Martius states that Razin’s agents incited the Russians “to rebellion, on the 
pretext of fighting for their former freedom against boyar violence”. In 1667, “he 
set out on the road to tyranny, while presenting his vile enterprise as hatred towards 
it [tyranny]”.98 In terms of his rabble-rousing abilities, Martius compares Razin with 
Catiline and with Wilhelm von Grumbach, the leader of a 16th-century German 
rising against the Emperor.99 Thus the German author brings a trans-national 
comparative perspective to bear on the Razin revolt, but he does so in relation not to 
the pretender phenomenon as such, but rather to the leadership of Razin, whose 
exploitation of the rumour about Tsarevich Aleksei he presents as only one device 
in his arsenal of demagogic stratagems to attract popular support. 
Unlike the Time of Troubles, when the source of political legitimacy itself was 
contested, the Razin revolt was a more conventional example of an uprising against 
the established order, and both Martius and the author of the Relation condemn 
Razin as a rebel against a legitimate ruler. The English account concludes with the 
pious words: “God Almighty give to the great Czar, Alexis Michaelewitz, the 
Victory over all his Enemies”,100 and Martius reflects on Razin’s execution that “no 
other end was deserved by one who betrayed his sovereign and was an enemy and 
traitor to his fatherland (desertor sui Imperatoris, et Patriae hostis Preditorque 
fuit)”.101 In line with the philosophy which prevailed in Europe in the later 
seventeenth century, after the experience of civil war and rebellion in England and 
elsewhere, both writers were hostile to a popular revolt which threatened social and 
political stability. 
CONCLUSION 
The Time of Troubles of the early 17th century was a complex sequence of events, 
involving foreign invasion as well as dynastic strife, civil war and social unrest. It is 
                                                 
97  Zapiski inostrantsev, 97. My emphasis (M.P.). 
98  Inostrannye izvestiia, 67. 
99  Ibid., 67, 69. His other comparisons, with Ivan Podkova and Philip the Magnanimous of 
Hesse (ibid., 64-65) are made in terms of their physical strength. 
100 Zapiski inostrantsev, 101. 
101 Inostrannye izvestiia, 50, 75. 
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not surprising that contemporary foreigners’ accounts focussed on those aspects 
which had the greatest international significance – the succession to the throne, and 
the rival interventions of Poland and Sweden – rather than on the socio-economic 
grievances of lower-class Russians, which are stressed in most modern historians’ 
accounts. The greatest trans-national interest of all, however, was aroused by the 
pretender phenomenon, and in particular by the extraordinary career and intriguing 
personality of the First False Dmitrii. Even those foreign observers who regarded 
him as an impostor mostly found him attractive and impressive as an individual; 
and the complex representation of the pretender in later literary and historical works 
owes much to his broadly sympathetic depiction by foreign participants in the Time 
of Troubles (after May 1606 Russian sources, by contrast, painted a uniformly 
negative picture of him as the apostate monk Grisha Otrep’ev). 
Pretenders have often been seen as a peculiarly Russian phenomenon, but the 
evidence examined in this article suggests that both the phenomenon itself and the 
narratives which accompanied it originated outside Muscovy and were brought into 
the country by the First False Dmitrii. Dmitrii’s supporters presented him as the true 
heir to the throne, returning to overthrow the usurper Boris Godunov. This back-
story resonated with (and may have been based on) the plots of chivalric romances 
which were popular in Western and Central Europe, and some foreign observers 
depicted Dmitrii as the hero of just such an adventure narrative. Others, however, 
who were acquainted with the pretender phenomenon elsewhere, saw Dmitrii as an 
impostor in the tradition of the Portuguese Sebastians and the false claimants to the 
Moldavian throne. The foreigners’ accounts of Dmitrii’s career transmitted familiar 
topoi back to their European audience: either the heroic romance of the persecuted 
tsarevich providentially restored to his ancestral throne (Barezzo Barezzi, Lope de 
Vega) or the cautionary tale of a fraudster who obtained his just deserts (Petreius).  
If the pretender phenomenon was imported into Russia by the First False 
Dmitrii, it found there a fertile soil in which it rapidly took root: either providing 
legitimation for revolt against a reigning monarch such as Vasilii Shuiskii, who, 
like Boris Godunov, was widely perceived as a usurper; or adding weight to a 
rebellion in the name of the true tsar (the Cossack campaigns involving Tsarevich 
Petr and others in support of “Tsar Dmitrii”; and Razin’s recruitment of Aleksei 
Alekseevich to help save his father from the traitor-boyars). After the death of the 
First False Dmitrii, however, the proliferation of self-styled descendants of Ivan the 
Terrible discredited the pretender phenomenon in the eyes not only of many upper-
class Russians, but also of foreign observers. While Tsar Dmitrii had been depicted 
by some as the real Dmitrii of Uglich, later Russian pretenders were represented in 
foreigners’ accounts almost exclusively as fraudsters and impostors. Within Russia, 
the motif of the true heir returning to reclaim his throne persisted in the back-stories 
of pretenders; and it was also found in the popular rumours and tales which 
surrounded them. The phenomenon of pretendership moved rapidly down the social 
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scale: the First False Dmitrii had been received at the court of the Polish king and 
corresponded with the Pope, but by the 18th century Russian pretenders were mostly 
of lower-class (cossack or peasant) background; and the narrative of the long-lost 
prince, originating in the chivalric romances of medieval Western Europe, had 
become folklorised in Russian popular culture. In their Russian manifestation, 
however, pretenders and their back-stories still had the power to mobilise a major 
popular revolt, as was the case with Pugachev in 1773-1774. 
 
 
Transgression of Boundaries  





Political Vacuum and Interregnum 




Great European revolts and civil wars were often preceded by a particular 
institutional aspect that was unintended but more or less inherent in monarchical (or 
maybe any political) order: the temporary lack of central power. The last episode of 
the French Wars of Religion, the Russian Time of Troubles, the French Fronde and 
similar events are only the most visible examples of political and social disorder 
caused by a vacant throne. Bluntly put, the notion of a void of sovereign power lies 
in the realm of history; it cannot be acknowledged by the Law schools. I would like 
to suggest that history tries to tell the events as they were, while legal studies 
describe them as they should have been. Historians are used to explore episodes of 
unrest, lawlessness and chaos, while positivistic Law teaches that such a thing 
should not even come into existence. Indeed, in our contemporary societies, 
constitutional texts provide rules to be followed on extreme occasions. They 
establish a collection of successive measures securing the continuation of the state 
so that the throne or head of state’s position can never remain unoccupied. Law is 
used to argue in terms of structural continuity, as if a change of regime was forever 
unthinkable. As the primary task of constitutional laws is to argue in favour of a 
legal and undisputable regime, only History has the capacity to show in retrospect 
how a regime could become incapacitated and eventually overthrown. At worst, in 
the light of an extraordinary tragedy or an evident impotence of central power, as, 
for example, it happened in France in 1814 or again in 1940, lawyers convened to 
compose an expedient legal text in order to organise transition and thus to re-
establish a visible realm of legality. Experience has shown that in case of a regime’s 
collapse, there have always been wise and cunning political survivors who then felt 
called upon to write a new constitution. To follow the 1814 example, the French 
senators were summoned by Talleyrand in April of the same year to declare the 
forfeiture of Napoleon’s imperial status. For that purpose, they referred to the old 
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and classical utopia of an original social contract, which Napoleon was accused to 
have violated when imposing new taxes without the consent of the French people. 
What is this notion of a political vacuum, the potential of which we are looking 
for throughout the early modern age? Let us define it as an accidental interruption 
of a political regime, an obvious vacuum of central power, the absence of any 
holder of the sovereign title or, conversely, the competition of several pretenders. It 
is a structural situation, a classical scheme that ancient dignitaries knew well and 
feared for very good reasons. They knew that it could happen in any form of 
regime, at any time, in any country. Let us imagine a village or a town left without 
relations to the central authority, without news, without help; then the political 
game would halt accordingly, coming down to its minimum scale, providing 
structure only to what is nearest and most immediate. Let a region be invaded by 
enemies or isolated by a catastrophe, such as an earthquake or plague, responsibility 
and power will be taken by a few local notables, mayor, syndic or landlord. So it 
happened in many regions and localities during the Second World War, especially 
in the tragic summer months of 1940 and 1944.  
In early modern times, in catholic regions, it was generally the parish vicar or a 
capuchin friar who was able to receive complaints, organise assistance and 
negotiate with the enemies, in short, to act as community spokesman.  
But in any epoch, the vacuum of power causes a return to primary or traditional 
authorities. This return may remain only a temporary refuge in a moment of 
adversity or, on the contrary, become a political challenge to central authority as 
such, an appeal to major traditional communal rights. Very different situations such 
as the commotion of a successful riot, the momentary victory of popular violence or 
an invasion by a foreign enemy may have very similar consequences: the legitimate 
power is overthrown and hence the power belongs to the street, to anyone able to 
master the course of events, if it is a dignitary or conversely some obscure chief 
who emerged in this emergency situation. In ancient rural societies, it could be an 
innkeeper, a veteran, a village solicitor who could become the precarious leader, the 
hero of the moment. Nothing except bravery, fair speeches or a feather on his hat 
was required, so that even hitherto unknown people could almost instantly play key 
roles. 
Such a situation occurred in Naples in June 1647, at the time of the most famous 
and most widely covered revolt of the early modern age.1 After some scuffles on the 
                                                 
1  Among a numerous bibliography on the Neapolitan crisis, see the recent study by Alain 
Hugon, Naples insurgée, 1647-1648. De l'événement à la mémoire (Rennes, 2011). 
The limits of a possible subversion of society and politics by the Neaopolitan revolt are 
shown by the easy restauration of Spanish power, which would last peacefully until 1708. 
On this topic, see the monumental work of Giuseppe Galasso, Napoli spagnola, dopo 
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market, in the timespan of only a few hours, the Spanish viceroy’s authority had 
vanished. The garrison soldiers had disappeared, having locked themselves in the 
castles. The big city seemed to have fallen, left for anybody who was capable of 
taking it. A fishmonger called Masaniello became the central figure in town, even if 
only for the duration of eight days. His extraordinary political fate stupefied 
contemporaries and fascinated posterity. In historiography, he occupies a strange 
and prominent place. He has become the best example of popular insolence, of 
sudden political promotion; he has become also the best model of the misfortune 
that awaited those who dared to defy the social order. His story would, for a long 
time, serve as a lesson of civic morality teaching everyone to respect his limits, and 
this applies both to the seemingly omnipotent viceroy who was so easily driven out 
of his palace and to the popular leader who was so pathetically murdered after only 
a week of his unwonted and cruel way of governing the city like a king, or rather, 
like the most absurd tyrant. 
During the following nine months, the Spaniards’ incapacity to reconquer the 
town perpetuated political uncertainty. In those days, every professional group 
among the Neapolitan people put forward new grievances, requests and 
controversial opinions. Censorship had disappeared, speech was free, usual 
eligibiliies for office became irrelevant, utopia was convenient and power was up 
for grabs, colloquially speaking. As it would happen in Paris in 1648 (during the 
Fronde) or again in 1790 (during the first months of Revolution), in 1647 a strange 
social phenomenon emerged in Naples. Historians have called it an explosion of 
political expression, a sudden, unusual, mad and chaotic freedom of speech. 
Disappearance of authority and proliferating demands were complementary. 
Uncertain legitimacy was a recurrent political danger in the old elective 
monarchies, sometimes even an unavoidably perilous period of transition. Two 
historical examples seem obvious in this logic, the State of the Church and the 
Kingdom of Poland. 
In Rome, after the death of a pope, specific institutions were called upon.2 This 
procedure was meticulously organised by the Roman Church. It originated from the 
first centuries of Christianity, as soon as the Pope, bishop of Rome, had become the 
undisputed political sovereign of the Eternal City. The assembly of cardinals, 
                                                                                                            
Masaniello (Florence, 1972); id., Il Regno di Napoli. Il Mezzogiorno spagnolo e austria-
co, 1622-1734 (Torino, 2006). 
2  Roman popular customs following the death of a pope have been examined by Italian 
medievalist historians. Reinhard Elze, “Sic transit gloria mundi. La morte del Papa nel 
Medioevo”, Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento 3 (1977): 23-41; Ago-
stino. Paravicini-Bagliani, Il corpo del Papa (Torino, 1994); Yves-Marie Bercé, A la dé-
couverte des trésors cachés (Paris, 2004), 271-273. 
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referred to as conclave, had to prepare the election of the next pope. Their travels to 
Rome, and their subsequent discussions could last several months, forming a long 
interregnum. During this period, government passed into the hands of the cardinal 
Camerlengo, who normally was in charge of the Church finances. In theory, 
nothing changed in the way the offices worked, and neither did anything in the 
institutional hierarchy. However, everybody knew that dangerous days lay ahead. 
Prelates and noblemen locked up their palaces and established armed guards to 
repulse possible attacks or sieges. Indeed, according to an ancient tradition the 
Roman people had a right to the dead Pope’s personal property. Already in the 6th 
Century, following the death of a bishop, the clerics of his diocese were accustomed 
to keep tabs on the goods left by the dead prelate. There was a logic in this strange 
custom. A bishop was supposed to be dedicated to the service of his mission, so that 
after his death his assets had to be returned to his church. This spurious tradition 
was claimed by the clerics and servants of the bishopric, particularly by the most 
rapid and skilful of them. The same rule was applied to pontifical assets in Rome 
and in all cities of the State of the Church. The origin of this creed seems to go back 
to a legendary memory of the right of citizenship in ancient Rome; it may also be 
the anthropological utopia of a primitive free status of humanity. It was in the 14th 
century, when the control of the large Roman population was a stake disputed 
between the local tradesmen and the clerics, that the pillaging custom became an 
institution of sorts. When the Pope returned from Avignon to Rome the ritual 
plundering was considered as revenge, retaliation for the Pontiff’s long absence. In 
1378, when Urban VI was elected after Gregory XI’s death, a mob awaited him in 
front of the conclave’s doors. The populace had already plundered the last Pope’s 
palace and now they asked the new one to distribute gifts, called mansilia, i.e. to 
throw silver coins to the crowd as a gesture of largesse. The ceremonial was 
supposed to demonstrate that the Pope served only as a depository of a treasure that 
belonged to all Christians, as if Christianity was represented by those who turned 
out to be in the streets, i.e. by those who were lucky to be in the right place at the 
right time.  
During the 16th and 17th centuries the right to plunder was maintained and 
actually exercised at every sede vacante. Usual laws and regulations seemed to 
have lost their legitimacy during this institutional moment. Sometimes plundering, 
theft and even murder were escalating to a tremendous degree, so that indignant 
witnesses hoped that it would soon be outlawed, for in their view it was indeed a 
disgrace to the Church. Such climaxes occurred in 1559, after the death of Paul III 
Farnese, in 1590, following the passing of the strong Sixtus Quintus, and finally in 
1654 upon the death of Innocent X, whose European policy had provoked much 
criticism, so that hatred between resident foreigners was exacerbated in Roman 
streets. Municipal magistrates, knowing all too well the traditional dangers of those 
days, organised patrols of militia men commanded by captains which had been 
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selected by the trades of each borough. It was a measure of precaution and 
simultaneously an observance of the strange custom. In some way, the dignitaries 
themselves respected the anomalous statute of these days. Indeed, they had to open 
the jails to free all prisoners incarcerated for debts or petty crimes, excepting only 
blood criminals. They organized guards in front of the dead pope’s houses, although 
in some places the pope’s relatives had already taken precautions and evacuated all 
movables, and in other places the servants had helped themselves and carried away 
whatever they were able to. 
In spite of all rules and precautions, nobody hindered the rabble to rule the city. 
Guards and foreign soldiers paid by ambassadors and cardinals of opposing nations 
fought openly in the streets. Mobs attacked the jails and freed popular bandits and 
murderers. In some provincial towns, where powerful factious families were used to 
fight for municipal dignities, retaliations and brawls exploded. 
The attempt to provide free access to the goods and chattels of the dead 
sovereign, liberation of the prisoners, general armament of the citizens and rights to 
open vengeance had reappeared at every sede vacante for at least four centuries. 
After 1654, these phenomena disappeared, either due to the modernisation of the 
Roman institutions or the decay of the politically high reputation of the Papacy. 
These behaviours can be read as a tentative form of subversion, as a return to 
primitive rights coming from God or from a mythical historical moment. 
Altogether, they can be looked at as a perspective of recurring renewal, a kind of 
violent welcome of the new pope, a step towards an expected happy pontifical reign 
to come. 
Another classical example of periodical instability was the Kingdom of Poland. 
Some elements of the Polish state might have to be recalled.3 It is well-known that 
the crown of Poland was elective and after the death of Sigismund Augustus, the 
last king from the Jagellon dynasty, the electoral assembly, Sejm or Diet, for the 
first time had an open and free choice. The Diet’s experiments well before 
Sigismund had gradually established a complex and precise governmental 
procedure that was to be observed during the interregnum. The interregnum 
consisted of three different assemblies: a diet of convocation (which was the most 
controversial one), a diet of election and a diet of crowning. During the 
interregnum, sovereignty was maintained by the archbishop of Gniezno, Primate of 
Poland, with the title of interrex. Public power was attributed to an elected marshal 
                                                 
3  The following summary of institutional practices of the Polish interregnums comes from 
the thesis of Ms. Natacha Leclercq, “Les journaux de la Diète de convocation polonaise 
de 1764”. This first hand work, thesis of the Ecole nationale des chartes in Paris, present-
ed in March 2009, has not yet been published. 
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who came from Little Poland, Great Poland or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 
according to the territory where the Diet was convened. 
All interregnum protocols and rites granted the kingdom its native freedom, 
which in 18th century was said to be inherited from the legendary Sarmatians. The 
free Polish people was supposed to be solely and completely embodied by its 
nobility. Indeed, if high-ranking members of the clergy had seats in the senate, there 
was actually no representation of burghers or town citizens in the diet, to which all 
noblemen were called. All noblemen were supposed to be equal, from the lowest 
landlords without any function up to the highest dignitaries and richest magnates. In 
addition, since the elections were personal, viritim, and since the votes had to be 
unanimous according to the right of liberum veto (from the diet of 1652 onwards), 
any nobleman could effectively filibuster or even entirely block political decisions 
at the diet. 
Ever since the diet of 1572, a list of measures was written down and presented 
to the future king. They were called pacta conventa. The newly elected monarch 
had to swear an oath, according to the precept si non jurabis, non regnabis. In 
addition, since the diet of 1587, the first point of deliberation had to be a 
denunciation of the misdeeds or crimes which the last king was responsible for. 
This collection of misdeeds was called exorbitances, gravamina or Rei publicae 
vulnera; the demands for their rejection were grievances or “doléances” in the 
common vocabulary of other early modern states. All these decisions, the writing of 
a convention to be sworn by and the composition of grievances, were supposed to 
renew the mythical original contract which, according to fictional memory, had 
linked the first king and the family chiefs at the time of the free Sarmatians. 
Thanks to this collection of rules, the interregnum looked paradoxically like the 
most legal and most efficient exertion of power, in contrast to which the actual 
reign of a king looked like a dangerous anomaly. It seemed that freedom reached its 
greatest degree only during the interregnum and that this political innocence, 
leaving the official annals of the kingdom aside, had to be renewed at every royal 
succession. 
Of course, a certain danger of anarchy was inherent to interregna. Riots, 
murders and brawls were commonplace during these extraordinary months. 
Intrusions of foreign powers during the long diets were patent and scandalous. 
Witnesses spoke of a “fair of freedom”, a time of “golden liberty.”4 It was actually 
during the 1648 interregnum that the wars known as the Time of Deluge began, and 
afterwards every diet meeting resulted in further weakening of the Polish kingdom. 
                                                 
4  Cf. Francis Dvornik, The Slavs: Their Early History and Civilization (Boston, 1956; 
reprint Boston, 1959); and Norman Davies, God's Playground. A History of Poland, 2 
vols. [Vol. 1: The Origins to 1795, Vol. 2: 1795 to the Present] (Oxford, 1981). 
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In both cases, the State of the Church and Poland, the mythical theme of a 
native situation of freedom can be identified. The major common point of these 
states was the electivity of their thrones, which therefore brought the frequent return 
of moments of political uncertainty, of sudden interruptions in the ordinary flow of 
events. 
The kingdom of France, however, represented quite an opposite model. There, 
royal jurists had precociously affirmed the principle of State continuity. They had 
established succession rules, which they claimed to be ancient and presented as 
fundamental laws of the realm. According to these laws, the new king immediately 
took his crown, without any intervention from the Church, the Parisian Parliament 
or an assembly of the estates. He became king at the very moment of his 
predecessor’s death, as the saying went: “the king never dies” or “the dead vests the 
living”. However, in spite of such a strong tradition, all periods of royal minority 
remained dangerous stages with threats of civil war. In contradiction to the learned 
doctrine emerged the popular idea that all political decisions had to be reconsidered 
at every new reign. In early modern times, this idea was as strong as ever. It 
demanded that all institutions had to be created anew, that the last reign’s misdeeds, 
such as taxes and wars, had to be cancelled whenever a young prince ascended to 
the throne. Here again appears the picture of an original contract between the 
people and the prince to whom public welfare had been entrusted. For political 
authors like Jean Bodin, this mythical contract could stand as the original consent of 
primitive forefathers; for some provincial historians it was a precise historical treaty 
linked to some legendary episode of the annals of the monarchy. At royal 
succession, this concept of an original state of freedom was remembered, and 
kingly prerogatives seemed to become subject to re-examination, as if a complete 
renegotiation of the state was imminent. 
It happened precisely in this manner at the end of Louis XIII’s reign. Cardinal 
Richelieu’s unpopularity and impatience towards the fiscal loads rose to the highest 
pitch. In November 1642, Richelieu’s death had boosted hope for political change. 
This opinion was strongly expressed in the words of the time by the parliament 
courts and by the assemblies of provincial estates. The importance of these 
representative institutions has often been ignored or overlooked by historians.5 So 
                                                 
5  To understand the importance of General Estates in Medieval and Early Modern France, 
see Neithard Bulst, Die französischen Generalstände von 1468 und 1484 (Sigmaringen, 
1992); Yves-Marie Bercé, “Le rôle des Etats-généraux dans le gouvernement du 
royaume, XVI° et XVII° siècles”, Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des inscrip-
tions et belles lettres 144, 4 (2000): 1221-1240. Of course, the estates were summoned in 
periods of political weakness, but they were not actually a subversive element. Instead 
they rather brought timely legal solutions. 
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far, at the end of the 17th century, a majority of provinces maintained their 
periodical meetings, which decided about consent to taxation, and took charge of 
tax assessment and collection. These prerogatives were alive chiefly in the Southern 
provinces, in the periphery of Auvergne and in little Pyrenean estates. In 1624, a 
strong offensive of fiscal centralisation had extended to some southern countries’ 
local fiscal offices, the so-called Bureaux d’élections, which had already been 
established in the 1550 in the Northern provinces. These finance offices were 
created to replace the traditional local estates. This occurred, for instance, in two 
little provinces surrounding the mountains of Auvergne, i.e. Rouergue and Quercy, 
This provocative administrative innovation had rapidly caused some local peasant 
uprisings in the summer of 1624; they were easily crushed, but even later the new 
institution was never accepted by the country folks. During the first months of 
1643, the estates of Rouergue were allowed to convene; they impressively asked for 
provincial fiscal debt relief, implying their intention to recover their local tax 
control.6 At the end of March 1643, the estates sent deputies to Paris to demonstrate 
the peasants’ misery and to plead for a fiscal reduction. Louis XIII died on the 14th 
of May, but the king’s councillors maintained the former political course without 
the slightest intention to modify the fiscal system. So, the deputies came back on 
the 26th of May without any promises, bringing with them only the recommendation 
to confide in the “intendant” of the larger province of Haute Guyenne. This 
dignitary, commissioner of the king’s Council, named Charreton, was by political 
conviction a resolute adversary of local powers. He had even tried to prevent the 
Estates’ deputation. However, notwithstanding the Council’s disappointing answer, 
popular hope had not weakened, so that on the 2nd of June, a score of country 
parishes from Lower Rouergue gathered in arms. This kind of country folk troop 
was at that time scornfully nicknamed “Croquants”. They managed to block the 
intendant himself in the town of Villefranche-de-Rouergue. Charreton, isolated, 
with only a few guards inside the town hall, was coerced by force to write down an 
ordinance reducing taxes to the level of the crucial year of 1618, when the young 
Louis XIII had effectively begun his personal government. This fake ordinance was 
all at once printed on leaflets and distributed all over the province of Rouergue. 
At the same time, the parliament courts of Toulouse (Languedoc) and Bordeaux 
(Guyenne) seemed to officially approve the claims put forward by the rebels of 
Rouergue. On the 4th of June, the Toulouse court filed a case against all royal 
                                                 
6  Yves-Marie Bercé, “La fin des Etats du Rouergue et les Croquants de 1643”, Etudes 
aveyronnaises. Recueil des travaux de la Société des lettres, sciences et arts de l'Aveyron, 
2008 (Rodez, 2009), 219-230; cf. id. “Voyages et routes des paysans. L'exemple du 
Rouergue en 1643”, in Les passions d'un historien. Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-
Pierre Poussou, ed. Reynald Abad et al. (Paris, 2010), 91-106. 
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commissioners who had been sent to Languedoc during the last ten years. On the 1st 
of July, the parliament court of Bordeaux, in its turn, relieved the intendants of any 
function under the threat of prosecution. In their logic, as fathers of the subjects and 
simultaneously keepers of the crown rights, the parliament councillors thought that 
it was their duty to repel inappropriate ruling, to make kings remember the 
fundamental laws on which they had to swear on coronation day. They held that a 
time of regency with an infant king on the throne put forward the political role of 
the magistrates. They referred to the free consent of the subjects to taxes, and to the 
required respect of judiciary procedures by the king. They demanded that the recent 
increase in duties and tolls would not have to be paid, since they had never been 
approved by the General Estates or by the Parliaments. They denounced the 
practice of commissioning intendants to the provinces with escorts of armed guards 
as an insult to the traditional, legitimate institutions of justice. They argued that all 
the dreadful decisions of the late king disappeared with him, and that these orders 
had, at least, to be re-discussed, especially in the event of an infant king’s accession 
to the throne, who was represented by his mother, the Regent Queen. So, the 
judiciary advice met the popular utopia of a return to the innocence of the “old 
days”; or, in another metaphor, that moment looked like the beginning of a political 
spring, a vernal renewal of the realm thanks to the arrival of a young prince. The 
power vacuum seemed to call for a new way of government. Even nowadays, a 
newly elected head of state is expected to grant reprieves and amnesties, and cut 
taxes, maybe, more or less sincere or efficacious. 
The intendant of Guyenne laughed at the daring actions of the Bordeaux court: 
 
These gentlemen imagine that with the king’s death they have got a general licence, that 
everything is dead with the king and only they have stayed alive and powerful, that all the 
army generals have had to flee to their home and to leave their duties at the death news, 
because, as they say, mandatum finitur morte, except for their own one. 
 
But the two subversive parliaments’ ordinances were published by the court’s 
printing masters, and sent everywhere. They confirmed the resolution of the 
Rouergue peasants. They directly instigated the noble estate of another 
neighbouring region, Gascony (Armagnac), to convene and articulate their 
grievances. There, a number of furious noblemen did even worse, when they took 
up arms and mounted their horses in order to expel and actually murder the 
intendant’s horse guards.7 
In Lower Rouergue, the popular insurgents seemed strongly encouraged by the 
ordinances of the two provincial courts, so that they could maintain their power in 
                                                 
7  Y.-M. Bercé, Histoire des Croquants, 2 vols. (Genéve, 1974), 2: 568, 569 and 575. 
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several smaller cities. They were convinced by the righteousness of their deeds; 
they believed that the Regent Queen would soon approve of their uprising. Alas for 
them, as a matter of fact, they were routed in a few days, at the beginning of 
October, as soon as the king’s Council was at last able to gather some five hundred 
horsemen to crush their disorderly, big troops. The intendant, Charreton captured 
and disarmed the insurgents; five of them had to die on wheels or gallows, and 
about one hundred others were sent to the Mediterranean galleys. 
I have to insist on my particular interpretation of these events. To say the truth, 
the fate of this small revolt in Rouergue has never been told in this fashion, i.e. 
stressing the role of the provincial estates and showing the convergence of peasant 
uprising and parliamentary ordinances. Local historians telling that story have 
generally referred to the commonplaces of villages’ misery and hopelessness of the 
popular complaints without mentioning the original institutional situation and the 
recurrent utopia of political renewal. 
It is noticeable that five years later, in the spring of 1648, the first events of the 
national crisis now called Fronde occurred again according to the same pattern. 
Once again ordinances were issued by the parliaments of Paris and the provinces, 
and again this happened simultaneously to gatherings of popular crowds almost 
everywhere, who expelled the intendants and their armed escorts. An assembly of 
General Estates was more and more expected. Let us repeat that this presentation of 
facts is only mine; it is not commonly admitted by historians of this period. Why 
such discrepancies? 
Speaking about revolts, historians tend to look only for social causes, which 
should be present at the beginning of any type of political violence, and they are 
right in doing so. But, they tend to forget the mechanisms of already existing 
institutions, their particular stakes and logics, their contradictions and blind alleys, 
and they also miss the game of political imagination of past realms of justice and 
the concomitant distortions of historical reality, which are always at work around 
institutions. In the French examples of the disorders of the years 1643 and 1648, the 
political vacuum and the contradictions of institutions played a prominent role, 
remaining silent yet strong. The local troubles that happened in 1643 after Louis 
XIII’s death may be considered as modest forerunners of the great crisis that was 
the Fronde. This interpretation has not been acknowledged because most historians 
actually despise the acuteness of the Fronde crisis, for they do not question the 
classical teleological narrative of events that presents absolutism, taking shape 
under the rule of Louis XIV in 1661, as a necessary episode in the history of 
France. Accordingly, they cannot recognise the coherent alternative program 
inherent in the claims of Rouergue peasants, or in the proliferating demands during 
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the years of the Fronde.8 Their rejection to deal with this political program and their 
scornful narratives of this major crisis has a long tradition. Indeed, it was 
conceptualized by Louis XIV himself, who gave order to tear out entire pages in the 
royal court’s registers; it assumed its literary strength with Voltaire and Michelet, 
who had decided to reduce their narratives of this crisis to ridiculous quarrels 
between some aristocratic ladies.9 
According to their way of writing history, institutions were only matters of fact 
which had nothing to tell about major historical events or great political chronicles. 
My purpose in this paper has been, on the contrary, to show that the dynamic of 
revolts comes not only from social rights or wrongs or from the characters of their 
leaders, mad, foolish, brilliant or charismatic, but also from the compulsion of some 
recurrent institutional situations. 
                                                 
8  For an explanation of the research of immanent trends in the course of history contrasting 
the naive reading of accomplished facts cf. Alphonse Dupront, Du sacré. Croisades et pè-
lerinages. Images et langages (Paris, 1987), 38-42. See commentaries by Sylvio De 
Franceschi, “Rythmique événementielle et longue durée selon Alphonse Dupront”, Revue 
historique 89 (659), 3 (2011): 611-636. 
9  The most pertinent history of the period can be found in Orest Ranum, La Fronde (Paris, 
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Richelieu […] dit avoir reconnu par expérience que, 
toutes choses égales d’ailleurs, les rebelles sont 
toujours moitié moins forts que les défenseurs du 
pouvoir officiel. Même si l’on pense soutenir une 
bonne cause, le sentiment  d’être en rébellion 
affaiblit. Sans un mécanisme psychologique de ce 
genre, il ne pourrait y avoir aucune stabilité dans les 
sociétés humaines. 
 
SIMONE WEIL (1909-1943), L’ENRACINEMENT 
(PARIS, 1949), 261. 
 
J’ai toujours pensé que dans les révolutions, et 
surtout dans les révolutions démocratiques, les fous, 
non pas ceux à qui l’on donne ce nom par 
métaphore, mais les véritables, ont joué un rôle 
politique très considérable. Ce qu’il y a de certain, 
du moins, c’est qu’une demi-folie ne messied pas 
dans ces temps-là et sert même souvent au succès. 
 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ŒUVRES, T. XII. 
SOUVENIRS, ED. LUC MONNIER (PARIS, 1964), 138. 
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thank for their help Malte Griesse and Marcel Thoene who have kindly accepted to revise 
the present article. 
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Revolts are no ordinary events. They subvert the pattern of society, the 
established order of things, an order which, in pre-modern Europe, was consecrated 
by Church and, even more perhaps, by informal belief.1 The very real dangers 
incurred by rebels added to their involuntary feeling of guilt, arousing in them 
strong, overwhelming emotions, shared also, although in a different key, by their 
victims. Fueled by these powerful sentiments, hatred, fear, defiance, enthusiasm, 
and the sheer joy of rebellion,2 even a minor revolt soon became known across the 
borders and stirred trouble, or at least excitement, in far-away countries. Because of 
the semi-divine nature of Order, still strengthened by the transnational solidarity of 
monarchs and elites alike, rebellion was resented in neighbouring lands as a scourge 
to avoid or an example to follow, but in any case as a threat to their usual way of 
life – all the more so, perhaps, because everyone knew that in given circumstances 
one might also be tempted to revolt.3 That is why representations of revolts, 
whether domestic or transnational, are very seldom neutral: their authors do take 
sides, explicitly or not, and nearly always, in the early-modern surviving texts at 
least, against the insurgents. 
                                                 
1  Even the authority of petty tyrants of the Long Parliament: “To rule is to be sanctify'd”, 
quoth (ironically) Hudibras' squire Ralph (Samuel Butler, Hudibras in three parts, writ-
ten in the Time of the Late Wars [first published in 1663], part I, canto III, line 1176). 
Conversely, revolt was condemned by Scripture itself: “For rebellion is as the sin of 
witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry” (first book of Samuel, 15, 23). 
2  “She experienced, for the first time, the terrible beauty of a rebellion […] ; the secrecy, 
the daring, the anarchic joy of breaking a law, sharpened the excitement of [the] affair ”, 
James Ngugi, A grain of wheat, (London [1967], 1974), pp. 44, 59 – a book that was sug-
gested to me by the late Yves Benot. The quotation describes the feelings of a British la-
dy, involved in an extra-marital affair, but is actually meant by the author as a parallel to 
the Mau-Mau movement in Kenya. 
3  In his dissertation, defended in 1674 (see below), Johannes Justus Martius could write: 
“nec unquam major calamitas fuit, quam cum auctore Stephano Räzino turbæ motusque 
existerent: nam iis non modo Moscovia metu perculsa, sed etiam tota Europa expecta-
tione futuri eventus aliquandiu suspensa fuit” [“there never was a worse calamity than the 
riots and rebellion aroused by Stephan Razin, for not only was Muscovy shaking with 
fear, but the whole of Europe also was for some time in suspense, waiting for the out-
come”]. This is confirmed by the reaction of German periodicals: “Zwischen September 
1670 und August 1671 ist im Durchschnitt jeder dritten bis vierten Zeitungsnummer eine 
Meldung über die 'Rebellion in der Moscau' zu entnehmen” (Martin Welke, “Deutsche 
Zeitungsberichte über den Moskauer Staat im 17. Jahrhundert”, Russen und Russland aus 
deutscher Sicht 9.-17. Jahrhundert, M. Keller, ed., (München, 1985), p. 264-286, 279. 
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The contemporary sources about the Razin rebellion, which has been chosen as 
a case for study in the present paper, are no exception to the rule. If we put aside a 
few “enticing letters” [prelestnye pis’ma], which were part of the rebels’ 
propaganda, all foreign relations of the revolt, all Russian documents pertaining to 
it condemn Razin and his followers. Not so the Russian folklore: Razin’s legend 
conveys a belated echo of favourable popular feeling.4 
Representations may be, and often are, analyzed for their own sake: in order to 
recapture the point of view of the observer, the historian’s attention is focused not 
on the actual events, but on the arrangements and distortions they are subjected to 
in the narrative. Radical sceptics even argue that representations are the only source 
available to us, since any conceivable document, be it manor accounts or a ship’s 
bill of lading, endeavours to present facts in a certain light – in other words, the 
simple act of writing something down is already, to some extent, tampering with 
reality. 
These objections notwithstanding, and believing that cross-checking sources 
against one another provides a sufficient degree of probability, I will try to relate 
representations to known facts so as to throw some light on both phenomena. The 
very nature of the task restricts the circle of acceptable evidence: second-hand or 
third-hand accounts are more informative about public opinion, i.e. about the 
historian’s or the compiler’s mind, than about the actual features of the rebellion. 
Only narratives written by eyewitnesses, only documents issued by agents on both 
sides can answer two questions I would like to put to the test: can we ascribe a 
social nature to Razin’s uprising? What kind of mechanism triggered the revolt at 
the crucial moment? Before dealing with these topics, I will give, by way of 
introduction, a survey of the available sources, a summary of the events,5 and 
devote some space to a seemingly irrelevant problem: how much did 17th century 
Muscovites, on both sides, care about representation? 
AVAILABLE SOURCES 
The bulk of the domestic sources on the Razin rebellion (razinshchina) has been 
published by Soviet historians between 1954 and 1976, under the highly ideological 
                                                 
4  Philip Longworth, “The subversive legend of Sten'ka Razin”, Russia/Rossiia. Studi e 
ricerche a cura di Vittorio Strada, n° 2, 1975, 17-40. 
5  A more detailed account in English: Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600-1800 (New York, 
London, 1972), chapter II. 
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title Peasant War under the Leadership of Stepan Razin. Documents.6 Quite a few 
additional materials have appeared since 1976. However, these documents will be 
mainly used to check foreign sources, the only ones that are, strictly speaking, in 
keeping with our subject.  
Not surprisingly, since Russia was at the outskirts of Europe, foreign sources 
are few, if we put aside second-hand narratives and various compilations, and make 
use only of reports by eyewitnesses.7 Four Dutchmen have described the early 
course of the rebellion. The author of the Letter written on board […] the Orel, […] 
September 24th 16698 is unknown, but very probably was a member of the Dutch 
crew of this first warship, Western fashion, ever built in Muscovy. David Butler, 
skipper, and Jan Janszoon Struys (ca 1630-1694), sailsmaster on the Orel, were 
ordered to join Astrakhan garrison, when the town was put under siege by Razin’s 
army.9 All of them took some part in the defense of the city and managed 
                                                 
6  Krest'ianskaia voina pod predvoditel'stvom Stepana Razina. Sbornik dokumentov, vol. I, 
II/1-2, III, IV (Moscow, 1954-1976) [hereafter: Krest'ianskaia voina]. Nearly all are offi-
cial documents, the only exceptions being the “enticing letters” mentioned above. 
7  Since M. N. Tikhomirov's not very satisfactory and outdated essay “Istochniki po istorii 
razinshchiny”, Problemy istochnikovedeniia, I (Moscow-Leningrad, 1933), p. 50-69, no 
recent study, as far as I know, has dealt with the foreign narratives of Stenka Razin's re-
bellion as a whole. They have been conveniently put together and published in Leningrad 
by A. G. Man'kov, in: Zapiski inostrantsev o vosstanii Stepana Razina (Leningrad, 1968) 
[hereafter: Zapiski], and Inostrannye izvestiia o vosstanii Stepana Razina, 1975 [hereaf-
ter: Inostrannye izvestiia]. Texts are printed both in the original languages and in Russian 
translation. The latter book includes extracts from chiefly German, but also French peri-
odicals. Man'kov describes foreign Razin narratives in general (Zapiski, 5-13, 84-87), and 
so does Serge Konovalov in his “Ludvig Fabritius's Account of the Razin Rebellion” Ox-
ford Slavonic Papers, VI, 1956, p. 72-94, 72-73 [hereafter: Fabritius], and in “Razin's 
Execution. Two Contemporary Documents”, S. Konovalov, ed., Oxford Slavonic Papers, 
XII, 1965, p. 94-98, 94 [hereafter: Razin's Execution]. 
8  Unless otherwise specified, all dates are given in the Julian calendar. In quotations of 
English or French texts of the 17th century, spelling has been conserved, punctuation 
slightly modernized. 
9  The anonymous letter, Jan Struys' narrative and  a letter written by David Butler from 
Ispahan, March 6th, 1671, are to be found in: Jan Struys, Drie aanmerkelijke en seer 
rampspoedige reysen door Italien, Griekenlandt, Lijflandt, Moscovien, Tartarijen, 
Meden, Persien, Oost-Indien, Japan […] (Amsterdam, 1676). Being unable to use the 
Dutch original, I have quoted here from the English The Perillous and most unhappy 
voyages of John Struys through Italy, Greece, Lifeland, Moscovia, Tartary, Media, Per-
sia, East-India, Japan and other places in Europe, Africa and Asia […] to which are 
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eventually to escape from Razin’s camp. So did Ludvig Fabritius (1648-1729), a 
young foreign officer who had already served nine or ten years in the Russian army, 
and came with the strong detachment sent up the Volga from Astrakhan against the 
rebels.10 His account is the best by far, at the same time simple, clever and 
unbiased, although written some twenty years after the event. The others rather tend 
to mingle facts with moral and political considerations. 
Another group of foreigners, who were not involved in the events, but lived in 
Moscow at that time and wrote about Russia, seem to have witnessed the arrival of 
Stepan Razin in Moscow and his execution. Their accounts are especially valuable 
since only one report by a Russian eyewitness has been found.11 The anonymous 
author, perhaps a Dutchman, of A Relation concerning the particulars of the 
Rebellion lately raised in Muscovy by Stenko Razin, who gave the most accurate 
account of the whole course of the rebellion, had probably access to official 
documents as well.12 Thomas Hebdon, an English merchant, brother of the well-
known diplomat John Hebdon the Elder, is the most reliable witness: on the very 
day of Razin’s death, he wrote a letter describing his execution.13 Johannes Justus 
Merz, latine Martius, (1648-1702), a Lutheran minister who worked from 1668 to 
1672 as a school teacher in the Foreign Quarter in Moscow, wrote a dissertation on 
                                                                                                            
added 2 narrativs sent from Capt. D. Butler relating to the taking in of Astrachan by the 
cosacs […] rendered out of Nether-dutch by John Morrison (London, 1686) and the 
French translation Les Voyages de Jean Struys, en Moscovie, en Tartarie, en Perse, aux 
Indes & en plusieurs autres païs étrangers (Amsterdam, 1681) [both hereafter: Struys]. 
10  Fabritius' memoirs have remained manuscript until Konovalov's publication. The original 
German text is in Zapiski, 14-46; quotations in this paper are from Konovalov's English 
translation, see footnote 9 above.   
11  Krest'ianskaia voina, IV, n° 66-67, p. 61-62. 
12  For conjectures about the author, see: A. L. Gol'dberg, “Soobshchenie o vosstanii Stepana 
Razina”, Zapiski, p. 157-165. The Relation was first published in Dutch: Kort Waerdach-
tigh verhael van de bloedige Rebellye in Moscovien […] (Haerlem, 1671) and in German: 
Kurtze doch Warhafftige Erzählung von der blutigen Rebellion in der Moscau […] (Em-
den, 1671). The English text was printed in Newcomb, 1672, and is reproduced, with 
Russian translation, in Zapiski, p. 84-126 [Hereafter quoted: Relation]. The French ver-
sion Relation des particularitez de la rebellion de Stenko Razin contre le grand-duc de 
Moscovie (Paris, 1672); repr. by Augustin Golitsyn (Paris, 1856) was translated from the 
English. 
13  His letter, written in Moscow on the 6th of June 1671, to Richard Daniell, an English 
resident in Riga, in Razin's Execution, p. 97-98. 
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Stepan Razin, defended in July 1674, and published in the same year.14 His 
information is partly derived from his readings, but his impressions on the mood of 
the Moscow crowd are undoubtedly his own.15 Jacob Reutenfels was a spectator of 
Razin’s “horrible” death.16 All other accounts may safely be ignored for the 
purposes of the present paper.17 
                                                 
14  Merz's biography by A. K. Gavrilov in Inostrannye izvestiia, p. 25-30. His dissertation: 
Martius, Johann Justus,     , id est Stephanus 
Razin donicus Cosacus perduellis, publica disquisitioni exhibitus, praeside Conrado 
Samuele Schurzfleisch, respondente Johanne Justo Martio, Mulhusa-Thuringo, d. XXIX 
Quintil. Anno M DC LXXIV, Wittenbergæ Ex officina Christiani Schröteri. It was re-
printed in Leipzig (1679), in Wittenberg (1683) and again in Leipzig (1698). Repr. in In-
ostrannye izvestiia, p. 31-75 (Latin original and Russian translation). Partial English 
translation (§ 27-30), Razin's Execution, p. 95-96. 
15   “Ita ex commentariis actorum Russicorum didici” (§ 25*, Inostrannye izvestia, p. 48: “So 
I learnt from russian writings”); “Ipse pro comperto habeo, quam parum omnes ab exitio 
abfuerint” (§ 22, ibidem, p. 47 : “I hold for certain that we all narrowly escaped being 
killed”).   
16  “Horrendum ejus modi inusitatioris supplicii specimen in Stenka, seu Stephano Rasin 
Cosaco rebelli Moscuæ spectavimus” [“A horrifying instance of this unusual kind of 
death we have seen in Moscow when Stenka, i. e. Stepan Razin, a rebel Cossack, was ex-
ecuted”], in: Yacobus Reutenfels, De rebus Moschoviticis ad Serenissimum Magnum 
Hetruriæ Ducem Cosmum Tertium (Patavii, 1680); facsimile edition by Marshall Poe: 
Early Explorations of Russia, vol. XI (London, New York, 2003), p. 164; German trans-
lation: Yacob Reutenfels, Das grosse und mächtige Reich Moscoviæ […] (Nürnberg, 
1687). Reutenfels (actually spelled “Rautenfels”) lived in Moscow from 1670 to the 
spring of 1672, cf. Claudia Jensen, Ingrid Maier, “Orpheus and Pickleherring in the 
Kremlin”, Scando-Slavica 59:2, 2013, 145-184, 148-150 
17  “A Narrative of the Greatest Victory known in the Memory of Man: Being the total 
Overthrow of the Great Rebel Stepan Radzin […]”, Inostrannye izvestia, p. 8-10; “Ritrat-
to della Moscovia. Ristretto geografico, historico e genealogico del gran Ducato o sia Im-
pero di Moscovia”, A. I. Turgenev, ed, Historica Russiæ Monumenta, II, Petropoli, 1848, 
p. 249-278 ; Historisch Verhael, of Beschrijving van de Voyagie, gedaen onder de Suite 
van der Heere K. van Klenk (Amsterdam, 1677), repr. with Russian translation, A. M. 
Lovjagin, ed., Posol'stvo Kunraada fan-Klenka […], (Saint Petersburg, 1900); Carl Va-
lerius Wickhart, Moscowitische Reise-Beschreibung […] (Vienna, 1675), p. 201-202. 
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SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS 
It is no coincidence if Razin’s first expedition (1667) starts at the end of the 
Thirteen Years, Russian-Polish War (1654-1667), at a moment when Russian 
taxpayers are at the end of their tether (taxes in grain alone have increased fourteen-
fold between 1620 and 1670), the Treasury runs short of money, and military men 
are no longer needed. All these factors help to understand the difficult position of 
the semi-independent Don Cossacks, who fought  alongside of Muscovite troops 
when they saw fit, and in return received subsidies from Moscow (grain, powder, 
cash and arms), yet derived part of their income from plundering raids, chiefly, but 
not exclusively, directed against Crimean and Ottoman territories.18 No wonder if 
the Russian government wanted to curb as much as possible the political freedom of 
the Cossacks. A particularly sensitive topic was the problem of fugitive peasants, 
who often joined the Cossack Host. Moscow insisted on having them returned, but 
the Don Cossacks, many of whom were themselves ex-fugitives, took pride in 
refusing. Razin would say in 1669: “It is not the custom among Cossacks to hand 
over runaways.”19 
One way of achieving control over the Cossacks was to reduce, postpone or 
even cut out the Don subsidies, another – the military colonisation of the South, on 
the Belgorod Abatis line. Both led to unexpected results: since supplies were 
lacking, the Cossacks switched to plundering, the only way left to survive. 
Colonisation, undertaken, of course, to defend Russian territory against Crimean 
raids, but also to keep an eye on the Host, brought thousands of deserters and 
fugitive peasants into the Don region, thus creating a situation close to famine.20 
Since economic and social differentiation was already well advanced among the 
Host, those who suffered most were the poorer Cossacks (golutvennye ljudi), as 
opposed to their well-to-do (domovitye) brethren.21 
                                                 
18  Brian Davies, “Muscovy at war and peace”, The Cambridge history of Russia, I: From 
Early Rus' to 1689, Maureen Perrie, ed. (Cambridge, 2006), p. 486-519, 493. Whenever 
possible, I have translated Russian terms in accordance with this edition. 
19  Maureen Perrie, “Popular Revolts”, ibidem, p. 600-617, 605; Viktor Ivanovich Buganov, 
Krest'ianskie voiny v Rossii XVII-XVIII vv., Moscow, 1976, p. 60, 71, 82 [hereafter: 
Buganov]. 
20  Davies, p. 499; Krest'ianskaia voina, I, n° 38, p. 73: according to a report from the gover-
nor of Tsaritsyn, 14 March 1667, “fugitive bondsmen [holopy] and peasants from the 
border, with wives and children, have taken refuge in many villages of the Don region, 
and because of that there is now a terrible famine on the Don.” 
21  A view contested by Nikolai Ivanovich Nikitin, “O formatsionnoi prirode rannikh ka-
zach'ikh obshchestv (K postanovke voprosa)”, Feodalizm v Rossii [Festschrift for L. V. 
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A minor, but ominous, episode occurred in June of 1666. A 700 men strong 
Cossack detachment under Vasilii Us (Basil “Moustache”) rode North, allegedly to 
offer their services as cavalrymen to the tsar. A deputation was indeed sent to 
Moscow, but met with a flat refusal and was ordered to go back to the Don. 
Meanwhile, Us and his men had moved their encampment further North to Tula, 
attracting quite a number of local peasants and bondsmen (see below) and looting 
noble estates in the vicinity. They withdrew in July only under military coercion. 
Not surprisingly, Us in time became one of Razin’s lieutenants.22 
The Andrusovo armistice (January 1667) didn’t improve the situation in the 
least. Tsar Alexis said as much in his letter to the shah of Iran23: “It has come to our 
knowledge that after we had made peace with the kingdom of Poland, bandits and 
fugitives from various places have appeared on the lower Volga” (May 3rd, 1668). 
A little later, in his message to the governor of Tsaritsyn, Razin provides the 
explanation: “In the Host, there is nothing left to eat or to drink, whereas the tsar’s 
subsidies in money and grain are sent sparingly. That’s why we went to the Volga, 
to feed ourselves.”24 
During the spring of 1667, small bands of Cossacks made their way to the 
Volga, where they attacked Russian convoys, and to the Caspian Sea, where their 
targets were Persian ships. They endangered thereby Russia’s good relations, and 
particularly trade, with Iran. Local governors soon put an end to these first attempts 
at piracy, but they were less successful against the large-scale expedition led by 
Stepan Timofeevich Razin.25 
Razin, born ca. 1630, belonged to the Cossack elite. Up to 1667 his life was in 
no way remarkable, at least according to the little information available.26 He took 
part, in 1658, in a Cossack deputation to Moscow. Three years later, as a Don 
Cossacks’ representative, he was a member of the embassy led by secretary Ivan 
Savvich Gorohov to meet Kalmyk tayishis Daichin and Monchak/Puntsuk.27 He 
                                                                                                            
Cherepnin], Moscow, 1987, p. 236-245, who argues that Cossack society was “pre-
feudal” and still primitive, nay regressive, in many ways. His analysis of Cossack way of 
life (p. 236-239) is remarkably lucid. 
22  M. Perrie, loc. cit.; more details in Buganov, p. 62-66. 
23  Buganov, p.71. 
24  Ibidem, p. 72. 
25  The diminutive of Stepan, “Stenka”, used in Muscovite official documents, is a pejora-
tive, indicating either young age or a low status in the social hierarchy.  
26  Buganov, p.66-70; Ocherki istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma XVII v. (Moscow, 1955), p. 
283 [hereafter: Ocherki]. 
27  About this embassy, see Michael Khodarkovsky, When Two Worlds met. The Russian 
State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600-1771, Cornell UP, Ithaca and London, 1992, p. 95. 
STENKA RAZIN’S REBELLION | 101 
 
then headed a Cossack detachment sent against Crimean Tatars in 1663. 
Meanwhile, he twice asked permission to make a pilgrimage to the Northern 
convent of Solovki (1652, 1661). 
In 1667, however, he takes the lead of the Cossack bands which are gathering 
again near the portage between Don and Volga rivers. As soon as the ice breaks on 
the Don (mid-April 1667), Razin and his 600 followers sail towards Panshin and 
Kachalinsk, where the river islands are well out of reach for regular forces. There 
he carefully prepares his campaign, recruiting men among Cossacks and “fugitives 
from various places”, stocking up plundered arms, ammunition, food and 
equipment. Part of the weaponry is provided by well-to-do Cossacks to individual 
members of the expedition, on a fifty-fifty (ispoly) basis, meaning that the investors 
would receive half of the expected booty. “It would be wrong”, writes Viktor 
Buganov, “to deny the predatory aspects” of Razin’s voyage.28 We may add that, 
mutatis mutandis, the management of this expedition is in many respects similar to 
the raids of the freebooters and buccaneers in the West Indies, as described by 
Exquemelin.29 
Once ready, Razin enters the Volga with his bands, now 1500 men strong: the 
flotilla heads South, past Tsaritsyn. Razin dodges or overcomes the detachments 
sent against him from Astrakhan. He already applies the tactics to which he will 
stick until the end of the movement: nobles, officers, merchants are put to death, as 
well as the rank and file who resist him; the rest switch sides and join the Cossacks. 
At last, between June 3rd and 5th, the Cossacks sail past Astrakhan by night, and 
enter the Caspian Sea. In July, disguised as pilgrims, they take the fort of Iaitsk by 
trickery, and there they remain during the winter of 1667-1668. All attempts made 
by the Russian government first to negotiate with Razin, then to drive him out of his 
stronghold, have failed.30 
Very little reliable information about Razin’s sea voyage is available to 
historians, since no research has been as yet conducted in Persian archives.31 As far 
as we know, the Cossacks abandoned Iaitsk in March 1668, and sailed southwards, 
                                                 
28  Buganov, p.72, 73. 
29  Original Dutch edition: Alexander Exquemelin, De Americaensche Zee-Roovers, Am-
sterdam, 1678, followed by German (Nürnberg, 1679), English (Bucaniers of America, 
London, 1684) and French (Paris, 1686) translations.  
30  Ocherki, p. 286. 
31  All accounts are only by hearsay, be it the reports of Russian town governors (in 
Krest'janskaja vojna), or the narratives of European travellers: Jean Chardin (1643-1713), 
who was in Persia at the time (Le Journal de voyage du chevalier Chardin en Perse et aux 
Indes orientales, Amsterdam, 1711), and Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), who arrived 
in Isfahan in 1683 (his account in Inostrannye izvestiia, p. 152-180).  
102 | ANDRÉ BERELOWITCH 
 
following the Western coast of the Caspian Sea, plundering ships and even towns 
(Derbent, Baku) as they went along. They freed Russian captives, and made 
prisoners among Persian population, to be bartered later or sold into slavery.32 
Alternating success and defeats, they accumulated considerable wealth, periodically 
divided between the fighters,33 but often suffered from illness and starvation. In the 
spring of 1669, Razin decided to offer his services to the shah.34 But the Persian 
ruler had Razin’s envoys executed, and sent troops against the Cossacks. Taken by 
surprise near Rasht, they took revenge on the city of Farah b d and, after defeating 
a Persian flotilla, sailed back towards Astrakhan in July 1669. 
Since he had been forbidden to sail into the Caspian Sea, Razin, entrenched in 
the Four Hills island at the mouth of the Volga, feared new attacks from Astrakhan. 
He certainly didn’t expect the third in command in the city, prince Semen L’vov, 
escorted by three or four thousand men with artillery, to present him a letter issued 
by the tsar in 1667, forgiving the Cossacks their faults if they promised to behave in 
the future. 
So it came that Razin and his men, “everyone of them appearing in the most 
splendid manner he could”, scattering gold coins to admiring crowds,35 made a 
triumphant entry into the town. Far from acting as repentant sinners, the pirates, 
while negotiations went on, sold slaves, beautiful cloth and jewellery in the market 
place, thus making a deep and lasting impression on the local population.36 The 
governors were even given generous presents by Razin himself. Finally, the 
Cossacks were allowed to sail back to their homes on the river Don, where they 
arrived in October 1669. 
                                                 
32  Slavery is present everywhere in this story: Razin wants to free Russian peasants from it, 
but his Cossacks sell their Persian captives, and the defeated rebels are, in their turn, ille-
gally enslaved by their victors (cf. Krest'ianskaia voina, III, n° 11, p. 12 ; n° 15, p. 15), e. 
g. by Ivan Bogdanovich Miloslavskii (ibidem, n° 205, p. 230) and many others (ibidem, 
n° 31, 45, 213). 
33  This was called duvanit', from duvan (a derivative of turcic divan), meaning the place 
where the warriors assemble, or the booty itself, human or otherwise. 
34  Kaempfer, Inostrannye izvestiia, p. 158. 
35  “For they had rifled many Gentlemens Houses where they found always Apparrel, Jewels 
and other Plunder for Habit and Ornament”, Struys, p. 186 ; “La plupart du peuple & des 
soldats, qui couroient en foule auprès de lui lorsqu'il paroissoit dans les ruës, & auxquels 
il jetoit souvent des poignées de ducats”, Struys, p. 176. 
36  Fabritius, p. 79 : “This human market lasted some six weeks” […] He [Razin] promised 
to free them [Astrakhan common people] from the yoke of the boyars ant set the slaves 
free, so that the people listened to him gladly and promised to help him with all their 
might as soon as he was ready to begin his attack.” 
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The whole Persian campaign looks very much like a rehearsal of the next, so 
purposeful were Razin’s moves between the autumn of 1669 and the spring of 
1670. Contrary to custom, he did not disband his troops, but kept them in a fortified 
island under strict discipline, while using what was left of the booty to arm and 
equip his small army, which was steadily growing in numbers: “He began 
straightaway quietly gathering the common people around him, giving them money, 
and promises of great riches if they would be loyal to him and help to exterminate 
the treacherous boyars.”37 By May 1670, Razin had under him four or five thousand 
men. 
Already in March, the Cossacks, assembled in a “ring” (krug),38 had been 
consulted about the choice of a target for the next expedition. They rejected Azov, 
as well as the Russian project (“go to Russia and fight the boyars”), and adopted 
enthusiastically the Volga instead. After killing two nobles sent by the tsar to report 
on Razin’s movements (April), the army arrived, probably on May 13th, in Panshin. 
Another circle was summoned, which confirmed the previous decision, but with a 
significant addition. When asked: “Would you all go from the Don to the Volga, 
and from the Volga into Russia against the sovereign’s enemies and traitors, to rid 
Muscovy of treacherous boyars and Duma [conciliar] people, and, in the provinces, 
of governors and administrators?”, the Cossacks answered in the affirmative.39 
Meanwhile, the authorities, who were kept informed by governors and spies, 
had sent a thousand musketeers [strel’tsy] under Ivan Lopatin down the Volga.40 
Another, much more important force (several thousand men commanded by prince 
Semen L’vov), was slowly moving up river from Astrakhan. When Razin arrived 
under Tsaritsyn, both armies were still on their way. The town was given over to 
the Cossacks by its revolted dwellers, and Razin immediately marched against 
Lopatin, whom he met and defeated some five miles upstream. The greater part of 
the musketeers were slaughtered, the rest joined the Cossacks or were pressed into 
service as oarsmen. Razin then turned around to meet the L’vov army, which he 
                                                 
37  Fabritius, p. 79-80. 
38  “A Krug is a meeting convened by order of the Ataman [elected chief, A.B.], at which the 
Cossacks stand in a circle with the standard in the centre ; the Ataman then takes his 
place beside his best officers, to whom he divulges his wishes, ordering them to make 
these known to the common brothers and to hear their opinion of the matter : if the pro-
posals of the Ataman please the commoners, they all shout together 'Lyubo, lyubo'“ 
(ibidem, p. 81) 
39  Buganov, p. 83-88.  
40  A picture designed to entertain and instruct tsar Alexis' children represents the flotilla on 
its way to Tsaritsyn. Cf. Z. I. Fomicheva, “Redkoe proizvedenie russkogo iskusstva XVII 
veka”, Drevnerusskoe iskusstvo. XVII vek (Moscow, 1964), p. 316-326. 
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found under Chernyi Yar. This is how Fabritius describes the battle (June 11th, 
1670): 
 
The next morning, at 8 o’clock, our look-outs on the water came hurriedly and raised the 
alarm as the Cossacks were following at their heels. […] In the meantime Stenka prepared for 
battle and deployed on a wide front; to all those who had no rifle he gave a long pole, burnt a 
little at one end, and with a rag or small hook attached. […] The common soldiers imagined 
that, since there were so many flags and standards, there must be a host of people. They put 
their heads together and at once decided that this was the chance for which they had been 
waiting so long, and with all their flags and drums they ran over to the enemy. They began 
kissing and embracing one another and swore with life and limb to stand together and to 
exterminate the treacherous boyars, to throw off the yoke of slavery, and to become free men. 
 
The general with his officers sought refuge in the Chernyi Yar fortress, but the 
garrison had also mutinied, and all eighty men were taken prisoners. 
 
Murder at once began. Then, however, Stenka Razin ordered that no more officers were to be 
killed, saying that there must be a few good men among them. […] A Krug was accordingly 
called and Stenka asked through his lieutenants how the general and his officers had treated 
the soldiers under their command. Thereupon the unscrupulous curs, streltsy as well as 
soldiers, unanimously called out that there were not one of them who deserved to remain 
alive, and they all asked their father Stepan Timofeyevich Razin should order them to be cut 
down. This was granted with the exception of General Knyaz Semen Ivanovich L’vov41 […] 
The officers were now brought in order of rank out of the tower […], their ropes were cut and 
they were led outside the gate. When all the bloodthirsty curs had lined up, each was eager to 
deal his former superior the first blow, one with the sword, another with the lance, another 
with the scimitar, and other again with martels […] Indeed, some were cut to pieces and 
straightaway thrown into the Volga.42 
 
The road to Astrakhan was now open. The city was defended by 6.000 soldiers and 
500 guns; Razin, however, had not only won over the town people43, but also the 
                                                 
41  In return for Razin's presents, in 1669, L'vov had given him “a beautiful gold-plated 
image of the Virgin” (Fabritius, p. 79), and the Cossack chief became the prince's sworn 
brother. That is probably why Razin spared L'vov until his own death on the scaffold 
(ibidem, p. 83, footnote 1). 
42  Fabritius, p. 81-82. 
43  “The report of these things [news from Chernyi Yar] […] gave the Rabble greater Occa-
sion to mutiny than they had before, yea, so far […] that they publicly reproached the Su-
periority that they durst not look out of their doors or windows, much less walk the streets 
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garrison itself. In the night of 21st to 22nd June, the city was easily taken, and the 
sequence of events in Tsaritsyn or Chernyi Yar, repeated: governors, officers killed 
along with the loyal soldiers; their goods plundered and divided among the rebels; 
new recruits rushing into Razin’s army and henceforth decreed Cossacks.44 
Astrakhan civilians were, likewise, democratically organized: they discussed their 
affairs in krugs, and elected their own atamans (Vasilii Us a popular winner). All 
official archives were systematically lacerated, especially indentures, thereby 
putting into effect Razin’s promises about “setting the common people free.” 
On the 20th of July 1670, Razin departed from Astrakhan with 11 000 men, 
leaving 2 000 behind. Stopping briefly in Tsaritsyn (4-7 August), he sent two 
detachments to stir up revolt in Ukraine, and moved up to Saratov, then to Samara, 
which didn’t even resist the rebel army. These were his last victories. He tried in 
vain to secure Simbirsk, a strategically important point on the Abatis line, defended 
by Ivan Miloslavskii. Razin took the town, but was unable to capture the citadel 
(September 5th-6th), which he put under siege for a whole month. This delay proved 
fatal to the movement. In the beginning of October, Simbirsk was rescued by Iurii 
Boriatinskii. Razin, wounded, was carried away by devoted followers and 
disappeared from the scene until his final capture.  
This did not stop the rebellion; although the main rebel army had been defeated, 
Razin’s lieutenants did not give up the struggle. Moreover, independent 
detachments, sometimes several thousand men strong, gathered in different parts of 
the countryside, mainly in the Middle Volga region. They took a few secondary 
towns, such as Penza, Temnikov, Alatyr’, and even marched on Arzamas, then 
headquarters of the repression. Here, under Iurii Dolgorukii, were concentrated, 
summarily judged and executed up to 11 000 insurgents: “The place was terrible to 
behold, and had the resemblance of the Suburbs of Hell.”45 Razin himself, captured 
on April 14th, 1671 by the notables among Don Cossacks, was brought to Moscow 
and executed on June 6th of the same year. The rebel city of Astrakhan surrendered 
to Ivan Miloslavskii only on the 27th of November. This was the last of the 
                                                                                                            
[…], for it was no rare thing now to see the Rabble assemble together in heaps, and be-
fore the Doors of the Magistrates, to cry out with infamous and bitter Railings, Now, 
now, the times begin to alter, it will be our turn next to Lord it, you villains” (Struys, p. 
208). 
44  After his escape, Fabritius is dressed Cossack fashion : “my [former] orderly […] cut my 
long hair – detested by the villains – […] and gave me a rough coat made of coarse sack-
ing.” (Fabritius, p. 82). 
45  Relation, p. 98. 
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razinshchina, which, according to the Relation, had mobilized up to 200 000 men,46 
but not the last of Russian revolts. Just as some of Razin’s companions had already 
taken part in the “Copper sedition” (1662), so did Viktor Buganov find survivors of 
the 1670-1671 civil war among the revolting musketeers in Moscow (1682), or 
even the Bulavin’s Cossacks (1707-1708).47 
REAPPRAISING THE EVIDENCE 
Such is, by and large, the picture resulting from the foreign narratives of Razin’s 
rebellion, if we exclude the abuse showered on its agents. It does not substantially 
differ from the standard version of the events approved by Soviet historians, except 
for rhetorical effects about the ruthless ruling classes and the splendid courage of 
the exploited. Actually, the obsessive class-struggle motif blocked innovative 
interpretation of the razinshchina for the better part of the last century, roughly 
from the provocative article by Andrei Kabanov,48 published in 1917, to the paper 
by Michael Khodarkovsky in 1994.49 Although the latter mainly discusses the more 
general problem of “peasant wars”, both analyze in some detail the behaviour of the 
rebels and of the authorities. I will try to follow in their steps, adding some 
comments of my own. 
Khodarkovsky has shown that, from the point of view of the Moscow 
government, incursions such as Vasilii Us’s foray near Tula, or even the Caspian 
expedition of Razin were not considered as extraordinary, and certainly not as a 
revolt: “Like their nomadic neighbours, the Cossacks traditionally displayed their 
                                                 
46  “It was of great importance to Russia, and a great Mercy of God, that the Rebels lay here 
and there divided; as also, that they could not agree among themselves, about the Su-
pream Command. For if this power of the Rebels, consisting of Two hundred thousand 
Men, had been united and unanimous, it would have been difficult for the Forces of the 
Czar to have resisted and mastered the same” (ibidem, p. 99). 
47  Buganov, p. 106, 112. 
48  A. K. Kabanov, “Razintsy v Nizhegorodskom krae (priemy bunta i usmireniia)” [“Razin's 
followers in the Nizhnii-Novgorod region (ways and means of revolt and repression)”], 
Sbornik statei v chest' Matveia Kuz'micha Liubavskogo, Petrograd, 1917, p. 413-428. On 
the tragic fate of Andrei Kiprianovich Kabanov (1876-1922), who was arrested by the 
Cheka and died while serving a sentence of one year forced labour for counter-
revolutionaty activities, cf. A. A. Kuznetsov, A. V. Mel'nikov, B. M. Pudalov, “Novye 
dannye o sud'be nizhegorodskogo istorika Kabanova”, on the site: www.opentextnn.ru. 
49  M. Khodarkovsky, “The Stepan Razin Uprising: was it a 'Peasant War' ?”, Jahrbücher für 
Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, vol. 42/1 (1994), p. 1-19. 
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ultimate dissatisfaction by turning against Moscow. When requests and complaints 
failed, military action was usually more effective in attracting the government’s 
attention.”50 
When the Nogays brought horses to sell to Moscow (a vital supply for Russian 
cavalry),51 the authorities knew that plundering on the way, sometimes on a major 
scale, was unavoidable. That was the price to pay if one wanted to have nomads at 
one’s service. The fact that most of the Cossacks were orthodox and, in a very 
broad sense, considered themselves Russians made no difference in that respect. 
Like the garrisons on the Ottoman-Habsburg borders, they may be described as 
“march warriors”, “living according to their own rules and codes of conduct.”52 
Forced tolerance of nomadic excesses explains why in 1667 Razin, when “only” 
guilty of piracy on the Volga (he was still on his way to the Caspian Sea), was 
granted a letter of grace by the tsar, forgiving his past misdeeds, provided he 
promised to sin no more,53 and also why, when returning from Persian shores, he 
was pardoned on the strength of that very same letter, and allowed to go home with 
his unruly band. 
By May of 1670, of course, rebellion became obvious and was named as such in 
official documents. Even then, forgiveness remained an option if the culprits duly 
expressed repentance. In the initial stage at least, negotiation was not excluded, and 
no visible barrier, as yet, separated the rebels from the loyal subjects of the tsar.54 
Both sides, as Kabanov has shown, tried to win over people who were hesitating on 
the brink of rebellion, and used strikingly similar methods to do so. Both drafted 
letters and manifestos, written by the tsar, his officials, the patriarch or the 
commanding officers in the field, or conversely by Razin himself or his lieutenants. 
Both found means to circulate these letters among the population, and both, when 
they could, wielded more potent arguments such as axes, swords, muskets or the 
gallows. 
                                                 
50  Ibidem, p. 9. 
51  Khodarkovsky, When Two Worlds met, p. 28. 
52  Peter F. Sugar, “The Ottoman 'professional prisoner' on the Western Borders of the Em-
pire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries”, Études balkaniques, 1971/2, p. 82-91, 82.  
53  Buganov, p. 75-76. 
54  In October 1670, two Chuvash hundredmen, loyal to the tsar, met a Chuvash imam (abyz) 
who was on the side of the rebels. After both parties had sworn not to shoot at each other, 
the imam departed, leaving “enticing letters” enclosed in a bark-box (Krest'ianskaia voi-
na, II/1, n° 90, p. 105-106). 
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CIRCULATING THE WRITTEN WORD: THE REBELS 
As a rule, Razin’s followers couldn’t spell, so finding able writers was something of 
a problem. They managed, nevertheless, with the help of local literati, parish 
clergymen, sextons, local clerks, and the like,55 and disseminated the messages as 
best they could. For instance, in October 1670, the small town of Saransk is 
stormed by a troop of Simbirsk musketeers and Cossacks, led by a Don Cossack. 
All the prisoners of the city jail are released, one of them is appointed ataman, who 
then does the round of the villages, handing out “enticing letters” copied by a clerk 
in Temnikov.56 A letter, addressed to the “populace” of the Tsivil’sk district and 
delivered by Cossack Kildibiakov, bids the peasants to turn the text over to local 
village sextons to have it copied word for word, and then to distribute the copies in 
villages and hamlets “so that everybody in the district would be acquainted with 
it.”57 
For the same reason, viz. general illiteracy, the messages were read in public, as 
e. g. at Unzha (a small town in the Galich district): “the local elder, Tarasko 
Grigor’ev, in lieu of the town crier, made the announcement on the market place, 
and the blackguardly letter was read by the town priest of Saint-Makarios, Timofei 
Andronnikov.”58 Reading messages from loyalists was quite naturally forbidden: in 
April 1671, a sexton pressed into service by the Cossacks (or so he said) stated that 
“as I read to the assembled people the letters sent by the nobles from the other side 
of the river, the rebellious Cossacks forbade the people to listen.”59  
Communication, however, was not achieved purely by means of words. Rebel 
chiefs were not adverse to some show of ceremony: “the criminal Il’iushka Ivanov 
[a well-known Razin’s lieutenant, A.B.] […] sent ahead scouts, to make sure that 
the priest would meet him with icons, and peasants with loaves of bread. And if 
anyone refused to do so, he would have everybody cut down and our houses 
                                                 
55  E.g. in the Shatsk region: “Among the bandits [rebels, AB] it was the sexton, Liubim 
Selivanov, whose surname I don't know, who wrote the letters” (ibidem, II/1, n° 224, p. 
273; November 1670). Sergei Ignat'ev, public writer on oath [ploshchadnoi pod'iachii] in 
Tambov, “wrote, he says, for the lawless Cossacks all kinds of letters” (ibidem, II/1, n° 
285, p. 359; December 1670). 
56  Ibidem, II/1, n° 110, p. 128-130; October 1670.  
57  Ibidem, II/1, n° 78, p. 91; September 1670. 
58  Ibidem, II/1, n° 288, p. 362; December 1670. Similarly, a letter from Razin to his follow-
ers in Tsaritsyn is read aloud in the krug (ibidem, I, n° 150, p. 210; July 1670). 
59  Ibidem, III, n° 47, p. 55. 
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destroyed.”60 Since this is an answer to official inquiry, the peasants pretend that 
they were forced to join the rebellion, which may or may not be true. But some of 
the few extant “enticing letters” are quite explicit: 
 
We beseech you to show your zeal for the house of the holy Mother of God, and for the great 
sovereign [tsar Alexis], and for your father [batiushka] Stepan Timofeevich [Razin], and for 
the whole Christian Orthodox Faith. […] But if you don’t come to the assembly for advice, 
the Great [Cossack] Host will punish you, your wives and children will be cut down, your 
houses destroyed, and your goods confiscated.61 
CIRCULATING THE WRITTEN WORD: THE GOVERNMENT 
The complex relationship between rebels and loyalists is perhaps best illustrated by 
the Kadom-Kasimov episode. In November 1670, Kirill Khlopov, an official of 
Kasimov, sent six monks and two men from the postal service to Kadom, with 
letters from the tsar urging the people of the district “to keep clear of the 
blackguards and traitors and make repentance.” Unfortunately, the governor of 
Kasimov, Mihail Dmitriev, deaf to Khlopov’s entreaties, decided to execute four 
peasants from Kadom, presumably suspected of rebellion, while Khlopov’s 
agitators were still in Kadom. Khlopov reports : “Thereupon the Kadom people, 
hearing this and enraged by the hanging of four peasants of their town […] lynched 
four of my envoys.”62 Obviously, in hanging the peasants, the governor had violated 
an unwritten rule, something akin to diplomatic immunity as long as talks were 
going on. A letter from four rebel atamans to an officer of musketeers confirms this: 
“As soon as you receive this note, please release our man, Semen Tatarinov, whom 
you took yesterday. And yet yesterday we were ready to meet you, to talk together 
for good counsel, and we sent him to talk to you, hoping [to succeed].”63 
                                                 
60  A. I. Kopanev, “Nakhodki bibliografa (Neizvestnye materialy o krest'ianskoi voine pod 
predvoditel'stvom Stepana Razina)”, Trudy biblioteki Akademii Nauk SSSR i fundamen-
tal'noi biblioteki obshchestvennykh nauk AN SSSR, vol. VI (Moscow-Leningrad), 1962, p. 
210-216, 212 (date unknown). “Loaves of bread” may be part of the traditional welcome, 
with bread and salt, or more prosaically food for Ivanov's men. 
61  Krest'ianskaia voina, II/1, n° 207, p. 252; November 1670.  
62  Ibidem, II/1, n° 237, p. 284-285; one of Khlopov's messengers survived and petitioned 
the tsar in 1672 (ibidem, III, n° 223, p. 251). 
63  Ibidem, II/1, n° 221, p. 270; November 1670. Although the context is somewhat unclear, 
it seems that the rebels sent Tatarinov in good faith, having perhaps received the oral 
equivalent of a safe-conduct. 
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These attempts at coming to terms did not suit at all the tsar’s policy. He 
ordered all his officers in the field to collect rebel papers, which they did,64 but 
forbade, of course, his subjects to read them. Even to mention the rebel propaganda 
was considered a crime: for having said, erroneously or on purpose, that a seditious 
letter had been found in Kurmysh, a peasant was sentenced to have half of his 
tongue cut out.65 Informed that Petr Sheremetev had corresponded with the rebels, 
Alexis complimented him on his military prowess, but warned him that writing to 
bandits was not seemly for boyars and officers of the tsar.66 The general purpose is 
clear: Alexis deliberately aimed at a clear-cut line between rebellion and loyalty, 
the better to suppress the former. 
The same line was pursued in foreign affairs. Receiving in November 1670 
colonel Nicolas von Staden, bearer of Swedish proposals for an alliance, tsar Alexis 
instructed him to demand from his principals that “the gazetteers be punished who 
are printing [on Swedish territory] unseemly pieces about the tsar, ex-patriarch 
Nikon and Stenka Razin.”67 
To understand the aspects of the rebellion which have just been described, one 
needed a really good knowledge of the language and a still better one of Muscovite 
society. That is why these features have been overlooked by witnesses from 
Western Europe. They draw a picture in black and white, where exciting tales of 
massacre and tortures conceal the off-stage talks and, more generally, the deeper 
mutual understanding that underlies conflict between the two sides in any civil war. 
The finer details are usually blurred (Fabritius being a welcome exception) under a 
thick layer of commonplace explanations.  
More surprisingly, because revolting non-Russians must have been 
conspicuous, none of the authors even mentions the Chuvash, Mari, Mordva, 
Tatars, Bashkirs, who, according to Michael Khodarkovsky, “constituted by far the 
most numerous and active part of the movement.”68 But that was true only later, in 
the Middle Volga stage of the rebellion, which the Dutchmen who had escaped 
                                                 
64  E. g., Iourii Dolgorukii writes, in December 1670: “In the current year 179 [1670/71], on 
different months and days, in different battles, these rebellious letters have been taken 
from rebellious Cossacks. And these letters we, thy slaves, have sent to you (Krest'ian-
skaia voina, II/1, n° 323, p. 407). 
65  Ibidem, II/1, n° 390, p. 507; January 1671. 
66  Ibidem, III, n° 100, p. 109, § 2; June 1671. 
67  D. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, Obzor vneshnih snoshenii Rossii po 1800 god. IV. Prussiia, 
Frantsiia i Shvetsiia, Moscow, 1902, p. 190-191. Later on, the Russian officials broached 
the same subject with the Swedish envoy (Krest'ianskaia voina, III, n° 236, p. 285-286; 
December 1672).  
68  Khodarkovsky, “The Stepan Razin Uprising”, p. 14. 
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from Astrakhan did not witness, since they were at that time living precariously as 
slaves in Persia. When Fabritius came back to Russia, the civil war was over.69 As 
to Martius, living in Moscow he was far from the field, and perhaps his Russian 
sources did not insist much on this aspect of the rebellion. 
WHO TOOK PART IN RAZIN’S REVOLT? 
Can foreign observers be trusted on the nature of the Razin movement, on its social 
make-up and, more specifically, on its beginnings? Struys has only witnessed the 
few days in Astrakhan before the storm of the city walls, and escaped before the 
town was taken. But Fabritius, as we have seen, has faced Razin’s men at Chernyi 
Yar, and lived among them for a few weeks, at first hidden and in Cossack disguise, 
then in the open, when he “was taken by everyone for a Cossack”, to the point of 
taking his share of the booty. He has met Razin twice, and the rebel chief 
apparently felt towards him something like benevolence, perhaps because of his 
skills as an artillery expert.70 
Painful memories combining with class prejudice, the general picture given of 
the rebels is utterly unfavourable: “riff-raff”, “Rabble”, “gemeine Kanalie”, 
“scoundrels”, “leichfertiges Gesindel”, “ruffians”, “curs”, etc. But at closer 
inspection of the texts, one finds that these pejoratives are not distributed at 
random. The Cossacks are described as “killing everyone and looting everything 
that came their way”,71 whereas musketeers and other soldiers who defected to 
Razin, or revolting townsmen, are called “rascally” or “treacherous streltsy”, 
“irresponsible scoundrels”, “bloodthirsty curs”, and the like. This might be a calque 
from Russian documents, e. g. a report, dated December 1670, by Avvakum Ievlev, 
governor of Efremov: “blackguardly Cossacks” (vorovskie kazaki) and “Tambov 
traitors” (izmenniki tambovtsy).72 In any case, it fits the facts, since the Cossacks 
were clearly the initiators of the movement; it also draws the line between 
independent “march warriors”, who only broke vague pledges of good conduct, and 
                                                 
69  Fabritius, p. 90-91. 
70  “I too had to take my share, but what my feelings were God only knows” (ibidem, p. 87). 
He first met Razin when the latter came back from his Caspian campaign (p. 79: “Stenka 
came with us to Astrakhan”), then when appealing to Razin for his countryman Butler (p. 
86-87; “artillery expert”: footnote 2). 
71  Ibidem, p. 70. 
72  Krest'ianskaia voina, IV, n° 24, p. 25; vorovskoi or the corresponding verb vorovat' mean 
any kind of breach of accepted patterns of behaviour, from forging a testimonial in a law 
suit to kindling civil war. 
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regular forces, or town and country people, who had solemnly sworn on the Cross 
allegiance and loyalty to the tsar. 
EVERYONE A COSSACK? 
A remarkable feature of the 1670 rebellion, as compared to previous (Bolotnikov, 
1606) or subsequent (Pugachev, 1773) movements, is its fidelity to Cossack 
institutions. There is no attempt at setting up a mock court or an imitation of 
Muscovite official bureaus: krug assemblies and elected atamans are supposed to 
meet the needs for organization in rebel-controlled areas, since all rebels became, at 
least in theory, members of the Cossack Host. How deep did this overall 
identification with the Cossacks go? 
When it came to storm Astrakhan, writes Fabritius, “the Cossacks had 
persuaded the common workers, or jariski (as they are called), to attack the quarter 
where the Dutch sailors had been posted”. As this was the most dangerous place, 
because “these Dutchmen knew how to handle guns”, it appears that Cossacks used 
the poorest townsmen as cannon-fodder.73 This statement is, to some extent, 
substantiated by the only published letter written by a rebel ataman to another: 
“And I’d be glad to come back to you, in Kuzmodem’iansk, only the populace 
(chern’) won’t let me go, because here, on the Vetluga, they are shouting for help 
‘The lords are coming!’, and wherever they [the lords] meet the populace, they cut 
them down.”74 Stenka Razin used the same term, as far as we can judge from the 
largest message apparently issued directly from him: 
 
This is Stepan Timofeevich adressing all the populace. Who will serve God and the tsar and 
the Great [Cossack] Host and Stepan Timofeevich, I have sent out Cossacks, and together 
with them you should exterminate traitors and exterminate bloodsuckers out of the 
community. And as soon as my Cossacks start to fight in earnest, you go to them for advice, 
and [you,] all indentured and banished men, join the army and my Cossacks. 75 
 
Although perhaps without derogatory intention, the Cossack leaders freely use the 
word chern’, usually applied to the lower classes of Muscovite society, from the 
country and the towns. It should be remembered, moreover, that Cossacks were no 
                                                 
73  Fabritius, p. 84; jariski (more correctly iaryshki) are unskilled labourers employed on 
ships, in docks, mills, etc.  
74  Krest'ianskaia voina, II/1, n° 169, p. 202; October 1670. The author is Il'iushka [Il'ia] 
Ivanov, mentioned above.  
75  Ibidem, II/1, n° 53, p. 65; before September 14th, 1670. 
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peasants, and even despised husbandry.76 At best, they protected peasants in a 
patronizing way, and admitted them in their midst, but I doubt very much that they 
ever considered them as their equals. Fabritius, who should know, speaks ironically 
of these newly hatched Cossacks: “So kamen die neiwe Kosacken, dehnen das 
Rantson von den armen Leuten versprochen wahr”,77 and so does, when caught in 
November 1670, Semen Tatarinov: “In the small fort of Lysogorsk, there are […] 
six peasants or peasants’ sons, who pretend deceitfully to be Don Cossack 
atamans.”78 
It appears that, whatever their appeal to the rural and urban population, the 
Cossacks clearly remained the undisputed leaders and organizers of the movement, 
as well as the nucleus and spearhead of the rebel army. The strategy, such as it was, 
and the aims of the rebellion were decided by Cossacks alone.79 
WHAT WERE THE COSSACKS FIGHTING FOR? 
The foreign narratives give a somewhat contradictory answer to this question. 
Being born robbers (or so Fabritius and Struys imply), their first objective 
obviously was to plunder, a view fully confirmed by the evidence. Russian sources 
even give some idea of the nature and size of the booty. In 1671, a group of Tatar 
mirzas [nobles] from Temnikov complain that their houses and estates have been 
looted: Umriak Dosaev’s damages are estimated at 500 roubles in cattle and cloth, 
not counting the currency and the land deeds; Alei Dolatkozin, whose list of stolen 
goods resembles very much a milliner’s catalogue, evaluates his losses at 217 
roubles in furs, bonnets, jewels, cloth and linen; his weapons, pewter and copper 
ustensils, etc. are also listed as stolen; Aidar son of Tokhtar, prince Shihmamet, 
declares a round price of 600 roubles, plus the land deeds.80 The deti boiarskie 
[petty nobles] from a village in Kozlov district petition the tsar in March 1671 for 
help: many of their “men” (serfs or slaves?) have been killed, their houses 
                                                 
76  M. Khodarkovsky, “The Stepan Razin Uprising”, p. 4: “In the second half of the 17th 
century when some of the recent arrivals to the Don attempted to farm, the Cossack ad-
ministration ordered them beaten and plundered, and instructed them to go back where 
they came from if they wanted to farm”. 
77  Zapiski, p. 26. 
78  Krest'ianskaia voina, II/1, n° 223, p. 272; about Semen Tatarinov, see footnote 65. 
79  I have expressed more or less similar views in: A. Berelowitch, “Une jacquerie moderne : 
la révolte de Pougatchev, 17 septembre 1773-15 septembre 1774”, La Revue russe, n° 27 
(2005), p. 37-59, 48-51. 
80  Krest'ianskaia voina, IV, n° 41, 43, 44, p. 36-39. 
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ransacked and burnt, their wives, children and cattle taken away.81 A minor clerk 
(pod’iachii) in Temnikov explains that his wife has been tortured by rebels to reveal 
where the money and crockery were.82 In comparison, the Astrakhan booty seems 
negligible: when it was divided, since “there were several thousand men more than 
they had reckoned […] each fellow’s share did not exceed ten Reichstaler.”83 
But even exceptionally bold robbers do not usually try to reform society, to take 
over entire countries, or even big towns,84 and neither do they, as a rule, aspire to 
the throne. According to foreign witnesses, Razin and his followers did just that, 
almost from the beginning of the second campaign. “Here [in Panshin, May 1670] 
he began straightaway quietly gathering the common people around him, giving 
them money, and promises of great riches if they would be loyal to him and help to 
exterminate the treacherous boyars.”85 A speech in the same vein, allegedly 
delivered by Razin to his army after Chernyi Yar, and probably pieced together by 
Struys, incriminates the “tyrants” who had so long oppressed them, and proclaims 
that he will relieve “his children” of their burden.86 The most convincing materials 
are given by the Relation, when depicting the final stage of the rebellion: 
 
Every where he promised Liberty, and a redemption from the Yoak (so he call’d it) of the 
Bojars or Nobles, which he said were the oppressors of the Country […] He, Stenko, was 
come by order of the Great Czar to put to death all the Bojars, Nobles, Senators, and other 
great ones […] as Enemies and Traytors of their Countrey […] [Razin’s followers] were 
commonly put upon the Rack, and being examined, what they designed in this Rebellion, they 
answered, that they intended for Mosco, and would have the lives of the Nobles, and other 
great ones.87 
 
                                                 
81  Ibidem, IV, n° 52, p. 46. 
82  Ibidem, IV, n° 26, p. 26; December 1670. 
83  Fabritius, p. 87. The Reichstaler contained 25.98 g. in pure silver, the rouble represented 
about 43.7 g. 
84  With the exception of Sir Francis Drake, but he was a privateer, tacitly approved by the 
Queen. Cf. the epigraph by Simone Weil. 
85  Fabritius, p. 79-80. 
86  The French translator obviously took a hand, too: “Enfin mes amis vous voilà libres, & ce 
que vous venez de faire vous affranchit du joug des tyrans. Ce joug est si lourd & si rude, 
qu'il y a de quoi s'étonner que vous l'ayez porté si long-temps sans en être accablés. Mais 
le juste Ciel ne l'a pas permis ; il a été touché de vos larmes, il vous envoie un Libérateur 
[…] qui vous aimera comme ses enfants & n'aura pour vous qu'un cœur de père” (Struys, 
p. 176). 
87  Relation, p. 97, 98, 99. 
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This last statement is amply borne out by numerous Russian questioning minutes. 
Although the majority of foreign witnesses describe Razin as an autocrat88 and 
assume that he coveted the throne, none has more forcefully expressed Razin’s 
ambitions than Martius. After comparing him to Catilina and Wilhelm Grumbach,89 
he writes: “This was a harbinger of terrible trouble to come, since things had come 
to such a point, that it seemed there was no way to end the disorders but either the 
tsar, or Razin should die.”90 This fits Michael Khodarkovsky’s conclusions 
perfectly: “Both Razin and the tsar insisted on representing the ‘true’ tsar and the 
‘true’ church. They were not competing for different conceptions of sovereignty 
and social values, instead they were vying for the same source of legitimacy.”91 
If true, the fact is indeed puzzling, no more so, but just as much as, the illiterate 
Pugachev undertaking to impersonate the late emperor Peter III. Struys himself, the 
most fanciful of our witnesses, is at a loss to explain how what might have been a 
somewhat protracted plundering foray had grown into a full-fledged crusade, or 
jacquerie, against social order at large. The best he has to offer is that “Radzin 
being arrived to this Pitch of Greatness was so puffed up as if he had conquered all 
the Empire.”92 Whatever the origin of this alleged bid for the throne was, it would 
imply that Razin, with utmost cynicism, first involved the Cossacks, then the 
“common people” in his selfish plans, under the guise of fighting the boyars. 
Indeed, some foreign observers (Struys, Martius) depict Razin as a cold-blooded 
murderer, maddened by ambition, and ascribe to him alone the origin and making 
of the whole rebellion. This does not fit, somehow, the impression gained from the 
available shreds of evidence, but on that point, as on many others, our 
                                                 
88  “L'on ne connoissoit Radzin que par le respect qu'on lui portoit, nul ne l'approchant qu'à 
genoux & le visage contre terre. Et quand on lui parloit, il étoit défendu de le nommer au-
trement que Batské, c'est-à-dire Père dans leur langue” (Struys, p. 173). 
89  Inostrannye izvestia, p. 45, § 14-15*. W. Grumbach (1503-1567), a noble from Franco-
nia, who tried to fight for prince Johann Friedrich the Younger against Augustus, Elector 
of Saxony. 
90  Inostrannye izvestia, p. 46, § 20 : “Hoc vero demum futuri motus maxime terribilis clas-
sicum erat, rebus quippe jam in eum locus deductis, ut tumultus, cujus componendi ratio 
non apparebat, vel Tzaris, vel Razini exitio terminaretur.” The “harbinger” was Razin's 
claim that ex-patriarch Nikon, actually detained in Kirillo-Belozerskii monastery, and tsar 
Alexis' son Alexis († 17 January, 1670) were among his followers. 
91  M. Khodarkovsky, “The Stepan Razin Uprising”, p. 17. 
92  Struys, p. 192; but the French version goes further : “L'Armée de Radzin croissant tous 
les jours, il en devint si fier qu'il […] ne douta pas qu'il ne fût bientôt sur le trône de ses 
voisins. […] Dans cet esprit d'orgueil secret, il se mit en tête de s'égaler aux Têtes Cou-
ronnées.” (Struys, p. 179-180). 
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documentation is silent or ambiguous, and Razin’s personality and ultimate plans 
remain an enigma.  
A better way to approach the problem would be perhaps to start from the other 
end, from the general state of mind in the Lower and Middle Volga region on the 
eve of the rebellion. As far as we can see, it was a tangle of resentment, hatred, 
hope, thirst for justice, perhaps nostalgic yearning for the roving life of yore.93 All 
this Razin, being a natural leader, perceived and crystallized, becoming at the same 
time the focus of and the driving force behind the movement. But we mustn’t 
expect ever to determine how far he intended to use the rebellion for his own ends.  
As for the Cossacks, they were no Robin Hoods, and probably did not think so 
much of redressing the wrongs of Muscovite society as of taking the place of the 
nobles – a surmise put forward by Aleksandr Stanislavskii regarding the Cossacks 
of the 1610-1620’s. Some of them were given estates during the first half of 17th 
century, but what they really wanted was to become government-appointed 
beneficiaries of a regular “feeding” income (kormlenie or pristavstvo), thereby 
supplanting the nobles as exploiters of the peasantry.94 If Cossack society was as 
primitive as Nikitin says,95 it is no wonder they closely resemble the Bacaudæ, who 
“seem to have had no social programme other than an exchange of roles between 
themselves and the landlords.”96 In so doing, they were certainly extending their 
usual scope of operation, they didn’t transform it. The faithless “common people” is 
another matter altogether. 
WHO JOINED THE COSSACKS? 
If asked “who joined the Cossacks?”, the Western witnesses answer, as one man, 
“the common people”: “In the Space of 5 days after he had got the Astrachan Fleet, 
his Army was raised from 16 000 to 27 000 Men, being a mixt of Pesants, Slaves, 
Tatars and Cossacks, and men of restless minds from all Parts”97; “at this time 
[1669] Stenka had an opportunity of […] becoming acquainted with the mood of 
the common people.”98 
                                                 
93  Cf. Boris Chichlo, “Sibérie: mode de colonisation – mode de production”, Sibérie II. 
Questions sibériennes, Paris, 1999, p. 95-118. 
94  A. A. Stanislavskii, Grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii v XVII v., Moscow, 1990.  
95  See footnote 23. 
96  Moses E. Finley, The Ancient Economy, London, 1973, p. 89. 
97  Struys, p. 191. 
98 Fabritius, p. 79 
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This is not absolutely accurate. Not all peasants joined the movement,99 and 
many who joined did so under duress. Conversely, there was a sizable number of 
recruits from privileged or semi-privileged classes. In June 1671, the governor of 
Kadom reports that “city dwellers of Korsun of all conditions have mutinied”,100 but 
there are more specific indications in the documents. To give but a few examples: 
petty noblemen from Kurmysh, Penza, Kozelsk, Voronezh up to a colonel of 
Circassians in Ostrogozhsk,101 a public writer on oath from Lyskovo, a dragoman 
from Astrakhan, a priest turned ataman who plundered goods to the amount of 2070 
roubles and kidnapped a six-month old baby.102 
Nevertheless, on the whole, Struys, Fabritius, Martius are right: this was a 
popular revolt, joined by sundry renegades from the upper strata of Muscovite 
society. 
WHY JOIN THE COSSACKS? 
Nearly all Western documents mention the deep-rooted, long-suppressed hatred felt 
by the lower classes for the boyars (which sometimes means not only the highest 
rank in Russian Court, but other noblemen as well), officials, officers in the army, 
landlords – their masters and oppressors – as the main cause of the revolt: the 
common soldiers “at once decided that this was the chance they had been waiting 
for so long […] The murderers [who] had so long thirsted after blood” (Fabritius). 
“Hence a rumour spread that boyars, against whom there was implacable hatred, 
were trying to take all the power in their hands […] So that in the year 1667 
Stephan Razin aroused minds already prepared for rebellion.”103 
Neither is it contradicted by the events, reflected in Russian as well as in foreign 
sources. In the Astrakhan region, the rebels 
                                                 
99 For instance, Ivan Ovchinnik, a serf of Kharlam Ofrosinov, being asked by rebels to 
give them bread and sheep, called them “good-for-nothing tramps”, and was killed ac-
cordingly (Krest'ianskaia voina, III, n° 118, p. 128; July 1671). 
100 Ibidem, III, n° 95, p. 101. 
101 Ibidem, II/1, n° 126, p. 151, captured in October 1670 (Kurmysh); II/1, n° 155, p. 183-
184, hanged on October 21st, 1670 (Penza); III, n° 30, p. 38 (Kozelsk); III, n° 178, 
p. 199 (Voronezh); II/2, n° 29, p. 38-39, n° 32, p. 41-42 (Ostrogozhsk). 
102 Ibidem, II/1, n° 161, p. 190-192; October 1671 (public writer); III, n° 298, p. 375-376 
(dragoman); IV, n° 38, p. 34 (ataman-priest). 
103 Martius, § 13, p. 43-44: “Inde rumor spargebatur, Bojaros, erga quos implacabile odium 
erat, omnem potestatem ad se trahere conatos […] Inde anno MDCLXVII Stephanus 
Ratzinus præparatos rebellioni animos commovit.” 
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committed many inhuman acts, and murthered the Gentry, who were fain to betake 
themselves to Astrachan disguised in Slaves Apparel. The Pesantry who indeed are very 
tyrannically dealt throughout all the Emperours Dominions, here found an occasion to be 
revenged of their Liege-Lords, and to show their Man-hood brought the Heads of their Lords 
and threw them at the feet of a Provost or Executioner thereto ordained, who gave them a 
reward for their Pains.104 
 
In the Middle Volga, “all the Russian Countrey-men living in this Tract, and 
belonging to Muscovian Lords, rose up against their Governors killing and hanging 
them.”105 Revolted peasants themselves confessed afterwards, when put to the 
question, not the murders, but the looting of noblemen’s estates.106 
Of course, official epistles, full of ponderously compounded platitudes, did very 
little or nothing to pacify the countryside. They could not compete with the brief, 
fiery messages of the atamans, which said nothing much, only “Be standfast, stand 
together with us”, but had all the glamour of novelty and excitement. Indeed, the 
attraction of the Cossack way of life, one could almost say “the Cossack style”, was 
a significant factor of the rebellion. Fabritius mentions a Polish nobleman who took 
him under his protection in Razin’s camp: “Wonsofski […] had been captured a 
year before by the Cossacks and in the meantime had come to like loose life [das 
lose Lehben]”; he now commanded a company.107 At an earlier date, Russian 
sources describe in detail an attempt to recruit new Cossacks, thus providing us 
with a short-range view of Cossack seduction. 
On July 20, 1666, four non-commissioned officers and an orderly of colonel 
Kravkov’s regiment gave evidence: 
 
a man, rank and condition unknown, met us at the ferry, and started to invite us to come to the 
Don Cossacks’ settlements. He called himself ataman, and [promised us] 10 roubles, and a 
horse with saddle, and a sabre apiece. On the morrow, he said, there would be 1700 Cossacks 
at the Serpukhov ferry. Once on the ferry, he told a girl ‘Were you younger and prettier, we’d 
have use of you in our Cossack krug. 
 
                                                 
104 Struys, p. 191-192. 
105 Relation, p. 98. 
106 Krest'ianskaia voina, II/1, n° 110, p. 129, October 1670, and n° 218, p. 267, November 
1670. 
107 Fabritius, p. 83. 
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All this is confirmed by different witnesses, and the man’s identity was soon 
revealed: he was page (zhilets) Emel’ian Vasil’ev Naryshkin,108 but he stoutly 
denied, not very plausibly, all he was charged with, including his none too tactful 
attempt at flirting and unsuccessful borrowing of tobacco.109 He was probably sent 
by Vasilii Us. The total catch of the tsar’s forces in July-August 1666 includes 
another noble, a run-away slave from Moscow, five peasants “led astray” by an ex-
serf of Moscow noble (moskovskii dvorianin) prince Ivan Golitsyn, and three 
domestic slaves (dvorovye liudi) of his fellow courtier, Stepan Fedorov Zhdanov.110 
THE SPARK THEORY 
Considering the events in retrospect, it seems that the turning point of the whole 
rebellion was the defection of prince L’vov’s army at Chernyi Yar. Had they stood 
fast against Razin, the Astrakhan revolt would probably not have occurred, or at 
least would have remained a local affair. Only moments before the defection, they 
had “unanimously shouted: ‘Yes, we will give our lives for His Majesty the Tsar, 
and will fight to the last drop of our blood.’”111 How are we to explain this volte-
face? It is true that, according to Struys, in Astrakhan, even before the Chernyi Yar 
defeat, musketeers “who had not in a long time received Pay […] found now 
occasion to grow mutinous”.112 The French translation is even more explicit, with a 
clear hint at desertion.113 Other soldiers, in the course of the rebellion, showed their 
unwillingness to fight by abandoning their posts.114 To join the rebellion was quite a 
                                                 
108 Judging by his subaltern, but nevertheless Court rank, he could belong to the Naryshkin 
family, who gave tsar Alexis his second wife in February 1671. He isn't to be found in 
the Naryshkin genealogy (A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii, Russkaia rodoslovnaia kniga, 2nd 
ed., II, Saint-Petersburg, 1898, p. 5-18, 463-464), but then he wasn't the sort of man the 
tsar's in-laws would readily boast about. 
109 Krest'ianskaia voina, I, n° 22, p.49-52. 
110 Ibidem, I, n° 28, 29, 30, 32, p. 57-58, 60-61, 64. Ivan Golitsyn, Boiarskaia kniga 1658 
goda, N. M. Rogozhin, V. A. Kadik, ed. (Moscow, 2004), p. 147; Stepan Zhdanov, 
ibidem, p. 189; the 1658 Court register remained in use up to 1676 (ibidem, p. 5). 
111 Fabritius, p. 81. 
112 Struys, p. 191. 
113 “Les soldats […] disoient hautement qu'ils alloient quitter le service, qu'il n'y avoit plus 
de quoi les payer, & que l'argent qu'on leur destinoit étant employé à d'autres usages, il 
n'étoit pas juste qu'ils continuassent à vouloir exposer leurs vies dont on avoit si peu de 
soin.” (Struys, p. 179). 
114 Struys, p. 191. 
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different, and a much more dangerous, prospect. To understand what happened, we 
must examine the evidence more closely, after attempting to deal with two popular 
misconceptions of revolt, all the more pervasive because they are only half-
consciously professed. 
One of them is of the materialistic persuasion: if enough grievances accumulate 
within a given social group, it will result, almost mechanically, in an insurrection, 
because the tension becomes unbearable. A pyrotechnic variation of the same 
compares popular anger to a powder magazine, which needs only a spark to 
explode. The other, walrasian, rationalistic approach imagines a potential rebel 
weighing carefully the pros and cons, and deciding for rebellion if and when the 
former tip the scale. Both interpretations have something in common: they exclude 
altogether psychology, and freedom of choice as well. 
Revolts, however, do not work that way. The powder keg may be full to the 
brim, but it still needs, to blow up, a specific operation of what, for want of a better 
word, we shall call the psyche. Actually, the whole human being is involved; an 
overwhelming rush of feeling brings every faculty to its highest, feverish level.115 
Since rebellion implies the infringement of sacrosanct Order (see above), this 
trance-like moment, sometimes bordering on madness, is essential in order to 
overcome fear. This is not to deny that the final outcome is the result of a long 
chain of factors, and that rational arguments are still remembered by the subject.116 
But they are suspended at the last second: loyalty, fear of punishment, resentment 
of past injustice, class-hatred, solidarity and twenty others alternate in his mind at 
lightning speed, until the leap into the unknown, which is the mark of genuine 
revolt. In a very short timespan, the decision is made: taking chances, assuming 
risks, and resolving, if need be, to sacrifice one’s life (“They swore with life and 
limb to stand together”117 – a stereotype of all rebellions and conspiracies). For 
death is not only, in such a case, a perfectly realistic expectation, it is also the 
ultimate proof of commitment. 
This timeless quality of revolt has been remarkably expressed by Michel 
Foucault, speaking about the 1979 revolution in Iran: “Uprisings do belong to 
history, but somehow they elude it. The gesture of a man alone, a group, a minority 
or a whole people rising up and saying ‘I will obey no more’ […] can’t be reduced 
                                                 
115 Which accounts for the extraordinary staunchness of Razin's followers, e. g. the “Nun in 
Man's habit [who] had commanded Seven thousand Men” (Relation, p. 99). 
116 Cf. Jacques Lacan, “Le temps logique et l'assertion de certitude anticipée”, id., Écrits 
(Paris, 1966), p. 197-213, 204 : “Le temps de comprendre et le moment de conclure.” 
117 Fabritius, p. 81. 
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to anything else […] because the rising man is ultimately beyond explanation.”118 If 
we adopt this view, it follows that no investigation, no matter how ingenuous or 
thorough, can really come within reach of the crucial moment of the “turn-around” 
– the actual meaning of rivolta. 
Stepping far beyond the borders of a historian’s professional caution, I would 
like to adduce from 1968 France an example which seems relevant to me, although 
much less risky for the actors than in the case of revolting Muscovite soldiers. 
Some day around May 15th, shop stewards of Renault factory in Boulogne-
Billancourt had refused access to our group of students and professors. After a 
while, one of them, partly relenting and talking across the closed gate, told us how 
the strike had started: 
 
There was no meeting, no instructions from the trade-unions, no leaflets, no talks, nothing. 
Suddenly, in one of the workshops, a machine-tool stopped, still without a word being 
spoken. Then another, and another. The workshop went silent, and so did, very soon, the 
whole plant. The old ones remembered: it had been exactly the same in June 1936. 
 
This “trance” theory was vigorously criticized by several members of the 
conference. I readily admit that not all rebellions start this way, Swiss peasantry of 
the 17th century, as studied by Andreas Suter, being a convincing counter-example. 
I dare say a sentence like “Now, now, the times begin to alter, it will be our turn 
next to Lord it, you villains” seems to show that plans for rebellion had been laid 
days, perhaps weeks before.119 I’ll try nevertheless to uphold my surmise, and for 
lack of direct proof, to find at least some corroboration: does the “trance” 
hypothesis help to explain the “particulars of the Rebellion” and some features of 
its representation? Even if it yields only faint, mostly negative, indications, the 
matter is perhaps worth a try. 
                                                 
118 Cf. Michel Foucault, “Inutile de se soulever ?”, in Le Monde, No. 10661,  1979, p. 1-2: 
“Les soulèvements appartiennent à l'histoire. Mais, par un certain côté, ils lui échappent. 
Le mouvement par lequel un homme seul, un groupe, une minorité, ou un peuple tout 
entier dit : 'Je n'obéis plus' et jette à la face d'un pouvoir qu'il estime injuste le risque de 
sa vie – ce mouvement me paraît irréductible […] parce que l'homme qui se lève est fi-
nalement sans explication : il faut un arrachement qui interrompt le fil de l'histoire et ses 
longues chaînes de raisons, pour qu'un homme puisse 'réellement' préférer le risque de 
sa vie à la certitude d'avoir à obéir”. My thanks go to Jean-Christian Dumont, who quot-
ed this text in his Servus: Rome et l'esclavage sous la République (Paris, Rome, 1987) 
and made it available to me. 
119 But Struys wrote that in 1676 and may have slightly revised his memories, and anyway 
there is a quite a gap between conceiving a plan and carrying it out. 
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THE BLIND SPOT 
Let us look anew at Fabritius’ narrative; it is the closest we can get to the state of 
mind of soldiers in the process of turning rebels. Rather oddly, he writes: “The 
common soldiers […] put their heads together and at once decided that this was the 
chance for which they had been waiting so long, and with all their flags and drums 
they ran over to the enemy.” He seems to imply that the “villains” had already 
resolved to defect (“the chance for which they had been waiting so long”), and 
Struys states it (“no doubt they had reached an understanding beforehand”). In that 
case, what need did they have to hold a council? Besides, if talks had been going on 
for some time, the officers would probably have heard, or at the very least would 
have had an inkling of it. What seems more likely is that the final decision was 
made on the spot, in only a few minutes or even less (“at once”). 
From Tsaritsyn to Samara via Astrakhan, Razin’s rebellion spreads very fast 
and meets with continuous success. This is consistent with what we know of other 
rebellions. For some, as yet unclear, reasons, the initial, trance-like outbreak of 
revolt is electrifying, and therefore tremendously contagious. Its epicenter may be, 
and often has been, compared to a conflagration, which raises instantly the social 
temperature to an incredible heat level. It is perceived at once, even from far away, 
and expands, when the conditions are favourable, with terrifying speed, which 
makes it well-nigh irresistible. Although remote from the Middle Volga theater, 
Martius understands perfectly that after the taking of Astrakhan swift movement is 
Razin’s chief asset: “Neither did Razin dally, as a man would, who wished to 
achieve his aims through rapidity, and endeavoured by every means and plan 
available to expand his power as broadly as possible.”120 
At Cherny Yar, after the paroxysm, tension slackens: “They began kissing and 
embracing one another.”121 But not all effusions of the rebels’ souls are dictated by 
brotherly love: “Murder began at once.”122 Why? Of course, human nature being 
what it is, the worst is hardly surprising. Still, on other occasions, Razin’s men, 
despite their general motto of “exterminating the boyars”, have made prisoners 
members of the ruling class, and the slaughtering of useful gunners could not be 
really justified by security issues. The explanation by revenge, favoured by 
Fabritius and Struys, is not completely convincing either. Revenge is individual and 
cold-blooded. Here we deal with a collective, murderous orgy, such as the one 
                                                 
120 Martius, p. 46, § 19 : “Nec cunctatus est Razinus, ut qui rebus suis festinatione consul-
tum cuperet, et omni ope atque consilio niteretur, ut potentiam suam quam latissime 
propagaret.” 
121 Fabritius, p. 81. 
122 Ibidem. 
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vividly described by Giovanni Verga in an imaginary Sicilian town: as soon as the 
town-dwellers see the flag on the city-hall which means “freedom”, they start 
massacring the galantuomi (notables) in a truly ghastly way.123 This is not such a 
rare occurrence, and fits e. g. the description of the September 1789 massacres in 
Paris. Faithful as historians try to be to their pledge of objectivity, it is sometimes 
difficult for them not to sympathize with the victims and enemies of such a 
rebellion. 
In that respect, the adjective “bloodthirsty”, often used by Fabritius when 
referring to the rebels, is perfectly apposite, in its most literal sense, even to the 
meaning of “maniacal”. Besides, bloodthirstiness is apparently contagious. After 
obtaining the surrender of Astrakhan rebels, Ivan Miloslavskii was relieved by 
Iakov Nikitich Odoevskii: the latter 
 
had got so used to torturing people that he could not eat in the morning until he had been to 
the place of torture and had people beaten with the knout, burned, and put on the rack. But 
then he could eat and drink enough for three. […] I had to remain behind and live for nearly a 
year among these barbarians.124 
 
Here, the “trance” theory may be helpful: Foucault has stressed the nobler side of 
revolt, but there is also a dark side to it. Not only political order, but customary (for 
Muscovites: Christian) norms of behaviour are thrown overboard as well. Mordlust 
is given free rein, since it is supposed to be harnessed in a good cause. More than 
that, it is possible that murder in this context is used as a language. Jan Dhondt, 
analyzing the political crisis in XIIth century Flanders, concludes that the choice of a 
prince “is, actually, a very primitive way, the most primitive imaginable, to 
influence the general policy of the earldom.”125 Murder could represent an even 
more primitive level of political thinking: actions speak louder than words. 
Fabritius must have felt, if not clearly understood, the outburst of passion, akin 
to lunacy, he witnessed at Chernyi Yar. If so, he did not think it was worth 
mentioning. For all the remaining observers, domestic and foreign alike, the central 
moment of revolt remains a blind spot, like an invisible black hole in the course of 
events. Unable to justify such a tremendous eruption of violence by its causes, they 
build up a heap of wrong reasons to conceal the gap: ignorance, stupidity, 
                                                 
123 G. Verga (1840-1922), “Libertà”, Cavalleria rusticana e altre novelle (Milano, 1994), p. 
233-240. I thank Andrea Graziosi, who suggested this parallel to me.  
124 Fabritius, p. 92. 
125 J. Dhondt, “'Ordres' ou 'puissances'“, Estates or Powers. Essays in the Parliamentary 
history of Southern Netherlands from the XIIth to the XVIIIth Century, Heule, 1977, p. 
25-49. 
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intemperance, cowardness, xenophobia, greediness, cruelty or general wickedness 
is what made the soldiers forfeit their pledge of loyalty. Once again, Martius is 
nearer the mark: he blames the rebellion on the instability, a characteristic feature, 
he says, of Russians and Cossacks.126 
One more question remains: given the hopelessly fierce attachment to routine 
common to all human beings, are not these temporary fits of madness which we call 
“revolts” the only way to achieve even moderate changes in the fabric of society – 
the fool’s bauble taking the place of “the spirits of the past […] battle slogans, and 
costumes in order to present this new scene”?127 But that is another story. 
                                                 
126 Martius, p. 40, § g: “Mirum tamen videri potest, quid sit, quod cum gens ista præter 
ingenitam erga Tzares suos venerationem, servituti assueta sit, tam subito ad seditionem 
concitandum impelli possit, nisi cognitum esset, ingenia ejus populi esse mutabilis […]” 
[One might wonder how it is that a people who, through their inborn veneration for their 
Tsars, are used to servitude, could be so suddenly impelled to raise sedition, were it not 
known that they are of a changeable character]. § h: The Cossacks “genus hominum est 
instabile, et natura sua quietis impatiens, ac prædandi cupidum” [“are an unsettled race 
of men, who are by nature impatient of quiet and eager for plunder”]. 
127 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852). 
 
 
Insurgents as Diplomates:  





Framing The Borderland: The Image  
of the Ukrainian Revolt and Hetman Bohdan 




In many ways, Ukraine burst upon the European scene in the mid-seventeenth 
century. The great revolt of 1648 brought the largest European state, the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, to near disintegration. By the 1650s events in the 
Cossack capital of Chyhyryn were being closely followed from Stockholm to 
Constantinople. European newspapers avidly printed reports on the Hetman Bohdan 
Khmel’nyts’kyi and his armies. Yet for much of Europe “the Ukraine” or the 
borderland of the Polish state was still a terra incognita about which statesmen and 
reading publics needed basic information and about which many uncertainties 
reigned. 
Within a few years of the revolt, the thirst for information was answered by 
publications on Ukraine and accounts of the revolt.1 The first texts were issued by 
                                                 
1  On the accounts of the revolt and reactions to it, see Volodymyr Sichyns'kyi, Chuzhyntsi 
pro Ukraïnu (Kyiv, 1993) (from the  2nd expanded Prague edition of 1942),  and the Eng-
lish translation Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the VIth to XXth 
Century (New York, 1953); Mykhailo Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 8, trans. 
Marta Olynyk, ed. Frank E. Sysyn and Myroslav Iurkevich (Edmonton and Toronto, 
2002), See especially Note 5: Sources for the Khmelnytsky Era and its Historical Tradi-
tion, 670-676, 678-683; Joel Raba, Between Remembrance and Denial: The Fate of Jews 
in the Polish Commonwealth during the Mid-Seventeenth Century as Shown in Contem-
porary Writings and Historical Research (Boulder, Colo., 1995); Dmytro Nalyvaiko, 
“Zakhidnoevropeis'ki istoryko-literaturni dzherela pro vyzvol'nu viinu ukraïns'koho 
narodu 1648-1654 rr.”, Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal (1969) 8: 137-144, 9: 137-143, 
10: 134-145, 11: 131-136, 12: 128-132, (1970) 1: 138-140; id., Kozats'ka khrystyians'ka 
respublika: Zaporiz'ka Sich u zakhidnoievropeis'kykh pam'iatkakh (Kyiv, 1992) and id., 
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the government’s supporters, in some cases for internal consumption, but also, 
especially when victories were proclaimed, to rally support abroad. Latin 
functioned both as the language of the Commonwealth’s learned elite and the 
international medium for the various cultures of the Commonwealth and the reading 
public abroad. By 1652, the Silesian Lutheran (for a time an Anti-Trinitarian) 
Joachim Pastorius published his Latin-language history of the revolt in Gda sk 
(Danzig).2 Like many of his Anti-Trinitarian confreres, he had resided in the 
Ukrainian lands in the 1630s and 1640s, but had fled the revolt. He was later to be 
rewarded for his historical writing by the post of court historian in Warsaw (he 
converted to Catholicism in 1658).  Other writers had a targeted public in mind. 
Another refugee from Volhynia, the Jewish Talmudist and kabbalist Nathan 
Hannover, issued his account of Jewish suffering and martyrdom during the revolt 
in Hebrew in Venice in 1653 not only as a commemoration but as a way to collect 
funds for other refugees.3 
The first work to take advantage of the need for accurate information on 
Ukraine in Europe originated from the pen of a French engineer and servitor of the 
Polish king. In 1651, Guillaume de Beauplan published his Description in Rouen, 
with subsequent editions appearing in 1660 and 1661.4 His perceptive account of 
Ukraine and the Cossacks, which was translated in full or in part into Latin, Dutch, 
Spanish, and English by the early eighteenth century, long served as the source for 
subsequent writing on the revolt. His maps published in Gda sk provided the basic 
information on geography, mapping Ukraine for the European world. Indeed 
another French eyewitness to events in Ukraine, Pierre Chevalier, was to borrow 
                                                                                                            
Ochyma zakhodu. Retseptsiia Ukraïny v Zakhidnii Ievropi XI-XVIII st. (Kyiv, 1998). On 
the earliest accounts of Kyiv and the surrounding area, see Hennadii Boriak, “Inozemni 
dzherela pro Kyïv XIII-seredyny XVII st.”, Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal 25 , 12 
(1981): 31-41. 
2  J. Pastorius, Bellum Scythico-Cosacicum seu de coniuratione Tartarorum, Cosacorum et 
plebis Russicae contra Regnum Poloniae (Gda sk, 1652). 
3  On the influence of Hannover's work, see Gershon Bacon, “'The House of Hannover': 
Gezeirot Tah in Modern Jewish Historical Writing”, Jewish History 17, 2 [special issue 
“Gezeirot T”ah: Jews, Cossacks, Poles and Peasants in 1648 Ukraine”] (2003): 179-206. 
4  The second expanded edition has been reprinted: Guillaume le Vasseur de Beauplan, 
Description d'Ukrainie qui sont plusieurs provinces du Royaume Pologne (Rouen, 1660, 
reprint Kyiv and Cambridge, Ma., 1990). For a modern English translation and discussion 
of the various editions and translations, see id., A Description of Ukraine, trans. and ed. 
Andrew B. Pernal and Dennis F. Essar [with introduction and notes] (Cambridge, Ma., 
1993). 
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liberally from Beauplan in his influential account of the revolt.5 The seventeenth-
century English translator of Chevalier’s work, Edward Brown, eloquently 
expressed the reasons for the European public’s interest in the area and the revolt in 
his preface, which also declared that the English as a maritime nation should have a 
particular fascination with the Cossacks: 
 
Although Ukraine be one of the most remote regions of Europe, and the Cossackian name 
very Modern; yet hath that Countrey been of late the Stage of Glorious Actions, and the 
Inhabitants have acquitted themselves with as great Valour in Martial Affairs, as any Nation 
whatsoever; so that this, and other Motives have made me earnest to put this account of it into 
English, where it cannot be otherwise then acceptable, since the Description of a Countrey 
little written of, and the achievments of a daring People, must needs be grateful to those, who 
of all the World, are the most curious and inquisitive, and the greatest lovers of bold Attempts 
and Bravery. The Ocean is our delight, and our Engagements upon the Seas, have rendred us 
considerable to the World. The Cossacks do in some measure imitate us, who took their rise 
from their Victories upon the Euxine, and setled themselves by incountring the Tartars in 
those Desart Plains, which do so far resemble the Sea […] The Actions of Kmielniski, 
General of the Cossacks, are very remarkable; and how he raised himself to that greatness, so 
as to be feared by a Nation [Poland-F.S.], which neither the Power of Christendom, nor the 
Turks could shake. 
 
Professional historians and men of letters joined in writing about the Ukrainian 
revolt, not least because Europe of the 1640s and 1650s was shaken by a whole 
series of upheavals and civil wars. It was this coincidence that would lead the 
twentieth-century scholar Roger Bigelow Merriman to pen his famous monograph 
Six Contemporaneous Revolutions, in many ways the pathfinder for the discussions 
on the Crisis of the Seventeenth Century that gripped the historical profession in the 
1950s and 1960s.6 Yet while Merriman did not examine the Ukrainian revolt 
against the Polish-Lithuanian state, his seventeenth-century predecessor Maiolino 
Bisaccioni devoted his second longest essay to this subject in his monograph on 
                                                 
5  Pierre Chevalier, Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre Pologne avec un dicours de 
leur origine, païs, mœurs, gouvernement & religion. Et un autre des Tatars Précopites 
(Paris, 1663). His work was published in 1672 in an English translation, without mention-
ing his authorship, by Edward Brown, A Discourse of the Original, Countrey, Manners, 
Government and Religion of the Cossacks, With another of the Perecopian Tartars. And 
the History of the Wars of the Cossacks against Poland (London, 1672). A Ukrainian 
translation of the French original appeared as P'íer Sheval'ie, Istoriia viiny kozakiv proty 
Pol' shchi (Kyiv, 1960). 
6  Roger Bigelow Merriman, Six Contemporaneous Revolutions (Oxford, 1938). 
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civil wars first published in Venice in 1653.7 Many Italian historians followed 
Bisaccioni’s lead in writing on the revolt.8 
ALBERTO VIMINA AND PAUL OF ALEPPO 
The accounts and histories of the revolt have often been mined for the information 
that they provide on the events described. They have also been looked at as sources 
for European opinion, not least because as the Ukrainian national movement of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century sought affirmation of its goals and postulates, its 
proponents could find them in the foreign accounts. Less attention has been paid to 
the accounts as sources for the cultural world view and political agendas of the 
writers’. In this paper attention will focus on two of the most important accounts of 
seventeenth-century Ukraine and the revolt by Michele Bianchi (Alberto Vimina) 
and Paul of Aleppo. Both were written by clergymen who travelled to Ukraine on 
missions and personally met with Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. One came from 
the pen of a European, while the other is one of the accounts that came from outside 
Europe, demonstrating the interest the revolt engendered in the Middle East. The 
comparison of a non-European, albeit Christian account, with a European account 
affords us with the opportunity to put in sharper focus the importance of the 
traveller and his world view and formation in shaping the representation of the 
revolt.9  
The first mission was undertaken in June, 1650 by the Venetian clergyman 
Michele Bianchi (1603-1667), who is better known by the pseudonym Alberto 
                                                 
7  Maiolino Bisaccioni, “Historia delle guerre civili di Polonia”, in Historia delle guerre 
civili di questi ultimi questi tempi, 2nd ed. (Venice, 1654), 272-397. On Bisaccioni's sour-
ces, see Lorenzo Pompeo, “Maiolino Bissacioni i jego polskie ródla”, Barok 5, 2 (1998): 
109-125. 
8  On Venetian historians, see Teresa Chynczewska Hennel, “Najja niejsza o Najja niejszej. 
Rzeczpospolita w weneckiej literaturze historycznej XVII wieku”, Odrodzenie i Refor-
macja w Polsce 50 (2006): 191-203. 
9  A comparison for Muscovy, using the writing of Paul of Aleppo and Adam Olearius, has 
been undertaken by Charles J. Halperin, “In the Eye of the Beholder: Two Views of Sev-
enteenth-Century Muscovy”, Russian History 24, 4 (Winter 1997): 409-23. Many of his 
comments on Paul of Aleppo's description of Muscovy apply to his account of Ukraine. 
There has yet to be a full comparison of Paul of Aleppo's descriptions of Muscovy and 
Ukraine. On the general question of use of travel accounts in describing Muscovy, see 
Charles J. Halperin “Sixteenth-Century Foreign Travel Accounts to Muscovy: A Meth-
odological Excursus”, Sixteenth-Century Journal 6 (1975): 89-111. 
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Vimina. Born into a burgher family in Belluno, Bianchi had adopted a pseudonym 
and absented himself from the Italian peninsula because of threats to his person. 
Finding refuge in Warsaw with the papal nuncio, Giovanni de Torres, Vimina 
gained protection from the Crown grand chancellor, Jerzy Ossoli ski, who stood for 
the policy of accommodation with the Cossacks. Undertaken by Vimina at the 
behest of the Venetian resident in Vienna, Nicolo Sagredo, the mission sought to 
convince the hetman to provide his marine forces to come to the aid of Venice in 
the war it was fighting against the Turks. This mission, like a subsequent endeavor 
the Venetians undertook in 1652 to win the Cossacks to their side, did not meet 
with success, not least because it presumed that the rebels and the Polish-Lithuanian 
government could come to terms and join the struggle together. Nevertheless, 
Vimina was to have a long diplomatic career, embarking on missions to Muscovy 
and Sweden, before he returned to Veneto and a sinecure in Pieve d’Alpago.10 
Like all Venetian emissaries Vimina had to write reports that fully described the 
lands that he visited. His report of the 1650 trip was included in part in his history 
of the civil war in Poland that was published posthumously in 1671. That volume 
also contained accounts of his missions to Muscovy and Sweden.11 Vimina’s book 
was largely overlooked by historians of the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising, but the 
account of his 1650 mission found in manuscript form in Ferrara by G. Ferraro and 
published in Reggio nell’Emilia in 1890 has had considerable impact in historical 
writing, in part in studies of the mission and the correspondence it engendered.12 
                                                 
10  On Russian-Venetian relations, see Philip Longworth, “Russian-Venetian Relations in the 
Reign of Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich”, Slavonic and East European Review 64, 3 (July 
1986): 380-400. 
11  For sections of the account on the Cossacks, see Vimina, Historia delle guerre civili di 
Polonia (Venice, 1671), 7-9. 
12  G. Ferraro, Relazione dell'origine e dei costumi dei Cosacchi fatta l'anno 1656 da Alberto 
Vimina ambaciatatore dell Republicca di Venezia (Reggio nell'Emilia, 1890) on the basis 
of a manuscript in a Ferrara library (page numbers for Vimina refer to this publication). 
The text was also published on the basis of a manuscript in a Vatican library: L.Alpago 
Novello, “La relazione intorno ai Cosacchi di Alberto Vimina”, Archivo storico di Bel-
luno, Feltre e Cadore 6 (1934): 581-586. A third manuscript copy in Venice was used as 
the basis for the Ukrainian translation by Kseniia Konstantynenko: Al'berto Vimina, 
“Relatsiia pro pokhodzhennia ta zvychaï kozakiv”, trans. Kseniia Konstantynenko, 
Kyïvs'ka starovyna (1999) 5: 69. For the correspondence, see M. Korduba, “Venets'ke 
posol'stvo do Khmel'nyts'koho (1650)”, Zapysky Naukovogo Tovarystva im. Shevchenka 
(1907): 51-89; and D. Caccamo, “Alberto Vimina in Ucraine e nelle 'parti settentrionali'“, 
Europa Orientalis 5 (1986): 223-283, 265-283. See also P. Pirling, “Al'berto Vimina: 
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The account appeared in Russian, Polish and Ukrainian translations, and in 
fragments in English.13 It has been valued for its description of everyday life in 
Ukraine and for the first-hand observations on Hetman Khmel’nyts´kyi.14 
The account of the second clergyman, the archdeacon Paul of Aleppo (Ar. 
Bulos al-Halabiyy) (1627-1670), son of Patriarch Makarios III of Antioch (Ibn al-
Za’im), has had an even greater resonance in modern historiography. In part this 
greater resonance can be explained because it is the account of an insider, an 
Orthodox clergyman, who was at the same time an outsider from the Middle East. 
As such, it combines privileged access to native informants and intimate knowledge 
of cultural and religious traditions with the curiosity of a traveller from afar who 
wished to explain what he saw to readers in the Eastern Mediterranean world. 
Paul accompanied Makarios on a journey for alms to shore up the tottering 
Antiochian patriarchate for which the primary patrons were the Orthodox rulers of 
Wallachia and Moldavia, and above all the sole independent Orthodox ruler, the 
Muscovite tsar. Trips by Eastern patriarchs over the preceding seventy-five years to 
                                                                                                            
Snosheniia Venetsii s Ukrainoiu i Moskvoiu 1650-1663”, Russkaia starina 109 (January 
1902): 57-70. 
13  See the Russian translation by N. Molchanovskii, “Donesenie venetsiantsa Al'berto 
Vimina o kozakakh i B. Khmel'nitskom (1656 g.)”, Kievskaia starina 19, 1 (1900): 63-
75. For the Polish translation, see Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel and Piotr Salwa, “Alberta 
Viminy Relacja o pochodzeniu i zwyczajach Kozaków”, Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Pol-
sce 30 (1985): 207-222. For the Ukrainian translation, see Al'berto Vimina, “Relatsiia pro 
pokhodzhennia ta zvychaï kozakiv”, trans. Konstantynenko , Kyïvs'ka starovyna (1999) 
5: 64-69. For fragments in Ukrainian see Sichyns'kyi, Chuzhyntsi pro Ukraïnu, 77-81 and 
in English see Ukraine in Foreign Comments, 89-92. English translations in this text were 
made by MyroslavYurkevich and this author from a corrected version of the Ferrara text 
supplied by Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel. We are grateful to Olga Pugliese of the Uni-
versity of Toronto for her careful correction of our text.  
14   On Vimina and his writings, see Kseniia Konstantynenko, “'Relatsiia pro pokhodzhennia 
ta zvychaï kozakiv' Al'berto Viminy: Istoriia,  uiavy, real'nist'“, Kyïvs'ka starovyna 5 
(1999) 5: 50-64; Riccardo Picchio, “E.M. Manoleso, A. Vimina e la Polonia”, in Venezia 
e la Polonia nei secoli dal XVII al XIX, ed. Luigi Cini (Venice and Rome, 1968), 121-
132; Lorenzo Pompeo, “Maiolino Bissacioni i Alberto Vimina: Dwóch historiografów 
wloskich wobec problemu kozaków w 1648”, Warszawskie Zeszyty Ukrainoznawcze 4-5 
(1997): 494-504; Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, “Venetian Plans towards Poland and 
Ukraine in the Middle of the Seventeenth Century. Girolamo Cavazza and Alberto Vimi-
na”, in Tentorium Honorum: Essays Presented to Frank E. Sysyn on His Sixtieth Birth-
day, ed. Olga Andriewsky, Zenon E. Kohut, Serhii Plokhy and Larry Wolff (Edmonton 
and Toronto, 2010), also published in Journal of Ukrainian Studies 34 (2009): 105-116. 
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Moscow through Ukraine had given them considerable experience in Ukrainian and 
Cossack affairs. Makarios’s predecessor, Joakeim V, had confirmed the statute of 
the Lviv brotherhood in 1586. The Jerusalem Patriarch Theophanes III had restored 
an Orthodox hierarchy under the protection of the Cossack Hetman Petro 
Konashevych Sahaidachnyi in 1621, and his successor Paisios had blessed 
Khmel´nyts´kyi as a prince at Christmas 1648. Makarios´s trip was the first to occur 
after the Cossack Hetmanate had taken shape, and Khmel´nyts´kyi had sworn 
allegiance to the Muscovite tsar in 1654. Passing through Ukraine in 1654 on his 
way to Moscow and in 1656 on his road back, Paul penned one of the most ample 
descriptions of Ukraine at a turning point of its history. 
A speaker of Greek who picked up some Romanian in his travels, Paul is 
thought by some scholars to have learned Slavic vernacular during his long stay in 
Muscovy from 1654 to 1656, though this would not have given him direct access to 
his interlocutors in Slavic during his first stay in Ukraine.15 Written as a diary at the 
behest of a colleague deacon Gabriel, but with an authorial voice that also 
addressed a purported reader, the immense Arabic text records the trip from Syria to 
Moscow and back from 1652 to 1659.16 The trip included two visits to Ukraine in 
1654 and 1656, and Paul was present at meetings with Hetman Khmel’nyts’kyi.17 
                                                 
15  Hilary Kilpatrick maintains that in addition to these languages, he knew Slavonic (“Be-
tween Ibn Ba a and al- ah w : Arabic Travel Accounts of the Early Ottoman Period”, 
Middle Eastern Literatures 11, 2 (August 2008):  239). The assertion does not correspond 
with Paul's own statement at the beginning of his stay in Muscovy that the members of 
the delegation spoke in Greek or Turkish to an interpreter they had hired in Moldavia, 
who translated into “Russian [Rus']”, “for one and the same is the language of the Cos-
sacks [Ukrainians], and of the Servians [Serbians], of the Bulgarians, and of the Musco-
vites.” Cf. Paul of Aleppo, The Travels of Macarius: Patriarch of Antioch, 2 vols., trans. 
F.C. Belfour (London, 1836), 1: 261. Presumably he referred to Church Slavic, a sacred 
language in Moldavia and in the Orthodox Slavic countries. Maria Kowalska says that he 
knew Greek and had freely learned Russian by 1656, the end of his stay in Muscovy 
(Ukraina w po owie XVII wieku w relacji arabskiego podro nika Paw a, syna Makarego 
z Aleppo, trans. M. Kowalska (Warsaw, 1985), 7). Charles Halperin rejects this view, 
though he does muse that his meetings with boyars were unlikely to have occurred 
through a translator (In the Eye of the Beholder, 413). Although there is no direct evi-
dence of his use of Turkish in Ukraine, the language was one known in Khmel'nyts'kyi's 
chancellery. 
16  Kilpatrick's article situates Paul's account in the Arabic travel literature of the age. 
17  The diary survives only in copies, not all of which are complete. The Arabic text was 
published in a partial English translation from one of the extant manuscripts in the 1830s 
(The Travels of Macarius) and in Russian translations in the late nineteenth century. The 
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UKRAINE AS THE CLASSICAL BORDERLAND 
Selection of a Western Christian and an Eastern Christian clergyman corresponds 
well with the position of Ukraine between West and East.18 Ukraine was a 
borderland or a meeting point in many ways. It stood at the point where the vast 
Eurasian steppe met the forest-steppe zone. Largely Slavic agriculturalists came 
into contact with Turkic pastoralists. Spheres of influence of the Ottomans, the 
Muscovites, the Lithuanians, and the Poles overlapped. Frontier societies such as 
the Crimean Khanate and the Zaporozhian Cossacks carried on raids and trade over 
a porous, sparsely inhabited zone across which the Tatars hunted for slaves and the 
Cossacks embarked in their small boats to take booty as far away as the environs of 
Constantinople. Western Christians and Eastern Christians, including the Uniates 
who emerged in 1596 when some Orthodox bishops and faithful were accepted into 
the Church of Rome, dwelled together in a land with an ancient Armenian 
community and a fast growing Jewish population. The second serfdom and a 
                                                                                                            
most authoritative Russian translation is Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makar-
iia v Rossiiu v polovine XVII veka, opisannoe ego synom, arkhidiakonom Pavlom 
Aleppskim, trans. G. Murkos, 5 pts. (Moscow, 1896-1900, reprint Moscow, 2005). The 
sections on Ukraine have been reprinted as Puteshesvtie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Ma-
kariia na Ukrainu v seredine 17 veka (Kyiv, 1997). A 20th-century edition of most of the 
Arabic text as well as a partial French translation appeared as “Voyage du patriarche Ma-
caire d'Antioch: Texte Arabe et traduction française”, trans. B.  Radu, Patrologia Orien-
talis 22, 1 (1930): 3-199; ibid. 24, 4 (1933): 443-604; ibid. 26, 5 (1949): 603-717; and a 
Polish one in Kowalska, Ukraina w po owie XVII wieku [translated from the Arabic]; the 
Ukrainian translations are from the Russian texts: Pavlo Khalebs'kyi, Kraïna kozakiv: Z 
podorozhnikh notatok, comp. M. Riabyi, trans. M. Slyvyns'kyi (Kyiv, 1995) and 
Ukraïna-zemlia kozakiv, comp. and trans. M. Riabyi (Kyiv, 2008). Unless otherwise not-
ed, the English translations of Paul's writings used here are from Belfour's English trans-
lation, with supplementary identifications in brackets. Belfour's translations are not al-
ways satisfactory. Citations are also given to English translations of Hrushevsky's render-
ings in Ukrainian of the Murkos edition in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-
Rus', vol. 9, book 2, part 1, trans. Marta Olynyk, ed. Serhii Plokhy, Frank E. Sysyn and 
Myroslav Iurkevich (Edmonton and Toronto, 2008), chp. 9. The Polish translation is es-
pecially valuable because of the translator's understanding of the material and provision 
of explanatory notes. For fuller information on the editions, translations and literature on 
Paul of Aleppo, see Halperin, In the Eye of the Beholder, 411. 
18  On Ukraine's intermediary situtation in this period, see Ihor Šev enko, Ukraine between 
East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century, 2nd rev. edn. 
(Edmonton-Toronto, 2009). 
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society of estates were taking hold in a military frontier that had earlier enjoyed 
greater equality guaranteed by the brotherhood of arms.19 The mix of civilizations, 
social norms, and political systems made Ukraine both familiar and exotic to the 
surrounding societies. The dissonances in this mix were the flash points for an 
enduring revolt and an involvement of much of Europe and the Middle East in an 
uprising launched by a few hundred Cossacks from the sich or stronghold beyond 
the Rapids of the Dnipro River. 
Generally states and courts prevailed in the information and legitimation wars 
waged with the rebels, especially if the rebels did not belong to established elites. In 
the main, the Polish-Lithuanian government did as well, employing fear of a bloody 
uprising of the lower orders and the solidarity of Catholic Europe, above all of the 
papacy, against schismatic rebels as arguments for securing favor and even 
assistance. Still the paralysis in the Commonwealth in the early phase of the revolt 
brought on by the death of the king and the enormous successes of the rebels in the 
first months undermined the Commonwealth’s cause. Other perceptions of the 
Polish-Lithuanian state also worked to weaken the state´s case. The Republic was 
known for its cavalier treatment of monarchs, and the proponents of absolutism and 
the power of kings had ample reason to be critical of the Republic.20 At the same 
time, most commentators saw the harsh serfdom of the Polish state and the 
overweening power of the nobility as virtually enslaving the populace and having 
goaded the peasants into rebellion.21 In addition, the perceived privileged position 
                                                 
19  On military borderlands and revolts, see Yves-Marie Bercé, Revolt and Revolution in 
Early Modern Europe: An Essay on the History of Political Violence, trans. J. Bergin 
(Manchester, 1987), 130-134, 156-163. 
20  Janusz Tazbir, “W oczach obcych,” in Rzeczpospolita i wiat: Studia z dziejów kultury 
XVII wieku, ed. id. (Wroc aw, Warsaw, Cracow, Gda sk, 1971), 175. 
21  For Chevalier's discussion that the peasants were treated like slaves and that one should 
not wonder why peasant disturbances were so frequent, see Discourse, 20-21, Istoriia, 
45-46. Beauplan, A Description of Ukraine, 15, discussed the ill-treatment of the peasant-
ry as a cause of the revolt in the following manner: “Thus, if it happens that these 
wretched peasants fall into the bondage of evil lords, they are in a more deplorable state 
than convicts sentenced to the galleys. It is this slavery which goads many of them to take 
flight, the more courageous of them fleeing to Zaporozhe, which is an area on the Bo-
rystenses to which the Cossacks retreat. After having dwelt there for some time and hav-
ing been to sea, they are considered to be Zaporozhian Cossacks. Because of such flights, 
the numbers of the Cossack ranks swell enormously, as is shown with sufficient evidence 
by the present revolt, in which the Cossacks, having defeated the Poles, rose some 
200,000 strong and made themselves masters of an area more than 120 leagues long and 
sixty wide.” (French original: Description d'Ukrainie, 8)  
136 | FRANK SYSYN 
 
of Jews in the Polish-Lithuanian state, including their rights to administer Christian 
subjects, was viewed as unacceptable in Christian Europe and as having driven the 
populace to revolt.22 
The rebels´ search for a hearing was also aided by the renown of the revolt´s 
organizing force, the Cossacks. The origin and nature of this phenomenon of the 
Slavic-Turkic borderland had been discussed by Polish historians of the sixteenth 
century. They dwelt on issues such as whether the Cossacks were merely a group of 
outliers of society or whether they represented a particular people or nation.23 Their 
discussions were picked up by Western and Central European commentators of the 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth century who had come to see certain legitimacy 
for Cossacks as a social group or even a nation.24 As the revolt made Ukraine the 
Cossack land in popular imagination, commentators more frequently dealt with the 
Cossacks as either a military force or the totality of the Ruthenians of the Ukrainian 
territories. Most important was that from the late sixteenth century when the 
Emperor Rudolf sent a delegation to the Zaporozhian Cossacks, they had received 
recognition as a subject of international diplomacy.25 Indeed the Muscovite state 
and the Ottoman Empire had dealt with the Ukrainian Cossacks as early as the mid-
sixteenth century. This prehistory of the Cossacks in international affairs and as a 
military-naval force that shook Ottoman control of the Black Sea meant that the 
Cossacks were not an unknown quantity in international affairs in 1648. In addition, 
the role of the Cossacks as defenders of the Orthodox faith from the early 
seventeenth century and the rebels’ espousal of the Orthodox cause made the 
Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising correspond to the most commonly accepted and 
                                                 
22  For Chevalier's discussion of the Jewish leaseholders' severity and cruelty as a cause of 
the revolt, see Discourse, 21, Istoriia, 46. The Jewish issue was one of the few about 
which even Polish Catholic apologists admitted fault on the government's side. See Frank 
E. Sysyn, “A Curse on Both Their Houses: Catholic Attitudes towards Jews in Father 
Ruszel's Fawor Niebieski”, in Israel and the Nations: Essays Presented in Honor of 
Shmuel Ettinger (Jerusalem, 1987), ix-xxiv.  
23  On the earliest accounts about the Cossacks, see Marshall Poe, “The Zaporozhian Cos-
sacks in Western Print to 1600”, Harvard Ukrainian Studies 19 (1995): 531-547. 
24 “Nations” might be presumed to have certain rights in the early modern world, including 
as Khmel'nyts'kyi was to argue the right to resist slavery or tyranny. See Frank E. Sysyn, 
“The Political Worlds of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi”, Palaeoslavica 10, 2 (2002): 203-205.  
25  On the mission of Erich Lassota in 1594, see the German original Tagebuch des Erich 
Lassota von Steblau, ed. Reinhold Schottin (Halle, 1866) and the English translation, L. 
Wynar and O. Subtelny, eds., Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks: The Diary of Erich 
von Lassota von Steblau (Boulder, Co., 1975).  
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legitimizing explanation of  revolts of the period, a religious war.26 The anti-
Catholic nature of the revolt meant that Orthodox powers had a certain sympathy 
for the revolt, even though this sympathy did not always outweigh their fear of 
social disorder. Protestants could also see the revolt as undermining the Counter-
Reformation, and by the 1650s Sweden and Transylvania could conceive of the 
Cossack Hetmanate as a component of a Protestant coalition. 
MYTHICAL UKRAINE 
The great revolt occurred at the time that two of the major myths about Ukraine that 
were to endure for centuries took shape. This was also the period that the myth of 
Muscovy as a tyranny/depotism flourished as did that of Poland as a paradise for 
nobles and a purgatory for peasants and later as an anarchic polity.27 As Nancy 
Shields Kollmann has pointed out, Ukraine in contrast was the subject of two 
positive myths.28 The first was that Ukraine was a land of unbelievable abundance. 
This myth had its origin in fifteenth and sixteenth-century Polish writings.29 Some 
of that abundance was seen as associated with game and fish, but more important 
was the image of Ukraine as a virtual Eden, in which grain and produce grew with 
almost no toil on the part of its inhabitants. The second myth represented Ukraine 
as a land in which the people cherished liberty. Though its inhabitants might seem 
                                                 
26 See Serhii Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine (Oxford, 2001); 
and Frank E. Sysyn, “Orthodoxy and Revolt: The Role of Religion in the Seventeenth-
Century Ukrainian Uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth”, in Religion 
and the Early Modern State: Views from China, Russia, and the West, ed. James D. Tracy 
and Marguerite Ragnow (Cambridge, 2004), 154–84. 
27  On Muscovy as a tyranny or despotism, see Marshall T. Poe, 'A People Born to Slavery': 
Russia in Early Modern European Ethnography, 1476-1748 (Ithaca, NY and London, 
2000). On foreign accounts of the Commonwealth, see Tazbir, W oczach obcych, 170-
196. On Poland's treatment of peasants, see Beauplan's comments: “In short, since they 
must give their masters what the latter choose to ask, it is no wonder that these wretches 
never accumulate anything, being subjected, as they are, to such harsh circumstances. 
However, that is still not all, for the lords have absolute power over not only their posses-
sions, but also their lives, so great is the liberty of the Polish nobles (who live as if they 
were in paradise, and the peasants in purgatory).” (A Description of Ukraine, 14-15; De-
scription d'Ukrainie, 7-8) 
28 Nancy Shields Kollmann, “The Deceitful Gaze: Ukraine through the Eyes of Foreign 
Travelers”, in Tentorium Honorum, 293-301. 
29  See P. Borek, Szlakami dawnej Ukrainy. Studia staropolskie (Cracow, 2002), 15-45. 
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rude and simple, they were credited with native wit and a striving for freedom. In 
this way, the revolt could often be conceived as embodying this drive for freedom. 
As Beauplan put it: “They greatly value their liberty, and would not want to live 
without it. That is why the Cossacks, when they consider themselves to be kept 
under too tight a rein, are so inclined to revolt and rebel against the lords of their 
country.”30 
While our two travellers were not the authors of works that formed the 
seventeenth-century myths (as did the works of Beauplan and Chevalier), their 
writings were in accord with these views.31 The pervasiveness of the account of 
Ukraine as a land of unparalleled fertility lends credence to assumptions that the 
newly ploughed black earth and the wildlife of the Dnipro basin were the sources of 
an abundance of produce and game in comparison to long farmed areas of Central 
and Western Europe or the more arid lands of the Middle East. The account of the 
Venetian Vimina could be seen as part of the Western and Central European visions 
that saw Ukraine as a type of Arcadia in the abundance of its bounty, the limited 
effort required in working the land, and the simplicity of its folk, though certainly 
not in its peaceful nature.  He assures his superiors that grain needed no cultivation 
and that dairy products, meat, and fish were no less abundant than grain.32 He 
regales the reader with visions of wild asparagus superior to that of the environs of 
Rome and Naples. But Vimina was a careful observer who commented on the lack 
of enclosed gardens and cultivation of vines. These observations coincide with his 
                                                 
30  A Description of Ukraine, 13; Description d'Ukrainie, 6. 
31  On the fertility of the land, see Beauplan, A Description of Ukraine, 12: “The fertile land 
produces grain in such abundance that often they do not know what to do with it” (De-
scription d'Ukrainie, 5). 
32  Vimina writes in his report: “The part of the land called Zaporizhia is so fertile that it can 
not only compare with the most cultivated areas of Europe but also satisfy the voracity of the 
most avid farmer. 
 This land is called Ukraina, that is, borders; its fertility is sustained by the abundance of grain 
that one sees growing uncultivated here and there, sprouting from seeds that the reapers and 
the wind have shaken to the ground, which are called padalica in the Ruthenian language and 
would be rendered as 'fallen grain' (caduto) in ours. Sometimes this grain is harvested, at oth-
er times it is neglected, there being such an abundant harvest gathered from the sowing as to 
make the peasants negligent of the effort required to avail themselves of the gifts bestowed by 
a generous soil. I would have found it difficult to believe these things had I not seen them 
with my own eyes, observing that the land yields sheaves so large and laden with grain that in 
many regions one could not obtain their equivalent despite careful cultivation […]. Dairy 
products, meat, and fish are no less abundant there than grain, whether because of the great 
number of pastures or the abundance of ponds.” Relazione, 9, 10. 
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vision of a populus that did not devote itself to arduous cultivation of the soil. His 
further comments on the Cossacks’ dedication to growing cabbages and cucumbers 
and conserving them in brine in the German manner give his relation a ring of 
authenticity.33 
In contrast to Vimina’s rather limited factual account, that of Paul of Aleppo 
reveals a wonder at the abundance that rings closer to the medieval Arabic accounts 
of distant and exotic lands. His much more extensive description tells us more of 
husbandry and cultivation techniques so that he does not see the people as lacking 
in industry, but his account of plenty seconds Vimina’s.34 Certainly when he 
describes fowl that lay eggs in the forest that are not collected because of their great 
numbers he seems to corroborate Vimina’s discussion of attitudes in harvesting 
grain. Still, Paul seems at times to exhibit naiveté in his praise of Ukrainian 
abundance. He comments on the various types of pigs that breed three times a 
year.35His amazement on the fertility of nature crosses over to his description of the 
numerous children of the land and the ability to raise army after army despite the 
great losses in war, so much that he speculates on the pregnancy cycles of the 
womenfolk before attributing the population growth to universal early marriage of 
                                                 
33  Vimina asserts: “Besides all the opulence already described, the bounty of the earth provides 
the inhabitants with unappreciated delicacies and an abundance of asparagus so large that I 
believe it can be compared with that most cultivated in Verona. It is very tasty and not bitter, 
unlike the wild variety with very thin stalks that is gathered in the countryside around Rome 
and Naples. I wondered at this, and at first sight I thought that they might be broom; in order 
to satisfy my curiosity I tried them many times, and the excessive quantity consumed then 
gave me a distaste for asparagus. Onions and garlic also grow wild; I tasted the former, which 
seemed very sweet to me. One does not see, however, in a country so fertile, any enclosed 
fruit orchards or gardens of unusual vegetables, melons, artichokes, or celery, except in the 
vicinity of Kyiv; all the Cossacks' attention is fixed on a single goal –to obtain a harvest of 
cabbage that they eat raw, or shredded and preserved with salt, as practiced in Germany. 
Moreover, they sow large quantities of cucumbers, which they also season in brine and eat 
with bread; they also serve them as a condiment with meat and fish. There are no vineyards, 
not because it is believed that the soil is unsuitable but because the inhabitants do not bother 
to plant and cultivate them, as is done in Austria and other regions where winter is very harsh, 
or perhaps because they are negligent farmers.” (Relazione, 11). 
34  Paul, The Travels of Macarius, 1: 193-195. Paul also describes well-tended orchards in 
the vicinity of Kyiv. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 2, part 1: 396. 
35   Paul, The Travels of Macarius, 1: 193-195; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, 
book 2, part 1: 386-387. 
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young girls.36 Seventeenth-century Ukrainian sources reaffirmed Paul’s observation 
on the vast number of children with the phrase “Fertile is the Cossack Mother”, and 
subsequent historians have speculated that the demographic boom explained the 
tensions and revolutionary nature of early modern Ukraine.37 Yet while both 
Vimina and Paul reflect a similar reality in their description of abundance and 
fertility, occasional divergences in their accounts may have reflected their differing 
standards and expectations, as well as their differing goals. It is only in this way 
that we can square Vimina’s comments on the lack of orchards apart from around 
Kyiv with Paul’s comments on arriving at Lysianka that “In the evening we came to 
a large town, fortified as usual, and with waters and gardens: for this blessed 
country is like a pomegranate orchard, so great is its beauty and cultivation.”38 
The perspectives of a Venetian and a Middle Eastern clergyman not only affirm 
the myth of Ukrainian abundance, they also agree on Ukraine as a land of liberty, 
albeit with differing definitions of what the essence of that liberty was. For Alberto 
Vimina the Cossacks belonged to a band of lands stretching from Muscovy to the 
Tatars, and to a degree including Sweden, in which barbarity (barbarie), the 
opposite of civilization (politìa) reigned.39 Yet in these distant lands he was aware 
that the political systems varied. The representative of the Serenissima Republic of 
Venice was able to appreciate republican structures whether of the noble-controlled 
Commonwealth or the Cossack Host. While the Commonwealth´s nobles disdained 
the Cossacks, the Venetian clergyman who sought their help was more egalitarian 
in his world view. Despite their rough and coarse appearance, he found them not 
lacking in lively ingenuity.40 Vimina turned to classical models and references to 
define the form of government of the Cossacks. He saw them as a hodgepodge of 
uncultivated people from which a Senate was formed, and he praised the Senate’s 
manner of deliberation. Comparing their polity to Sparta (a positive model of 
government in seventeenth-century terms), he described the Cossacks as only 
having liberty to boast of since they cared not for the amassing of wealth.41 Seeing 
                                                 
36   Paul, The Travels of Macarius 1: 179; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 
2, part 1: 380. 
37  On the demographic explosion as a cause of revolt, with Ukraine a prime case, see Jack 
Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley, 1991), 344. 
38  Paul, The Travels of Macarius, 1: 193 
39  Caccamo, Alberto Vimina in Ucraine, 264-265. 
40  Here too one can find an echo of Beauplan (A Description of Ukraine, p13; Description 
d'Ukrainie, 6). 
41  “On the basis of these observations one can readily deduce the customs of these people, who 
have never left their country except to engage in warfare, a school that generally produces 
men who are worldly, but coarse and rough. By their outward appearance and manners they 
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merit in this rude republic, Vimina did not however perceive a well developed 
system of administration and finances within it, a characteristic of more developed 
lands.42 
                                                                                                            
appear simple, but they are not stupid or lacking in lively intelligence. This is evident from 
their conversation and methods of governing. For the history of politics is a complex dance 
that makes men cut a fine figure at gatherings but disappears at the threshold of government 
and lays bare their crudeness. From this hodgepodge of uncultivated people a rudimentary 
senate that assists the general is formed. It should be borne in mind that these people take 
their hands from the plow and the magistracy in order to apply them to wielding arms. In the 
Senate they bring matters to fruition; arguing their opinions without ostentation, with the goal 
of contributing to the public good. And if they find the ideas of others better, they are not em-
barrassed, nor do they hesitate to abandon their own opinion and embrace the better one. 
 I would therefore say that this republic of the Cossacks might resemble that of Sparta if there 
were a similar degree of sobriety among them, whereas they can certainly be compared to the 
Spartans in rigor of training.” (Vimina, Relazione, 13-14) 
 Vimina also writes: “On occasions spent at his table, when glasses were frequently raised, 
I noted that there was no lack of pleasant and witty conversation. I could quote several 
witticisms, but, wishing to be brief, I shall recount only one. My servant was at pains to 
emphasize the grandeur and marvels of the city of Venice, which they were eager to hear 
about. Having expatiated sufficiently on the location, buildings, and riches, he described 
the city's great expanse, saying that there were so many alleys that even the residents 
themselves would get lost. A Cossack replied, 'Oh, do not exalt the city of Venice to me, 
for I find that the same thing happens to me too in this small room: after sitting for a few 
hours at this table, I cannot find the door to return home.'“ (Relazione, 19) 
 He asserts: The Cossacks can boast of nothing other than liberty; it seems that they do not 
prize wealth at all, as they are content with little. This was a teaching articulated but not prac-
ticed by Seneca, who, while accumulating treasures, endeavored to stress in his writings that a 
man does not become rich through the acquisition of riches but through the diminution of 
greed.” (Ibid., 14-15) 
42  He maintains: “I believe it would be both interesting and necessary, in order to make a 
complete report, to say something about the administration, its forces and revenue. 
I would describe it even in detail if there were any particular order to be discerned in it. I 
can say, however, that as far as administration is concerned, in the towns mentioned there 
live certain consuls who adjudicate civil cases and impose light corporal punishment, 
while matters of importance are reserved to the judgment of the general, and so it appears 
to me that he is a true despot. The state of the armed forces is revealed by the experience 
of past campaigns. Who knows the precise number of soldiers that can be gathered? One 
can say that there are as many soldiers as there are heads, for they all prefer to engage in 
warfare than to handle a spade. Concerning income I cannot say, observing only that it is 
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Paul shared with Vimina the conviction that the Cossacks were content with 
little,43 though in his almost uniformly positively assessment he saw them as having 
an excellent financial administration.44 Here, of course, the difference may be that 
Vimina saw the Hetmanate at its birth, while Paul observed the Hetmanate five 
years later. But for Paul the liberty that the revolt had achieved was above all 
freedom from the accursed Polish servitude, which was envisioned above all as 
religious bondage. He saw as the Cossacks’ great achievement that they, through 
their revolt, lived in freedom, which for him meant in an Orthodox state and 
society. 
 
And what a blessed nation it is! What a happy country! This is its greatest merit, that it 
contains not one inhabitant of any other sect whatever, but is pure, and peopled only with the 
orthodox, the faithful, and the truly religious. How great is its zeal for purity and holiness of 
spirit! how clear its principles in the truth of orthodoxy! Blessed be our eyes for what we saw, 
which we experienced! For this people, from being in captivity and slavery, are now living in 
mirth and cheerfulness and liberty.45 
 
Having charged that the perfidious Poles had poisoned their own king, implicitly 
justifying the revolt and seconding the voices that saw the Polish elite as anarchic, 
the Orthodox cleric could exult that the time of Khmel’nyts’kyi was an age of 
                                                                                                            
of no great amount or consequence, neither in the public nor the private sphere.” 
(Ibid., 19) 
 Vimina's use of “true despot” (vero Despota) for Khmel'nyts'kyi would seem to conflict 
with his discussion of the Cossack entity as a republic. It seems that he was reflecting the 
great power gained by Khmel'nyts'kyi after his victories and not using the term to charac-
terize a political system. Despota might better be rendered as master. He may have seen 
Khmel'nyts'kyi in the tradition of the Italian Renaissance despots. 
43  Paul, The Travels of Macarius, 1: 200; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 
2, part 1: 394. 
44  Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 2, part 1: 381. 
45 Paul, The Travels of Macarius, 1: 191. “What a blessed people they are! What a blessed 
land this is! Its great merit lies in the fact that it has no infidels at all but only pure Ortho-
dox believers, steadfast and pious! Delighted are our eyes with what they have seen, de-
lighted are our ears with what they have heard, and happy are our hearts with the joy and 
rapture they have experienced. Having once been in bondage, these Cossacks now live in 
joy, pleasure, and freedom”. (Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 2, part 
1: 374) 
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justice.46 His concept of justice was not only the right religious order in that he also 
discussed national and social issues.47 According to him, the Cossacks had been 
treated as slaves by the Poles, who had impressed them into arduous tasks, and only 
after the revolt “those who had laboured and endured all the hardships of the work 
came into their rightful possession of it”.48 He saw Khmel’nyts’kyi’s revolt as 
releasing the Cossacks from slavery and captivity and the Poles’ cruelties.49   
Paul diverged further from the concept of liberty as referring to Orthodox living 
in Orthodox states and societies when he contrasted Ukraine with Muscovy in a 
commentary that, while he may not have been aware of them, fit well in the 
Western myths of the time. On reaching Ukraine from Muscovy in 1656, he 
proclaimed 
 
During these two years in Muscovy, a padlock had been set on our hearts, and we were in the 
extremity of narrowness and compressure of our minds; for in those countries no person can 
feel any thing of freedom or cheerfulness, unless it be the native population. Any one like 
ourselves, though he became sovereign of the whole territory, would never cease to have a 
disturbed mind, and a heart full of anxiety. The country of the Cossacks, on the contrary, was 
like our own country to us, and its inhabitants were to us boon companions and fellows like 
ourselves.50 
 
                                                 
46  Paul, The Travels of Macarius, 1: 175; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 
2, part 1: 380. 
47  For a nuanced discussion of religious and ethno-national themes in Paul's work, see 
Charles J. Halperin, “Friend and Foe in Paul of Aleppo's Travels of Patriarch Macarios”, 
Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 14/15 (1998/1999): 97-114. 
48  Paul, The Travels of Macarius, 1: 182. “obtained all rights and all power over that which 
had been the object of their labor and their suffering in bondage.” (Hrushevsky, History 
of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 2, part 1: 382.)  
49   Paul, The Travels of Macarius, 1: 172. 
50 Paul, The Travels of Macarius, 2: 306-307. “During those two years in Muscovy a lock 
hung on our hearts, and our minds were constricted and oppressed to the utmost. For in 
that land no one can feel free or satisfied, except perhaps its native inhabitants. Anyone 
else, just like us, even were he to become ruler of the whole country, will never cease to 
be agitated in his spirit and alarmed in his heart. By contrast, the land of the Cossacks 
was as though it were our own country, and its inhabitants our good friends and people 
like us:” (Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 2, part 1: 373-374). 
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While Paul had written approvingly of the Muscovite state and ruler in the 
massive sections of his diary on Muscovy,51 he clearly had been put off by the 
atmosphere in that Orthodox state and found that of Ukraine more to his liking. His 
evaluation was formed in the context of foreigners’ enforced isolation in Moscow. 
What he came to, however, may be interpreted as an assumption similar to that of 
so many Western authors that the Muscovites might be disposed to such a state and 
society that others, including other Orthodox, found constraining. In Ukraine he had 
an Orthodox society that he found welcoming and attractive without the pressures 
and confinement of Muscovy.52 
THE AUTHORS’ MISSIONS AND AUDIENCES 
In addition to reflecting the two general myths on Ukraine of the age in his work, 
each author portrayed Ukraine and the revolt in accordance with his mission and his 
desire to elicit the appropriate response from his intended reader. Vimina had to 
square a circle in reconciling the Cossack rebels with the Polish-Lithuanian 
government in order to obtain both powers´ support in the war against the 
Ottomans. Hence he had to see the Cossacks as a group worthy to treat with not 
only by the Venetians, but also by the Polish-Lithuanian authorities. They had come 
to an uneasy truce with the Cossacks in 1649, when the Crimean khan had been 
wooed away from the Ukrainian rebels. Therefore Vimina’s depiction of the 
Cossack polity as a rude but militarily powerful entity might be expected. Certainly, 
he affirmed the wisdom of trying to come to an alliance with the Cossacks when he 
wrote: “Who knows the precise number of soldiers that can be gathered? One can say 
that there are as many soldiers as there are heads, for they all prefer to engage in 
warfare than to handle a spade.”53 For the Venetian authorities he had portrayed the 
Cossack land as a military republic headed by a powerful general or despot in a 
wealthy land. His superiors undoubtedly had embarked on their policy because of 
                                                 
51  See the discussions of Paul's views in Poe, 'A People Born to Slavery', which curiously 
does not deal with his comparison of Muscovy and Ukraine. 
52  Malte Griesse has suggested that Paul's evaluation should be seen as an indictment of 
Muscovite treatment of foreigners, a situation of captivity not experienced by the native 
population. I am thankful to him for posing this possibility. Still, I think the passage that 
“anyone like us, even though he became sovereign of the whole territory” would still not 
be able to adjust to Muscovite ways indicate a broader negative evaluation of Muscovy 
and its inhabitants. 
53  Vimina, Relazione, 19. 
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these assumptions that Vimina had amplified and confirmed. They also had to hope 
that a way could be found to overcome religious differences. 
The concept of the alliance would require Western and Eastern Christians to set 
aside their divides. Vimina stressed recent progress in bridging differing 
interpretations of the Filioque.54 His plans could only work if the differences 
between the churches could be minimized. Therefore, Vimina pointed to a certain 
indifference of the Cossacks to religion and saw only the clergy as knowledgeable. 
He maintained: “As for devotions, I have not observed frequent public attendance; 
they frequent taverns more than churches, making it apparent that the maxims of 
Romulus are valued here more than those of Numa. They show constancy in 
maintaining the errors of their schism but are unable to identify them and live mostly 
according to the faith of their fathers; only their priests know the basic distinctions.”55 
Thus, he saw the Cossacks as adepts of Rome’s warlike founder and military leader, 
and not his pious successor Numa Popilius. While he was willing to admit a certain 
level of learning of the monks in Ukraine, he looked condescendingly on the culture 
and language of the land. Indeed, his attribution of its Slavonic scriptures to a text 
associated with Seint Jerome may be seen as part of his view of the superiority of 
the Western Church.56 He discussed the religious issues in the revolt from a 
Catholic point of view, especially those emerging in the heat of the revolt, but the 
                                                 
54  “But concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit through the Son and not from the Father, as 
the Latins believe, they disagree with us, although they cannot say how the schism originated. 
These errors have already been condemned. The deduction seems clear that the Son did not 
share the original inspiration with the Father, and since there was a moment's interval be-
tween them, there was consequently a difference in degree. But now I understand that when 
the most recent effort was made by Urban VIII and W adys aw IV, the king of Poland, to re-
unite the churches separated from the Latin church, it was determined that it was all the same 
whether the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father by way of the Son, or from the Father and 
the Son; hence it was acknowledged that the Three Persons were alike in degree, in not hav-
ing been created, in eternity and equality.” (Relazione, 15-16) 
55  Ibid., 15. 
56  “They have no letters other than vernacular Ruthenian, and few are those who even dedicate 
themselves to them. Their ritual language is Slavic, into which they have translated the Holy 
Scripture of Saint Jerome, and they also read the doctrines of the Holy Fathers translated into 
that language. It is said that their vernacular differs from Slavic as Italian does from Latin. 
Earlier, only the nobles studied it; hence only a few priests understand it. Nevertheless, some 
monks, especially those attending the metropolitan, are not ignorant of it. One finds some 
men of letters who devote all their study to confirming their errors.” (Ibid., 12-13) 
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Catholic priest did not wish to see these as excluding cooperation with the 
Cossacks.57 
Paul had set out with his father to find material support for the Orthodox of the 
Ottoman Empire. He had found that the Orthodox world could now look to a new 
Orthodox power that had triumphed over the Latin foe. He could also seek to raise 
his own spirit and the spirit of his flock by seeing in Ukraine a model Orthodox 
society. These were the aspects of Ukrainian society that Paul emphasized in what 
is the most comprehensive account of the religious and culture life in mid-
seventeenth century Ukraine. In marvelling at what the revolt had wrought and the 
birth of a new Orthodox power, Paul always put the respect shown to his father the 
patriarch to the fore in making his judgements.  
Paul described a society with a high degree of religious practice and learning. 
Indeed, he found the rigors of the practice, especially the standing in churches 
during lengthy services, taxing.58 In describing the population, he maintained: “We 
observed in them all a perfect spirit of religion, and abstinence and humility, to the 
utmost.”59 Paul’s account has served as the source for discussions on the high 
literacy rate in Ukraine, including of women and girls.60 He maintained that since 
the liberation of the land by Khmel’nyts’kyi, literacy had increased among the 
populace. Since Paul undertook his trip four to six years after Vimina, there may 
                                                 
57  “Many deny Purgatory, while others profess it, not by means of fire, but as punishment of the 
senses by other means –an opinion that should not be condemned. They deny particular 
judgment of the soul, maintaining that there will be neither reward nor punishment until the 
day of the Last Judgment. For they say that if the body itself has had a part in merit or guilt, 
having become as it has [after death] foul and insensitive matter, it ought to be denied reward 
or exempted from punishment, while the soul, because of the consent lent to the flesh, should 
alone enjoy the glory or suffer the punishment. And there are those who declare that it is nec-
essary to rebaptize the Latins, even though they say that they have not been remiss in sub-
stance or form. Recently such confusion has been practiced in the revolts of the Cossacks, 
who have brought to their baptismal fonts those Catholics who have wished to espouse the er-
ror of the Cossack schism. There are even those who believe that transubstantiation does not 
take place with unleavened bread; hence they call the Latins unleavened heretics” (Ibid., 15-
16). 
58  Paul, The Travel of Macarius, 1: 186; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 
2, part 1: 391. 
59  Paul, The Travel of Macarius, 1: 186; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 
2, part 1: 391. 
60 Paul, The Travel of Macarius, 1: 164. The translation in Hrushevsky that they “know how 
to read” appears to be the correct one (Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 
2, part 1: 382). See Kowalska, Ukraina w po owie XVII wieku, 18. 
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have indeed been a change in Ukraine’s religious, intellectual, and cultural life. 
Paul, who travelled slowly throughout Ukraine and served in numerous church 
services in dozens of settlements, had more opportunity to observe this aspect of 
Ukrainian life than Vimina did. Yet it is certain that the standards and expectations 
of Venice and Ottoman Syria may have differed. Still, in reading Paul’s account, 
which Hrushevsky has called 
 
a panegyric to a liberated people, which had put its newly won freedom and prosperity, 
gained at great cost, to such fine use: instead of spending time in leisure and luxury, it curbed 
its physical needs and devoted everything to cultural weal, as it was then understood, and to 
the building of new churches, the creation of icons and paintings, the cultivation of church 
singing, and the development of schools and education, 
 
we must assume, without discounting his extensive evidence, that Paul was 
predisposed to find this model in the land and society that he praised.61 
The Eastern patriarchates and the Greek clergy in particular often dreamed of 
liberation from the Turks and even of the great project, the restoration of the 
Christian Empire. One can find little of these dreams in Paul´s account. Indeed, in 
recounting the indignities of Polish rule over Ukraine, he even proclaimed:  
 
And why do I pronounce them accursed? Because they have shewn themselves more debased 
and wicked than the corrupt worshippers of idols, by their cruel conduct to Christians, 
thinking to abolish the very name of Orthodox. God perpetuate the Empire of the Turks for 
ever and ever! for they take their impost, and enter into no account of religion, be their 
subjects Christians or Nazarines, Jews or Samarians: whereas these accursed Poles were not 
content with taxes and tithes from the brethren of Christ, though willing to serve them; but, 
according to the true relation we shall afterwards give of their history, they subjected them to 
the authority of the enemies of Christ, the tyrannical Jews […] 62  
 
                                                 
61  Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 2, part 1: 382. 
62   Paul, The Travel of Macarius, 1: 165. “Why do I call them accursed? Because they 
showed themselves to be more vile and malicious than the evil pagans; they tortured 
Christians and plotted to destroy the very name of Orthodox. May God preserve the king-
dom of the Turks for all eternity, since they take tribute and do not interfere with matters 
of faith. But these accursed ones were not content to take tribute and a tithe from their 
brothers in Christ; instead they kept them in bondage and consigned them to the rule of 
the enemies of Christ, the merciless Jews.” (Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, 
book 2, part 1: 377). 
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Far from rallying to the call of a common Christian cause against the Turks, 
which was essential for Vimina´s project to enlist the Catholic Commonwealth and 
the Orthodox Cossacks against the Ottoman Empire, Paul saw the Catholics as the 
main enemy and the Turks as even a form of protection from them. He was, 
however, clearly uplifted by the appearance of a new Orthodox power and above all 
its immense army, which he estimated with the usual hyperbole of the age as 
500,000 strong.63 Vimina, who had more concrete plans for the army, had merely 
said that there were as many soldiers among the Cossacks as there were heads. 
While Paul may not have had a plan for them, he understood the army’s 
significance for the Orthodox cause as he compared it favorably to the forces of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, the Orthodox vassals of the Porte to which the 
patriarchates traditionally appealed for support.  
In describing the war, Paul turned to the images that pervaded the religious 
thinking of the age. For him the deaths on the Ukrainian side were those of martyrs 
and their enemies had committed numerous bestial acts, including cutting open the 
wombs of pregnant women.64 One can indeed find direct parallels with the Hebrew 
chronicles and the Polish accounts of the period, albeit reversing perpetrators and 
victims. His emphasis on the position of the Jews as abnormal in a Christian society 
coincided with many Western Christian discussions. But Paul also brought his own 
world view as to who the enemies of the Ukrainians were to his account. While one 
cannot know what his informants told him, one suspects that his emphasis on the 
revolt´s destruction of the Armenians, whom he places on an equal plane with the 
Jews and mentions almost as frequently, may come more from his antagonism 
toward the numerous Armenian communities in the Ottoman Empire and their 
church’s challenge to Orthodox dogma than from his informants´ accounts.65 In the 
same way, his hatred of the Jesuits, which certainly was exuded by the rebels, may 
also have derived from their machinations against the Orthodox in Constantinople 
or his attitudes toward them in Syria. His play on the similarity of their name to the 
                                                 
63  Paul, The Travel of Macarius, 1: 184; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 
2, part 1: 375. 
64  Paul, The Travel of Macarius, 1: 177, 183; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, 
book 2, part 1: 378. 
65   Paul, The Travel of Macarius, 1: 171, 173, 185; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', 
vol. 9, book 2, part 1: 376. On Paul's discussions of Armenians, see Halperin, Friend and 
Foe, 108-109. He points out that Paul devotes relatively little attention to Armenian mer-
chants as playing a negative role. On the fate of Armenians during the Khmel'nyts'kyi 
Uprising, see Yaroslav Dashkevych, “Armenians in the Ukraine at the Time of Hetman 
Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj (1648-1657)”, Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3-4 (1979-80): 166-188. 
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Yazidis, the syncretic sect among the Kurds abominated by Christians and Muslims 
alike, surely sought to sway his potential reader far from Ukraine.66 
DEPICTIONS OF THE HETMAN 
Both authors met with the fabled leader of the revolt Bohdan Khmel´nyts´kyi, the 
man about whom all Europe and the Near East sought information and whom 
subsequent generations have found so enigmatic. The discussions of 
Khmel´nyts´kyi have always been grounded in an author´s position on the revolt 
and the effect desired on the readers.67 From the Hebrew chronicles’ epithet “May 
his name be blotted out” to the Polish broadsides depicting him as a crocodile, his 
enemies sought to demonize him. In the same way his followers and successors 
sought to glorify him from the time he entered Kyiv on Christmas 1648 to the 
acclamations that he was “well-named Bohdan, given by God, to free the Ruthenian 
nation from the Polish servitude.”68 
The antagonistic goals and the conventions of the age must make us wary about 
all depictions of the hetman. In early eighteenth-century Ukraine, the Cossack 
officers and clergy knew of Bohdan from Hryhorii Hrabianka´s history composed 
over half a century after the revolt, which circulated in numerous manuscripts.  
 
A man worthy of the name hetman: boldly he was ready to take on any misfortunes, even 
more diligent was he amidst these very misfortunes; whereby no toils tired his body, and his 
good spirit could not be subdued by adversaries. He endured cold and heat equally. He ate 
and drank what nature demanded and was not overcome by sleep at night or during the day. 
When he lacked time due to affairs and military matters, he rested only a little, and then not 
                                                 
66  Paul, The Travel of Macarius, 1:205. Belfour translates the term as “priests of the Devil” 
a play on the term “devil worshippers” often ascribed to the Yazidis (Hrushevsky, Histo-
ry of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 2, part 1: 376). Largely based on the work of Robert M. 
Haddad, Syrian Christians in Muslim Society: An Interpretation (Princeton, 1970), 
Charles Halperin paints a picture of “cooperation, if not respect” of Syrian Orthodox 
(Melkites) with other Christian groups, including Armenians and Italian Jesuits. This 
opens up the possibility that Paul came to his antagonism as a result of his travels and 
contacts (especially of the Jesuits) and now sought to propagate these views. I neverthe-
less believe he came to Ukraine with these antagonisms and now could take delight that 
these religious antagonists were now defeated, 
67  See Frank E. Sysyn, “The Changing Image of the Hetman”, Jahrbücher für Geschichte 
Osteuropas 46, 4 (1998): 531–545. 
68 Ibid., 532.  
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on expensive beds, but on such beddings as a military man ought. Even amid the military din, 
he slept calmly, in no way concerned. His dress did not stand out at all against the others, 
only the gear and his horses were somewhat better. He was often seen covered with a military 
cloak, as he rested among the guards. He went first into battle and was the last to leave it.  
 
Some of those readers, graduates of the Kyiv Academy and other higher schools of 
the Hetmanate, may have recognized that Khmel´nyts´kyi was being appropriately 
glorified in the manner and almost the exact words that Livy praised Hannibal, 
albeit with the negative passages removed, but it took modern scholars over 150 
years from the time the work was published in full in the 1840s to make that 
connection.69 
Vimina´s depiction of the Cossack hetman, so important as that of an emissary 
who met with him, can also in some ways be seen in the tradition of depicting great 
military commanders stretching back to Livy. 
 
As for his origin, he descends from a noble father who was banished and deprived of his title 
of nobility. He is of taller than average height, with a large frame and a sturdy constitution. 
                                                 
69  See Marko Antonovych, “Kharakterystyka B. Khmel'nyts'koho u Hrabianky i Liviia 
(Zamitka)”, Ukraïns'kyi istoryk 32 (1995): 165-166. These passages are from Livy, Ab 
urbe condita, 21.4. See Books 21-25: The Second Punic War, trans. Alfred John 
churchCand William Hackson Brodribb (London, 1883): 4-5. 
 “There was no one whom Hasdrubal preferred to put in command, whenever courage and 
persistency were specially needed, no officer under whom the soldiers were more confi-
dent and more daring. Bold in the extreme in incurring peril, he was perfectly cool in its 
presence. No toil could weary his body or conquer his spirit. Heat and cold he bore with 
equal endurance; the cravings of nature, not the pleasure of the palate, determined the 
measure of his food and drink. His waking and sleeping hours were not regulated by day 
and night. Such time as business left him, he gave to repose; but it was not on a soft 
couch or in the stillness that he sought it. Many a man often saw him wrapped in his mili-
tary cloak, lying on the ground amid the sentries and pickets. His dress was not one whit 
superior to that of his comrades, but his accoutrements and horses were conspicuously 
splendid. Among the cavalry or the infantry he was by far the first soldier; the first in bat-
tle, the last to leave it when once begun.”  
 The passage that follows immediately is removed. 
 “These great virtues in the man were equaled by monstrous vices, inhuman cruelty, a 
worse than Punic perfidy. Absolutely false and irreligious, he had no fear of God, no re-
gard for an oath, no scruples. With this combination of virtues and vices, he served three 
years under the command of Hasdrubal, omitting nothing which a man who was to be a 
great general ought to do or see.”  
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His speech and manner of governance indicate that he possesses mature judgment and acute 
intelligence; although it appears that he applies himself excessively to drink, he still does not 
fail to take care of business. Therefore I believe that two powers can be found in him –one 
active, sober, and capable in the administration of affairs, the other dormant and mired in 
intoxication. He behaves in an affable and down-to-earth manner with which he wins the 
devotion of his soldiers, while maintaining discipline by means of severe punishment. To all 
who enter his chamber he holds out his hand and has all sit down if they are Cossacks. In this 
chamber no luxuries are to be found. The walls are bare of any tapestries, the chairs 
unadorned. There are only some rough benches covered with leather cushions, which I 
believe the Romans called subsellia, and with the legs of which, it seems to me Plutarch 
writes, the Gracchi were killed when they wished to introduce the agrarian law. A curtain of 
damask hangs in front of his small bed, at the head of which hang a bow and a saber, the only 
arms that he is accustomed to bear. Neither is his table more sumptuous. Although they eat 
without napkins, the only silverware is spoons and goblets; the rest of the service is of tin. He 
has prudently decorated his house thus in order to remind himself of his status, so that his 
soul does not swell up with inordinate pride. Perhaps he has followed the example of 
Agathocles, who, being the son of a potter, but elevated to the status of royal despot, ordered 
that his table and sideboard be furnished with vessels of clay, whence the verses: 
 Ausonis fictilibus cenasse ferent agatoclea vasis, 
 Atque Abachum samio saepe ornasse luto.70 
 
While Vimina’s short description was neither a panegyric nor a “borrowing” in the 
manner of Hrabianka, one can wonder if his education affected his depiction of 
Khmel’nyts’kyi as a man of simple demeanor who wins the hearts of his followers 
by his affable ways but rules with an iron hand. Indeed, Vimina seems to echo Livy 
on Hannibal when he sees two natures in the hetman, one sober and capable, the 
other intoxicated. His vivid portrait of Khmel´nyts´kyi with these two natures 
coincides with many other contemporary descriptions. But in conveying his 
impressions, Vimina turned to classical descriptions of the military leader as he did 
in describing his rooms and his manner of setting a table. His comparisons with 
Agatocles, the tyrant of Syracuse whom Macchiavelli criticized for brutality and 
impiety in The Prince, is intriguing. Still we assume Vimina turns to the well-
known epigram of Ausonis primarily as a means of conveying the mode of 
Khmel’nyts’kyi’s success in gaining the people’s support to his elevation as a type 
                                                 
70  A badly distorted quotation from the poet and rhetorician Decimus Ausonius Magnus (310–
393). The lines, taken from the ninth in Ausonius' series of Epigrammata, should read: “Fama 
est fictilibus cenasse Agathoclea regem / atque abacum Samio saepe onerasse luto” (It is said 
that Agathocles, when king, dined off earthen plates / and that his sideboard often bore a load 
of Samian ware). Cf. The Works of Ausonius, ed. R. P. H. Green (Oxford, 1991), 68. 
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of despot and his military prowess rather than echoing the criticisms of The Prince. 
Vimina conveys his fundamentally positive assessment of the Cossack hetman and 
his followers to the Serenissima in providing them a type of leader and an army that 
could serve as an ally. 
For Vimina, the product of a Western society of corporate orders and estates, 
his egalitarian praise of the low-born Cossacks and his own origin as a burgher did 
not erase the importance he attached to high birth. Therefore he immediately turned 
to Khmel´nyts´kyi´s noble father, who had been deprived of his nobility, in 
explaining the reasons for the revolt. For early modern Europe the noble rebel was 
always more acceptable: superior noble birth and attributes could go far in 
explaining a rebel´s success.71 Vimina also tried to give us a portrait of the 
psychology of the man. He alludes to the personal confrontation over a woman that 
some subsequent historiography focused on as sparking the revolt when he 
mentions Khmel´nyts´kyi marrying the wife of Daniel Czapli ski in a discussion of 
matrimony and divorce. He provides us with the appropriate Ciceronian adage 
(Quales sunt in Republica principes, tales et sunt reliqui cives) as demonstrating the 
effect of Khmel´nyts´kyi´s example. He does this while at the same time making the 
stunning assertion that it was Czapli ski and his patron Alexander Koniecpolski 
who were responsible for instigating the current disorders, shifting blame away 
from the Cossack hetman and making him more acceptable to those opposed to 
rebels against lawful authority.72 
Paul of Aleppo praises Khmel’nyts’kyi unceasingly and wholeheartedly 
throughout his work. His description of the patriarch’s meeting with the hetman is 
one of the most comprehensive discussions of Khmel’nyts’kyi by an eyewitness. 
Paul’s reference points are not to generals, but to rulers. He informs his reader: 
“Kings and Emperors are unequal to the contest of magnanimity with him” and 
later that “[h]is mode of conduct is conformable to that of the greatest of kings, 
                                                 
71  The tendency to assume that a complex and successfully executed revolt must have been 
engineered by social betters can be seen in some of the Polish commentary on the revolt, 
including discussions that the clergy and bishops must have masterminded it. See Frank 
E.Sysyn, “Seventeenth-Century Views on the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising: An 
Examination of the 'Discourse about the Present Cossack-Peasant War'“, Harvard 
Ukrainian Studies 5, 4 (December 1981): 430–66. 
72  The General has given an example to all, so that the saying might remain true: “Quales 
sunt in Republica principes tales et sunt reliqui cives”. By marrying the wife of Czaplin-
ski, a Polish noble, a favourite of Aleksander Koniecpolski, the Major Standard-Bearer of 
the Kingdom. The two of them are said to have been the instigators of the recent disor-
ders. (Quales in Republica principes essent, tales reliquos solere esse cives. Cicero, Epis-
tulae ad familiares,1.19.2). 
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Basil the Macedonian, according as it is described in history. Every person who 
sees him is in admiration of him, and says, ‘Is this that Akhmil [Khmel], whose 
fame is spread over the whole world?’ ‘In the country of the Franks, as we were 
informed, they have composed poems in his praise and in celebration of his wars 
and conquests.”73  The Byzantine emperor Basil and founder of the Macedonian 
dynasty who had been depicted by his grandson Constantine VII as an ideal ruler 
serves as a fitting precedent in depicting to his Orthodox Arabic flock the founder 
of the Cossack Hetmanate.74 
Paul does not explain from which historians he took his view of Basil and 
whether he accepted Constantine’s version of royal descent or other historians’ 
attribution of humble origin, but if indeed the latter was the case, he had one more 
reason to see Basil as the model for Khmel’nyts’kyi. Certainly he describes 
Khmel’nyts’kyi’s simplicity in dress and manner as a virtue akin to Basil’s. 
Thereby, one sees in the frequent praise of this simplicity by Paul  a means of 
glorifying Khmel’nyts’kyi such as when he says: “‘It was delightful to witness the 
beauty of the Khatman’s [Hetman’s] language, his placid demeanour, his humility 
and condescension, and his tears of joy’”, that “[t]here is no affair in which he is 
engaged to which he does not himself attend; and he is moderate in his eating and 
drinking and clothing,” that 
 
At this moment he approached from the gate of the city with a numerous troop, in the midst 
of whom it was impossible for any one to distinguish him, otherwise than by observing that 
they were all clothed in handsome garments, accoutred with valuable arms; whereas he wore 
mean and scanty clothing, and was provided with armour of no price. 
 
and that, “so great is the blessing of God upon him, and so entirely overlooked is 
the meanness of his person.” 
In praising Khmel’nyts’kyi as a ruler in the tradition of Basil, Paul had obvious 
foils in the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, especially Vasile Lupu of 
Moldavia. He maintained: “Where are your eyes, ye Begs[Hospodars] of Moldavia 
and Wallachia? And where is now your grandeur, where your haughtiness? Each of 
                                                 
73  Paul, The Travel of Macarius, 1: 197-198. The statements that follow about Khmel'ny-
ts'kyi are on pages 196-199 unless otherwise indicated. 
74  On Basil's origin, see Norman Tobias, Basil I  Founder of the Macedonian Dynasty: A 
Study of the Political and Military History of the Byzantine Empire in the Ninth Century 
(Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter, 2007), chp.1. On Constantine's portrayal of his ances-
tor, see the German translation of Basil's life, Vom Bauernhof auf den Kaiserthron: Leben 
des Kaiseros Basileos I, trans. and ed. Leopold Breyer, Byzantinische Geschichts-
schreiber, ed. Johannes Koder, vol. 14 (Graz, 1981). 
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you is inferior in value to any Prokonikos [polkovnyk-colonel] of the Khatman’s 
[Hetman’s] suite, and in justice and moderation infinitely below him”. He 
contrasted Khmel’nyts’kyi’s qualities with the Moldavian’s stern demeanor, 
ostentation, and arrogance and Khmel’nyts’kyi’s victories with Vasile’s defeats. 
 
Now Vasili Beg [Hospodar Vasile] of Moldavia was perfect in the majesty of his stature, and 
in fierce command of his countenance, and was renowned throughout the universe for his 
wealth and treasures; and yet all this availed him nothing; but in his first battle, and in his 
second and third, and many times more, he was defeated, and put to flight. 
 
The two men also differed in the degree of respect they had shown the patriarch, a 
crucial determinant for Paul’s evaluation of a ruler. “In respect to his manner of 
sitting at table, let it be observed, that he placed himself in a lower seat, and our 
Lord the Patriarch in the seat of eminence, according to the reverence due to him in 
every assembly.” “He was not like the Begs[Hospodars] of Moldavia and 
Wallachia, who seated themselves in the centre, and placed the Head of the Clergy 
below them.”75 Vasile had clearly not demonstrated the respect that Khmel’nyts’kyi 
had shown the patriarch and the humility that Khmel’nyts’kyi accorded the 
churchman weighed greatly in Paul’s praise of him. 
Paul continued the tradition that had begun during Patriarch Paisios’s visit at the 
end of 1648-49 of comparing the hetman to Moses liberating his people from a 
bondage worse than the Egyptian, that of the Poles. 
 
Truly God is with thee; and it is He who has raised thee to deliver his peculiar people from 
their bondage to the nations; as Moses formerly delivered the Israelites from the servitude of 
Pharaoh, whom, with his followers, he overwhelmed in the Red Sea: but thou hast destroyed 
them, the filthy Poles, with thy depopulating sword - glory to God, who has done in thee all 
these great works! 
 
                                                 
75  “As soon as he beheld our Lord the Patriarch at a distance, he alighted from his horse, 
with all his attendants; and came and knelt down, and kissed the hem of the Patriarch's 
train, a first and a second time; then the cross, and his right-hand. And our Lord the Patri-
arch kissed the Khatman's [Hetman's] forehead.” “Then they brought upon the table some 
bowls of spirits, which they drank out of noggins; and the liquor was hot: but for Akhmil 
[Khmel] they set a silver cup of a particular kind of spirit. Having first made the Patriarch 
drink, the Khatman [Hetman] was the second to drink himself; and then he sent down the 
cup to each of us, for we were standing before him. How admirable this humility of a 
soul, which may the Almighty preserve still long on earth!” Paul, The Trave of Macarius, 
I: 199, 198, 199. 
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In resorting to the comparison with Moses, so commonly used for Byzantine 
and other rulers, Paul elevated the person of Khmel’nyts’kyi to royal heights.76 He 
praised his having been chosen by his fellows when he said; “This Akhmil [Khmel] 
is an old man, of those who have been most prospered by the blessing of God: in 
possession of every quality to be a leader – and of the most important of all, secrecy 
– he is spontaneously chosen of his fellow-men.” Yet it was God’s elevation of him 
as a Moses to his people that had raised him to the level of Emperor Basil. 
In elevating his subject in his Syrian Christian readers’ eyes, Paul both 
interpreted and approved of the very different society and mores of the Ukrainian 
borderland. For his Orthodox flock, he described beardless and mustachioed 
Cossacks who did not fulfill usual Orthodox prescriptions to be bearded. He did so 
by maintaining that their very name Cazak contained this meaning, a curious 
etymology for a Turkic word usually thought to mean free man or nomad.77 That 
poems were written to Khmel’nyts’kyi in the lands of the Franks was seen as a 
positive, just as Paul of Aleppo praised the realistic icons of Ukraine and the 
Western-influenced choral singing.78 In part, the alms-seeking churchman was 
impressed with the state of Orthodoxy he found in Ukraine, where the revolt had 
made the church dominant and the wealth of a society was directed toward the 
Orthodox culture. In part, his life under Muslim rule and wandering among various 
northern lands made him more flexible than, for example, were his coreligionists in 
the Tsardom of Muscovy. In part, he may have been open to the accomplishments 
of the West, just as his coreligionists in Crete long under Venetian rule had been in 
evolving new schools of painting. While he condemned the Latins and the Poles, he 
willingly accepted many of their influences on the Orthodox Ukrainians. What is 
clear is his joy in finding a new Orthodox power that might serve as a support and 
inspiration for the beleaguered Orthodox Christians of the Middle East. He chose to 
paint that polity and its leader in the brightest of hues. 
The accounts of Alberto Vimina and Paul of Aleppo do indeed provide 
invaluable information on Ukraine at the time of the revolt and the court of Hetman 
Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. Anyone who has read Vimina’s description of the 
hetman’s table will be well prepared for Paul’s account: 
 
                                                 
76  On the epithet “New Moses” of the Byzantine emperors and “Second Moses” for 
St.Volodymyr of Kyiv, see Šev enko, Ukraine between East and West, 192. 
77  “All of them wore, as they are accustomed, their chins shaven: and the meaning of the 
word Cazak, or Cossack, is this, viz. “beard-shorn”, but nourishing the whiskers.” 
78  On singing, see Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, book 2, part 1: 390; on 
painting, see Paul, The Travel of Macarius, 1: 201. 
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Then they brought upon the table some bowls of spirits, which they drank out of noggins; and 
the liquor was hot: but for Akhmil [Khmel] they set a silver cup of a particular kind of spirit. 
Having first made the Patriarch drink, the Khatman [Hetman] was the second to drink 
himself; and then he sent down the cup to each of us, for we were standing before him. How 
admirable this humility of a soul, which may the Almighty preserve still long on earth! He 
had no cup-bearers, nor any officers to cover up and guard the vessels of his meat or drink, as 
is the fashion of Princes, and even of subordinate Governors. Next they served up 
earthenware dishes of salt-fish boiled, and other eatables, in a plain way. There were no silver 
plates, nor forks, nor spoons, nor any thing of the kind: and yet every one of the servants of 
his servants had numerous chests full of bowls and cups and spoons of silver and gold, with 
other treasure, gained from the Poles; which none of them desired or cared for here, being out 
on a military expedition: but when they are at home, in their own native places, it is a 
different thing. 
 
Indeed, the two constitute the major sources that we have on that table, and they in 
many ways corroborate each other. One may also say that one finds similar 
correspondence on the simplicity of Khmel’nyts’kyi’s dress and the approachable 
nature of his person.  
Yet however important the comparative evidence we draw from the two 
travelers, we must always take care to filter in the models by which they formed 
their narratives and the goals which they sought to obtain through their texts. 
Frequently, these are easily discerned such as when Vimina ever anxious to provide 
context through classical allusions turns to Ausonius to give context to 
Khmel’nyts’kyi’s table.79 For Vimina the models of understanding were based in 
the Classical world, the teachings of Catholic dogmatics, and the diplomacy of 
Venice, just as Paul’s world was shaped by Orthodoxy, the Byzantine past, the 
humiliation of the Antiochian present, and the Ottoman structures (so that 
hospodars are explained as Begs).  Frequently, their comments reflect the cultural 
world views to which they belonged. Vimina, the product of the world of humanist 
learning and questione della lingua, tells us that the Ruthenian vernacular differs 
from Slavonic as Italian differs from Latin, while the Orthodox cleric, a product of 
Eastern Christian thought, informs us that the Serbs, Bulgarians, Cossacks, and 
Muscovites shared one Rus’ language, which was clearly the liturgical Slavonic. 
Fortunately we have both foreign and domestic sources, above all the voluminous 
primarily Polish correspondence, that discuss politics, personalities, and plans in a 
way so largely lacking for sources of Muscovy in the same period.  Therefore a 
                                                 
79  Yet even here one must take care to see if the mention of Agactocles was meant to reso-
nate with his audience when he was describing a general who had reached despotic pow-
ers.  
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comparison of the travelers’ accounts with other sources may frequently expose our 
travelers’ goals and distortions. When Paul describes Khmel’nyts’kyi as abstemious 
in drink, we may assume that this quality had to apply to his ideal ruler and that 
Vimina and many other contemporary sources are a more reliable source on 
Khmel’nyts’kyi’s drinking habits.80 What we must recognize, however, is that the 
sober Khmel’nyts’kyi and Paul’s representation are as important a field for study as 
our attempts to penetrate what they depicted. 
A Western Christian clergyman and an Eastern Christian clergyman travelled at 
about the same time from the old civilizations of the Mediterranean to the north. 
They visited the once great city of Kyiv that had been part of the greater 
Mediterranean world around the year 1000. Their goal was the new polity created 
by the Cossacks whom they sought to integrate into their plans for their respective 
southern worlds. Their differing cultures of West and East, albeit stemming from 
the same roots and frequently interacting, shaped the way they portrayed what they 
saw. Their accounts are not only of great value for understanding what they 
perceived. They also tell us much about the observers and their worlds. 
                                                 




Transnational Representations of Revolt and 
New Modes of Communication in the mid-
seventeenth century Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth: Jerzy Lubomirski’s Rebellion 




During the last decades, religion on the one hand, and the slow but steady move 
towards modern nationalism on the other hand have been considered as the most 
important factors in early-modern conflicts. The use conflicting parties made of 
transnational motives in their propaganda, mostly allusions to foreign powers taking 
sides with their domestic rival, should corroborate this accentuation. So should also 
a closer look at the seventeenth-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a place 
of armed conflict and counter-reformation. However, an analysis of transnational 
motives in the contemporary representation of a seventeenth-century major 
rebellion in this country, led by the magnate Jerzy Lubomirski, demonstrates the 
importance of factors other than religion and an emerging national consciousness, 
namely the structuring of the public sphere through the perception of the actors and 
the pressure of a political order providing legitimacy for protest: That order 
demanded radical figures of argumentation to combat the growing protest, for 
which allusions to the actors’ relations to foreign powers provided. Still, 
transnational positions in the network of communication dealing with the revolt 
also provided for moderate assessments, which broke with traditional conventions 
of discourse. 
Scepticism about the exclusive role of religion and emerging nationalism in 
early modern conflicts in Eastern Europe has been provoked by historian Natal’ia 
Yakovenko. She has convincingly demonstrated that revolts in the seventeenth 
century were also shaped by the development of subcultures in a society prone to 
make these categories look less significant than nineteenth and twentieth-century 
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ideologists wanted them to be. Iakovenko discusses the mid-seventeenth century 
Khmelnytsky uprising with its numerous victims from all nations and confessions 
in the concerned areas of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. What undermined 
central categories such as confession and nation, was a subculture that could be 
found in all conflicting parties, i.e. the professional identity of soldiers who, 
independently of their allegiance, shared mutual respect, the desire to make booty, 
and the contempt for the lives of civilians.1 The question asked in this book is 
whether the (self)-positioning of the agents in a transnational context can also be 
considered as an orientating factor which fashioned modes of action and discourse 
in early-modern revolts. In this manner, we are studying transnationality as a 
resource that guided behaviour in a similar way than the subculture analysed by 
Iakovenko did. 
How did transnational motives influence the basic contemporary categories of 
conflict? The interaction (and maybe alteration) of concepts interpreting conflicts 
“vertically”, that is, as individuals’ attacks against authorities perceived as revolt by 
the attacked, on the one hand and of concepts describing a conflict as ubiquitous 
and horizontal, that is, as “civil war”, on the other is of particular interest here. Both 
“revolt” and “civil war” partially transformed medieval concepts, notably the right 
to resistance and the definitions of peace and of the violation of peace. But the 
concept of “civil war” was more subtle and more hegemonic as to the still 
unregulated spaces in which social and political action had taken place before the 
beginning of the modern era. The term “civil war”, designating violent conflict not 
only between subjects and authorities, but also among subjects, came close to 
contemporaries’ experience as depicted above. Yet the topic of civil war is also 
well-known to have been elaborated by a contemporary of the events described 
here, Thomas Hobbes, into an apocalyptic vision of universal warfare to be tamed 
only by a strong state.2 
The interlinked construction of revolt and civil war which I am interested in can 
be considered as a part of a large-scale process in the history of communication. 
Broadly speaking, face-to-face communication as norm and practice, which 
provoked the interpretation of conflict as a matter of honour between agents 
identified and represented as persons, was being transformed. More mediated and 
less personalised communication encouraged the idea of a plurality of opinions 
                                                 
1  N. Iakovenko, Paralel’nyi svit. Doslidzhennia z istoriï uiavlen‘  ta idei v Ukraïni XVI-
XVII st. Kyiv 2002, 189-228. 
2  Cf. Bernhard Kroener, “Krieg”, in Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit (7), ed. Friedrich Jaeger 
(Stuttgart, 2008), col. 137-162. 
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being natural.3 The result could theoretically have been the decrease of discursive 
pressure towards solutions by battle – unless no new means were used to provoke a 
conflict.  
This view of the development of communication may be elaborated to envisage 
the front lines in early modern conflict. Persons and parties in conflict on all levels 
of the social hierarchy were profiled by complex processes of construction and 
distribution of honour titles. In this sense “revolt” was perceived as an asymmetric 
interpersonal conflict about honour, with a ruler’s honour being attacked by 
subjects’ disobedience. As to the transnational aspect of conflict discussed here, it is 
clear that there were modes of attributing honour which transcended the 
increasingly fixed borders between early modern states and also the borders 
sometimes arising within these states. These modes could be, for example, ideals of 
military honour both in its traditional knightly and its new soldier’s version 
mentioned above. However, titles equal by name did not equally provide their 
owners with honour, authority and power. The best example of this is the position 
of kings. Protected by legal acts that were at least similar in criminalising attacks on 
the person bearing the title of king, the positions of monarchs nevertheless strongly 
differed. The king’s extent of power and the degree to which his position was 
rooted in an enduring dynasty influenced the variety of means to represent him as a 
person – and, thus, also the degree to which both royal and anti-royal propaganda 
sought these means in a transnational context. 
The early modern period was characterized by a rapidly increasing exchange of 
people, goods and information. Transnational motives, which were not always 
confined to what had actually happened, but to the needs to provide or confirm 
legitimacy in the very moment when it was being contested, were thus within the 
reach of the European political elites. Borrowing was facilitated by basic processes 
marking the period, even if the final result of these processes was a stronger 
demarcation between countries and cultures. These processes, namely the profiling 
of confessions, nation building and military reform, were charged with ideology. 
Insofar, they stood in sharp contrast to the lived experience, which often strikingly 
contradicted ideologically based promises and expectations. Given these 
contradictions, it could be useful for agents to extrapolate the conflict by alluding to 
“foreign” influence or to their adversaries in the conflict, said to be seeking help 
from abroad. Such motives were conceived and diffused in expectation of their 
political use or even their juridical dimension, as they could make the adversaries’ 
actions look like conspiracy and treason in the sense of penal law.  
                                                 
3  R. Schlögl, “Kommunikation und Vergesellschaftung unter Anwesenden. Formen des 
Sozialen und ihre Transformation in der frühen Neuzeit”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 24 
(2008): 155-224, especially 176, 209, 216-217. 
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Allusions to foreign influence in propaganda diffused by the different parties in 
a conflict classified as a revolt are one of two aspects of transnationality in protest 
movements which I would like to discuss. The other aspect is the structure of the 
public sphere. A comprehensive discussion of the involvement of European 
political orders with a transnational space of exchange of information and discourse 
is out of the scope of this article. But I am going to cite a few examples of how 
transnationality and extraterritoriality in the seventeenth century provided for an 
enlargement of the public sphere and for a new perspective on king and rebel, 
offering an interpretation that transcends the traditional view of revolts as conflicts 
about honour depicted above.  
My topic is a high-ranking noble’s mid-seventeenth century rebellion against 
Jan Kazimierz, king of Poland and grand prince of Lithuania. Due to the lack of a 
comprehensive study of the public sphere in early-modern Poland-Lithuania, I can 
only make some preliminary remarks on representation in that rebellion.4 But I can 
rely on a number of studies of the factual history of the rebellion, its social 
background and its political implications. As mentioned above, I also rely on works 
about conflicts in the Commonwealth which revise the topoi of national 
historiographies.  
The case discussed on the following pages might in still another respect be 
helpful to continue the revision of stereotypes disseminated by national 
historiographies. Periods of upheaval in early modern Eastern Europe have been 
used to establish topoi of vitality or decay. As to the seventeenth century, a 
somewhat optimistic approach has been applied to Russia, the historical “winner” 
of that century: Even before the more and more “absolute autocracy” coped with a 
number of uprisings, the social forces at the very beginning of the century already 
managed to interpret and present what was in fact mainly a civil war as a conflict 
with foreign powers, and thus to establish the basis of national statehood.5 In the 
case of Poland-Lithuania, historians have stated exactly the opposite: Revolts of the 
seventeenth century made visible patterns of behaviour that finally led to the fall of 
the Republic of nobles. Reluctance to reform a political order, which could easily 
be used for intervention from abroad, was accompanied by the loss of tolerance and 
the rise of xenophobia, all of which contributed to destabilising and discrediting the 
                                                 
4  Such a study, which would include the transnational dimension of the public sphere in 
early-modern Poland-Lithuania, could recur to the classical works by Janusz Tazbir, no-
tably Janusz Tazbir, Rzeczpospolita i wiat. Studia z dziejów kultury XVII wieku 
(Wroc aw, 1971). Tazbir, however, does not explicitly deal with the public sphere.  
5  V. Kljuchevskii's interpretation of the growth of national consciousness at the end of the 
Time of troubles can be understood that way (V. Kljuchevskii, Sochineniia v deviati 
tomakh, 9 vols. (Moskow, 1988), 3: 64. 
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Commonwealth’s political order.6 But does a political order indeed suffer from 
xenophobic attitudes of its actors? If this had been the case, there would have been 
a lot more failed states in history. To be sure, when dealing with the last two 
centuries preceding the divisions of Poland, one cannot help but pay attention to the 
making of the fatal stigma of Polish anarchy. Still, in order to properly locate the 
Polish-Lithuanian case in the current discussion about early-modern communication 
and the public sphere, the focus of interest should be replaced: The way revolts, the 
climax of disorder, and their transnational dimension were dealt with might have 
been less due to a direct orientation on (proto-)national values than to the set of 
references defining what was “public”. 
What exactly was this particular revolt about? The Commonwealth of Poland-
Lithuania had a political order based on far-reaching rights of the nobility, with the 
assembly of nobles electing the king. In the period under consideration, candidates 
usually came not from within the Commonwealth, but from abroad. King Jan 
Kazimierz, himself from the Swedish dynasty of the Vasa, intended to change the 
political order of the Commonwealth by having his successor elected while he 
himself was still alive (vivente rege). It was clear that this would be a successor 
according to the king’s choice. Jerzy Lubomirski, a powerful magnate, Great 
Marshall of the Commonwealth and himself a possible candidate for the throne, 
acted against these plans, referring to the rights and the freedom of the nobility.  
During the mid-seventeenth century, the Commonwealth was permanently at 
war with its neighbouring countries. Discontent was not only nourished by the 
king’s plans concerning his successor, but also by the crown’s incapacity to pay the 
troops. The king tried to cope with Lubomirski as the head of resistance by 
political, military and judicial means. But it was not easy to use criminal law 
against a noble in a Republic of nobles. Having Lubomirski finally condemned for 
lèse-majesty, the king drove him into outright military resistance. Lubomirski and 
his adherents called their military actions a “rokosz”, that is, military resistance 
against a king violating the rights of the nobility. The nobles of the Commonwealth 
considered this form of resistance against the king not only as legitimate, but also as 
legal. For them, the rokosz was based on their right to organize in confederations 
not only during an interregnum, but also during a reign when it came to fulfil tasks 
the monarch would not or could not manage, such as the defence of the 
Commonwealth’s endangered borders or the defence of nobility rights.7    
                                                 
6  M. Nagielski, Rokosz Jerzego Lubomirskiego w 1665 roku (Warszawa 1994), 242, refer-
ring to Tazbir, Rzeczpospolita. 
7  J. Bardach, Historia pa stwa i prawa Polski, 5 vols. (Warszawa, 1957), 2 [Od po owy 
XV wieku do r. 1795]: 244. 
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Although lead by a magnate, the Lubomirski rebellion was less far away from 
mass revolt than it might initially appear. A matter of elite politics, it was also 
linked to a military revolt, and it was a reason for the top players to turn to the most 
humble subjects for support. Some aspects of the rebellion thus touch the problem 
of mass revolt both as it has been associated by historians with what used to be 
called “antifeudal protest” and as it has been identified as the “language of the 
crowd” ever since the eighteenth century. Still, the revolt first and foremost has to 
be considered in the scope of the public space in the Republic of nobles. The way 
this public space and its legal foundations were perceived within the 
Commonwealth and beyond the borders influenced the status of the country in 
international relations. 
1. PUBLIC PROCEDURE AND INFORMAL POLITICS: 
THE REPUBLIC’S OPEN FLANK  
The notion of rokosz, an armed uprising against the king considered legal, 
concretized the Commonwealth’s nobles right to resistance. It is significant that a 
seventeenth-century French observer of Lubomirski’s rebellion found it impossible 
to translate “rokosz” into French and therefore simply left it as it was.8 
The French observer’s failure to translate the term is significant. Authors like 
him, writing for external readers, developed a political ethnography of the Republic 
of nobles, taking an alienated position as referring to what they knew about that 
political formation. To indicate the uniqueness of certain traits in the Polish 
political landscape – like the rokosz – was a means to make it exotic. Another 
means to express the author’s distance to the subject was the description of the 
Commonwealth’s political procedures in terms of parody.9 To parody procedure 
                                                 
8  Nagielski, Rokosz, 91. 
9  An example is the French historian de Bizardière's description of what can be called the 
epilogue of the Lubomirski rebellion. In 1668, two years after the rebel's death, his main 
enemy, King Jan Kazimierz, finally abdicated the throne. The nobility was to elect a new 
king. Having shown how the most insolent tricks used by foreign candidates failed with 
the assembled nobles, Bizardière is also highly ironic about the final election procedure 
and its result: the election of a new king from within the nobility of the Commonwealth 
after a great number of monarchs from foreign dynasties: see Michel de Bizardière, 
Neuligst eröffnetes Polnisches Staats-Cabinet Oder Eigentliche Beschreibung der 
Merckwürdigkeiten/so sich von langen Zeiten her in diesem Königreich zugetragen 
(Cölln, 1698) (original text in French, Paris, 1697). I here refer to the text as printed in 
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was to parody a crucial element in Poland-Lithuania’s political order. Procedure in 
the sense of a formalized process claiming openness concerning its results was 
certainly not always observed in practice. Nevertheless, it symbolized and 
guaranteed the public status of the nobility and, thus, its political legitimacy. 
Notably the formal observation of the rules for convoking and carrying out the 
assembly of nobles was all the more important because, particularly in times of 
crisis, political and juridical functions of the assembly of nobles overlapped, with 
the Sejm also being the Republic’s highest court.10 The qualifications of “public” 
and “private” mattered concretely as to what was considered as debatable at the 
assembly of nobles in an open and mediated discussion  about matters of common 
interest.11 
Of course the reach of the distinction of public and private as well as the reach 
of the claim to politics being public could not but be limited in real life. There were 
large areas of informal power dominated by forms of communication far from the 
procedures of public political communication. For example, the Lithuanian 
aristocracy participated in the institutions of the Commonwealth, but its influence 
was mainly organized as informal power based on sociability. Lithuania was 
dominated by a few aristocratic clans. Surveying the postal traffic, one of them 
even organized a specific means of controlling communication.12 The Lubomirski 
rebellion shows clearly how much informal politics mattered in this context. In 
order to gain the Lithuanian aristocrats’ support, both the royal party and the rebel 
extensively made use of personal persuasion outside of formal political 
representation, which meant that the king, the queen as well as a monk charged by 
Lubomirski travelled to see the Lithuanian magnates and convince them of their 
cause, with the king promising important offices in order to get military support.13  
The highly-developed and extensively used vocabulary denoting public 
institutions and hinting at their assumed commitment to public interest made the 
contrast between an ideal order and a much less ideal practice visible. Moreover, 
the understanding of rokosz as legal resistance implied that the rebel institutions 
were ascribed the same public quality as the original ones. As we shall see, 
                                                                                                            
Die gelehrte Welt des 17. Jahrhunderts über Polen. Zeitgenössische Texte, ed. E. Szarota 
(Wien, 1972), 342-348. 
10  About the Republic's highest court: Bardach, Historia pa stwa i prawa, 2: 153-155. 
11  Comp. Nagielski, Rokosz, 149. 
12  A.Rachuba, “Litwa wobec s du nad Jerzym Lubomirskim”, Kwartalnik historyczny 93 
(1987): 679-707; A. Rachuba, “Zabiegi dworu i Jerzego Lubomirskiego o pozyskanie 
Litwy w 1664 roku”, Przeg d historyczny 78 (1987): 1-17. About the control of the mail 
traffic: Nagielski, Rokosz, 149. 
13  Rachuba, Zabiegi dworu i Jerzego Lubomirskiego, 1-17. 
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formations belonging to the constitutional order – notably the army – could 
organize within the frame of legality to articulate their needs as a social group. In 
case of the army, this concerned the crucial matter of pay. But the more profiled 
such formations were as public organs, the more could the articulation of limited 
interests discredit the Republic’s political order to the (willingly) unaccustomed 
eye. It was easy for a French diplomat to declare, for example, in an alarming tone 
that the unpaid royal army of the Commonwealth “is for sale”14 – a situation not 
extraordinary in that period, but of greater public visibility in Poland-Lithuania than 
elsewhere. The high degree of structured public institutions, that is, modern, not 
archaic elements, made the Republic of nobles as a political order rather vulnerable. 
In this sense, the role of crises such as the Lubomirski rebellion in a transnational 
interplay discrediting the Republic of nobles on the long run has to be investigated 
further. Given the delicacy of the wide-spread and highly elaborate public quality of 
institutions in the Commonwealth, my thesis is that the modernisation of the modes 
of communication about internal conflicts rather accelerated than slowed down this 
process.  
As to the long-term development of the Commonwealth’s inner situation as well 
as its international position, I suppose that these modes of communication certainly 
played a more important role than xenophobic attitudes or the agents’ relations to 
foreign powers in the Lubomirski movement. 
2. LUBOMIRSKI IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT: 
TRANSNATIONAL ELEMENTS IN RELATED REVOLTS  
Historians consider resistance against foreigners in the royal army as one of several 
factors that made up the reasons for the uprisings in 1606-1609. King and rebel 
alike built up their respective international network in close rivalry to each other, 
with Lubomirski being supported, for instance, by the Elector of Brandenburg-
Prussia, while his rival, the king, was in close relation with the noble opposition in 
this neighbour monarchy.15 But neither xenophobia nor appeals to foreign support 
were specific characteristics of Lubomirski’s rebellion, as a look at comparable 
seventeenth-century revolts inside and outside of the Commonwealth demonstrates.   
Lubomirski’s rebellion may be compared to another major rebellion in 
seventeenth-century Poland-Lithuania, and also to the French Fronde.  
A major conflict between the crown and a noble rebel in the Commonwealth 
had already marked the years from 1606 to 1609. That confrontation between the 
                                                 
14  Nagielski, Rokosz, 83. 
15  Ibid., 43. 
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crown and part of the nobility was in many respects similar to the conflict between 
the king and Lubomirski more than half a century later. Both conflicts were centred 
around the nobles’ and the king’s prerogatives in their mutual relationship. In both 
conflicts the issue of confessional freedom as well as noble resistance against the 
secular power of the church played a role.16 Contemporaries themselves compared 
the two rebellions. King Jan Kazimierz’s astronomer believed that the Lubomirski 
rebellion was worse than the older one because of the simultaneous uprisings in the 
Ukraine and the Muscovite danger.17 Resistance against the presence of foreigners 
in the royal army is mentioned as one of several factors that made up the reasons for 
the uprising in 1606-1609.18 As to the Lubomirski rebellion, it may have resulted in 
growing resistance against a king from a foreign dynasty: In fact, the nobles elected 
their next king from among the Commonwealth’s domestic elite. But it would be 
difficult to prove that the mid-seventeenth century revolt itself was more marked by 
xenophobia than the one in the first decade of the 17th century. 
Compared to the Fronde in France, the Lubomirski rebellion shows important 
differences, but also reveals parallels. One difference lay in the medial 
representation of the monarchy, which was, of course, closely linked to the 
hereditary position of the king in France on the one hand and the position of an 
elected king in the Commonwealth on the other hand. Relations of the agents to 
foreign powers played a role in both revolts. This was in part because one of the 
main motives for these movements was the disappointment of high-ranking office 
holders with the crown.19 Needless to say, high-level office holders were also 
transnational agents. Another similarity is the disastrous financial situation of the 
crown, that is, its difficulties to pay for its military forces – with the difference that 
the French monarchy recurred to what has been called an inner “système fisco-
financier”, while the Polish king had to rely on subsidies paid for by or 
intermediated by the French court.20 Yet in general, the use of foreign support by 
the opponents was by no means unique to the Lubomirski movement and Poland-
                                                 
16  On the conflict about the representatives of the church and their secular power in the 
Lubomirski rebellion: W. K aczewski, Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski (Wroc aw, Warszawa, 
Kraków, 2002), 240. About the early 17th-century Zebrzydowski rebellion: H. Wisner, 
Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego (Kraków, 1989), especially 1-9. 
17  K aczewski, Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski, 229. 
18  Wisner, Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego, 16, 18. 
19 As mentioned above, Lubomirski himself held high offices in the Commonwealth. For 
the French case: A. James, The Origins of French Absolutism 1598-1661 (Harlow et al., 
2006), 56. 
20  Quotation: James, Origins of French Absolutism, 53; Nagielski, Rokosz, 27. 
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Lithuania: One of the principal actors of the age of the Fronde, the Prince de Condé, 
tried to achieve military invasion from abroad for his cause.21  
A transnational context of agency in revolts was thus not exceptional – at least 
if the revolt was a rebellion of nobles. Dealing with the representation of the 
Lubomirski revolt on the following pages, we have to consider that its transnational 
motives reflected a real and quite common state of things. However, propaganda 
presented the facts in an original way. 
3. LUBOMIRSKI’S REBELLION IN DOMESTIC JURISDICTION 
At first sight, one of the most prominent representations of the revolt – its staging as 
a juridical drama - was a purely internal one. Both the king and Lubomirski made 
abundant use of formalized legal procedures and their written representations to win 
their case. In practice, legal procedure was, of course, by no means independent of 
the power of sociability. It was easier to judge those who socially and culturally did 
not belong to the core of the Republic than those who did. 
The king’s jurists had a large choice of accusations against Lubomirski to 
present to the assembly of nobles – and yet a restricted one. These restrictions 
concerned precisely the magnate’s relations to foreign powers in the conflict about 
the future of the Polish throne. It is significant that there were cases of accusation of 
political crime in 17th-century Poland in which foreign relations of the defendant 
played an important role. In the mid-seventeenth century, a former Cossack hetman, 
Ivan Vyhovs’kyi, was judged mainly for his relations with the Ottoman Empire. At 
the same period the leader of a peasant uprising, Aleksander Leon Kostka-
Napierski, was condemned for talking about his alleged relations with external 
enemies of the Commonwealth.22 But in our case, the accused belonged to the inner 
circle of the formally and informally powerful; he was both in the centre and on the 
top of the noble stratum, sociable both to the nobles, many of whom felt he shared 
their cause, and to the king himself. This cut short the field of possible accusations. 
Lubomirski’s acts might easily be compared to the very similar modes of action of 
the monarch himself. Therefore, the magnate’s secret correspondence with the 
emperor and the elector was no explicit matter of accusation.  
So what was left to the king to accuse the rebel of? Fortunately for the royal 
party, the accusers found it possible to charge him with breaking a law which, in 
order to promote formal equality among the nobles, forbade the use of particular 
                                                 
21  James, Origins of French Absolutism, 70-71. 
22  A. Lity ski, Przest pstwa polityczne w polskim prawie karnym XVI-XVII wieku (Katowi-
ce, 1976), 62. 
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titles hinting at the superior position of the concerned nobles within their estate.23 
This point in the accusation was a tribute to the szlachta as a social formation. The 
main crimes Lubomirski was charged with and then judged for at a dramatic 
assembly of the nobles in 1665 were, however, actions against the king. As I will 
discuss later, Lubomirski was, for instance, accused of having tried to establish 
himself as a counterweight to royal power by establishing a “protectorate” over the 
Republic and to have stirred up public opinion against the ruler.24 In the sense of 
what has been said above about the early-modern understanding of revolts, lèse-
majesty, the legal formula used by the king in the conflict with Lubomirski, was a 
representation of the sovereign’s honour. In the 16th century, Polish nobles had 
fought against the use of lèse-majesty by their monarchs. In 1539, they had 
achieved that lèse-majesty referred only to crimes directly against the person of the 
king. At least as far as Polish (but not Lithuanian) law was concerned, they thus had 
successfully banned the large understanding of that crime in Roman law, which 
they considered as “law for unfree peoples”.25 In this tradition a law of 1588 made 
sure that accusations of lèse-majesty should not hinder a noble in his legal political 
activity.26 The concept of rokosz, a legalized, far-going form of resistance against 
the crown, demonstrates that this was a notion wide-open to interpretation. Insofar 
the 1588 law on lèse-majesty was clearly pro-noble. On the other hand, that law 
was a relatively fresh basis of reference for accusations of political crime for mid-
seventeenth century actors, a legal source which possessed the legitimacy of law 
made by the Republic of nobles itself. This was important, as the noblemen of the 
Commonwealth considered foreign law as an instrument for installing the much-
feared dominium absolutum of a king assuming more and more power. 
King Jan Kazimierz and his jurists finally managed to persuade the Assembly of 
nobles to condemn Lubomirski for lèse-majesty. Some years later, another 
assembly of nobles – ironically the Sejm following the abdication of Lubomirski’s 
royal adversary – rehabilitated the then late magnate. Thus, so far, the case looks 
like a series of events within the frame of the domestic noble public sphere. In fact, 
it transcended this frame. The transnational elements in the discourses about 
Lubomirski provided for this enlarged scope. 
                                                 
23  K aczewski, Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski, 225-226. 
24  See below and annotation 28. 
25  Lity ski, Przest pstwa polityczne, 21, 171. 
26  St. Salmonowicz, “La noblesse polonaise contre l'arbitraire du pouvoir royal: les privi-
lèges judiciaires de la noblesse”, Revue du droit français et étranger 72 (1994): 21-29, 
27. 
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4. ENLARGING THE SCOPE: TRANSNATIONAL MOTIVES IN 
THE PROPAGANDISTIC REPRESENTATION OF THE 
REBELLION  
The problem with the accusation of lèse-majesty in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth was its very nature: a king-centred crime in a non-king-centred, 
mixed political order. It is therefore logical that in the eyes of the king and his 
advisors, the mere declaration of Lubomirski’s condemnation, which was sent to all 
towns of the Commonwealth, did not suffice. To convince the many discontented 
people, more efforts were needed. Printers worked night and day to immediately 
produce a large documentation of the Lubomirski case from the king’s point of 
view.27 This work, “Processus iudiciarius”,28 suggests through its documentary 
character that there was a well-informed reading public to discuss and judge the 
case. The text did not do without allusions to foreign princes’ influence on 
Lubomirski’s actions, but its polemic elements concentrated on the negative effect 
of Lubomirski’s activity for Poland’s position in the conflict with the Tatars and the 
Cossacks. Yet, most remarkable in our context is a reference to the English regicide 
of 1649 and the following period of Oliver Cromwell’s rule as “protector”. 
According to the “Processus”, Lubomirski’s adherents had even made an axe for 
him as symbol of his new function as a “protector”. One of these adherents 
explicitly announced that it was time to cut off the heads first of the king and then 
of high court officials. The “Processus” underlines that the expression for “cut off 
the heads” was pronounced in Tatar language! The text further tells us that several 
other supporters of the rebels agreed to this, referring to the English example and 
stating that they themselves, the nobles of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 
had more reason to cut off their king’s head than the English had had. Some high-
ranking nobles were shocked about what they heard and immediately made an 
effort to install a trial against those who pronounced such “blasphemy”. Not so 
Lubomirski, who did everything to downplay the crime and thus, the text suggests, 
showed his approbation.29 Of course, Lubomirski rejected these reproaches in his 
printed answer to the “Processus”, denying any ambitions to become a “Protector” 
of the Commonwealth.30 
                                                 
27  St. Szczotka, “Zabiegi o pozyskanie ch opów w okresie rokoszu Lubomirskiego”, 
Przeg d historyczny 43 (1952): 319-337. 
28  Georgius Lubomierski, Processus iudiciarius in causa illustri et magnifico Georgio 
comiti in Wisnicz et Iaroslaw Lubomierski (Varsaviæ, 1664), E. 
29  Ibid.  
30  Jerzy Lubomirski, Publicæ Innocentiæ Manifestum Deo Mundo Patriæ (s.l., 1666), 84. 
TRANSNATIONAL REPRESENTATIONS OF REVOLT | 171 
 
So, the English regicide took a prominent place in the royal propaganda for the 
reading public. It is remarkable that it reoccurs in the risky propaganda efforts to 
gain the support of a group traditionally outside of the system of political 
representation: the peasants. To agitate peasants to rise against nobles was to play 
with fire and, thus, it was done only when the struggling parties felt that their cause 
was at stake. The arguments used in the addresses to the peasants are therefore 
worthy of attention. 
Trying to agitate peasants against Lubomirski and his noble followers, the royal 
side acted according to patterns established during the Swedish invention into the 
Commonwealth a decade before the events (in 1655): The Swedish king had then 
tried to rise the peasants against their noble lords, and King Jan Kazimierz, for his 
part, had tried to make the mountaineers of the Podhale region, the most rebellious 
element among catholic peasants in Poland, rise against the Swedish invaders. 
Taking this into account, the king’s analogous action in 1665, the appeal to the 
peasants’ support in the struggle against Lubomirski,31 can be considered as a kind 
of declaration of war against this domestic enemy. Yet the royal address to the 
peasants also explicitly raised the topic of civil war,32 and thus transcended the 
scope of arguments that had so far been tied to the interpretation of the conflict as a 
revolt. To be sure, during Lubomirski’s rebellion, the idea of civil war had already 
emerged, but only privately, for instance, in the correspondence of Jan Sobieski’s, 
the future king and the victor of Vienna in 1683, who mentioned robberies by 
Lithuanian troops on Polish territory.33 Yet in the king’s uniwersa y (manifestos) to 
the Podhale peasants the civil war motif was developed in public.  
The king was the first to address to the Podhale peasants. Lubomirski, for his 
part, also wrote to them, recommending himself not only as the defender of a just 
cause, but also as a victorious warrior. The king did not hesitate to contradict this 
version, stating that Lubomirski’s victories had been bought by the blood of the 
peasants.34 This is in fact to say that the magnate had not made war against the 
Swedish troops, but that his war had been a domestic one!  
In their manifestos to the Podhale peasants, both the king and Lubomirski 
accused each other of having exposed the people to Tatar raids.35 Yet the most 
remarkable element in the propaganda for peasants is once more the mentioning of 
the English regicide. Supporting the king’s cause, an anonymous adherent of the 
king’s side stated in his appeal to the peasants that Lubomirski had even sent a 
                                                 
31  Szczotka, Zabiegi o pozyskanie ch opów, 321-322. 
32  Ibid., 319-337. 
33  Nagielski, Rokosz, 97. 
34  Szczotka, Zabiegi o pozyskanie ch opów, 321, 328-329, 333. 
35  Ibid., 332. 
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person to England to get to know how to proceed. The “Processus” was cited as a 
proof that these accusations against Lubomirski were true, that is, the authority of 
the printed text was referred to. The king’s supporter justified the fact that this Latin 
text was incomprehensible for peasants by the need to inform other countries about 
Lubomirski’s evil-doing.36 The reference to the English regicide, for its part, shows 
that the author assumed events that mattered for the European public to matter also 
for peasants in a Polish mountain region. The domestic public (i.e., the whole 
Commonwealth, including at least a part of its peasant population) was thus 
consequently thought of as complementary to an international public and vice versa. 
Yet the regicide motif also fulfils the same function as the other conspicuous 
transnational motives in the pro- and anti-Lubomirski propaganda, the allusion to 
the Tatar or Tatar-Cossack danger. Poland-Lithuania’s electoral monarchy was a 
political order rationalised in the sense of not leaving much room for the 
sacralisation of the king. There was no room for anything analogous to the famous 
French leaflets of the period – the Mazarinades – with their conspicuous images of 
the king between heaven and hell.37 Transnational motifs – the Tatars and, most 
notably, the English regicide – took the place of apocalyptic motifs which 
developed along the long-term presence of hereditary kingdom in other political 
orders. In other words: when it came to constructing radicalism under the given 
circumstances, transnationality was an indispensable source to recur to. A closer 
study of the background of the regicide motive and the protector motive shows how 
this worked. 
5. THE ENGLISH REGICIDE AND OLIVER CROMWELL 
AGAINST A POLISH BACKGROUND 
There were good conditions in the Commonwealth for receiving information about 
developments in England, but the allusions to the English regicide and the 
Protectorate cannot be considered as a mere reflex of fresh news: In 1664 
Cromwell, “Lord Protector of the Realm of England” from 1653 to 1659, had been 
dead for five years, and the Stuart monarchy had been restored. These new 
circumstances might have enhanced the Polish king’s hope to successfully discredit 
his adversary in the eyes of an international public by alluding to his alleged 
                                                 
36  Ibid. 
37  A. Pietsch, “Zwischen Gottesähnlichkeit und Höllensturz. Das Bild des französischen 
Königs in Zeiten der Fronde”, in Die Bibel als politisches Argument, ed. A. Pe ar and K. 
Trampedach, Beihefte der Historischen Zeitschrift, ed. Lothar Gall, vol. 43 (München, 
2007), 333-348. 
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ambitions to become Protector himself, as monarchy now seemed to be victorious 
at the very spot where it recently had been most dangerously been attacked. 
The argument also corresponded to internal demands. Restricted by the 
Commonwealth’s minimalist law on lèse-majesty, Lubomirski’s accusers were to 
find both arguments for the Marshall’s evil intention concerning the king in person 
and for his treacherous intentions, for his being prepared to collaborate with anyone 
and to borrow from anyone in order to achieve his aims. England, Oliver Cromwell 
and the Protectorate offered such opportunities. Yet apart from alleged sympathy 
with the king-murderers fitting very well into the  conditions  an accusation of 
political crime had to fulfil, there were also other reasons why the English case as 
cited in royal propaganda was suitable. 
The strong English presence in several sectors of the Commonwealth’s society 
makes it probable that recent English events were known and that therefore 
allusions to them would be understood. England’s quickly modernising economy, 
which was heading towards the beginnings of industrialisation, was an important 
complementary partner for the Commonwealth, which provided England with grain 
and with raw material for the English textile production.38 Moreover, due to the fact 
that in an age of confessional conflict, the Commonwealth had long been receiving 
persons from many confessions, including those persecuted at home, the British 
catholics in Poland-Lithuania were quite numerous.39 They were particularly strong 
in the army. Jan Kazimierz even had special Irish units.40 It is significant that not 
only Polish propaganda presented England (or, better, England in a certain, recent 
period) as a hotbed of subversion, but in a way also vice-versa: In England, Poland 
was perceived as a potential place d’armes for Irish insurgents who could be 
recruited from the Irish units in the Polish military.41 
During the Protectorate, England had become more deeply involved with 
politics in Poland-Lithuania’s sphere of interest than before. Cromwell had 
ambitious aims as to common strategies of protestant countries, but the interests of 
English merchants also had to be taken into account. This was especially the case 
when the Protector, whose original basis of power had been the army, at a later 
stage tried to gain larger support. He could then count on the London merchants’ 
                                                 
38  Edward Alfred Mierzwa, Anglia a Polska w pierwszej po owie XVII w. (Warszawa, 
1986), passim. 
39  Antoni Krawczyk, “The British in Poland in the Seventeenth Century”, The Seventeenth 
Century 37 (2002): 254-271, especially 254. 
40  Krawczyk, The British in Poland, 260. 
41  Ibid. 
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and money lenders’ interest in a stable government,42 but this even more bound him 
to a balanced strategy in the Baltic region. As a result, the government restricted the 
number of English soldiers to be recruited for the Swedish wars against the 
Commonwealth.43  
The Protector himself was a highly conspicuous figure in England. He had been 
shaped in this way by adversary English royalist propaganda even at a stage when 
his actual power did not yet justify such a strong image.44 Two contradictory 
symbols, the axe symbolizing his responsibility for the regicide of 1649 and the 
knightly sword, were attributed to him on printed pictures.45 The martial qualities 
he was accorded mirrored his military identity and the military basis of his rule. 
This martial image was ambiguous in the context of mid-seventeenth century 
debates about legitimate power. Cromwell’s strong connection to the military made 
him vulnerable to sharp criticism not only in England. “Both Florentine and  
Venetian ambassadors  saw Cromwell as a tyrant because he ruled with the support 
of the army”.46 In England, a similar argument arose when the question of the 
Protector’s follower and thus the options to extend the Protectorate or to restore 
monarchy became acute. Cromwell, though probably waiting to be offered the 
crown himself, had declared hereditary monarchy (but democracy as well!) a 
negative extreme in 1655.47 However, it soon became evident that Cromwell’s 
contemporaries stuck to hereditary monarchy, which they considered as a natural 
order in spite of the 1649 execution of the Stuart king then considered a tyrant. The 
arguments of the 1649 anti-royalists were now turned upside down: It was no 
longer the hereditary monarch, but the potentially elected king who was supposed 
to become a tyrant, and the military men surrounding Cromwell were considered as 
a danger.48 
As object to a fierce debate about hereditary monarchy and the influence of the 
military on politics, Cromwell and the Protectorate were a valuable point of 
reference in the Polish context. Hereditary monarchy was the central matter of 
                                                 
42  Eric Porter, “A Cloak for Knavery: Kingship, the Army and Parliament, 1654-1655”, The 
Seventeenth Century 17 (2002): 187-205, especially 192. 
43  Barry Coward, The Cromwellian Protectorate (Manchester and New York, 2002), 130. 
44  Laura Knoppers, Constructing Cromwell: Ceremony, Portrait, and Print, 1645-1661 
(Cambridge et al., 2000), 30. 
45  Knoppers, Constructing Cromwell, 50. 
46  Marco Barducci, “Oliver Cromwell, European Historical Myth? The Case of the Italian 
States in Seventeenth-Century Representations of Cromwell”, The Seventeenth Century 
23, 1 (2008): 57.  
47  Porter, A Cloak for Knavery, 188. 
48  Ibid., 197-198. 
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conflict between Lubomirski and his supporters on the one hand and the royal party 
on the other. The military question was a crucial one, too, in the mid-seventeenth 
century Commonwealth. Citing the historian Iakovenko, I have hinted at the 
significance of professional soldiers’ mentality for the experience of internal 
violence that large parts of the Commonwealth’s population underwent in that 
period. Military men had not yet been profiled as a social group in the first half of 
the century, but wars and invasions of the mid-century pushed forward a 
professional conscience of both the officers and the soldiers. In permanent military 
conflict both with external and internal adversaries, the rulers of the 
Commonwealth felt pressure from many sides to make the army more efficient. 
Trying to do so, they copied what was considered as useful from Habsburg, 
Swedish, Turkish, Persian, and Tatar troops.49 The core of the Commonwealth’s 
military forces had been a royal army of mercenaries, which was transformed into a 
standing formation in the course of the 17th century. This army had differed from 
the beginning from other European mercenary armies in so far as it was not the 
product of “private” military entrepreneurship: It was recruited in the name of the 
king, its leaders were installed by the monarch, and it was to be paid by state 
means.50   
Funding is well-known to have been the vulnerable point of army 
modernisation, especially in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with its high 
degree of political participation by all layers of the nobility, since this participation 
included questions of state finance. A part of the Commonwealth’s army, the light 
cavalry, was “seldom paid except out of booty”.51 Yet the core of the army expected 
the king to pay the soldiers. If he did not, the army formed one more institution of 
self-defence legitimated by custom, which could not easily be declared illegal 
because it was a variation of the noble confederation described above: the Zwi zek. 
This formation was supposed to exert pressure on the king to fulfil his financial 
obligations. In contrast to the confederation, the Zwi zek was no exclusively noble 
institution: it included non-noble soldiers.52 Thus it was a sworn association of 
military men, a Männerbund, and in a way a public institution of what Iakovenko 
calls the military subculture of the Commonwealth.  
                                                 
49  Henryk Wisner, “Polska sztuka wojenna pierwszej po owy XVII wieku. W tpliwo ci i 
hipotezy”, Kwartalnyk historyczny 84 (1977): 405-415; Alfred P. Brainard, “Polish-
Lithuanian Cavalry in the Late Seventeenth Century”, The Polish Review 36 (1991): 69-
82, especially 74. 
50  Bardach, Historia pa stwa i prawa, 2: 250, 137. 
51  Brainard, Polish-Lithuanian Cavalry, 76. 
52  Bardach, Historia pa stwa i prawa, 2: 244. 
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To be sure, it was not before the end of the seventeenth century that such a 
Zwi zek tried to pursue political aims beyond pressing for payment.53 But the 
formation of two of these formations within  a few years – in 1659 and 1661 – was 
an important political fact even if both restricted themselves to the issue of 
payment. This is all the more true as it was Jan Kazimierz’s major adversary to 
come, Lubomirski, who took the lead of the 1661 Zwi zek. It was this dimension of 
Lubomirski’s military leadership which the mentioning of Cromwell and the 
Protectorate in royal propaganda alluded to. 
Considering transnational representation in Lubomirski’s rebellion, we thus 
have to conclude that this rebellion was not just an act of resistance by nobles 
fearing a royal dominium absolutum. It rather reflected the float of information and 
the differentiated concepts of legitimate rule in contemporary Europe. Cromwell 
and the Protectorate as points of reference in royal propaganda against Lubomirski 
bear witness to the strong presence of people from abroad (the British in this case) 
in the Commonwealth, but also of the power of military men, whose self-
organization made them agents of their own. Thus, the rebellion stood for the 
manifold subcultures that made up the Commonwealth and which the attribute 
“Republic of nobles” describes only partially. 
6. AN ALTERNATIVE VOICE FROM EXILE 
When Lubomirski died in 1667 in Silesia, his legal status was that of a political 
criminal in exile. He was not alone. The legal categories treating revolt as a crime, 
which were accepted in all European monarchies under consideration in this article, 
created not only the option to use European revolts for propaganda purposes, they 
also created a truly transnational group of people with a common fate: that of 
persons condemned for major political crimes living in exile. A voice from abroad 
commenting on the Lubomirski revolt in a way which significantly differed from 
the king’s and the rebel’s propaganda was that of the Anti-Trinitarian Stanis aw 
Lubieniecki, whom Janusz Tazbir drew historians’ attention to.54 Lubieniecki was 
among the Polish nobility living in Prussian exile.  He offered a thorough reflection 
of the transnational character of the conflict, including the topic of money and the 
relation between want of money, inflation and the dependence of the Republic’s 
political forces on foreign courts. He distinguished Tatars and Cossacks, who for 
other authors were but one, pleading for the Cossack’s reintegration into the 
                                                 
53  Ibid.  
54  Janusz Tazbir, “G os aria ski w polemice rokoszu Lubomirskiego”, Przeg d historyczny 
60 (1959): 62-80, especially 72. 
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Commonwealth through religious tolerance. Even the French-born queen’s 
manoeuvres were described with an appeal to human understanding: the Queen’s 
position was explained to be dependent on family loyalty and insofar (considering 
female nature in its contemporary construction, one may add) natural.55 Compared 
to the king’s and Lubomirski’s propaganda, this author’s arguments shifted from 
describing a conflict of honour to the more “modern” analysis of positions and 
opinions as described in ideal typology by historians of communication. 
For our story, it is important to remark that the cited author did not deem it 
possible to confront his presumed readers in the Commonwealth with his real 
identity as an exiled Anti-Trinitarian. The confessional conflict, but, possibly, also a 
presumed effect of the official dishonouring of the condemned as infamous may 
have incited Lubieniecki to hide his identity behind a fictional catholic author.56 He 
thus assumed an authorship qualifying for legitimate claims to authority in the 
Commonwealth as it was in the mid-seventeenth century: that of the average 
catholic nobleman. Voices of the exiled were certainly not supposed to successfully 
claim such authority. The rules of noble public status and of public discursive 
authority largely overlapped: This made the way out of the mid-seventeenth century 
crisis more difficult.  
Many elements in Lubieniecki’s position were not new. They mirrored 
traditional views and coalitions of the confessional age. The author’s peace vision 
might have been enrooted in the Anti-Trinitarians’ irenical views. The 
understanding for the cause of the Cossacks might have recurred to the good 
relations between Protestants and Orthodox in the Commonwealth before the 
Khmel’nyc’kyj uprising of 1648.  
Nevertheless, the alternativeness of that voice might also hint at the specific 
character of the communicative context it emerged from. The juridical procedure to 
which their cases had been subjected gave the banished a public status and 
established a durable, though negatively defined, relation to the political formation 
they came from. This was also the case with the banished rebel Lubomirski himself, 
who wrote and printed his propaganda in Silesia, while the Polish crown claimed in 
vain that the Holy Roman Empire should cease giving him exile. This public status 
distinguished them ,from those whom the mass exoduses caused by religious 
persecution drove abroad. When studying the transnational representation of 
revolts, the transnational spaces of communication inhabited by the exiled of 
European monarchies in defence against unruly subjects should be considered. 
Lubieniecki’s more modern, pluralistic vision of things broke with the view of 
the conflict as a legitimate or non-legitimate revolt. This vision tended towards the 
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civil war interpretation, but without the call for a strong monarch most prominently 
deduced from a vision of civil war by Thomas Hobbes. Ironically, such a broad 
view on foreign dependence and multiply motivated dissent gave more material to 
discredit Poland-Lithuania’s political order as a façade or even a mere back-drop to 
“anarchy” than the representation of resistance as revolt could ever provide. The 
modernisation of communication was not to the Commonwealth’s advantage.
 
 
Governments Struggling with Foreign 




“Revolts” in the Kuranty of March–July 1671 




The kuranty are the surveys of the foreign press prepared for the Tsar and Boyar 
Council starting in the middle of the 17th century. It is impossible to determine 
when the practice of their compilation began, since it developed gradually over 
many years. The kuranty began to be compiled on a regular basis in 1665, when a 
contract was concluded between the foreigner Jan van Sweeden and the Chancery 
of Privy Affairs (the organ concerned with questions of personal interest to Tsar 
Aleksei Mikhailovich) for the organization of the Riga post, which was to supply 
Moscow on a bi-weekly basis with foreign newspapers.1 Starting in September 
1668, the Riga post arrived weekly, and beginning in March 1669 a second post, 
located in Vilna, also began to operate weekly.2 The kuranty were read to the Tsar 
and members of the Boyar Council. In the second half of the 17th century, they were 
the basic source of operative information for the Russian government about the 
political situation in Europe.3 The kuranty used in this manner were filed in the 
archive of the Diplomatic Chancery. Today, the main collection of them is 
preserved in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA, f. 155). 
                                                 
1  Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, ed. Imperatorskoi Arkheograficheskoi komissiei, 
t. 21. Dela Tainogo prikaza, kn. 1 (Sankt Peterburg, 1907), stb. 1065. 
2  I. P. Kozlovskii, Pervye pochty i pervye pochtmeistery v Moskovskom gosudarstve, 
2 toma (Varshava, 1913), 2: 36–37. 
3  E. I. Kobzareva, “Izvestiia o sobytiiakh v Zapadnoi Evrope v dokumentakh Posol'skogo 
prikaza XVII veka” (Dissertatsiia na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kand. ist. nauk, Moskva, 
1988 [unpublished]), 178. 
The main aim of our essay is to show which articles in the European press 
concerning social conflicts such as disorders, plots, revolts, uprisings and popular 
182 | INGRID MAIER, STEPAN SHAMIN 
 
movements attracted attention from the Russian government during a specified 
period, viz. from March to the beginning of July 1671.4 
Previous research has touched upon representations of revolts in the kuranty on 
more than one occasion. The first translated news items studied by Russian scholars 
were reports about the uprising of Stepan Razin. As early as 1857, A. Popov 
commented on the Russian authorities’ attempts to prompt Sweden to punish those 
who spread rumours about the uprising of Stepan Razin and the dispute between 
Aleksei Mikhailovich and Patriarch Nikon in the European newspapers.5 
Subsequently, N. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii and G. Forsten explored this subject.6 A 
significant part of the kuranty containing news about the Razin uprising has been 
published.7 Other social conflicts were less elaborately examined. The American 
scholar D. C. Waugh in his dissertation noted the kuranty reports of the 1660s, 
which described disturbances in the Ottoman Empire.8 The materials of the kuranty 
featuring news about various social conflicts in England have been studied in detail. 
The Russian scholar E. I. Kobzareva examined the information about England 
received and translated in Russia from 1642 to 1688 in her (unpublished) doctoral 
dissertation.9 S. M. Shamin analysed the reports in the kuranty concerning the 
uprising in Moscow in 1682.10 However, no one has yet undertaken to analyse all of 
the news in the kuranty about social conflicts for a particular period. 
For our analysis we have chosen the kuranty ranging from March through the 
beginning of July 1671. We selected this period because at that time Russia was 
                                                 
4  The relevant documents are kept in RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7 (most docu-
ments); ibid., 1665 [!], ed. khr. 12 (just one set of kuranty that ended up in the archive in 
the wrong chronological order). 
5  A. Popov, Istoriia vozmushcheniia Stenki Razina (Moskva, 1857), 81–82. 
6  N. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, Obzor vneshnikh snoshenii Rossii (po 1800 god), ch. 4 (Mos-
kva, 1902), 190–191; G. Forsten, “Snosheniia Shvetsii i Rossii vo vtoroi polovine 
XVII v. 1648–1700” [chast' 4], Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia (June 
1899): 278–339. 
7  A. G. Man'kov, ed., Inostrannye izvestiia o vosstanii Stepana Razina. Materialy i issledo-
vaniia (Leningrad, 1975), 80–151. 
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Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1972). 
9  Kobzareva, Izvestiia, 145–199. 
10  S. M. Shamin, “Kuranty kak istochnik po istorii Moskovskogo vosstaniia 1682 g.” (to 
appear). 
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the Razin uprising from the very beginning, but no kuranty for the last months of 
1670 and the first two months of 1671 have been preserved (the kuranty compiled 
between July 6 and the beginning of September 1671 are also missing). According 
to the German press historian Martin Welke, the Razin revolt was one of the most 
frequently reported events in the German newspapers of 1670–1671.11 The 
translators of the kuranty usually did not leave out these reports in their news 
bulletins for the Tsar and boyars. 
Our primary inquiry is not so much concerned with reports about revolts in 
Europe in general, but rather the way in which European news about events in 
Russia came back to their starting point. The existence of published studies on the 
given theme has substantially facilitated our work. In the first part of our paper we 
examine kuranty materials about social conflicts in Poland / Ukraine and in Western 
Europe; the second part is devoted to the uprising of Stepan Razin. 
The translations in the kuranty of reports written in German were derived for 
the most part from Berlin newspapers: B. Einkommende Ordinari und Postzeitun-
gen12 and Mittwochischer / Sonntagischer Mercurius.13 In all likelihood, the 
compilers of the kuranty used the Königsberg newspaper Königsb. Sontags / 
Donnerstags Ordinari PostZeitung as well, but only five complete issues and one 
fragment of that paper have been preserved in Moscow for all of 1671.14 Only one 
of them relates to the period we examined,15 and that issue was not used as a source 
for any of the translations. However, since the Königsberg paper was very popular 
in the Diplomatic Chancery in the 1660s,16 there is no reason to think that the 
                                                 
11  Martin Welke, “Rußland in der deutschen Publizistik des 17. Jahrhunderts (1613–1689)”, 
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16  See Vesti-Kuranty 1656 g., 1660–1662 gg., 1664–1670 gg. Ch. 2: Inostrannye originaly k 
russkim tekstam. Issledovanie i podgotovka tekstov Ingrid Majer (Moskva, 2008), 78–79. 
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situation changed significantly in 1671. Due to the poor preservation of the 
newspaper, we probably did not identify any “Königsberg originals”.17 As for the 
Dutch kuranty originals for 1671, we could identify Russian translations from 
newspapers printed in Amsterdam, Haarlem (near Amsterdam) and The Hague. 
Unfortunately, not many editions printed during the period under consideration are 
still preserved in Moscow.18 Since so many 17th-century newspaper issues have 
been lost forever (not only in Russia, but also in other countries), we could trace the 
foreign originals for less than 50% of the kuranty texts quoted in this article. 
In order to understand which news about revolts attracted the interest of the 
Muscovite government, it is necessary to establish which of the newspapers that 
arrived in Moscow were translated and which were not. We can be most confident 
about this in those cases when translations of articles from specific issues of a 
European paper are found in the kuranty. In these cases we can surmise that the 
omitted publications were irrelevant to the translators.19 The matter is more 
complicated in the cases when there is no translation in the kuranty from an issue of 
a newspaper that was nevertheless received in Moscow. Then it is necessary to 
decide whether the articles of that issue were omitted because they were of no 
interest to Russian diplomats or whether the file of the kuranty in which they were 
found has been lost. 
In this context we analysed the degree of preservation of the kuranty for the 
relevant period, viz. March – July 1671. The schedule of the Riga and Vilna posts 
meant that foreign newspapers for the compilation of the kuranty were obtained 
about eight times a month (four times each via the Riga and the Vilna postal line). 
                                                 
17  No copies have been preserved in other repositories either; see Else Bogel & Elger 
Blühm, Die deutschen Zeitungen des 17. Jahrhunderts. Ein Bestandsverzeichnis mit his-
torischen und bibliographischen Angaben, Studien zur Publizistik. Bremer Reihe. Band 
17:III (München etc., 1985), 109. 
18  For an exact survey of all printed Dutch 17th-century newspapers still preserved in 
RGADA see Ingrid Maier, “Niederländische Zeitungen ('Couranten') des 17. Jahrhun-
derts im Russischen Staatsarchiv für alte Akten (RGADA), Moskau”, Gutenberg-
Jahrbuch (2004), 191–218. Moreover, two (probably unique) issues – which we saw only 
after the 2004 article was printed – can be found in RGADA, f. 155, op. 2, ed. khr. 45 and 
46: Oprechte Haerlemse Dingsdaegse Courant No. 14 and Amsterdamsche Dingsdaegse 
Courant No. 15, both printed April 8, 1681. 
19  It is possible that in cases when the quantity of information was large, the translators 
might omit also those materials which would have been included in the kuranty in other 
circumstances, where there was a smaller amount of pertinent information. In any event, 
the compilers of the kuranty did not omit new information about subjects which directly 
touched upon Russian interests. 
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However, in practice, for the period of the 1670s–1690s the kuranty were compiled 
less frequently. The reasons for this might vary, although in the first instance they 
relate to the shortcomings of the postal service. Since the European newspapers 
passed through several postal stations on the road to Russia, a delay at any of those 
stations meant that several issues of one and the same newspaper might arrive in 
Moscow on the same day, and therefore could be translated on the same occasion. 
Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the kuranty were not compiled in cases where 
the newspapers did not contain any new information of interest to the Russian 
government. In the period of interest to us, March to July of 1671, there are four to 
nine “issues” of the kuranty compiled each month (see Table I). 
 
Table I. Kuranty compilations from March to the beginning of July 1671 
 March April May June 
via Riga post 2 2 2 4 
via Vilna post 3 2 5 5 
Total 5 4 7 9 
 
From Table I we can conclude that the kuranty for May and June – seven and nine 
compilations, respectively – have most likely been preserved in their entirety. It 
might even be that all sets compiled during March and April have been preserved to 
our time. In those months, on account of the melting of the snow and the spring 
“roadlessness”, the mail always functioned significantly worse than in other 
months; hence,  the kuranty were compiled less frequently. 
Let us turn now to the analysis of the kuranty texts. 
SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN EUROPE 
The political elite in Moscow was extremely interested in the European press 
reports about the struggle of the Cossacks in Western Ukraine under Hetman P. D. 
Doroshenko against Polish rule. Doroshenko, who could not hope to deal single-
handedly with the Polish army and those Cossacks who sympathized with Poland, 
placed Ukraine under the control of the Turkish sultan. This provoked a war 
between Poland and the Ottoman Empire along with its subject, the Crimean Tatars. 
In a letter from July 21, 1667, Sultan Mehmed IV had informed the Polish King Jan 
Kazimierz that if he wished to preserve peace with the Ottoman Empire, he should 
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refrain from any attempt to bring the Cossacks under his control.20 Poland had no 
wish to lose the Ukrainian territories which remained under its rule. The start of the 
inevitable war was delayed by the fact that until September 1669 the Turkish army 
was occupied in the war over Crete. 
It is no exaggeration to conclude that the events on the eastern borders of the 
Polish state attracted more attention on part of the Russian government than did any 
other matter of foreign affairs. In fact, Russia and Poland were obligated by a treaty 
of alliance to help one another in the event of an invasion by the Turks or Tatars;21 
hence, Russia was directly involved in the events. It is difficult to determine the 
entire number of publications on “Ukrainian popular movements” in the kuranty on 
account of the fact that Doroshenko’s actions resulted in war between Poland and 
the Ottoman Empire. In many instances, it is impossible to separate these events. As 
a whole, the news about the situation in Ukraine, the diplomatic negotiations 
between Poland and its enemies (Turkey, the Crimea and the Cossacks), articles on 
the mustering of armies and their funding, and descriptions of military actions 
constituted no less than 27–28% of the contents of the kuranty for the given 
period.22 These reports permitted the readers or listeners to follow the events in all 
their details. In the European press, the “Ukrainian problem” received significantly 
less attention. Only in rare cases could a quarter of any issue of a German 
newspaper be devoted to this subject, whereas news about the Ukraine in Dutch 
newspapers was still more limited. 
The news in the kuranty about Poland allows us to follow the gradual 
exacerbation of relations between the Polish King and the Ukrainian Cossacks (who 
were under his rule), an accelerating conflict that became more complicated 
because of external interference by Turks and Tatars. During the winter of 1670–
1671, there was still a serious chance to preserve peace. This becomes evident from 
a news item sent from Warsaw on January 23, 1671, and translated for the 
                                                 
20  B. N. Floria, “Nachalo otkrytoi osmanskoi ekspansii v Vostochnoi Evrope (1667–1671 
gg.)”, in Osmanskaia imperiia i strany Tsentral'noi, Vostochnoi i Iugo-Vostochnoi 
Evropy v XVII v., ch. 2 (Moskva, 2001), 78. 
21  Floria, Nachalo, 77. 
22  The following method of calculation has been used: all the kuranty of the period under 
study have been copied into the computer, and the total number of characters taken to 
equal 100%. Then all information not connected with the given theme has been excluded 
and the number of characters in the remaining text calculated. The given method has 
some minor faults. For instance, in articles which as a rule contain information on several 
topics it is not always possible to separate them from one another. Moreover, sometimes 
difficulties arise in interpreting the text of reports. This problem is especially severe in 
the analysis of the numerous reports about the course of the Polish sejms. 
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kuranty.23 It said, among other things, that the Polish ambassador Karvovskii, who 
had been in the Crimean khanate for some time, had received the khan’s promise 
that he would preserve peace, at least under certain conditions. Karvovskii was also 
said to carry with him original letters written by the Cossack leaders Khanenko and 
Doroshenko, “from which their unsteadiness becomes evident”. Since the Warsaw 
message undoubtedly was written by a correspondent whose sympathies were with 
the Polish King, the above mentioned “unsteadiness” can be understood as the rival 
Cossack leaders’ lacking the will to subordinate themselves to the Polish King. 
In mid-spring there was still hope for peace, as becomes clear from a 
correspondence under the headline L’vov (= Lemberg), March 6.24 An envoy from 
the Ukrainian Cossack hetman Doroshenko to the Polish King had been killed in 
Podolia. Although the Polish Field Crown Hetman (from 1668), Prince Dymitr 
Jerzy Wi niowiecki (1631–1682), wanted to see the supposed killer sentenced to 
death, further development of the “Ukrainian matters” showed that this did not 
contribute to the improving Polish-Ukrainian relations. The newspaper article and 
its Russian translation end with a sentence regarding huge troop contingents in 
Turkey and the worthless statement “but what their intentions are we do not know”. 
Later on, toward the end of March, the threat of war became apparent and the 
news that reached the Russian readers was not only about sabre-rattling, but it also 
contained reports about minor encounters. In April it was clear that a serious war 
was imminent. A news item in the kuranty datelined Warsaw, April 11, reads as 
follows: 
 
There is bad news from the borders with the Tatar, Cossack and Turkish territories. Not long 
ago Tatars and Cossacks have caused this state [i.e., Poland] huge devastation. It is reported 
that the Tatars have gathered 4000 men, the Cossacks 2000 […] Moscow’s ambassador was 
dismissed. He is very dissatisfied, since he received the king’s charter25 not from the king’s 
hand, but from the chancellor’s.26 
 
                                                 
23  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 5v–6. The Russian text was translated from a 
Dutch newspaper, Oprechte Haerlemse Dingsdaegse Courant No. 6, 1671, p. [2] 
(RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 6, fol. 4v). 
24  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 47–47v. We have identified the original 
article for the Russian translation in the Berlin newspaper Mittwochischer Mercurius No. 
12, 1671, p. [1] (RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 3, fol. 27). 
25  In the Dutch original the Russian word gramota is used (in the slightly distorted form 
Ramotta). 
26  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 89v–90. The translation is made from a 
Dutch newspaper, Amsteldamsche Dingsdaegse Courant No. 17, 1671, p. [1]. 
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The threat of an upcoming war might have been diminished by a constructive 
agreement with Russia, but apparently such a settlement was not achieved. Another 
article, under the headline Warsaw, May 1, clearly shows that the absence of 
internal accord in Poland was an extremely serious obstacle when it came to the 
organization of any successful resistance against the aggressor. When the fortress 
Kamenets Podol’skii (which played a key role in controlling Podolia) already was 
in serious danger of being besieged, the Polish government was unable to collect 
the necessary troops or to pay the German mercenaries, as the Russian political elite 
could read in this news item from Warsaw: 
 
This crown is under great danger on the part of the Cossacks, Tatars and Turks, since their 
[i.e., the Cossacks’] highest hetman Doroshenko has united his forces with some thousand 
Tatars against Kamenets Podol’skii. His majesty the King has ordered a general mobilization 
of the Republic, but this will not be possible to get through before the wedding of Prince 
Dmitrii [i.e., Dymitr Wi niowiecki, the Field Hetman of the Crown]. Meanwhile much harm 
will be done to this state. Two days ago an envoy arrived from Moscow; his intentions are not 
known. In Radom the Polish soldiers have received their pay, but not the German ones. The 
latter say that they are going to take this matter into their own hands.27 
 
The defeat of the Polish troops and the conquest of Kamenets Podol’skii by the 
Turkish sultan one year later, in 1672, became a natural consequence of this 
situation. However, these events are already beyond the chronological limits of our 
study. 
Another national liberation movement whose successes were followed 
attentively in Moscow was the conflict between the Holy Roman Emperor and the 
Hungarian conspirators – in particular counts Péter Zrínyi (in the printed 
newspapers and in the kuranty usually called Serini / Sirini), Kristóf Frangepán, and 
Ferenc Nádasdy – who requested military aid from the Ottoman Empire in their 
struggle to re-establish the rights and freedoms of the Hungarian nobility. This 
made the Holy Roman Empire a potential ally of Russia and Poland. Furthermore, 
if the Turkish army moved against the Empire, not against Poland, then Russia 
would be spared the immediate prospect of a conflict with one of the most powerful 
armies in Europe at that time. Against this background it is no surprise that reports 
about the relations between the Emperor and the Hungarian conspirators occupied 
nearly 6.5% (22 entries) of the contents of the kuranty in the given period. That 
number of translated reports made it possible for a Russian reader or listener to 
                                                 
27  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 112–112v. The original could be located in 
the Berlin newspaper Mittwochischer Mercurius No. 1671/18, p. [2] (RGADA, f. 155, op. 
1, 1671, ed. khr. 3, fol. 35v). 
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follow in some detail the emerging events. In particular the reports included in the 
kuranty tended to conclude that the Turks did not want to support the Hungarian 
conspirators: it was too important for them to maintain the relatively good relations 
with the Empire following the Truce of Vasvár concluded on August 10, 1664. 
Reports sent from Vienna at the beginning of February spoke of the Turks’ 
unwillingness to support the Hungarian nobles: 
 
From Vienna February 1. Our courier, who has already been expected for three days, has 
returned from Turkey bringing news that the Turks will not accept the Hungarians as their 
subjects and do not wish to quarrel with us about that. Thus it is anticipated that there will be 
no conflict with the Turks.28 
 
Later, there was news about how the Turks were handing over to the Emperor his 
subjects which had fled to them, or were ordering the Prince of Transylvania 
Michael Apafi to execute them: 
 
From Vienna April 21. From Upper Hungary is news that prince Obavti [= Apafi], on the 
orders of the Sultan, decreed that several of the Hungarian traitors who wished to flee to 
Transylvania be beheaded. Also the border pashas have written to the Imperial border 
commanders of their hope that they would not admit any Imperial traitors and give them 
refuge.29 
 
From the Empire, from Vienna May 9. One of Prince Michael Apafi’s men came to us in 
Vienna from Hungary and informed us that the Turks wish to hand over all Imperial traitors, 
and several Imperial regiments have been sent to receive these fugitives. But the French 
ambassador to the Sultan has insistently requested that the Sultan not order the Imperial 
traitors to be handed over. However, the Sultan has not listened to him and ordered that all the 
traitors be given back.30 
 
Very rarely did the translators in the Diplomatic Chancery omit any articles about 
the planned (and later carried out) execution of the Hungarian conspirators: 
 
From Vienna April 15 […] The main conspirators were sentenced as follows: Count Nadasty 
first is to have his hand cut off and then his head; so likewise Franshipalni [= Frangepán], but 
Count Sirinii’s sentence may be reduced because he willingly confessed his guilt, to wit that 
                                                 
28  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 6v. The original is in Oprechte Haerlemse 
Saterdaegse Courant No.1671/7, p. [2] (ibid., ed. khr. 6, fol. 6v). 
29  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 104v. 
30  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 134–134v. 
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he wanted to catch the Emperor and hand him over to the Turks. So it is expected that he will 
be sentenced to imprisonment for life. But others expect that he too will be executed, because 
after admitting his guilt he conspired with Nadasty about betrayal. Among them no one 
committed as great an evil as Count Nadasty, because he killed his wife for refusing to poison 
the Emperor.31 
 
This, incidentally, seems highly unlikely – that Count Ferenc Nádasdy, who had 
been the High Judge of the Crown Court, ordered his own wife to poison the 
Emperor and then killed her for refusing to do so.32 
 
From Vienna May 3. Now the Hungarian traitors have been executed: Count Nadasty and 
both Counts Francipani and Sirini have been beheaded after their profound expressions of 
repentance. Before his execution, Count Nadasty wrote to the Emperor and abjectly 
petitioned for his benevolence, especially regarding his innocent children, that they not be 
tainted by his treachery. And Count Serini before his death removed his golden chain 
decorated with diamonds and containing holy relics and handed it over to the Imperial 
commissioner in order that he give it to his son. And Count Francipani wrote a book while in 
prison from his deep intellect, and now they wish to publish the book. And the Emperor 
decreed that 2000 requiems be performed for those executed. Also, in the city of Pressburg, 
they executed by sword the gentleman Hanov and his companion, and those who are still in 
custody will soon meet the same fate. The Turkish pasha in the city of Gro wardein has 
captured 17 fugitive Hungarians, and the Sultan has ordered him to hand over to the Imperial 
Commissioner those individuals and others who fled from Transylvania to the Ottomans, 
because the Turkish Sultan did not wish to place those fugitives under his protection.33 
 
All these reports would not leave any doubt in the minds of Russian kuranty readers 
that the Turks would not support the uprising in Hungary in the near future and thus 
would have their army free to campaign against Poland. If one compares the 
                                                 
31  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 100v–101. 
32  The information about the planned poisoning of the Emperor (that should have taken 
place in 1666) was also printed in a contemporary pamphlet, albeit with some reservation 
about the reason of the death of Nadasty's wife: “[…] (deßwegen Sie selbst/ wie man 
glaubt/ hernach mit Gifft hingerichtet worden) […]”. See: Warhafftige und ausführliche 
Relation, Wie die Ungarischen Rebellen Zu Wien in Oesterreich/ Als auch Zur Wieni-
schen Neu-Stadt Und zu Preßburg Am 30. Aprilis Anno 1671. Zur verdienten Straffe ge-
zogen worden. P. [3]. Six pages of this pamphlet are accessible on www.vd17.de (VD 17 
No. 14:002279R; accessed June 23, 2009). 
33  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 116v–117v; the original is in B. 
Einkommende Ordinari und Postzeitungen No. 1671/74 (ibid., ed. khr. 2, fol. 56v). 
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relative quantity of news in the kuranty to that in the European newspapers about 
Hungarian events, it turns out that the German newspapers were contained more, 
but the Dutch less than in the kuranty. 
News about disorder in the Ottoman Empire was related to what, for Russia, 
was the critical problem of Turkish expansion in Eastern Europe. Such reports 
constituted about 2% (10 articles) in the kuranty of the period under examination. If 
some substantial internal political crisis were to begin in Turkey, then the Turkish 
army would be unable to embark on an invasion. Reports concerning unrest of local 
inhabitants of various regions of the Ottoman Empire and concerning the attempts 
of the Sultan’s mother to arouse the janissaries against her son gave the Russian 
government reason to hope for such a turn of events. Here are two of the most 
characteristic reports: 
 
From Venice February 28. They write us from Constantinople that the Sultan’s mother is 
diligently trying to depose the Sultan himself and all his officials. On account of that, she has 
been haranguing all the janissaries. Moreover, we are told that in the city of Kaschau, the 
local inhabitants have begun a revolt and attacked the pasha’s chambers with a great shout 
and wanted to kill the pasha on account of his having imposed on them high taxes and even 
more fiscal exactions for the Sultan, and for his arbitrary rule. And the pasha, upon seeing 
them, ordered all their money to be tossed out the window. And that barely pacified them. 
Likewise in Macedonia a revolt against the pasha has broken out which he managed to quell 
with money.34 
 
From Venice March 21. Letters to us from all places are in agreement that all efforts to re-
concile the Sultan with his mother have failed, and his mother with particular zeal has 
enlisted the Constantinople janissaries on her side. As a result, disorders are expected which 
will mean that the Sultan will not attack any Christian monarch.35 
 
There is no doubt that the articles on disorders in Turkey were of great interest to 
Russian diplomats, just as they were to the readers of the European press. The 
relatively small number of such news items can be explained by the fact that the 
events reported in those articles had no serious consequences. The proportions of 
reports in this thematic group in the kuranty and in the European newspapers are 
roughly identical. 
The remaining conspiracies and uprisings in (Western) Europe in the period 
under examination were of secondary significance to the authorities in Moscow, 
                                                 
34  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 38v–39. 
35  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 59v. The original is in Oprechte Haerlemse 
Dingsdaegse Courant  No. 1671/7 (National Archives, Kew, SP 119/61/42). 
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since they did not affect Russian interests directly. In the kuranty, they appeared 
merely as part of the general panorama of European political life. The quantity of 
information about these events did not exceed one per cent of the surviving 
documents. On the basis of this evidence, it was impossible to understand the 
substance of the conflicts noted in the kuranty and figure out their causes. On four 
occasions, for instance, the kuranty included correspondence concerning the 
struggle of the free city Braunschweig against the Princes of Lüneburg (House of 
Guelph). Braunschweig had received its city status back in the 15th century. In 
1671, the Prince of Lüneburg annexed it, but in the articles included in the kuranty, 
the matter was presented as though the inhabitants of the city had rebelled against 
their ruler. 
In actual fact, Duke Rudolf August (1666–1704),36 after a long siege by an army 
of 20,000 (commanded by Count von Waldeck) and some 80 cannon, had 
seized/conquered the city and deprived it of its traditional independence.37 The 
city’s independence had been defended by about 3,000 individuals (using 137 
cannon) – effectively, there was no way Braunschweig could maintain its position 
as a free city without outside military assistance. The fact that part of the 
inhabitants of Braunschweig sympathized with the Duke weakened the city’s 
defences and helped the Duke achieve his goals. On June 11, Braunschweig 
submitted to the Duke’s demands, and on June 12, the city gates were opened to his 
army of some 5,000 men (the rest of the Duke’s army left). On June 16 there was a 
ceremony of taking the oath of fealty to Duke Rudolf August and his brother Anton 
Ulrich. The city had to pay 3,000 thalers (later 4,000) per month in addition to 
providing grain, money for the officers and quarters for more than 3,000 men. All 
of the city’s arms, military supplies, and silver were confiscated. The previous city 
statute was annulled; the autonomy of this formerly free Hanseatic city came to an 
end. 
In the articles selected from European newspapers for the kuranty, there is 
unqualified sympathy with the policies of the Duke. The defenders of the city’s 
freedoms are described in negative colours: the lower classes revolted; they killed 
the commandant; drunks are wandering around […] One must suppose that the 
Duke himself provided the information about the conflict: 
 
From Hamburg May 30. We have been informed from the camp outside Braunschweig that 
the inhabitants of that city have asked their rightful Lüneburg princes for a respite of one day. 
                                                 
36  The son of the famous Duke August, the book collector and founder of the Wolfenbüttel 
library, Herzog August Bibliothek. 
37  See Richard Moderhack, Braunschweiger Stadtgeschichte. Mit Zeittafel und Biblio-
graphie (Braunschweig, 1997), 119–122. 
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And they have proposed the following terms: 1. that they wish to be as before under 
administration of the Lüneburg princes; 2. that all their villages will be handed over to those 
princes; 3. that in compensation for their guilt they will give those princes 6 barrels of gold 
and accept that the princes’ troops be quartered at city expense. And in the city the lower 
classes rebelled and killed their commandant, and wander around all the time drunk, and the 
Burghers and Councilmen are frightened of them.38 
 
From Lüneburg June 3. The Army of the Prince of Braunschweig is besieging the city of 
Braunschweig and bombarding it with large artillery. And peasants have brought more 
cannon to the camp on 4,000 horses. And those of the city inhabitants who begin to speak 
about making peace are threatened with death by the rabble.39 
 
From Stockholm May 14. […] The city of Braunschweig is under siege and two colonels and 
a major have been killed. And Brandenburg emissaries have gone to the city and persuaded 
the burghers that they should throw their lot in with the Braunschweig princes. Also 
emissaries from Lübeck, Hamburg and Bremen have come. The outcome of all this will soon 
be known. May the Lord bring about a good result.40 
 
From Wolfenbüttel May 30. Our Braunschweig and Lüneburg troops with artillery have 
arrived outside the city of Braunschweig and invested it with force. From within the city they 
can inflict no damage on the besiegers even though they fire on them constantly. It is 
anticipated that we will begin to bombard the city with fire bombs. To the great regret of our 
Prince they are opposing him with arms and fire; and hence yesterday a herald was sent to 
them in the city demanding that they abandon their evil thoughts. The leading people in the 
city are inclined to do that, but the rabble will not listen to them, and whoever talks of peace 
they call a traitor and beat.41 
 
One can imagine that it would have been impossible for those who heard such news 
– i.e., the Tsar and boyars – to make sense of the reasons for the conflict or the 
course of the military actions. Out of the mass of correspondence printed in the 
Western newspapers on the subject (in some German as well as in Dutch issues 
there were as many as five different articles on the Braunschweig conflict), the 
Russian translators selected either irregular publications42 or, more probably, those 
                                                 
38  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 147v. 
39  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 152v. 
40  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 159–159v. 
41  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 159v–160. 
42  Thus, for example, from the Berlin newspaper Mittwochischer Mercurius, Week 25, was 
translated a newsletter from Warsaw of June 19 (fol. 156–157; in the kuranty this article 
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in which the conflict was described precisely as a revolt of Braunschweig against 
the city’s lawful ruler. Such a strange selection of news is easy to understand in the 
context of Russian realities during the reign of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. By the 
1670s, Russian rulers had not had to deal with independent or politically 
autonomous cities for over a century, even though the inhabitants of various 
Russian cities often rebelled against the exactions of royal administrators. For 
example, in 1650, Pskov and Novgorod revolted. The government’s troops were 
forced to lay siege to them. However, during the revolt there were conflicts between 
the more radically inclined “masses” and the city elite in both cases. Thus, the 
compilers of the kuranty selected for translation not the more precise information 
but that which more readily fitted into the accepted structure of social relations. 
It also would have been difficult for a Russian audience to understand the only 
report in the kuranty for the period under study concerning a conspiracy in Spain. 
Here, the matter concerned the struggle between the natural son of Philip IV, Juan 
Jose of Austria and his opponents for influence over the King of Spain, Carlos II, 
who was still a minor: 
 
From Spain, from the city of Madrid April 3. In recent days in this city they have found a 
letter containing the discharge of lord Dekardov,43 who was recently executed. The letter says 
that he was not guilty in the disputes which arose between the Queen and lord Juan of Austria 
regarding the Queen’s confessor lord Eberhard.44 And when the King’s halberdiers by royal 
                                                                                                            
was combined without a new heading into another Warsaw communication of the same 
date whose original we have not located). In the same issue are four articles about the 
conflict between the city of Braunschweig and the Dukes of Lüneburg under the follow-
ing headings: Wolfenbüttel vom 13./23. dito (Junii); Hannover/ vom 13.23. dito (Junii); 
Hamburg/ vom 16.26. dito; Ein anders/ vom vorigen. The last article contains extremely 
important information about the events in Braunschweig, but this article is not in the ku-
ranty: “Gleich itzo kömmt der Braunschweigische Bote aus selbiger Stadt/ berichtet/ daß 
am verwichenen Dienstage Ihre Hochfürstl. Durchl. von Wolffenbüttel/ in Begleitung des 
Printzen von Oranien und anderer Fürsten und Herren/ daselbst eingezogen. In ermeldter 
Stadt sind 6000. Mann zu Fuß/ und 100. zu Pferde/ ligen alle auf den Wällen. Die Huldi-
gung ist am Freytage geschehen/ und imputiret der Pöbel alles dem Rath/ der ihnen nicht 
von Ihro Hochfürstl. Durchl. Postulatis fürgebracht. Die Herren und dero Völcker sind 
schon voneinander.” 
43  “Dekardov” is a transliteration of Antonio de Cordoue in the original (see footnote 45); 
apparently, the Spanish family name Córdoba (Italian form: di Cordova). 
44  Johann Eberhard Nidhard / Neidhardt, 1607–1681, later (from 1672) Cardinal Nidhard. 
The Queen's advisor after the death of King Philip IV, forced by Juan of Austria to leave 
Spain in 1669. 
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decree had been sent to the residence of the executed [i.e., “Dekardov”] in order to look for 
that letter, they found there another letter, in which he [“Dekardov”] indicated that he planned 
to poison the lord Juan of Austria. In addition he wanted to place gunpowder under the royal 
chambers. On account of this report the king and queen wish to leave those chambers for the 
time being until the gunpowder be found.45 
 
The article does not permit drawing any kind of intelligible picture of the situation 
at the Spanish court. It is possible that the compiler of the kuranty was attracted by 
the fact of the supposed mining of the royal palace. 
A month later the kuranty included one more report concerning a planned 
attempt on a certain king’s life – this time, true, the planned attack concerned a 
period which antedated the newspaper entry by some 65 years: 
 
From Rome May 9. Last week the Jesuits informed the Roman Pope about 40 individuals of 
their order whom they termed martyrs and brought him their portraits in order that he enrol 
them in the list of martyrs. And afterwards the Pope learned the truth: that the English King 
had executed those Jesuits because they had tunnelled under his palace and placed there a 
barrel of gunpowder, and the Pope thus turned down the petition citing the fact that they had 
been punished for criminal activity and not because of their Christian faith.46 
 
Certainly not all readers of this news article understood that it deals with the 
“Gunpowder Plot” of 1605, when English Catholics (among others, the Jesuit 
Father Henry Garnet)47 organized an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the life 
of the English King James I. Apparently the compilers of the kuranty took that 
information to be “current”. A plot aiming to kill the King of England was in and of 
itself a sufficiently noteworthy event to attract attention. In this instance, the 
information was doubly interesting for the Russian government, because the 
assassination attempt was organized by the Jesuits. The Russian government was 
very suspicious of that order, since they were active in spreading Catholicism 
among the Orthodox population of those parts of Ukraine and Belorussia which 
                                                 
45  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 110–110v. The original is in the Hamburg 
newspaper Europæische Sambstägige Zeitung No. 16 (State Archives Stralsund, E4O 
511o). 
46  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 150v–151. 
47  Born 1555, executed on May 3, 1606. 
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were under Polish rule. News about Jesuit activity was regularly included in the 
kuranty.48 
THE RAZIN UPRISING 
A significant part of the kuranty in the period studied (6.7% of the total volume or 
32 entries) consists of news about the uprising initiated by Stepan Razin.49 A larger 
part of the materials, both in the quantity of text and the number of entries, was 
given over only to the “Ukrainian” subject matter. Also, in the European press – 
especially in the German newspapers – the Razin rebellion played an important 
part, although it probably occupied less space than in the kuranty, especially in the 
Dutch newspapers, which were printed at quite a temporal distance from the events 
(as opposed to German newspapers from the relevant period), from the corpus of 
which every third or fourth issue contained news about the uprising in the Volga 
region.50  
Of course, the Russian government possessed much more information about this 
uprising than the compilers of the European newspapers. Therefore, the inclusion of 
such news in the kuranty could not broaden the knowledge of Russian diplomats 
about the activities of the rebels. The reason for the interest in the event lay 
elsewhere: the translations showed what was being written about the Russian state 
in Europe, that is, they enabled the Russian leaders to learn something about the 
image of Russia abroad. 
This interest in Russia’s image was not purely theoretical. The success or failure 
of Russian embassies depended on how Russia was perceived in Europe. Moreover, 
the Russian government actively undertook to attract to Russian service foreign 
specialists – soldiers, doctors, mining specialists, artists, musicians, etc. Negative 
press about Russia either made the hiring of such specialists more costly or even 
impossible. News about victories by Razin also might have forced European 
merchants involved in long-distance international trade (especially that through 
Arkhangelsk) to refuse travelling to Russia. This is the key to why the picture 
                                                 
48  S. M. Shamin, “K voprosu o vliianii inostrannoi pressy na dukhovnuiu zhizn' russkikh 
liudei v XVII – nachale XVIII vv.”, Vestnik tserkovnoi istorii (2007), No. 2, 139–149, 
140. 
49  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 6v–7, 9v, 14, 20v–21, 23, 24–26, 30, 40v–
41, 49v–50, 51–51v, 55–58v, 70, 70v, 88, 101–101v, 102v, 103, 113–113v, 118–118v, 
122v, 128, 134, 158v, 166. 
50  Approximately 640 German newspapers from that time are preserved, containing more 
than 180 news items about the Razin uprising. See Welke, Rußland, 203. 
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painted by the kuranty could not please either the Tsar or the boyars. Even though 
there were quite varied publications in the press, many articles substantially 
exaggerated the successes of the rebels and understated the victories of the Tsar’s 
armies. For instance, the Hamburg newspaper Nordischer Mercurius wrote about 
the fact that especially news sent by correspondents in Riga could not be trusted at 
all; in their newsletters, people who had never been in the army, who were no 
longer in active service and even people who had already died could be named as 
having been taken captive, etc.51 
In fact, at the time when the kuranty we are discussing were compiled, the peak 
of the rebellion had already passed. On the 1st–3rd of October 1670, Razin had been 
severely wounded and his army crushed in a decisive battle near Simbirsk. On April 
14, 1671, the Cossacks captured Razin and handed him over to the authorities. The 
leader of the rebellion was executed in Moscow on June 6, 1671. While the unrest 
continued yet for some time, it no longer presented a threat to the state. 
Nonetheless, the European press right up to the summer of 1671 continued to 
publish “news” about the victories of Razin. The translation of a newsletter from 
Hamburg (dated June 6 – the day of Razin’s execution) reads as follows: “Couriers 
report from Livonia and from Moscow that the traitor Razin is again gathering his 
forces and seizing cities”.52 Other articles reported about the political isolation of 
Russia and its actual collapse. News items of this kind were fraught with very 
serious image problems for the Russian authorities and substantially weakened the 
position of Russian diplomats in international negotiations. Here are the most 
striking examples: 
 
From Warsaw January 31. There is news from Moscow that the disorders there are still going 
on and that Razin has taken Astrakhan’ and Kazan’ as well as about 50 other places. He is 
said to have with him about 200,000 men. A Swedish emissary is said to have arrived there to 
negotiate a treaty, calling him the Tsar of Astrakhan. Allegedly the Persian shah also is 
interfering in this unrest on account of differences [with Russia] over the Caspian Sea.53 
From Vilna February 26. Here there is definite news that plenipotentiary ambassadors from 
the Muscovite state have been sent to his Majesty the King in order to seek assistance against 
Stenka Razin. And in exchange they wish to offer the Poles Smolensk and all of Ukraine. 
And Stenka Razin wishes to send his emissaries to the King, so that he will not aid Moscow. 
                                                 
51  Welke, Rußland, 204. 
52  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 158. 
53  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 6v–7. The original is in Haeghse 
Dynsdaeghse Post-tydinge No. 14, from The Hague (ibid., ed. khr. 5, fol. 8). 
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And this gives the Polish crown hope that all which Moscow had seized from it will be 
returned.54 
From Prussia March 3. They report from Vilna that they are awaiting the return of their 
envoy from Moscow, and it is expected that he will bring news as to whether the Russians 
will surrender Smolensk, Bykhov and Kiev or wish to fight. The latest letters from Riga 
indicate that the Tsar ordered the removal of the largest artillery detachment from Smolensk 
on account of the news that Stenka Razin has submitted to the Poles and Swedes.55 
From Wismar March 27. From Riga they report that several regiments of cavalry have been 
ordered from Sweden to Riga, but it is not known for what purpose, whether to help his 
Majesty the Tsar or because they wish to obtain some compensation. With regard to the 
troops of his Majesty the Tsar, the letters affirm that they have all been defeated, and the rebel 
has sent to his Majesty the Tsar six demands that must be agreed to by his Majesty the Tsar if 
the rebel is to desist from attacking in the future, i.e.: 1. that the Tsar shall name him Tsar of 
Astrakhan’ and Kazan’; 2. that the former Patriarch be restored to his place in Moscow; 3. 
that the rebel be given 20 millions in gold; 4. that ten princes be handed over to him; 5. that 
an image of him is to be painted and erected; 6. that he receive tribute on an annual basis.56 
 
It is impossible to see a communication of actual information in the last of these 
texts. There are no documents confirming that such negotiations should have taken 
place. Much later, in 1672, Russian diplomats told their Swedish colleagues: “[…] 
it is not true that the bandit Stenka Razin should have sought opportunities to 
communicate with his Majesty the Tsar and submitted demands concerning the 
above-mentioned points.”57 
The text with the six alleged demands by Razin has to be seen as a composition 
of an inflammatory nature, similar in function to the fabricated “letters of the 
Turkish Sultan”, rather curious examples of anti-Turkish propaganda.58 The 
authentic letters of Stepan Razin and his cohorts have been thoroughly studied. In 
them, Razin always presents himself as the ally of the Tsar or of his son Aleksei 
Alekseevich (already deceased at that time). The leader of the rebellion purports to 
be carrying out their instructions – to decimate the boyars and other “evil 
perverters” of the Tsar’s will.59 Such an attitude toward the powers was called 
                                                 
54  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fols. 24v–25. 
55  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fols. 25–25v. 
56  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fols. 56–57. 
57  Popov, Istoriia, 82. 
58   See Daniel C. Waugh, The Great Turkes Defiance: On the History of the Apocryphal 
Correspondence of Ottoman Sultan in its Muscovite and Russian Variants (Columbus, 
Ohio, 1978). 
59  V. I. Buganov, Razin i razinitsy (Moskva, 1995), 12–45 and passim. 
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“naive monarchism” in Soviet historiography. It was common to all peasant 
movements in the Middle Ages. In any event, we cannot see in the “ultimatum of 
Stepan Razin” a work by a Russian author. The European newspapers, however, 
identify for us the source of its spread, the city of Riga in Sweden’s Baltic 
provinces. 
Why did bogus newsletters about the weakness of the Russian state appear in 
the European press? The Soviet historians A. L. Gol’dberg, A. G. Man’kov and 
S. Ia. Marlinskii suggested that “no occasion was missed to distort specifically and 
intentionally information about the situation in Russia and compound the horrors in 
order to prepare popular attitudes abroad for the event of an intervention in the 
internal affairs of Russia by a European state.”60 However, we disagree with this 
viewpoint. There are no facts attesting any preparation by the governments of 
Poland or Sweden, Russia’s European neighbours, for an incursion into its territory, 
so it would not be necessary to “prepare” the European public opinion for such an 
incursion. The reason for spreading such reports must be sought elsewhere. In the 
1650s and 1660s, Russia engaged in wars with Poland and Sweden. The inhabitants 
of Poland and the Swedish Baltic provinces feared their eastern neighbour and 
disliked her. This was fertile soil for the fabrication of reports that could be 
damaging to the Russian government, since news about Russia’s impoverished 
situation might discourage the entrepreneurs of Holland, England and Hamburg 
from trading with her, and thus automatically give an advantage to their Polish and 
Baltic colleagues. 
The Russian government reacted fiercely to such publications. At the end of 
1670, the foreigner von Staden (who was in the service of Tsar Aleksei 
Mikhailovich) was commanded by the Russian government to induce the Swedish 
side to punish “gazetteers” who printed unseemly talk about the Tsar himself, about 
the former Patriarch Nikon and about Stenka Razin. As an example of such a 
publication, the Russian diplomats adduced a text about 
 
how the former Moscow Patriarch gathered a large army and intended to march against his 
Muscovite Tsarish Majesty, the reason being that the Tsar had dishonoured him and removed 
him from the Patriarchal rank for no reason at all, and without considering that he, the 
Patriarch, was a wise and learned man and in every regard better and more worthy than the 
Tsar himself. And the reason for the Patriarch’s removal was that he had allowed Lutherans, 
Calvinists and also Roman Catholics to enter the Russian churches, something that in earlier 
times had been looked upon as unchristian acts. Moreover, from the borders of Russia this 
news has come, that his Majesty the Tsar is seeking to make peace with Stenka Razin, 
something which Razin is inclined to do only on the following conditions: 1) that the Russian 
                                                 
60  Man'kov, Inostrannye izvestiia, 88. 
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ruler honour him as Tsar of Kazan’ and Astrakhan’; 2) give him from the royal treasury 20 
barrels of gold for his army; 3) hand over to him, Stenka, eight of the Tsar’s closest boyars, 
whom he intended to execute for their misdeeds; 4) that Patriarch Nikon, who was now with 
him, be restored to his rank.61 
 
According to the Russian diplomats, this text was printed in the “Riga newspapers” 
from November 19, 1670.62 Obviously this is another variant of the report cited 
above (from Wismar on March 27, 1671), about the “ultimatum of Stepan Razin”; 
the report had in fact been received in Wismar from Riga (see above, “From Riga 
they report […]”). 
On December 29, 1672, during negotiations in the Diplomatic Chancery in 
Moscow with the Swedish envoy A. Eberschildt, it was asserted that 
 
other faults have been committed on the side of his Royal Majesty, concerning which the 
above-named Colonel of the Tsar’s, Nikolai von Staden, declared in Riga to the subjects of 
his Royal Majesty, who control the printing houses and print newspapers and write falsely 
and much that impugns the honour of our Great Sovereign, his Majesty the Tsar. They print 
and write and thus by means of their publications and letters foster disputes, and hostility and 
vexation between our Great Sovereign and their most powerful sovereign, his Royal Majesty. 
And an excerpt from some newspapers was shown the envoy to indicate which were the 
articles in question […]. 
 
The envoy responded: “Those news letters are printed near Riga in Königsberg; in 
Riga there are no news letters in German ordered to be printed by the subjects of his 
Royal Majesty, but only ones in Swedish.”63 
As we can see, the Swedish diplomats re-directed the complaint to the 
publishers in Königsberg. 
The subject of the Riga publications about Razin was raised many years later by 
Russian diplomats. In 1676, during the Russo-Swedish negotiations on the River 
Meuzitsa (the border between the Russian and Swedish possessions in the Baltic 
                                                 
61  Bantysh-Kamenskii, Obzor, 190–191. 
62  A newspaper printed in Riga as early as 1670 is not known. The oldest preserved issue of 
any newspaper printed in Riga dates from January 1681; see: V. I. Simonov, “Aus der 
Geschichte der periodischen Zeitung in Riga im 17. Jahrhundert”, Gutenberg-Jahrbuch 
(1984), 172–179 (reproduction of the title page on p. 173); Bogel/Blühm, Die deutschen 
Zeitungen des 17. Jahrhunderts, 140–141. Probably a newspaper from another city had 
printed the incriminating text under the headline “From Riga [date]”. 
63  Krest'ianskaia voina pod predvoditel'stvom Stepana Razina, t. 3 (Moskva, 1962), 285–
286. 
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region), the Swedish diplomats were again put on notice that during the rebellion of 
Stepan Razin, in Riga and other Swedish cities, newspapers in which the honour of 
the Tsar was impugned were published: “[…] and such papers filled with 
falsehoods were spread throughout Europe.”64 The last time this accusation was 
aired in Russo-Swedish negotiations was in 1684.65 By then, the uprising of Stepan 
Razin was already history. Mentioning him was not an actual offense, but a means 
of putting pressure on the Swedish negotiation partners. 
It is not impossible that the Russian government devoted particular attention to 
publications impugning the Tsar’s and the country’s honour in order to put forward 
complaints concerning these publications in diplomatic negotiations later on. A hint 
in this direction might be attributed to the fact that some articles about the defeat of 
the rebels were not translated. Thus, three articles (the first three in the newspaper) 
were selected for the kuranty from No. 12 of the Berlin newspaper Sonntagischer 
Mercurius: from Lemberg (today L’viv, Ukraine) March 6, from Warsaw March 
13, and from Prussia March 21. All these articles concerned events in Ukraine (in 
particular, the activities of the Cossacks) and in connection with that the activities 
of the members of the Polish sejm. The translators ignored the remaining articles 
printed in that issue of the newspaper – with news from The Hague, Nürnberg, from 
the Lower Rhine, from Hamburg and Brussels. A brief report about the rebellion of 
Stepan Razin on the fourth page of the newspaper (contained in a second 
communication from Hamburg dated 14/24 March) was among the omitted ones. It 
stated that Stepan Razin had been defeated, and 100,000 of his men had been 
killed.66 
Quite curious is also the way in which a report from Danzig was treated. The 
Russian kuranty version states: “From Gdansk February 4. They write in various 
letters that the traitor Razin calls himself king of Astrakhan’ and Kazan’.”67 The 
Dutch original for this article has been located. It is longer than the Russian 
translation; the author here adds his doubts as to whether this is accurate 
                                                 
64  Forsten, Snosheniia Shvetsii i Rossii, p. 321. 
65  K. A. Kochegarov, Rech' Pospolitaia i Rossiia v 1680–1686 godakh. Zakliuchenie 
dogovora o Vechnom mire (Moskva, 2008), 270. 
66  The “Russian” information in that newspaper issue reads as follows: “[…] Die grosse 
Theurung in Moßkau sol nun meist von dar ab- und nach Wolgada und Archangel kom-
men seyn/ da doch vor diesem von selbigen Orten eine grosse Quantität von Korn nach 
Moßkau gebracht worden. Daß der Rebell Roharzin [sic! = Razin] geschlagen/ und das 
Landvolck/ welches ihm in der Länge von 200. Meilen/ zwischen der Stadt Moßkau und 
Wolgada/ zugefallen/ von der Moßkowitischen Armee bey 100000. niedergesäbelt wor-
den/ davon wird von einigen Moßkowitisch-gesinneten viel gesprochen […].” 
67  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 6v. 
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information: “[…] but this is not believed to be true”68 – however, these doubts 
were not translated into Russian. Thus only the part which could have been adduced 
as a complaint in negotiations with Dutch diplomats was translated. 
In all likelihood, the Russian government not only protested against such 
publications through diplomatic channels but sent its own information about the 
situation to the European press. The following kuranty item supports such a 
hypothesis: 
 
Translation from Dutch newspapers. 
 
From Moscow January 26. Here there are letters from the regiments of his Majesty the Tsar 
which write how the bandit Stenka Razin has arrived at the city of Simbirsk with 20,000 men. 
And from the 4th of September through the 3rd of October they launched 15 terrible assaults 
on the city. But thanks to the zeal of the defenders and the manly boldness of the general Ivan 
Bogdanovich Miloslavskii all of these assaults were turned back. And when the general 
prince Iurii Nikitich Boriatinskii arrived from Kazan’ and joined forces with the besieging 
soldiers, the bandit was clobbered and himself wounded and barely escaped in a boat. And 
only a few people escaped with him. 500 people were taken alive who were executed on the 
spot, and for this service his Majesty the Tsar rewarded that lord Ivan Bogdanovich 
Miloslavskii with a high rank. Afterwards the military forces of his Majesty the Tsar defeated 
the bandits in many places and took back from them the places they had seized. And this 
disorder has now completely ended. And the merchants can once again set out for this state.69 
 
The article contains many precise details. It encompasses a whole month of military 
actions at Simbirsk (from September 4 through October 3). Moreover, the compiler 
of the information knows not only of the victory over Razin but about the fact that 
general Miloslavskii was rewarded for that victory. This latter fact does not allow 
us to see in the article a letter sent after the raising of the siege of Simbirsk directly 
from the battlefield. Rather, the article is based upon an official communication of 
the Russian authorities. 
                                                 
68  “Dantzich den 4 Februarij. Met eenighe brieven heeft men, dat den Rebel Stephanus 
Ratzin, den Titul van Koningh over Astracan en Casan, sich soude toegeeyghent hebben: 
maer het selfde wert niet voor seecker aenghenomen […].” Amsterdamse Dingsdaegse 
Courant No. 1671/7, p. 1. The original is in RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 4, 
fol. 6. We cannot be absolutely sure that the Russian version is made exactly from this 
Amsterdam newspaper, since there is only one overlapping news item; of course, the 
same (or a very similar) report could also have been published in another issue of a Dutch 
newspaper. 
69  RGADA, f. 155, op. 1, 1671, ed. khr. 7, fol. 40v. 
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The peculiarity in the dating of the report is also consistent with this hypothesis. 
It was sent from Moscow approximately three months after the battle, when the 
“news”, to put it mildly, was already dated. If we suppose that here we do not have 
“fresh news” but the refutation of false reports about the victories of Razin, then 
such a delay in no way seems strange. One can see in the text of the report the 
purpose for which it was compiled: in the last line its author declares “merchants 
can once again set out for this state”, that is, merchants can again ply their trade. If 
our hypothesis is correct, then the placing of such a publication in a Dutch 
newspaper at the end of January, when the merchants trading with Moscow were 
deciding whether or not to go to Arkhangelsk during the current year, was 
completely appropriate. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the kuranty compilations shows that the Russian government was 
very interested in conspiracies, revolts and uprisings in various European countries. 
This interest was fed both by the needs of foreign policy and by simple curiosity. 
All of the European social conflicts, which were widely reported in the European 
press, were also registered in the kuranty. However, the interest of the compilers of 
the kuranty in such events was unbalanced. Even in those cases where the events 
greatly interested the Russian government, material which was repetitive and of 
secondary importance was omitted. 
The closer to the borders of Russia the event, the greater the attention it drew. In 
those instances, when the events touched Russian interests, the kuranty included a 
sufficient number of publications to allow the Russian authorities to understand the 
details of what had happened. In the remaining cases the compilers of the kuranty 
merely described the event. In these instances, the kuranty could seriously distort 
the substance of what was happening, as was the case with the taking of 
Braunschweig. 
The inclusion in the kuranty of news about the rebellion of Stepan Razin was 
connected with the fact that the Russian government was concerned about its image 
in Europe. The Muscovite authorities fought the dissemination of negative 
publications by two means: they registered complaints to the publishers through 
diplomatic channels and they sent letters to the publishers of newspapers with their 
own description of the events.70 
                                                 
70  The authors are very grateful to Daniel Clarke Waugh (Seattle) for his valuable help in 
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In the 16th and 17th centuries, public interest in social unrest was steadily growing. 
Contemporaries perceived revolts increasingly across state borders. The 
development of newspapers played an important role in the dissemination of such 
representations. European governments challenged by domestic revolt often tried to 
influence and, if possible, monopolize revolt representations.1 These efforts were 
generally limited to the internal spheres of debate. There seemed to be no point in 
trying to exert concrete influence on foreign representations. But the internal 
interpretation of the events was decisive for the definition and adjustment of the 
relationship between rulers and subjects. We know little about the extent to which 
the concerned governments saw to international coverage. Probably they cared 
about their reputation abroad, and this contributed to a certain parallelism of the 
development and normative shifts in dealing with rebellious subjects. Questions of 
legitimacy were debated in an international context. Manuals of statecraft and 
works of political philosophy addressed to a larger reading public and tackled 
political and ethical problems on a more general scale.2 
                                                 
1  Cf. Andreas Würgler, Unruhen und Öffentlichkeit. Städtische und ländliche Protestbewe-
gungen im 18. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 1995). 
2  This did not necessarily mean that violence against subjects was branded as illegitimate. 
Clemency towards internal rebels could also be regarded as a token of weakness and thus 
diminish a government's weight in the eyes of its diplomatic or military allies and/or ad-
versaries. It seemed not always compatible with the idea of absolutist rule and a strong 
sovereign, and consequently it could have a negative impact on a country's position with-
in the larger constellation of powers. 
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In general, governments could influence foreign interpretations of revolts in 
their realm only insofar as they adjusted their policies and sometimes tried to 
conform to more or less universally accepted standards of legitimacy. However, in 
the case of the Russian Empire we can observe a gradual shift to more particular 
and increasingly systematic attempts at moulding foreign perceptions. Certainly this 
is true not only for representations of revolts: the claim to self-representational 
monopoly also extends to other spheres concerning the image of the Russian 
government and state. But I argue that the Tsarist government was particularly 
sensitive to foreign descriptions of revolts in Russia – and of the way it handled 
them. It was the preoccupation with such descriptions and the rather successful 
attempt to muzzle foreign coverage that contributed to a dynamical process of 
estrangement that ran counter to the simultaneous efforts at Europeanization.  
A major shift can be observed in the aftermath of the second and last uprising of 
the strel’tsy (musketeers) in 1698, which ended up in the complete abolition of this 
particular military (and social) estate of the Muscovite empire.3 Nevertheless, this 
shift was not an abrupt one. It was preceded by a gradual development of what we 
could call a particular representational policy, but it was also accompanied – and 
maybe even triggered – by noteworthy changes in foreign patterns of depicting 
Russian revolts in general. An isolated snapshot of the echo of the strel’tsy uprising 
would not be sufficient. The dynamic it engendered has to be put into a long-term 
perspective, which can be done here only in a very cursory way.  
In this article, I will therefore try to tell two stories, which are intimately linked 
together and at the same time oddly detached from each other. The first one is that 
of foreign representations of Russian revolts: it traces some European perceptions 
of social unrest and uprisings in Russia and explores the underlying paradigms that 
shaped the narratives based on the observers’ and their (potential) readers’ cultural 
and experiential backgrounds. As the material is abundant, this story can be told in 
more detail than the second one that deals with the Russian government’s policy 
towards these foreign depictions, i.e. with its explicit or implicit reactions to the 
foreign literary and journalistic treatments of these most delicate issues of Russian 
domestic politics. Explicit evidence is scarce. These issues of representational 
policy were rarely raised in written form. Apparently, they were a matter of taboo in 
Russia. That’s why we can often only guess about the motives of the government’s 
                                                 
3  The abolition of the strel'tsy helped complete military reform that had been underway 
since about the 1630s. For the history of military reform in the 17th century see Carol 
Belkin-Stevens, Soldiers on the steppe. Army reform and social change in early modern 
Russia (DeKalb, 1995), who regards the process as being triggered from the steppe fron-
tier, where besides the Cossacks in the open fields the strel'tsy regiments stuffed the for-
tresses. 
STATE-ARCANUM AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES | 207 
 
representational policy. Where we can find articulate reference to content, it was 
expressed in terms of “true” and “false”: foreign authors were accused of lying, but 
generally it remains vague what exactly was the bone of contention. Of course, 
there is distortion in these foreigners’ reports, probably much of it involuntary, 
based on inadequate information and misunderstandings. But the Russian 
government’s negative reactions are far from being limited to actual deformations 
of historical facts; and on top of that certain deformations seem to be more than 
welcome. This vagueness is the reason why the two stories may occasionally appear 
as detached from each other. 
Without excluding other sources my main focus will be on German accounts. 
The German newspaper-system of the 17th century was the most substantial in terms 
of diversification, editions, print run and reception.4 German papers were highly 
commercialized and disposed of a whole network of correspondents, among whom 
one can even find non-German residents or travellers to Russia. Still more 
important than the overall significance of German-language journalism in early 
modern Europe is the fact that since at least the first half of the 17th century the 
Muscovite ambassadorial office (posol’skii prikaz) acquired mainly German 
newspapers and translated relevant parts of them that were read to the Tsar and his 
diplomatic staff. Many of these readers’ digests (called kuranty) have survived.5 
Muscovite politicians thus used Western (mainly German) newspapers as a source 
of information on international affairs, but also to learn what foreign powers 
thought about Russia. This makes German accounts particularly relevant for an 
enquiry on what we might call the Russian government’s representational policy.  
In a first part I will present paradigms of the foreign depiction of revolts in 
Russia and sketch some directions of their development until the end of the 17th 
century. The material is well exploited: internal sources on Russian revolts are 
scarce and scholars of social unrest in Muscovy have largely relied on foreign 
accounts such as diplomatic records, travelogues, leaflets and even newspapers, to 
reconstruct the course of such events. My focus is a different one. Rather than in the 
actual events of revolt, I am interested in recurring patterns that allow for 
conclusions on experiential backgrounds, implicit understandings and interpretative 
frameworks employed by the eye-witnesses and second-hand disseminators, who 
were themselves not entirely familiar with Russian culture, and who were writing 
for an almost ignorant audience. From this angle, stereotypes and distortions are not 
                                                 
4  400 Jahre Zeitung. Die Entwicklung der Tagespresse im internationalen Kontext, ed. 
Martin Welke (Bremen, 2008). 
5  In second place after the German papers were the Dutch ones. All other languages were 
rather rarely translated. See Vesti-kuranty. 1656g., 1660-1662gg., 1664-1670gg., ed. In-
grid Maier and Sergei I. Kotkov (Moskva, 2009). 
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a problem. On the contrary, they are often even more revealing than descriptions 
that stick closely to historical facts (although it is often hard to distinguish between 
myth and reality when the same documents inevitably serve as cornerstones for an 
allegedly factual reconstruction by historians).6  
For the above-mentioned reasons, it is probably not a coincidence that it was a 
German text that caused a scandal: Johann Georg Korb’s diary. The author was 
secretary of an imperial embassy to Moscow (1698/9) and had witnessed the brutal 
mass repressions staged against the strel’tsy accused of large-scale rebellion upon 
Peter’s I return from his great embassy to the West. The diary was published about 
two years later (in 1700 or 1701) with emperor Leopold’s I privilege. This book, 
dealing (amongst other aspects) with the strel’tsy uprising of 1698, encountered 
severest diplomatic reactions in Muscovy and entailed a far-ranging and long-
lasting shift in Russian representational policy, which in turn had considerable 
consequences on subsequent foreign representations of Russian revolts. The 
conflict, however indirectly, reveals much about the Muscovite government’s 
shifting conceptions of Arcanum and of what was sayable in (different) public 
realms. In the second part of this paper, I therefore analyse Korb’s description and 
interpretations of the strel’tsy revolt and of the ensuing waves of governmental 
repression. His interpretation is regarded in the light of its continuity with former 
foreign accounts on earlier Russian revolts rather than in terms of rupture.  
In contrast to that, the Russian diplomatic reaction, the pressure the Muscovite 
government exerted on the imperial court in Vienna to obtain a revocation of the 
book, and the measures it would undertake with regard to future representations of 
Russia, reveal, if not complete discontinuity, at least a new quality and intensity of 
interference into foreign representations of Russia. In the third part of this article, I 
therefore turn to the Russian government’s point of view. I try to explore its 
motives and describe the practical consequences that Russian foreign-policy makers 
have drawn from the scandal. I will argue that the consequences were not limited to 
the response to Korb’s book and to diplomatic relations with Vienna, but that they 
were more long-lasting and gave birth to what I would call a new proactive foreign-
media policy. The prohibitive impact of this policy can be seen from the 
representation or rather non-representation of the revolts of the early 18th century, 
mainly the Astrakhan rebellion and the Bulavin uprising. Here the grip of Russian 
media policy seems to have already been quite palpable. In the 18th century large-
scale revolts became rarer in Russia as well as in the rest of Europe. But the 
memory and apprehension of such events was still vivid. This might be one reason 
                                                 
6  For a revaluation of stereotypes in mutual perceptions as a source of cultural history see 
Gabriele Scheidegger, Perverses Abendland - barbarisches Russland. Begegnungen des 
16. und 17. Jahrhunderts im Schatten kultureller Missverständnisse (Zürich, 1993). 
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for revolts being increasingly debated as threatening potentials that had to be 
prevented. At the same time, the interpretation of revolts as a phenomenon of 
backwardness became more and more prominent. Since at least the 16th century 
Muscovy had the reputation of a barbarian and savage country. Now a 
developmental factor was brought into play. This was immediately related to a 
revaluation of the monarch in the person of Peter I, who was regarded as the 
promoter of Enlightenment. This strengthened an interpretation of revolts as a 
manifestation of backward resistance against progressive projects of reform and 
civilizational missions, which I deal with in the fourth and concluding part. 
FOREIGN REPRESENTATIONAL PATTERNS OF MUSCOVITE 
REVOLTS IN THE 17TH CENTURY 
There is no need to emphasize that the 17th century was rich in revolts. This is true 
for Muscovy as well as for most European countries, and well beyond Europe.7 
Observers were familiar with manifestations of social unrest and sometimes even 
engaged in explicit cross-country comparisons. In spite of all regional differences, 
observers apparently considered the situation in middle and Western European 
countries to be comparable. Was this also the case for Russia, independently of all 
exotic (or barbarian) flavour it had for most Europeans? To a large extent the 
country was still a terra incognita. Interestingly, in his voluminous history of civil 
wars (guerre civili), written in the early 1650s and referring to most recent events, 
the Italian Maiolino Bisaccioni did include chapters on the Ottoman Empire and 
Poland/Ukraine, but not on Muscovy, although the country was haunted by revolts 
no less than others at the time.8 By contrast, in 1689/90 the Hamburgian Kern-
Chronik, an annual journal giving a month-by-month discussion of current events, 
published an “Appendix concerning the most noteworthy and outstanding 
revolutions and changes of the state, from 1600-1690, through all kingdoms and 
estates of the whole world” that includes, after the most familiar European 
countries, a chapter on Muscovy, then, in order: on Hungary, Persia, India, China, 
even Japan and on what the editors call a “barbarian revolution” in Morocco.9 If the 
                                                 
7  For the discussion of a general crisis of the 17th century see The general crisis of the 
seventeenth century, ed. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M Smith (London, 1997). 
8  Maiolino Bisaccioni, Historia delle gverre civili di qvesti vltimi tempi (Venetia, 1655). 
9  Appendix zu dieser Kern-Chronica: Betreffend die fürnehmsten und sonderbahresten 
Revolutiones oder Staats-Veränderungen dieses itzigen Seculi, von Anno 1600 biß 1690. 
Durch alle Königreiche und Stände der gantzen Welt. In: Historischer Kern oder kurtze 
Chronica Der merckwürdigsten Zeit- und Wunder-Geschichte/ so sich im Jahr 1689 zuge-
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extension to “all” countries indicates a process of representational globalization, but 
would not necessarily mean an increased familiarity with Russia in particular, it is 
remarkable that in the succession of the chapters Muscovy figures before Hungary. 
It shows an increased sense of Russia’s belonging to a European community of 
states.10 
Most foreigners travelling to, or even permanently living in, Muscovy resided in 
the capital. Some traders also lived in the Northern commercial centres like 
Novgorod and Pskov. Their depictions of Muscovite revolts have to be 
differentiated. Urban riots, such as the town rebellions of 1648-50 were fairly 
familiar to many of them. So they often qualified the actors of urban unrest as 
“commoners”, “die Gemeine” or “der Gemeine Mann”, expressions that establish 
terminological equivalence with European models. That dwellers of Russian towns 
were far from enjoying privileges and rights comparable to other European ones 
was not a problem, and in Western countries, terms like der gemeine Mann were 
not limited to townspeople. The huge uprisings in the periphery were much further 
away from the foreigners’ mental and cultural universe. These revolts – quite 
misleadingly labelled as “peasant wars” in Soviet historiography – were generally 
led by Cossacks, a social stratum (or even estate) that did not correspond to 
Western standards.11 The Cossack revolts were also far away in a literal sense. 
Whereas foreigners often became immediate eyewitnesses of the town rebellions 
they wrote about, this was hardly ever the case for the rebellions in the periphery.12 
This naturally had an impact on their judgment. They mainly had to rely on 
government information and propaganda. Often their personal contacts were quite 
limited to representatives of the Muscovite elites, so that they had little access to 
rumours circulating among the “commoners”. This resulted in relatively gloomy 
portraits of the actors, who were often depicted as scoundrels or traitors, 
conforming to their undiscriminating qualification as vory [criminals or traitors] by 
Russian authorities.  
                                                                                                            
tragen. Mit den vornehmsten Conterfaiten der itzo im Krieg befindlichen Potentaten/ und 
sonst vielen Abrissen der merckwürdigsten Belagerungen. (Hamburg, 1690). 
10  Such synopses have apparently been written by authors who had not visited Russia and 
compiled their information from the accounts in regular newspapers and from travelogues 
written by eye-witnesses. 
11  This was true for Ukraine as well and it would thus be interesting to compare Western 
Europeans' perceptions of Russia and Ukraine.  
12  A notable exception is Fabritius for the Razin uprising. See Arkadii G. Man'kov (ed), 
Zapiski inostrantsev o vosstanii Stepana [Timofeevicha] Razina (Leningrad, 1968): 14-
83, 132-156 (German original with Russian translation). 
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In contrast to this negative pattern, in descriptions of town rebellions such as 
those of 1648, 1662 and partly even 1682, many foreigners tried to go beyond the 
one-sided interpretational schemes offered by proclamations of the authorities. 
They asked for the reasons for the insurgency, described the misery of the people 
and did not even refrain from explaining the observed resistance as more or less 
legitimate, because it was directed against the ubiquitous abuse of power and 
systematic embezzlement practiced by high-ranking government officials at the 
public expense.13 Even more so, in such narratives the corrupt behaviour of 
government officials is often contrasted with the actions of the insurgents, who are 
depicted as explicitly avoiding selfish behaviour in their own ranks. Looting was a 
matter of revenge, not of robbery. Luxury items pillaged from the detested targets 
of violence were ostentatiously destroyed, not stolen. Much emphasis was put on 
just and impartial distribution of goods or money according to actual or imagined 
rights or privileges and, of course, on the constant appeal to the Tsar, who was at 
rare critical moments even obliged to engage into direct negotiations with the 
insurgents. Lawful conduct was of paramount importance for the protestors, and 
those who violated their basic ideas of justice were often tried and severely 
punished, especially if they came from the insurgents’ ranks or pretended to do so.14 
To be sure, foreigners did not explicitly justify the insurgents’ violence – and 
revolts in Russia tended to be much more violent than in Western Europe, where 
the subjects had more legal channels at their disposition. But they manifested 
understanding. This understanding and relative sympathy towards the urban 
insurgents is even more noteworthy, as foreigners had often become themselves 
targets of revolt. What historians often attribute to people’s ingrained xenophobia 
was not necessarily seen as such by the foreigners immediately concerned. In 
contrast, many of them were well aware of their trading privileges that put Russian 
urban dwellers at a disadvantage. For instance, the Swedish ambassador 
Pommerening, whose residence burnt down completely in the Moscow uprising of 
1648, even asserted in his account to Queen Christina that it was not the insurgents, 
but the people of the Tsar’s odious favourite Morozov, who put fire to almost the 
                                                 
13  This was the way how foreigners painted officials such as Pleshcheev, Trakhaniotov 
Morozov in 1648, or the strel'tsy officers like Griboedov and others in 1682. 
14  This aspect is also emphasized in a recent study on revolts in Russia, Volksaufstände in 
Rußland. Von der Zeit der Wirren bis zur “Grünen Revolution” gegen die Sowjetherr-
schaft, ed. Heinz-Dietrich Löwe (Wiesbaden, 2006). The evaluation is largely based on 
foreigners' accounts, particularly for the town uprisings. However, this foreign perspec-
tive is not reflected as such here. 
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whole town because their master hoped to take advantage of the chaos to better 
escape from the people’s anger.15 
For the mighty revolts on the periphery, the picture is different. Foreigners, who 
had rarely seen the insurgents with their own eyes, describe them as bad characters 
with basically evil intentions, devoid of any sense of justice and order. But still 
another explicative pattern is noteworthy: the emphasis on the multinational 
character of the Empire. Incontestably, Russian revolts in the periphery enjoyed 
significant support from many non-Russian peoples, both peasants and nomads, 
whose territories had been more or less recently incorporated into the Muscovite 
state. Especially at the beginning of Russian rule, these movements were often 
separatist and seemed to aim for a status quo ante of independence, but more often 
they fought for inherited (or imagined as such) privileges under the Tsar’s rule,16 
similar to the claims of their Cossacks allies. The multinational dimension became 
an increasingly important motive in many accounts of revolts by foreigners. This is 
apparently due to a particular European interest in this dimension. Several factors 
seem to be important: 
 
1) Many, but by far not all, of these non-Russians were Muslims: Tartars, 
Bashkirs, Kalmyks, etc.), and their participation in Muscovite revolts was 
somehow related by some to European aspirations to win Muscovite support for 
the struggle against the Ottoman Empire.  
2) Especially in newspapers we can observe an increasing sensibility to the idea of 
“nations”. The term had not yet acquired our modern-day all-inclusive meaning 
and the non-Russian ethnic groups of the Muscovite empire could certainly not 
be equated to what German-speaking contemporaries dubbed “Nationen”.17 But 
observers of Russia seemed to draw at least parallels.  
3) The multinational dimension inspired some Europeans’ imagination and 
attracted their taste for exotic flavour. Perhaps except for the Tartars, heirs of 
                                                 
15  Report to Queen Christine, June 6, 1648. In: Gorodskie vosstaniia v Moskovskom gosu-
darstve XVII v. Sbornik dokumentov, ed. K. V. Bazilevich (Moskva, 2003): 36-39. 
16  For a very instructive overview of the non-Russian nationalities of the Middle Volga, 
including their insurgent activity from the 16th to the 18th century cf. Andreas Kappeler, 
Russlands erste Nationalitäten. Das Zarenreich und die Völker der mittleren Wolga vom 
16. bis 19. Jahrhundert (Köln, 1982). For the nomad Bashkirs of the Ural region, who 
were much later incorporated into the Russian Empire, cf. Irek G. Akmanov, Bashkirskie 
vosstaniia (Ufa, 1993). 
17  On the emergence of the idea of nationhood in late Middle ages and early modern times 
see Caspar Hirschi, Wettkampf der Nationen. Konstruktionen einer deutschen Ehrge-
meinschaft an der Wende vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit (Göttingen, 2005). 
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the Mongols that had once terrified Europe, these people were almost unknown 
to Europeans. They seemed so radically different – much more than the 
Russians who were at least Christians –, that their ethnonyms alone opened 
fertile grounds for the imaginary, for spine-chilling stories as well as for more 
benign associations.  
 
During the enormous revolts stirred up from the Cossack periphery – those of the 
Time of Troubles (1604-1615) and those relating to the Razin uprising (1667-1671) 
– the non-Russian peoples incontestably played an important role. Abroad, one was 
well aware of Muscovite expansion and the increasingly multinational character of 
the emerging empire. Corresponding to the significance of the event, the narrative 
of the conquest of Kazan’ and Astrakhan figured prominently in the historical 
narratives of most Western travellers’ accounts. But they did not necessarily give 
attention to the multinational dimension of revolts. Numerous observers, for 
instance, hardly took note of the insurgent activity of the non-Russian peoples of 
the Middle-Volga region during the Time of Troubles.18 These commotions in the 
periphery were completely overshadowed by the events in the centre, where the 
False Dmitriis and their numerous supporters aimed for the Kremlin. Foreign 
interference, particularly open Polish and Swedish intervention and their 
sovereigns’ claims to the Muscovite throne, were deemed much more important, 
especially from a Western point of view. And, interestingly, the neglect of the non-
Russian periphery in Western accounts like Margeret’s and Petreius’, published 
shortly after the events, was often perpetuated in Russian chronicles composed from 
the 1630 on.19 
                                                 
18  The Dutch merchant Isaac Massa (1586-1643) is an exception. See Isaak Massa, Kratkoe 
izvestie o Moskovii v nachale XVII v. (Moskva, 1936). But whereas he relates at length 
the history of the conquest of the Khanates of Kazan' and Astrakhan under Ivan IV. (in 
the early 1550s), he only cursorily mentions joint actions of the “Nogais, Chermis Tartars 
together with the Mordvins” in the Time of troubles, during which he was in Moscow 
almost until the end of Vasilii Shuiskii's reign. Massa was well informed about the multi-
ethnic dimension of the emerging Russian empire. He managed to publish two articles on 
Siberia at his lifetime, whereas his major account on the Smuta remained unpublished 
and would only be edited in the 19th century. I thank Andreas Kappeler for drawing my 
attention to Massa's reference to the events in the Middle-Volga-region. 
19  Only the Novyi letopisets mentions for 1606/07 that “Mordvins, apiculturists, Boyar 
kholopy and peasants” and for 1608-11 that “people from downstream, Mordvins and 
Cheremisy” besieged Nizhnii Novgorod. Then it mentions the clerk Nikanor Shul'gin in 
Kazan', who refused to participate in the Opolchenie (the people's volunteer militia set 
out to liberate Moscow from the Poles) and then (in 1613) to kiss the cross for the new 
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In contrast to the events of the Time of Troubles the Razin rebellion (1667-
1671) did not have a real international dimension – except for Razin’s Persian 
campaign and for the participation of some Zaporozhian Cossacks. But the growing 
dissemination of newspapers throughout Europe already made it a media-event and, 
as the contemporary Justus Martius’ put it in his doctoral dissertation in 1674: “the 
whole Europe lived for some time in anxious expectation of its outcome”.20 An 
Ottoman dimension was pitched high by foreign observers. The Northern 
Mercurius, a newspaper published in Hamburg that obtained information on 
Muscovy via Riga, emphasized the significance of the Tartars, who are even 
mentioned in the first place, before the Don-Cossacks, as the instigators of the 
revolt.21 Furthermore, the correspondent suggests a strong implication of the 
Ottoman Empire. He calls Razin “Prince Stephan Razin Ottoman” and presents him 
either as an ally, or as an instrument of the Sultan. As to the Tartars, this connection 
seems self-evident to him. In many German accounts “the Tartars” make their 
appearance as odious brutes raping government officials’ wives and daughters after 
their husbands were executed by Razin. This “big tyrant”22 would have been 
particularly fond of having these wives bound naked on horseback to hand them 
over to the Kalmyks “who are the ugliest among the Tartars”.23  
                                                                                                            
Tsar Mikhail Romanov. According to the chronicle he tried to rally the people of Kazan' 
and then of Arzamas, because he wanted to rule in Kazan'. The chronicler suggests that 
these attempts were rather unsuccessful. Khroniki smutnogo vremeni. Bussov, Konrad; 
Elassonskii, Arsenii; Gerkman, Elias, ed. A. Liberman (Moskva 1998): 312, 328, 366, 
369, 378, 381. 
20  “[…] domi periculum adiit, nec unquam major calamitas fuit, quam cum auctore Stepha-
no Räzino turbae motusque existerent (g): nam iis non modo Moscovia metu perculsa, 
sed etiam tota Europa expectatione futuri eventus aliquandiu suspensa fuit.” Zapiski in-
ostrantsev o vosstanii Stepana Razina, 39. 
21  Ibid., 92-96. At the beginning, in a correspondence dating from August 20, 1670, pub-
lished Sept. 6, the fall of Astrakhan is even exclusively attributed to a Tartar rebellion. 
100.000 Tartars were said have conquered the town, the Cossacks and Razin are not even 
mentioned. 
22  The term indicates that Razin is recognized as a sovereign, although a bad one who 
abuses his power. 
23  Relationis historicae semestralis autumnalis continuatio. Historische Beschreibung der 
denckwurdigsten Geschichten, so sich […] vor und zwischen jüngst verflossenen Franck-
furter Fasten biß an und in die Herbst-Meß dieses lauffenden 1671. Jahrs […] zugetragen. 
Franckfurt-am-Mayn, 1671. In ibid., p.98-99. It is conspicuous that in English accounts 
Razin gives the wives simply to “his soldiers” for rape. “A Relation concerning the Par-
ticulars of the Rebellion raised in Muscovy by Stenka Razin. Its Rise, Progress, and Stop: 
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Although Razin allegedly aimed for Moscow and the Kremlin, the main 
message of the accounts from Riga focuses on his activity in the south-eastern 
periphery, especially on the non-Russian territories around the former Khanats of 
Astrakhan and Kazan’. The most imminent threat to the Muscovite state, they said, 
was thus to be thrown back to its territorial status of 1554, i.e. to the time before the 
annexation of Astrakhan and probably even Kazan’ (1552). This would entail the 
loss of Siberia and its rich natural resources. Access to Siberia would be barred by 
something comparable to a new important Ottoman outpost ranging from the 
Khanat of the Crimean Tartars through the southern Russian steppe far into the 
black-earth agricultural region of the Middle-Volga.24 In the same light, another 
German account from Frankfurt (Main) asserts that Razin had negotiated with the 
Muscovite crown and presented a whole catalogue of claims, among them to be 
recognized as king of Kazan’ and Astrakhan.25 In fact, such negotiations had never 
taken place. Razin probably had offered his services to the Persian Shah in the first 
phase of his campaign (1667-1669). But he did not seek an alliance with the 
Sublime Porte or the Crimean Tartars – nor were the non-Russian participants of his 
movement. This “misinterpretation” figures mainly in the accounts originating from 
the Holy Roman Empire that was actively seeking for the inclusion of Muscovy 
into a Christian military alliance against the Turks.  
And these newspaper accounts made their way (back) to Moscow. They were 
translated for the foreign office and read to the Tsar. Of course, Moscow was 
shocked by the Razin revolt. But the German interpretations in terms of cooperation 
between Cossacks and non-Russian nationalities under Muscovite rule with the 
Sultan might have had a particular impact on the Tsar. And Russian foreign policy 
indeed underwent a radical turn after A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin’s dismissal from the 
foreign department (1671). Whereas this latter’s ultimate priority had been 
prevalent against Sweden in the Baltic Sea, his successor A.A. Matveev abandoned 
North-Western aspirations to finally put into practice the anti-Turkish alliance that 
                                                                                                            
together with the manner of taking that Rebel, the Sentence of Death passed upon him, 
and the Execution of the same.” See: Ibid., 91-106, 96. 
24  The correspondents do not hint at the Ural population, mainly nomadic Bashkirs, Mus-
lims like the Tartars, whose resistance to Muscovite rule was ferocious throughout the 
17th (and still during parts of the 18th Century). It is true that their territory was hardly 
touched by the Razin uprising, but they had initiated a big and long-lasting revolt only 
some six years earlier (1662-64), it would have been easy to include them into this sup-
posed Turk-inspired campaign of conquest. But apparently the Bashkirs were still com-
pletely out of sight for European observers. On the Bashkir revolts see Akmanov, Bash-
kirskie vosstaniia. 
25  Relationis historicae… Zapiski inostrantsev o vosstanii Stepana Razina, 99. 
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the middle-European powers had desired for such a long time. Of course it would 
be exaggerated to attribute the fundamental shift exclusively to the foreign 
representation that related the Razin revolt to the Ottoman Empire, but it apparently 
did play a certain role. 
We can also find emphases on the actions of non-Russian peoples in foreign 
accounts of the strel’tsy revolt in 1682, which was so entangled with the fight of the 
different court factions for the succession to the throne after Fedor Alekseevich’s 
death in April 1682, that the spectre of a second Time of Troubles (Smuta) began to 
haunt Moscow. This revolt, during which the strel’tsy temporarily took hold of the 
Kremlin and killed many high-ranking boyars on May 15-17, 1682, was in fact an 
urban uprising and it took place in the capital. There was no link to a simultaneous 
Bashkir uprising against Russian rule and colonisation in the Ural region, which 
had been going on since 1681. References to the Bashkirs can be found in a letter to 
the Apostolic Nuncio in Poland Cardinal Cybo. The representative of the Curia was 
well informed, as he attributed the rebellion to the attempts under Tsar Fedor 
Alekseevich to convert the Muslim Bashkirs to Christianity.26 In contrast to earlier 
guarantees to respect the religion of the non-Orthodox, the Tsarist government had 
started in 1680-81 to foster Christianization. It resorted to draconian measures, such 
as the confiscation of the land of non-Russian nobles who refused to convert. As a 
corollary, their peasants’ were enserfed. The new policies aimed mainly at the 
sedentary peoples of the Middle Volga (Muslim and pagan), but the nomad 
Bashkirs were well aware of what was happening to their Muslim neighbours: they 
reacted with alarm and violent revolt, when in November 1681 the decision was 
taken to establish a new eparchy in Ufa, which heralded a new intensity 
of
 
Orthodox encroachments upon the nomadic Muslims’ religious self-
determination.27  
Naturally, the Curia was particularly sensitive to religious matters in Russia. 
Given Moscow’s reluctant opening towards Western influence, the Vatican did not 
abandon hopes to win over the country to the Roman Catholic Church. It was 
certainly an attractive idea (and illusion) to overcome the schism with what had 
been the most important branch of Eastern Christianity since the fall of 
Constantinople. But apart from that, in an age of reformation and counter-
reformation and after the devastations of the Thirty Years’ War, religious conflict 
was a major explanation for the era’s violent social conflicts in general. Therefore it 
is all the more astonishing that the foreign observers, including the Vatican, 
                                                 
26  Letter dated 21 October 1682. In: Monuments historiques relatifs aux règnes d'Alexis 
Michaélowitch, Féodor III et Pierre le Grand czars de Russie. Extraits des archives du 
Vatican et de Naples, ed. Augustin Theiner (Rome, 1859): 238.  
27  Akmanov, Bashkirskie vosstanija, 83-85. 
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completely neglected the intra-Orthodox conflict that fuelled the uprising, 
especially in its later phase. They did not even mention the rebel leader 
Khovanskii’s attempt to rehabilitate Old Belief.28 This apparently had to do with 
their profound misunderstanding of what Nikon’s church reforms and the Old 
Believers’ resistance to them really meant for Russian Orthodoxy. Certainly the 
continuation of the reforms and the simultaneous dismissal of the Patriarch (1666) 
had contributed to this confusion. (The reason for his destitution was not liturgical 
reform but dissension about the primacy of worldly or ecclesiastic power, a 
dissension that was never fully acknowledged).29 
Whereas the representatives of the Vatican were quite accurate in making a 
clear distinction between the events in Moscow and what happened in the Ural and 
Volga regions, it is again the Kern-Chronik published in Hamburg that relates the 
strel’tsy’s movement to both the Bashkir uprising and the first Russo-Turkish war 
that had in fact already been brought to an end in the truce of Bahçesaray in 1681: 
 
In Moscow things looked quite badly. Some restless people abused the musketeers’ uprising 
to arm themselves and to fish in troubled waters. The Turks and the Tartars took hold of 
many islands in the black sea and in the Dnepr, to the great harm of the Cossacks, as the 
rightful masters of these. The Bashkir Tartars who are subjected to the crown of Moscow, 
rebelled and went into battle with a huge force, in order to relieve themselves of the 
Muscovite yoke; a militia was sent to steer this rebellious people, and [the Bashkirs] were 
defeated twice, but thereupon they [the Bashkirs] withdrew to their neighbours, the Kalmyk 
Tartars, whose king, himself on horseback, and with considerable auxiliary troops, came to 
the assistance of the Bashkirs, so that they gathered an army of 50.000 men, and went directly 
for the main town Kazan.30 
 
Indeed, Bashkirs and Kalmyks, both Muslim nomads, were acting in concert. The 
Kalmyks in the Southern steppe beyond the Jaik, were not yet subjected to 
Muscovite rule, but their raids for booty onto the adjacent Muscovite territories 
were a quite common practice. But sedentary non-Russians also joined the 
Bashkirs, which, in this case, consisted mainly of the indigenous peoples of the 
Middle Volga region, namely Tartars and Mari (Cheremisy), who could still profit 
                                                 
28  Ivan Khovanskii was a high-ranking boyar, who took sides with the insurgents. The 
uprising lead to his promotion to the top of the streletskii prikaz (musketeer's office) and 
he became the most popular leader of the rebellious strel'tsy. For this reason the revolt is 
often called Khovanshchina – also in Musorgskii's famous opera (1883).  
29  Foreigners' perceptions of Nikon's church reforms and Old Belief have been examined by 
Aleksandr Lavrov's in his presentation at the workshop this volume is based on.  
30  Kern-Chronik (August 1682): 90-91. 
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from their former revolt-experience during the Razin uprising. It was not least due 
to the chaos in the capital that the regional authorities were not able to cope with the 
situation. The auxiliary forces they demanded from Moscow did not come and they 
were forced to employ a mixed strategy of stick and carrot: as usual the Don and 
Jaik Cossacks were mobilized to fight against the Kalmyks, and at the same time 
regional officials in Ufa and Kazan’ tried to persuade the Bashkirs to surrender 
voluntarily and thus be sure of the Tsar’s grace and the guarantee of their 
privileges. But the Bashkirs remained suspicious. Previous experience had shown 
them that it might be naïve to rely on Moscow’s promises. In its Bashkir epicentre 
the revolt thus continued until 1684. The emphasis on conflicts with the Turks and 
the Crimean Tartars in the Black sea area and on the territories of the Zaporozhian 
Cossacks, and the implicit assumption that all these Muslim activities must be 
related, have to be ascribed to the apprehension that after the first Turkish war the 
Russians had again made their peace with the Ottoman Empire. Invoking and 
exaggerating the Turkish danger and relating it to multi-national and internal revolts 
imbued with religious conflict, was time and again an attempt to win over Moscow 
for a crusade alliance against the Sublime Porte (and in 1686, with Moscow joining 
the Holy League, this seems to have been successful).  
Of course, most attention was attracted to the events in the capital. Here, 
foreigners were on the scene. And here the dynastic succession itself was at stake. 
All accounts connect the strel’tsy’s insurrection against their superiors to the power 
void that was due to the fact that after Tsar Fedor’s death on April 27, 1682, his two 
potential successors were minors and would be unfit for rule at least for a few years. 
Ivan was 16 and mentally insane; his half-brother Peter was only ten. This opposed 
the family clans of their respective mothers: the Miloslavskiis for Ivan and the 
Naryshkins for Peter.31 The final decision to crown both, which was taken in the 
heat of the strel’tsy revolt, was at least a temporary victory for the Miloslavskiis 
with Ivan’s sister Sofiia emerging as the new regent. Subsequent Russian memoir 
literature under Peter I (after his accession to power in 1689) cited Sofiia as 
instigator of the strel’tsy’s murderous enterprise, a view that has often been 
reproduced in historiography. But in contrast to that, the foreigners did not 
demonize Sofiia and regarded the outbreak of the strel’tsy uprising as largely 
independent from the factional struggle within the high nobility. According to the 
established narrative of the town revolt, they recognized the strel’tsy’s claims as 
                                                 
31  And indeed, the revolt broke out only a few days after Fedor's death. The question of 
succession was disputed; and the highest nobility was divided between the elder but in-
sane Ivan and the younger but healthy Peter. The final decision to crown the two of them 
was a novelty in Russian and European history. Their sister Sofiia was victorious: she 
managed to get the regency. 
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legitimate: the commanders had misappropriated the pay for the troop and had 
forced their subordinates to work on their private estates. Tsar Fedor’s initiatives to 
redress these abuses had been cut short by his death. His death thus triggered two 
parallel but separate phenomena: the boyars’ fight for succession and influence, and 
the strel’tsy’s protest against their superiors’ abuses, against their regime of egoism 
and narrow self-interest.32  
Foreign accounts often depicted this arena of court-struggle in terms of 
conspiracy and palace revolution, at the time a common master narrative for 
denouncing revolts, especially in England, where regicide had a certain tradition. 
However, in the overall-framework of this narrative the London Gazette, which 
turned out to be relatively uninformed in those days, drops a keyword that will 
become increasingly important during the following years:  
 
Our Letters from Moscow give the following account: That the late Czar Alexis [sic! in 
reality Tsar Fedor is meant] who Married with a Polish Lady, having by her means taken a 
great Affection to the manners and customs of this Nation, and designed to introduce them 
among his own Subjects, the more to civilize them, had thereby raised a great hatred in the 
Boyars, and other great Men against him, who resolved to Poyson him and his Queen, and 
effected it by the means of a Jew.33 
 
The regicide attributed to “a Jew” is not so astonishing here, as anti-Judaism was 
widespread all over Europe: during the chaotic May days the strel’tsy indeed made 
a chase on foreign (including Jewish) physicians who were suspected of having 
                                                 
32  See the accounts and correspondences of the Danish commercial agent Heinrich Butenant 
in Petr N. Krekšin, Peters des Grossen Jugendjahre. “Kurze Beschreibung der gesegneten 
Taten des grossen Gosudars, des Kaisers Peters des Grossen, Selbstherrschers von ganz 
Russland” ; nebst einem Anhange aus zeitgenössischen Stimmen, nämlich Heinrich Bu-
tenant, Patrick Gordon und Otto Pleyer, zu den geschilderten Ereignissen (Stuttgart 
1989), of the Danish diplomat Hildebrandt van Horn, Hildebrandt von Horn, “Doneseniia 
koroliu Danii. Moskovskoe vosstanie 682g. glazami datskogo posla”, Voprosy istorii 
1986, no.3 and of the Dutch resident van Keller in M. I. Belov, “Pis'ma Ioanna fan Kelle-
ra v sobranii niderlandskich dokumentov”, in Issledovaniia po otechestvennomu istoch-
nikovedeniiu. Sbornik statei posviashennyi 75 letiiu S.N.Valka (Moskva, Leningrad, 
1964), 374-383. Cf. also Aleksandr S. Lavrov, “Politicheskaya bor'ba v Rossii 1680-kh 
godov v doneseniiakh Khil'debrandta fon Gorna. (istochnikovedcheskie zametki)”, Vest-
nik S.-Peterburgskogo universiteta Seriia 2 (istoriia) 16, 3 (1999). 
33  London Gazette, Monday August 14 to Thursday 17, 1682, headed: Warsaw, July 25. 
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provided the boyars with poison to murder the Tsar.34 It is rather remarkable that 
“the Boyars” are globally identified as the culprits, which even adds to the 
legitimacy of the strel’tsy’s preoccupation with settling accounts with the “traitors”. 
According to this narrative, the boyars wanted to get rid of the Tsar – for a 
noteworthy reason: they opposed his Westernization policies. But the spectre of 
Westernization is not connected here to religion and to fears of Western attempts to 
introduce Catholicism35 as it was the case in earlier foreign accounts of the Time of 
troubles: Here the issue is the goal of “civilizing” Russia and Russian subjects, 
including the boyars themselves. This aspiration is mainly ascribed to Fedor’s first 
Polish wife, Agaf’ja Grushetskaya, who was indeed the first Tsaritsa to appear in 
public at all, even in Western clothes. And, with the Tsar’s approval, she was the 
first to summon the boyars to cut their beards, a measure of Westernization that 
would be taken up in a ruder and more coercive way by Peter I after his return from 
the first great Embassy to Western Europe in 1698.36 
The discourse about recalcitrant, backward subjects roused up by a modernizing 
and civilizing Tsar, would become prevalent in the following years under the 
impact of early Enlightenment. This changed the face of revolts in foreign 
representations. More and more foreign accounts depicted revolts as manifestations 
of backward resistance to the civilizing efforts of a centralizing state.  
The leading circles in Russia seemed to be aware of an ever increasing 
European interest in the exotic “tribes” and “backward” ethnic groups of the 
Empire. Apparently they also tried to exploit such Western curiosity, which can be 
seen from a strange news item in the kuranty (the translations from Western 
newspapers for the Tsar and his diplomatic staff) from the same troubled period of 
1682. It purports a revolt of the Siberian “Irgen’ tribe”. These “savages” would 
have rebelled “for the sake of the sable fur” (apparently questions of hunting rights, 
trading privileges, tributes, taxes, etc.). Stepan Shamin, who has discovered this 
item in a dossier of kuranty dated 1st May, assumes that the report had been 
launched by Yazykov, a supporter of the Naryshkin clan, who tried to use Western 
newspaper coverage (real or fake) as an instrument in the factional struggle. The 
report says that “the important Man, Sir Kholopov, was sent to the Enisei with 
troops, in order to extinguish the fire” of the rebellion. Apparently Yazykov wanted 
                                                 
34  A vivid account of that is supplied by Heinrich Butenant, who was suspected to shelter a 
physician, because he was his neighbour and friend. See Wahrhaftige Relation der trauri-
gen undt Schrecklichen Tragedy hier in der Stadt Moscau furgefallen auff Montag, 
Dienstag undt Mitwochen, den 15, 16 undt 17 May jetzigen 1682-ten Jahres. In: Krekšin, 
Peters des Grossen Jugendjahre, 160–76. 
35  Here the whole question of Old Belief is again completely ignored. See above. 
36  Hans-Joachim Torke, Die russischen Zaren. 1547 - 1917 (München, 1995): 137. 
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to get a rival out of the way. According to a later complaint by Kholopov, it was on 
Yazykov’s initiative that Tsar Fedor had assigned to him this Siberian mission. But 
after Fedor’s death the order had fallen into oblivion. Therefore Yazykov tried to 
remind Fedor’s successor(s) of the decision through foreign newspapers, i.e. 
through publicity in the West. Once the message was printed in Western 
newspapers, he could be sure that it would soon figure in the kuranty, since 
virtually any message relating to Russia was translated. It was more difficult to 
persuade Western correspondents of the relevance of Kholopov’s nomination into 
the Trans-Baikal region. Why should it be of any interest to Western readers? Why 
should a newspaper print such a message? Here the combination of wild tribes of 
the Far East with the issue of revolt was suitable bait.37 
We don’t know exactly whether this revolt of the Irgen’ tribe in the Trans-
Baikal region had really taken place or if it was made up as a news item. But be that 
as it may, the case highlights a conscious gamble with the Europeans’ attention to 
the multi-ethnic dimension of the Muscovite Empire.38 The news item corresponded 
to an emerging paradigm in foreign accounts that ascribed a close relationship 
between backwardness and revolts. Backwardness was seen particularly in the 
exotic tribes of the Russian Wild East that seemed to prompt European fantasies in 
a similar way to perceptions of the various peoples in the overseas colonial world.39 
JOHANN GEORG KORB’S DIARY AND  
THE SECOND REVOLT OF THE STREL’TSY, 1698 
When the second strel’tsy revolt took place (in June 1689) and Emperor Leopold’s 
delegation under F.A. v. Guarient und Rääl sojourned in Moscow (from April 1698 
to July 1699), Peter’s reign was consolidated. Nine years earlier he had taken over 
the regency from his half-sister Sofiia – after she had waged a complot against 
                                                 
37  S.M. Shamin, “Kuranty kak istochnik po istorii Moskovskogo vosstaniia 1682 g.”, in 
Problemy istochnikovedeniia, ed. S. M. Kashtanov (Moskva, in press). 
38  Ibid. finds the case particularly noteworthy, because in his eyes this information on the 
far-away Sibirian ethnic groups had not been of any interest for European readers – this 
in order to emphasize the aspect of instrumentalization. But in fact, if this was true, the 
message would have hardly been published. In my view, the occurrence indicates to what 
degree the ethnographical interest had increased and how Russian elite members were 
sufficiently aware of this European trend to be able to make use of it.  
39  The topos of (European) civilization as opposed to Asiatic barbarism can be found in 
many foreigners' accounts on Russia. See for instance Jenkin's account who outlined the 
struggle of civilization with the Timurian Mongol barbaric heritage. 
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him.40 His nominal co-regent and half-brother Ivan V was dead (since 1696), and so 
was his mother (since 1694), who had influenced his government in the first years 
of his reign. Peter was on his first journey abroad (“incognito”) to study the 
European navies. He only returned after the message of the strel’tsy’s mutiny had 
reached him in Vienna. This came when he had realized during negotiations with 
Leopold I. that his plans to activate the Holy League for his struggle against the 
Crimean Tartars and the Ottoman Empire were thwarted.41  
The strel’tsy’s revolt of 1698 was a far-ranging event, not so much because of 
the size and amplitude of the uprising itself, but because of its aftermath: the 
complete abolition of the old Muscovite military estate that helped to accomplish 
the army reform initiated under the first Romanov Tsar, as well as the diplomatic 
scandal caused by the publication of the diary that Johann Georg Korb, the imperial 
delegation’s secretary, had held during the stay in Moscow and that I will analyze 
in what follows. The artistic echo of the uprising is considerable, partly because it 
became intimately interwoven with Peter’s legendary cutting of his boyars’ beards 
and the introduction of Western garments at court: a symbol of Peter’s break with 
Old-Moscow.42 Apparently, the mutiny itself was relatively small-scale in 
comparison to the following requital. Recently historians have even doubted 
                                                 
40  On the confrontation between the regent Sofiia and her half-brother Peter in 1689 and the 
alleged conspiracy see Lindsey Hughes, Sophia, Regent of Russia. 1657-1704 (New Ha-
ven, 1990): 221-241; Aleksandr S. Lavrov, Regentstvo tsarevny Sof'i Alekseevny. Slu-
zhiloe obshchestvo i bor'ba za vlast' v verkhach Russkogo gosudarstva v 1682-1689gg. 
(Moskva, 1999): 157-190. 
41  Handbuch der Geschichte Rußlands, Band 2 Vom Randstaat zur Hegemonialmacht, 
1613-1856, ed. Manfred Hellmann and Gottfried Schramm (Stuttgart 1986), 243-244. 
The Reich was absorbed by the controversy over the Spanish succession. This was an in-
version of the situation earlier in the 17th century, when the Reich tried unsuccessfully to 
win Russia for an anti-Ottoman coalition. The Reich's refusal to engage in a common war 
against the Turks would contribute to Peter's I reorientation towards the North, to his 
concentration on the access to the ice-free Baltic Sea, by which he picked up the thread of 
A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin's foreign policy of the 1660. This would lead to the Great North-
ern War (1700-1721). 
42  Cf. for instance Albert Lortzing's popular opera “Tsar and carpenter”, first performed in 
1837 in Leipzig. The break with Old-Moscow is the central motive in Olaf Brockmann, 
“Der Bruch Peters mit Alt-Moskau. Korbs Diarium und Diplomatenberichte aus Moskau 
zu den Ereignissen der Jahre 1698 und 1699”, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 38, 
4 (1990): 481-503, who interprets Korb's diary in this light. 
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whether it merited the appellation of a revolt at all.43 Four strel’tsy regiments had 
been directly transferred from Azov to the Polish-Lithuanian border, where they 
had to serve as guards under extremely miserable conditions. The situation still 
aggravated as a consequence of crop failure and delayed in kind wages. In spring 
1698 they thus sent some 175 representatives to Moscow. There Peter had 
established a temporary boyar government for the time of his absence. Suspicious 
of the strel’tsy, he had instructed this government to keep the regiments at any rate 
away from Moscow.44 Accordingly, the government reacted with nervousness, but 
in the end it satisfied the strel’tsy’s claims and they returned to their garrisons at the 
border.45  
Only when Peter branded the boyars’ softness in a letter from abroad and 
ordered a transfer of the regiments to other garrisons and exemplary punishments of 
the “deserters”, the boyar government revised its former measures and put Peter’s 
orders into practice. The strel’tsy refused to hand over the “deserters”, but they set 
off to their new garrisons. Only on the way they apparently decided to take in 
Moscow along the way to visit their wives and families whom they had not seen for 
more than 18 months. – Home leave had already been a major request of their 
preceding petition. When their commanders refused, the strel’tsy deposed them and 
elected new ones. Now the boyar government set out an army detachment against 
them. The encounter took place at the New Jerusalem Monastery, some 60 km to 
the North-West from Moscow. Patrick Gordon, Peter’s Scottish favourite, was 
among the military commanders and led the negotiations with the strel’tsy. He 
described the events in his diary (that remained unpublished at the time): The 
strel’tsy handed over a petition in which they asked for a permission to come to 
Moscow in order to “visit their houses, wives and children” and “to petition for 
their necessityes”.46 When this was not granted they persisted. After further 
unsuccessful negotiations, the government forces opened fire; the mutineers were 
                                                 
43  On the course of the events cf. Alexander Moutchnik, “Der 'Strelitzen-Aufstand' von 
1698”, in Volksaufstände in Rußland, 197-222; Sarah Schiffmann, Aufruhr der Strelitzen 
im Jahre 1698. Ursachen, Verlauf, Unterdrückung, Folgen (PhD diss., University of Vi-
enna, 1932); Brockmann, Der Bruch Peters mit Alt-Moskau. 
44  In 1697 there had been a conspiracy, into which some strel'tsy were accused to be in-
volved. On the 1697 Tsykler affair see Hughes, Sophia, Regent of Russia, 248-249. 
45  For a detailed historiographical account see Moutchnik, Der “Strelitzen-Aufstand” von 
1698. 
46  Tagebuch des Generals Patrick Gordon, während seiner Kriegsdienste unter den Schwe-
den und Polen vom Jahre 1655 bis 1661 und seines Aufenthaltes in Rußland vom Jahre 
1661 bis 1699, ed. M. A. Obolenski and Moritz Conrad Posselt (Leizig, 1853): 195. The 
entry refers to June 17.  
224 | MALTE GRIESSE 
 
apparently reluctant to launch an offensive, and it came to a very short skirmish, in 
which they were rapidly defeated. Requital and investigation followed 
immediately.47 But only in autumn, when Peter hastily returned to Moscow from 
Vienna and took the investigations into his own hands, was the decisive link to 
Sofiia as instigator of the “conspiracy” finally “established”: allegedly she had 
summoned the strel’tsy to the capital in order to be restored to the throne.  
Peter did not conceal his massive application of torture: the innumerable 
executions were staged publicly and apparently foreign ambassadors, including the 
members of the imperial delegation, were even invited to assist. That’s why Korb 
could give an eye-witness account of the punishments. Although the requital 
seemed particularly ferocious, neither torture, nor the publicity of repression was 
much at odds with contemporary “European standards”.48 Although he did not spare 
the lurid details of Peter’s crackdown on the strel’tsy, Korb therefore did not expect 
to provoke a scandal with the publication of his diary. And he had some reason not 
to expect such a ferocious reaction. His diary appeared only at the end of 1700 or in 
1701, although previously, in 1698 and 1699, right after the events, several reports 
on the executions had been published in German newspapers and journals. These 
reports astonishingly resembled Korb’s later diary-publication and maybe even 
stemmed from his quill.49 As in the diary, cruel details were not withheld. For 
example, the accounts described at great length how imperial Ambassador Guarient 
was invited to the Kremlin for three consecutive dinners: the opulent meals were 
accompanied by executions. According to one report of the Kern Chronik, 1.300 
persons were beheaded on the first day, 700 on the second, and on the third day, the 
hangman cut off noses and ears of 400 more insurgents who were then exiled to 
forced labour in Siberia, all this in presence of the Tsar and the ambassador who 
were virtually at table. 
 
The Tsar ordered a considerable number of the rebels to be hanged on girders that were fixed 
in the embrasures in the city wall. Many of them got a brand on their cheeks and many of 
them were sent to Siberia into eternal misery. The Tsar’s blood brother and many boyars had 
their hands sawed off or had to suffer other humiliations.50 
                                                 
47  This account is based on Ibid., 192ff.  
48  On repression standards cf. Karl Härter's contribution to this volume. 
49  I am grateful to Martin Welke for having drawn attention to this circumstance and for 
having shared his source-findings with me.  
50  Die gestraffte Revolten, Kern-Chronik (November 1698). “Ein groß Theil der Rebellen 
ließ der Czaar an Balcken hengen/ welche er rings der Stadt-Mauer aus denen Schieß-
Löchern stecken lassen. Viele wurden auff denen Backen gebrandmahlet/ und eine große 
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Interestingly enough, these reports did not cause any scandal in Russia.  
But they were widely read abroad. Leibniz, for instance, an avid reader of 
newspapers and journals, had already manifested a particular interest in Russia. 
Already in 1698 he commented on the repressions of the strel’tsy in a letter to his 
Swedish correspondent: “One could imagine that the Tsar has done that in order to 
tacitly reproach Emperor Leopold I that he is not absolute enough to do similar 
things. […] It’s a pity that this grand duke who has so many laudable qualities is 
not yet able to get rid of his penchant for cruelty.” And as his correspondent had 
already expressed apprehension that Russian military priority might shift from the 
Black Sea towards the Baltic and notably to Sweden, Leibniz added ambiguously:  
 
But instead of quarrelling with Sweden, which might become bad for him [i.e. for Peter I], I 
would recommend him to turn his weaponry against the Levant and to subjugate the 
barbarians, the Kalmyks for instance, who don’t yet recognize him [as their sovereign]. It is 
true that the conquests he could make in this direction would render him still more 
formidable. But as he does not seem to remain with his arms folded, it would be better for 
Christianity, if he was occupied further away from us.51 
 
In a letter to Nicolaas Witsen, the mayor of Amsterdam, Leibnitz is less critical and 
refers to the domestic disorder that forced the Tsar to re-establish internal peace by 
such atavistic means, “a custom originating still from the Scythes.”52 The 
ambivalence of Leibniz’s evaluation of Peter I, an enormous admiration for his 
reforms in general coupled with certain bewilderment about these cruel acts, 
corresponds more or less to the general tone of Korb’s diary. Admiration for the 
reform-Tsar was definitely prevailing, although Peter had so far done little that 
made him stand out from his predecessors – apart from his appearance abroad that 
indeed earned him the most sympathy from the European hommes de lettres. 
                                                                                                            
Menge nach Syberien in das ewige Elend geschicket. Der Zaarin leiblicher Bruder und 
viele Bojaren mußten sich die Hände absägen/ oder eine andere Schmach anthun lassen.” 
51  Draft of a Letter to Sparvenfeld, December 27, 1698 in French, quoted in Woldemar 
Guerrier, Leibniz in seinen Beziehungen zu Russland und Peter dem Grossen. Eine ge-
schichtliche Darstellung dieses Verhältnisses nebst den darauf bezüglichen Briefen und 
Denkschriften (Hildesheim, 1975): 39. 
52  Letter of March 14/24, 1699. Quoted from Mechthild Keller, “Wegbereiter der Aufklä-
rung. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz' Wirken für Peter den Großen und sein Reich”, in West-
östliche Spiegelungen. Russen und Rußland aus deutscher Sicht und Deutsche und 
Deutschland aus russischer Sicht von den Anfängen bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Mecht-
hild Keller, Ursula Dettbarn and Lev Zinov'evich Kopelev (München, 1985), 400. 
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What distinguished Korb’s diary from formerly published German newspaper 
records on the retaliation against rebellious strel’tsy? What was it that provoked the 
scandal? Certainly, the bone of contention has to be searched for in the author’s 
description of events rather than in his attempts to explain why things happened as 
they did. However, in coherence with our cursory look at the paradigms of 
preceding foreigners’ approaches to interpreting revolts in Russia, I will start with 
Korb’s “aetiology”, his search for adequate interpretations and explanations of what 
happened. Probably the scope and cruelty of the retaliation seemed excessive to 
him, at least in comparison to the seeming harmlessness of the mutiny itself. 
Indeed, normally even in cases of much fiercer insurrection, as in 1682, the Tsarist 
government contented itself with executing the ringleaders to set a warning 
example, and to grant an amnesty to the rest. It seems as if Korb was rather puzzled 
by the sudden cruelty that, on the first glance, hardly fit with his positive image of 
the enlightened monarch. In his attempt to justify the cruelty of repression he thus 
tends to enlarge the rebellion and the depravity of its underlying motives.   
How to Reconcile the Russians’ “Inborn Servitude”  
with the Occurrence of Revolt 
Korb’s diary with its regular entries for almost every day of the embassy’s stay in 
Moscow contains not only information on the mutiny and its aftermath. The author 
covers various topics, jumping erratically from one to another. Only the first part of 
the published book is the actual diary. It seems not to have been considerably 
reworked for literary purposes, although Korb translated his originally German 
entries into Latin. This actual diary is less prone to interpretation and explication 
than thematic second part that starts with a coherent narrative of the strel’tsy’s 
rebellion. Certain points mentioned before in the diary reoccur here, but Korb also 
added new aspects and attempts at interpretation. In subsequent chapters Korb 
portrays court-life, customs and traditions based on what he has seen and 
experienced in Moscow and its environment.53  
In this sense this two-part book is much more comprehensive than the 
newspaper reports. And although many depictions seem to be quite well-balanced 
and far from a simple black-and-white-scheme, Korb generally sticks to a 
                                                 
53  The most detailed study on Korb's diary is Friedrich Dukmeyer, Korbs Diarium itineris in 
Moscoviam und Quellen, die es ergänzen. Beiträge zur moskowiisch-russischen, österrei-
chisch-kaiserlichen und brandenburgisch-preussischen Geschichte aus der Zeit Peters des 
Grossen (Vaduz, 1965), a doctoral dissertation that was originally published in 1909-
1910.   
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widespread Western view of the Russians’ barbarianism,54 superstition,55 excessive 
cruelty, penchant for tyranny, the leading circles’ inclination to corruption and 
embellishing military defeats,56 as well as to the ubiquitous habit of lying. In a 
chapter on the “Russian character” Korb also reproduced existing Western 
stereotypes of the Russians’ almost natural servitude and inborn servility. He 
explicitly and affirmatively quotes John Barclay’s Icon animorum with his 
comments on 
 
 this race, born for slavery [that] becomes ferocious at the least trace of liberty; placid if 
oppressed, and not refusing the yoke, they of their own accord confess themselves slaves of 
their prince. He has the right to their wealth, their bodies, and their lives. Humility more 
sordidly crouching the very Turks entertain not for their Ottoman sceptre.57  
 
It is the idea of “tyranny without a tyrant” – an Aristotelian response to an apparent 
conceptual dilemma. In the categorisation of the different forms of government, 
tyranny was understood as a short-lived, illegitimate form characterized by the ruler 
abandoning the common good for the sake of his private benefit. This form of rule 
sooner or later provoked the resistance of the subjects, whose inborn sense of 
liberty would urge them to remove the illegitimate monarch. However, what was 
perceived as tyranny in Russia seemed astonishingly permanent and stable, similar 
to what Aristotle at his time observed in the Empires of the Orient. Aristotle’s 
solution of the problem was simple: the “barbarian” subjects lacked the sense of 
freedom that was so fundamental to the Greeks. Government of the state was 
assimilated to the despotic rule of the household, where private interest was (quite 
                                                 
54  For the theme of barbarianism in European ethnographical accounts of Russia see Mar-
shall T. Poe, 'A people born to slavery'. Russia in early modern European ethnography, 
1476 -  1748  (Ithaca,  NY,  2000).  
55  Cf. the entry for August 10 and 11, 1698. Johann Georg Korb, Diary of an Austrian 
secretary of legation at the court of Czar Peter the Great, trans. Marshall Poe (London, 
2003), 165-167. 
56  See the entry for August 19, 1698. Ibid., 168-169. 
57  Ibid., 516. Korb has taken the quotation from John Barclay's (1582-1621) Icon animorum 
(8th chapter on the Russians' national character): “servituti gens nata, ad omne libertatis 
vestigium ferox est; placida, si prematur, neque abnuunt jugum; ultro fatentur Principi se 
servire. Illi in suas opes, in corpora, vitamque jus esse. Sordidioris reverentiae humilitas 
Turcis non est in suorum. Ottomanorum sceptrum […] Magnatibus, licet ipsi serviant, in 
minores suos & plebejos, quos per contemptum nigros homines, & Christianos [in the 
sense of krestiane, peasants] communiter appelland intolerabilis fastus est, & vulgus ho-
rum maxime supercilium timet.”  Cf. Dukmeyer, Korbs Diarium itineris, 2: 49. 
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naturally) paramount. Instead of striving for freedom the subjects loved their 
servitude, so that tyranny became a permanent institution and even functioned as 
such without an explicit tyrant at the head of the state.58  
Korb seemed to see the Russians more or less in this light. He thus describes 
episodes from Moscow in the Tsar’s absence, that illustrate the idea of tyrannis sine 
tyranno: for instance the fate of a woman who had shown compassion towards a 
strelets in the pillory. When passing she let slip a sigh: “Alas! Which mortal knows 
whether you were guilty or innocent”? This was enough for another passerby to 
denounce her exclamation “to the Boyars as an indubitable indication of treason.” 
Korb was bewildered: 
 
A woman’s pity for condemned and public criminals was deemed dangerous. So she was 
forthwith dragged up, along with her husband, to an examination. Now, when it was proved 
that there was nothing more in question than unreflecting and womanly compassion for the 
unfortunate, and that there was no trace of deliberate malice, they were indeed exempted from 
the penalty of death, but nevertheless condemned to exile. Thus thoughtless and guileless 
liberty of the tongue is chastised where subjects are coerced to obey through fear alone.59  
 
This fits with Korb’s depictions of the leading Boyars’ tyrannical behaviour. Even 
B.A. Golitsyn, Peter’s former educator and head of the government in the Tsar’s 
absence, who was often visited by the Ambassador Guarient, Korb’s superior, 
boasted in the presence of his foreign guests of his despotic regime at home towards 
his servants and family.60 
The Muscovites’ compliance with this sort of arbitrariness seemed to be rather 
at odds with the very possibility of rebellion and revolt. And like many other 
foreigners who subscribed to the idea of Russian servility, Korb had some problems 
classifying the uprising. He was aware of this contradiction, although he did not 
explicitly address it. In his chapter on “the Russian character” he thus sketches a 
situation of general depravity and falsehood: 
 
Devoid of honest education, they esteem deceit to be the height of wisdom. They have no 
shame of lying, no blush for a detected fraud: to such a degree are the seeds of true virtue 
proscribed from that region, that vice itself obtains the reputation of virtue.61 
 
                                                 
58  Poe, A people born to slavery. 
59  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 156-157 (Entry of July 24, 1698).  
60  Ibid., 158-160 (Entry of July 25 and 26, 1698).  
61  Ibid., 517.  
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This habit of lying is illustrated in a description of a scuffle that took place 
between German ambassadorial servants and some Muscovites. It ended with the 
interference of a contingent of soldiers who brought the Germans to the military 
guard, where the officers (also mainly Germans) considered them innocent and 
released them all. However, the following day the Russians scufflers wrongfully 
accused Guarient’s servants of having made use of weapons in the brawl: 
 
One of the Muscovites went about showing his wounds, and having suborned witnesses at a 
cheap rate, contended that he bore the marks of a sword that had been drawn against him: the 
falsehood of which being evident to our eyes, we could not but marvel prodigiously at the 
corrupt morals of this people, and how their abominable custom of lying and perjury is 
allowed to go unpunished. Search for false witnesses where you will among the Muscovites, 
and you will find them. For fate hath instituted such a universal perversity of reason in 
Muscovy, that it is very nearly the index of a superior intellect to be able to cheat.62 
 
But rebellions and revolt do not necessarily ensue from lying, fraud and ubiquitous 
crime. Even if these deviant practices turn out to be extremely widespread, they 
remain individual rather than collective.63 Fraud and other criminal acts aim at 
small egoist benefit, whereas in their descriptions of 17th century Russian town 
rebellions many foreign observers point at the circumstance that collective agency 
was accompanied by an orientation towards a common good, which implicitly 
challenged the authorities, especially when a tyrannical ruler or more often his evil 
councillors lacked precisely this such a dedication to the common good.64 
Reasons for the Revolt as Suggested by Korb’s Account 
On these premises Korb felt compelled to speculate as to possible reasons for the 
strel’tsy revolt. Why such an act of resistance, and resistance against what, if the 
Muscovite subjects were “natural slaves”, who had no idea of freedom and actually 
                                                 
62  Ibid., 155-156 (entry July 24, 1698).  
63  On criminality in Moscow see Christoph Schmidt, Sozialkontrolle in Moskau: Justiz, 
Kriminalität und Leibeigenschaft 1649-1785, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des 
östlichen Europas 44 (Stuttgart, 1996). Foreign images of criminality and deviant behav-
iour are quoted in the Introduction. The separation between criminality and rebellion was 
in reality not as strict as this conceptualization suggests. Robber gangs sometimes linked 
the two phenomena and fitted more or less to Hobsbawm's paradigm of the Social ban-
dits. At least vaguely they often defended a notion of social justice. But this dimension is 
ignored in representations by foreigners, differently from their depictions of town revolts. 
64  See above. 
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loved their servitude?  Korb’s explanatory attempts go in different directions that 
are not always reconcilable with each other: he refers a) to celestial constellations; 
b) to the major “ringleader” Sofiia; c) to an “infection” from Polish unrest; d) to the 
multi-ethnic character of the empire and finally, and apparently related to this 
multi-ethnic dimension, e) to the circumstance that in Russia people would not fight 
against, but to retain a servitude that seemed endangered by Peter’s enlightenment 
policies.65 
a) Comets as Harbingers of War and Revolt  
The link between ignorance and servility was almost classical, but Korb relates this 
topos to astrological questions: 
 
In their schools positively the only labour of the schoolmasters is to teach the children how to 
write and shape letters. The height of learning consists in committing to memory some 
articles of their creed. They despise liberal arts as useless torments of youth, they prohibit 
philosophy, and they have often publicly outraged astronomy with the opprobrious name of 
magic. It is criminal to introduce the calendar of Vo[i]gt the astronomer into Muscovy, 
because this general proposition, Moscau wird seinem Ungluck auch nicht entgehen (neither 
will Moscow escape her ill-fortune), he presaged rebellion to the Muscovites.66  
 
J. H. Voigt (1613-91) was at the time one of the most popular German 
mathematicians and astronomers (and astrologists) writing on comets. He regarded 
them as harbingers of disaster. This general assumption since Antiquity had been 
made an object of new scientific enquiry by outstanding scientists such as J. Kepler 
and H. Cardanus. Given the appearance of comets immediately before the Thirty 
Years’ War (1618), the plague in Hamburg, along with the numerous revolts and 
civil wars in the mid-17th century this idea had become particularly widespread.67 
                                                 
65  Curiously, Korb did not even evoke one of the most widespread explanations in foreign 
records on the events: an interpretation of Peter's absence in the light of his alleged at-
tempt to reunite rally the Orthodox Church to Rome and thus to betray the Muscovite re-
ligion of his fathers and of the population at large. Many reports that go along with this 
idea combine it with a social differentiation, saying that the Boyars' and many representa-
tives of the clergy stirred up the population against the Tsar by propagating that he aimed 
at converting his country to Catholicism. For a synopsis of these accounts see Dukmeyer, 
Korbs Diarium itineris, 1: 179-184. 
66  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 518-519.  
67  Already Cardanus (1501-1576) was convinced that comets stirred up the human bile. In 
this sense Johannes Kepler ascribed the Portuguese King Sebastian's impulsive and im-
prudent military campaign of 1577 in North Africa (that ended up in a defeat and finally 
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Voigt’s prognostics of earthly events based on stellar phenomena were quite 
detailed, and in this sense he had predicted uproar in Moscow. Korb enumerates 
Voigt’s calendar among other Western scientific achievements. In Russia, such 
calendars were highly popular. This made their predictions extremely dangerous in 
the eyes of the government. Therefore, Sofiia’s government forbade them shortly 
after the 1682 strel’tsy uprising.68 According to Korb the Russian authorities said 
“that evil spirits, at whose suggestion and showing astronomers may sometimes 
guess about the future what is beyond mortal ken, must have helped him [Voigt] in 
this black art.”69 
The Russian authorities apparently feared unrest, not least because such 
announcements risked frightening and stirring up the population. In our eyes, this 
seems rather rational: superstition and popular beliefs were perceived as a mighty 
force that was able to foment uproar and should therefore be bridled.70 But for Korb 
(and his well-read European contemporaries) proscribing such calendars meant 
rejection of scientific knowledge and was a clear indicator of superstitious 
obscurity, absolutely equivalent to the rejection of fine arts and many other 
                                                                                                            
cost the king's life) to the apparition of a comet. The impact on royal blood was particu-
larly high, so that Sebastian did not want to listen to his soberer counsellors' warnings. 
Bisaccioni, Historia delle gverre civili di qvesti vltimi tempi, the contemporary “histori-
an” of the transnational political crises around 1650 explicitly relates the numerous re-
volts of the mid-17th century to comets. Not only were scientific observers prone to such 
explanations of human behaviour. Politicians also recurred to these scientific insights. At 
the negotiations for the Westphalian Peace of 1648 the Swedish delegate Salvius referred 
to “the disposition of the stars” that might have been the reason why “in the whole world 
one hears about the people's revolt against their sovereigns: for instance in France, Eng-
land, Germany, Poland, Muscovy and in Turkey.” Georges Livet, La guerre de trente ans 
(Paris, 1966): 121. 
68  See S.M Shamin, “Evropeiskaia astrologiia i russkoe pravitel'stvo v XVII stoletii”, in 
Estestvennonauchnaia knizhnost' v kul'ture Rusi, ed. A.Iu. Samarin (Moskva, 2005). 
69  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 519.  
70  Repercussion of astrological beliefs on actual human behaviour could really be a catalyst 
of revolt. For instance in the wake of the Swiss peasant war (1653) the fire-tail of a comet 
was interpreted as the symbol of a sword announcing imminent war. Andreas Suter, Der 
schweizerische Bauernkrieg von 1653. Politische Sozialgeschichte - Sozialgeschichte 
eines politischen Ereignisses (Tübingen 1997), 94-95 affirms that the ensuing excitement 
and apprehension has contributed to heated atmosphere that led into the confrontation.  
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achievements of the Enlightenment.71 And in spite of all interdictions, Moscow still 
had not escaped uproar. Concerning the paradox of inborn slaves revolting against 
servitude, natural (or astronomical) law was thus an explanation of revolt that did 
not need people’s striving for justice or freedom.  
However, stars and comets were only causes of causes and most of Korb’s 
explicative efforts involved deliberate human agency, although in an inverse sense. 
Well informed by Patrick Gordon and other military commanders, Korb listed the 
strel’tsy’s grievances: their lack of adequate rations and consecutive half-starvation, 
as well as the long separation from their families in Moscow. But these limited 
motives did not seem sufficient to him. The unspoken question he tried to answer 
was: If the strel’tsy revolt had such a limited and presumably rather easily remedied 
cause, would Peter’s retaliation have been so ferocious? As an admirer of Peter as 
an enlightened monarch Korb was convinced that there must have been much more 
at stake. 
b) Ringleaders – Sofiia as the Clandestine Instigator 
Revolts could not develop without ringleaders: this was opinio communis in early 
modern Europe and maybe until now. And the more important the ringleaders, the 
more dangerous a revolt could become.72 In Sofiia, the revolt had a high-ranking 
ringleader who strove for nothing less than the crown. Korb subscribed to Peter’s 
indictment against his half-sister and reproduced the official scenario of her alleged 
secret correspondence with the strel’tsy from her ecclesiastical imprisonment. 
Through a beggar woman, Sofiia would have transmitted her instructions in a loaf 
of bread.73 Probably Korb still doubted if this scenario was sufficient to convey to 
his readers the dangerousness of the situation that alone would legitimize Peter’s 
brutal reprisal. So he awkwardly introduced a flashback to the 1682 uprising that 
served to outline the whole potential of the 1698 events. His description of the 1682 
events was certainly influenced by Heinrich Butenant’s narrative. The German 
merchant and commercial agent of the Danish crown had been an eyewitness and 
almost a victim of the uprising: his description had circulated in German 
publications for years. But Korb did not adopt the Butenant’s rather positive 
evaluation of Sofiia. Rather he made her image conform to the negative view 
propagated by Peter’s government. Korb thus tried to show how the strel’tsy had 
been Sofiia’s puppets in 1682, with the cruel slaughters of a considerable part of the 
                                                 
71  The same argument can be found in Olearius' account that strongly influenced Grimmels-
hausen's Simplicissimus. Cf. Mechthild Keller, “Simplizianische Moskowienfahrt. Hans 
Jacob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen”, in West-östliche Spiegelungen, 377-378. 
72  Cf. Karl Härter's contribution to this volume.  
73  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 413-418. 
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highest court-elite74 as a result. The impending repetition of this scenario in 1698 
called for severest counter-measures.  
However, this “historically informed” picture seems not to avoid perplexity 
about the causes, especially given the premises that Korb was convinced of Peter’s 
outstanding qualities and presented the Tsar as a sovereign who wanted and did the 
best for his people and who acted for the sake of the common good, different from 
the tyrannical type of rulers. Korb wanted to go beyond a simple designation of a 
culprit and tried to explore more profound motives for resistance. He apparently 
wanted to explain why the strel’tsy could have stood up for the power-hungry Sofiia 
and, principally, why they assisted her against the enlightened Tsar Peter, in whose 
policies Korb saw the burgeoning of far-reaching reform.  
c) Revolt as an Epidemic that does not Stop at State Borders 
Korb’s introduction to his chapter on the strel’tsy revolt is an attempt to find and 
explore deeper reasons for the uprising. Apparently, Korb identified revolts as 
trans-border-phenomena, something similar an infection that could spread like a 
wildfire, even across state-frontiers, and even if (as in the given case) the subjects 
on both sides of the frontiers lived under different political systems with different 
social structures and with monarchs who were far from equal in terms of their 
actual powers. 
 
By a common sport of fortune it very often happens that when a friend would extinguish the 
houses of his neighbours which the flames are devouring, his own is involved in the same 
peril. And so it is not without reason that we deplore a calamity that may befall ourselves as 
often as Ukalegon hard-by is on fire.75 
 
Everybody knows that when the Poles were about to proceed to the vote for the 
election of a monarch to the throne of their widowed Republic, their struggles were 
divided between two candidates. These wild gusts bursting beyond the narrow 
limits of the Diet, among this fiery people [lit. lively/ vivid tribes/peoples (lat. apud 
vividas gentes)], burning as they are with subtle and active intrigue, menaced a 
tempest fraught with universal danger.76 
 
                                                 
74  Ibid., 436-443. 
75  Ucalegon was one of the Elders of Troy, whose house was set on fire by the Achaeans 
when they sacked the city. His name in Greek is translated as “who doesn't worry” and 
has become synonymous for a “neighbor whose house is on fire.”  
76  “Quae procellae ex Comitiorum freto exaestuantes, apud vividas gentes, subtilique, & 
exerto ambitu ferventes, funestam omnium discriminum minitabantur tempestatem.” 
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The Czar of Muscovy, roused by the proximity of the peril, ordered a strong body of troops 
under the command of General Knes Michael Gregorowicz Romodanowski, to lie in 
observation upon the frontiers of Lithuania, so as to be able, should public disorders arise out 
of the strife of private individuals, to settle them promptly and repress with strong succours 
the disturbers of the public peace, and force them the more efficaciously into the reverence 
due to their lawfully elected king. 
But how wonderful are the vicissitudes of fortune and of human affairs! The flood burst in 
wild rage upon him, who rashly thought to brave the unruly inundation that menaced the quiet 
of a neighbouring nation. Four regiments of Strelitz, which lay upon the frontier of Lithuania 
[inspired by the Polish neighbours], had nefariously plotted to change the sovereignty.77  
 
Korb’s account evoked serious troubles, almost civil war in the terminology of 
natural catastrophe: wildfire, storm on the sea, tempest, inundation, etc.78 Of course, 
Peter stationed his strel’tsy garrisons at the border, not out of human kindness 
towards his Polish neighbours, but as a supporting measure for his active 
interference into the Polish struggle over succession to the throne. Peter had his 
candidate, August of Saxony (the “lawfully elected king”), and succeeded in 
imposing him on his neighbours, and that with the aid of military threat. The 
strel’tsy regiments at the frontier played an important role in this menacing 
scenario.79 But it is not likely that Korb’s introduction on Poland was meant as an 
ironic criticism of Peter’s interventionism. Such intervention was perceived as 
rather normal and, beyond that, Peter’s engagement corresponded to the general 
interests of the Reich that favoured: August to keep out the French-backed 
candidate Prince Conti, who would have dissociated Poland-Lithuania from the 
anti-Ottoman front in Eastern Europe.80 In any way, the Polish-Lithuanian republic 
and its political system with its powerful aristocracy and its weak elected king was 
not viewed as an enlightened model. By contemporaries it was rather seen as an 
                                                 
77  Ibid., 391-392.  
78  These metaphors, modes of explanation, were widespread in 17th century literature on 
revolts. See Peter Burke, “Some Seventeenth-Century Anatomists of Revolution”, in 
Storia della Storiografia 22 (1992): 23-35 on the mainly Italian historians writing on the 
uprisings and civil wars of the mid 17 century crisis. 
79  K. Piwarski, “Das Interregnum 1696/97 in Polen und die politische Lage in Europa”, in 
Um die polnische Krone. Sachsen und Polen während des Nordischen Krieges 1700-
1721, ed. J. Kalisch and J. G. Gierowski (Berlin, 1962), L. R. Lewitter, “Russia, Poland 
and the Baltic 1697-1721”, The Historical Journal 11, 1 (1968). 
80  Even though the Germans were busy with the debate over Spanish succession and there-
fore did not engage in a coalition with Russia to wage war against the Turks, the Reich 
remained interested in an eastern-European anti-Ottoman stronghold. 
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appalling example of chaos and inability to act (due to the magnates’ liberum veto), 
which was a strong argument for absolutism as the most rational and progressive 
form of government.81 
d) The Multi-National Dimension  
as a Fermenter of Extreme Violence 
According to Korb “political fermentation” came from those “tribes” or “peoples” 
who were “seething with rage”. The multi-”tribal” dimension of the Polish 
“inundation” seemed particularly prone to spill onto Russian territory, for the 
Empire was to an even greater extent multi-national. For this reason, it is important 
to take into account how Korb introduced his clumsy digression on the 1682 events: 
 
Others have already stated that the Russians are sprung from the Roxolanes, the name being 
only slightly altered. More recently the river Moskva, which flows past the metropolis of 
Muscovy has given rise to their name of Muscovites. Nor have there been wanting men of 
genius to describe the times when this race, whom some will have it came from beyond seas, 
grew to their mighty strength from small beginnings, from their first royal feat in Novgorod 
and Kiew, the Wlodimir, and lastly Moscow. By the tyranny of Ivan Basilowicz which served 
him to subdue to himself so many vast neighbouring regions, the kingdoms of Casan and 
Astracan, either by the death of their rulers or their imprisonment, Muscovy grew to its 
present immensity of empire, the very hugeness of which has often already proved a source of 
misery, and the incurable wounds of which the restless minds of the people are constantly 
tearing open before the heal.82  
 
Only after this focus on territorial expansion into the terrains of wild peoples, and 
on the perils of separatist stirrings, did Korb come to the “1682 civil dissensions” 
and the accompanying “fearful internecine cruelties in rapine, and slaughter, and 
pillage”.83 When reading Korb’s account, one feels slightly bewildered by his 
sudden historical flashback to the “Roxolanes” and the annexation of Kazan’ and 
                                                 
81  For foreign views of the political system in Poland see Elida Maria Szarota and Adam 
Kersten, Die gelehrte Welt des 17. Jahrhunderts über Polen. Zeitgenössische Texte 
(Wien, 1972). 
82  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 436. The Latin text reads: “Joannis Basilidis tyran-
nide, qua tot amplissimas vicinas Provincias Casani, Astrachanique regna Principum 
morte, aut captivitate sibi subjugaverat, i eam, quae nunc est, amplissimi Dominatûs 
magnitudinem adolevit, quam hucusque sua moles saepe afflixit, cujus insanabilia vulne-
ra inquietae subditorum mentes periculissima sui avulsione nec dum passa sunt ducere ci-
catricem.” 
83  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 436-437. 
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Astrakhan. This seems rather awkward and out of context. But apparently it was 
meant to stress the general potential for conflict of the Muscovite Empire’s multi-
ethnic composition. For Korb this should help explain the amplitude of the 1682 
uprising, although the events themselves were not related to any multi-ethnic 
dimension and Korb was not able to establish such a link.  
e) Resistance to Enlightenment –  
Struggle for the Maintenance of Servitude 
The significance of the non-Russian peoples seemed to be at the core of Korb’s 
(mostly implicit) aetiology. It is the reading of revolts as manifestations of 
retrograde resistance against the civilizing process imposed from above. We have 
seen an earlier glimpse of such an interpretation in the London Gazette that tried to 
explain the upheavals of 1682 as a response against Tsar Fedor’s inclination to 
Western, notably Polish, habits and his attempts to “civilize” his people.  
In Korb’s eyes revolt in Russia could also not be explained by a misled fight 
against servitude, as it had often been done in accounts of European revolts.84 
“Inborn slaves” could certainly not be seduced by the fallacious prospect of 
freedom and justice. Rather he believed the Russians to love their servitude and to 
struggle against those who wanted to deliver them from tyranny, who vouched for 
progress and enlightenment (like Peter). Korb could build on many earlier 
travelogues, whose authors had noted with stupefaction how Russians deliberately 
sold themselves into serfdom, when he wrote: 
 
The slavery laws are in vigour among the Muscovites. Some become slaves by captivity, 
others are so by birth, many from being sold by their fathers, or by themselves: for if they be 
manumitted by their dying masters, so accustomed are they to slavery, that they make 
themselves over as slaves to other masters, bind themselves slaves for a sum of money.85 
 
Korb actually reverted to a well-established stereotype, when he underlined that in 
Russia a father could sell his son into bondage four times.86 Only Peter I had 
                                                 
84  For this pattern of a fight against servitude see for instance the following treatise: 
Wahrhafftig-Abbildender Auffruhr- und Empörungs-Spiegel. In welchem Alle unruhige 
und verwegene Köpffe gahr leicht und eigentlich zu erkennen seyn/ beydes Ihnen selbst 
zu nöthiger Betrachtung/ und allen redlichen/ Gottfürchtenden/ ihr Vaterland liebenden/ 
… Gemüthern zu nützlichem Gebrauche vorgestellet (Friedberg [i.e. Hamburg], 1687). 
85  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 522.  
86  This assertion comes from Herberstein and has since be repeated in many travellors' 
accounts, but also in political philosophy. Still in the 16th century Bodin has taken it up in 
his major work, Les six livres de la République. See Poe, A people born to slavery, 173. 
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attacked these evils, Korb noted admiringly, but at the same time these efforts on 
behalf of his people’s freedom and maturity incurred hatred against him: 
 
However […], now that Muscovy possesses a monarch whose intellect is so highly gifted by 
nature, and who is urged on by the wonderful stimulus of glory, people opine that a milder 
statute will be substituted for this very crude authority of parents over their sons. Though, in 
truth, the nation itself has such a dislike of liberty, that it seems to exclaim against a 
happiness for which it was not created, and is so inured to its slavish condition that it will 
scarcely endure the prudent and kindly solicitude of the Prince for his dominations and his 
subjects to be carried out to the full extent.87  
 
Korb assumed that these objections to “happiness” could get extremely violent. 
According to the manifestations of this sort of violence could already be observed 
in the revolt of 1682. In retrospect Korb thus presented the 1682 events as a revolt 
against Peter’s accession to the throne, since initially Peter alone had been 
nominated Tsar. Therefore he interprets the strel’tsy’s refusal to take an oath on 
Peter in 1682 as an act of resistance against the breakthrough of enlightenment. As 
we have seen, this is rather at odds with the representation of that time, since Peter 
had been a child and the party of his family (the Naryshkins) stood rather for 
tradition and for the rejection of foreign influence, whereas the Miloslavskiis (with 
Ivan as their candidate) had proved to be open reform-oriented. Many reform 
projects had been initiated under Fedor and under Sofiia’s regency (until 1689). The 
early years of Peter’s actual reign, i.e. the first half of the 1690s, witnessed in 
reality a revocation of many of these reform initiatives. The government ordered the 
eviction of the Jesuits from Moscow, the persecution of the Kievian Uniates and 
even the suppression of the “regiments of the new order” [polki novogo stroia]. 
This made the initial phase of Peter’s regency a period of Orthodox and xenophobe 
intolerance, with notable setbacks on the reform process, even in the military 
domain, which would later be at heart of the Tsar’s reform efforts.88  
                                                                                                            
But whereas for Herberstein this was a sign of Russian despotism, Bodin quoted such 
passages approvingly, since he made Muscovy a model for his idea of sovereignty. 
87  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 523-524.  
88  For de la Neuville, apparently a French diplomat in Polish service, Peter is the embodi-
ment of cruelty and Asiatic backwardness, whereas Sofiia and especially her lover and 
policymaker Golitsyn are the guarantors of progress. This is even more noteworthy as he 
was on a diplomatic mission in Moscow at the time of the coup d'état of 1689 that led to 
the end of Sofiia's regency. In his account that has apparently been written up at the be-
ginning of the 1690s (first published in 1698) Neuville well purports Sofiia's assassina-
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All this seemed now to be forgotten, and Korb described Peter as if he was born 
as the enlightened reform Tsar. In contrast to him, all his predecessors appeared to 
Korb as the obscure representatives of a tyrannical and unenlightened past:  
 
The Czar is endeavouring, by means of various arts and sciences, to frame a better state of 
things in his kingdom. If success should crown the prudent efforts of good counsel, people 
shall shortly be astonished at the fair edifice that will stand where there was nothing but huts 
before; unless some misfortune should happen or a defection of the people, or perhaps even 
simply the very barbarity of their inclinations should render them incapable of bearing their 
own good fortune, or make them grudge to their posterity a lot so happy, and envy the labours 
of the present for the profit of future generations.89 
 
Thus Korb considered even the people’s jealousy towards the future, towards their 
own children and grandchildren’s generation, as a motive for opposition to Peter. 
The events of 1698 bore a similar potential as the 1682 revolt, and apparently 
Peter’s wrathful reprisals were necessary, all the more so as the boyars subscribed 
to the same tradition of tyranny as the commoners.  
The Ignominious Role of the Elites: Boyars and Clergy 
Korb made clear that Peter often could not rely on his boyars, who also resisted his 
reform measures – not only the cutting of beards, which Korb regarded as 
symptomatic, but also more profound changes. General corruption and depravity 
forced Peter to take ruthless steps. Returning from abroad, he learned at a banquet 
that his commander-in-chief, A.S. Sheyn, had promoted colonels and other officers 
for money, regardless of their merits. This was a major infringement of one of 
Peter’s principal reform aims, the establishment of a meritocracy, as well as the 
struggle against corruption and haggling for positions. Following Korb’s account, 
Peter’s 
 
wrath had grown to such a pitch that he drew his sword, and facing the general-in-chief, 
horrified the guests with this threat: “By striking thus, I will mar thy malgovernment.” 
Boiling over with well-grounded anger, he appealed to Prince Romodanowski, and to the 
Dumnoi Mikitim Mosciwicz; but finding them excuse the general-in-chief, he grew so hot 
that he startled all the guests by striking right and left, he knew not where, with his drawn 
sword. Knes [Prince] Romodanowski had to complain of a cut finger, and another of a slight 
                                                                                                            
tion attempt on Peter's live. See Foy de La Neuville, Zapiski o Moskovii (Moskva, 1996) 
with Aleksandr Lavrov's informative introduction.  
89  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 519.  
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wound on the head. Mikitim Moscivicz was hurt in the hand as the sword was returning from 
a stroke. A blow far more deadly was aiming at the general-in-chief, who beyond a doubt 
would have been stretched in his gore by the Czar’s right hand, had not General Lefort (who 
was almost the only one that might have ventured it), catching the Czar in his arms, drawn 
back his hand from the stroke.90 
 
However choleric Peter behaved in this episode, Korb considered his outburst of 
rage justified: corruption was so ingrained among the Muscovite elites that 
extraordinary action was indispensable to have any chance of making them grasp to 
what extent they acted wrongly and, in the long run, of uprooting this evil.  
Representatives of the clergy were presented as equally or even more 
untrustworthy. The clergy had been given custody of Peter’s half-sister Sofiia, an 
issue of highest delicacy directly related to the 1698 uprising: 
 
The Patriarch cast upon others the blame that the Czarine was not yet shut up in a monastery, 
and the consequent contempt of the Czar’s commands: his Majesty the Czar’s indignation at 
which was so fiery that he ordered the archimandrite and four popes, to whose charge the 
Patriarch imputed it, to be set upon little carts (sboseck) by soldiers, and dragged to 
Bebraschentsko [Preobrazhenskoe, a village near Moscow, where executions were staged] by 
night.91 
 
In Korb’s record these scenes were Peter’s first confrontations after his return to 
Russia that predicted the brutal reprisals that would follow. But on top of that, Korb 
contended that priests had pronounced their benediction over the insurgents’ deeds 
and were ready to carry icons in order to get commoners of the capital to join the 
uprising. Thus the clergy were not spared in the executions, even though this meant 
breach of a taboo: 
 
The ignominious gibbet cross awaited the popes, by way of reward in suit with the thousands 
of signs of the cross they had made, and as their fee for all the benedictions they had given to 
the refractory troops. The court jester, in the mimic attire of a pope, made the halter ready, 
and adjusted it, as it was held to be wrong to subject a pope to the hands of the common 
hangman.92 
 
The Tsar’s dissatisfaction with some Orthodox Church clergy must have attracted 
the attention of Guarient’s delegation, as Rome, the Emperor, Jesuit circles and 
                                                 
90  Ibid., 184-185 (Entry of September 14, 1698).  
91  Ibid., 192 (Entry of September 19, 20, 1698).  
92  Ibid., 431 (7th execution, October 27).  
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others still hoped for Russia’s conversion to Roman Catholicism.93 Korb refrained 
from any speculation about this point. Moreover, in a conflict where the patriarch 
reproached the Tsar for his heavy use of torture in the interrogations of the rebels, 
the chronicler clearly took sides with the Tsar, although otherwise he was reluctant 
to admit the necessity of such cruel measures. Korb saw the unreliability of major 
representatives of the court-elites as the main reason why Peter personally 
interfered in the interrogations of the strel’tsy’s: 
 
The very Grand Duke himself, in consequence of the distrust he had conceived of his 
subjects, performed the office of inquisitor. He put the interrogation, he examined the 
criminals, he urged those that were more pertinaciously silent, to be subjected to more cruel 
tortures; those that had already confessed about many things were questioned about more; 
those who were bereft of strength and reason, and almost of their senses, by excess of 
torment, were handed over to the skill of the doctors, who were compelled to restore them to 
strength, in order that they might be broken down by fresh excruciations.94 
 
The same mistrust seemed to be the reason why Peter compelled his boyars to carry 
out numerous death sentences and closely observed their performances. “[A]ll the 
Boyars, Senators of the realm, Dumnoi, Diaks, and so forth, that were present at the 
council constituted against the rebel Strelitz, had been summoned by the Czar’s 
command to Bebraschentsko, and enjoined to take upon themselves the hangman’s 
office.”95 Serving as executioner was extremely disgraceful and degrading for the 
members of the aristocracy. They could have refused to obey in this matter, if the 
Tsar himself had not assumed this odious job on the very first day: “Five rebel 
heads had been cut off in that spot by an axe that was swung by the noblest arm of 
all Muscovy.”96 The summons of the boyars to take an active part in the execution 
became both an act of humiliation and a test of loyalty. 
Foreigners as Peter’s only Trustworthy Support 
In the diarist’s eyes, the Tsar’s well-founded mistrust of his boyar entourage and of 
representatives of the Orthodox high clergy helped to explain why foreign servitors 
had become Peter’s main allies in the struggle against ubiquitous depravation. In his 
separate chapter on the strel’tsy’s revolt, Korb emphasized that Patrick Gordon’s 
diplomatic skills had prevented a worse outcome of the confrontation between 
                                                 
93  Dukmeyer, Korbs Diarium itineris, 1: 167-214. 
94  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 409.  
95  Ibid., 429-430 (5th execution: 23rd October, 1698).  
96  Ibid., 424 (The First Execution, 10th October, 1698).  
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rebellious strel’tsy and his loyal Muscovite troops at the New Jerusalem Monastery. 
Korb singled out German Lieutenant-Colonel von Grage, whose accuracy and 
precision would have broken the rebels’ resistance immediately: “The Strelitz saw 
safety nowhere; arms could not protect them; nothing was more appalling to them 
than the ceaseless flash and roar of the artillery showering its deadly bolts upon 
them from the German right.”97 Similarly the diarist describes a banquet at this 
same von Grage’s residence, where the Tsar himself deigned to be present (in spite 
of swollen cheeks by toothache): “The Czar never showed himself more frankly 
gay; perhaps because none of the Boyars or anybody else was present to trouble the 
sensations of joy with evil eye.”98 
Such comments were not devoid of patriotic pride on Korb’s part, but they also 
remind us of the dreams of leading Enlightenment thinkers in Germany about their 
close collaboration with the Tsar for the sake of civilizing Russia. However, as 
Korb and others before him depicted the situation, the Russian people were far from 
being a tabula rasa, onto which it would be easy to inscribe a new progressive and 
enlightened code that would henceforth determine their thinking and behaviour.99 
Deep-rooted evils tended to make the Russian people not only less receptive to 
Enlightenment ideas, but foreign observers made them out as the principal cause of 
stubborn resistance against anything progressive. The Tsar favoured “progressive 
foreigners”, whereas the Russian people hated them for their “progressiveness”. 
Foreign accounts quoted this among the central motives of the rebellion. Korb 
referred to an interrogation of Sofiia’s ladies-in-waiting, one of whom 
 
                                                 
97  Ibid., 401. Probably these two armies were also his main informants on this encounter in 
which he had naturally not assisted. For the similarities with Gordon's account of the 
suppression of the uprising at Novoerusalimskii, cf. Brockmann, Der Bruch Peters mit 
Alt-Moskau; Dukmeyer, Korbs Diarium itineris, 2: 100.  
98  Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 191 (Entry September 18, 1698). “Liberius nun-
quam animi fui alacritatem Tzarus ostendit; forte quod Bojamen aliorumque, nemo ade-
rat, qui inviso aspectu gaudii sensum turbaret.”  
99  This was Leibniz's idea as he expressed it in his memorandum of 1708 that he addressed 
to Tsar Peter. He emphasized the hugeness and thus the importance of the empire 
reigned by Peter that “encompassed almost the whole North of our hemisphere”. And 
“since most of it is still tabula rasa and the new pot that has not yet assumed foreign 
taste in studies, many mistakes that have invaded [our sciences] can be avoided and im-
proved, especially because everything is canalized by the mind of a sage ruler”. Tat'iana 
Anatol'evna Oparina, Inozemtsy v Rossii XVI - XVII vv. [ocherki istoricheskoi bio-
grafii i genealogii] (Moskva 2007): 402. 
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after threats and a few strokes with the knout, confessed that the hatred which all Muscovites 
bear to General Lefort, and all Germans in general, was the main cause of the pernicious 
design; for to such a degree has nature made most Muscovites barbarians that they cannot 
bear virtue to be imported by foreigners.100 
 
All this conveys Korb’s and others’ idea that in his struggle for reform, 
enlightenment and the common good of the Russian people, Peter I could only 
count on the faithful assistance of his foreign servitors. The representatives of his 
immediate Russian entourage were either unreliable, or even supported a 
recalcitrant people, whose stubborn resistance to any novelties questioning their 
inherited barbarism, egoism and indecency needed to be countered with resolute 
and, if necessary, brutal measures. 
DIPLOMATIC SCANDAL: A SHIFT IN THE TSARS’ 
INFORMATION POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON WESTERN 
COVERAGE OF RUSSIAN REVOLTS 
As a whole, Korb’s book provides an enthusiastic description of tsar Peter’s actions 
and initiatives – and it contrasts his luminous image with the dark reality of his 
country. In fact, the Russian population had hardly ever been described differently. 
Apart from that, the antagonism between the Tsar and his country legitimated 
Peter’s occasional cruelty as necessary recourse to the stick. Why then did the 
publication of Korb’s book in 1700/1 result in such a huge diplomatic scandal?  
But I have to start with a very short summary on what the Russian government’s 
reaction actually was. At the beginning of 1701, Russian Ambassador Prince P.A. 
Golitsyn learned in Vienna about Korb’s diary. Immediately he wrote a furious 
letter to inform Peter I about the deed of “culprit Guarient”, the Imperial 
Ambassador and chief of the 1698 delegation to Moscow. Although the diary was 
published by Korb under his name, Golitsyn took Guarient for the author and 
deemed him responsible for the publication – politically and personally.101 Golitsyn 
had the diary quickly translated into Russian and sent it to Peter, together with the 
                                                 
100 Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 201 (Entry of October 6 and 7, 1698).  
101 In fact, Korb definitely was the author. This can be clearly determined from Korb's 
personal documents in the Amberg district archive. The similarities between the diary 
and Guarient's accounts sent to Kaiser Leopold, is due to the fact that Korb was also re-
sponsible for the correspondence with Leopold I. See Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, 
Staatsabteilung Rußland I, 18 (1698). I am particularly grateful to Aleksandr Lavrov, 
who provided me with his copies from the Amberg archives.  
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Latin original. Golitsyn’s personal translator seemed to have had some difficulty 
with the Latin text. Normally, he translated between from Russian into German and 
vice versa, maybe Dutch as well, as did most translators at Muscovite foreign 
office. The translation was inexact, full of mistakes. At the same time the translator 
deliberately left out the most delicate passages that might have offended the Tsar, 
such as paragraphs about his active participation in the executions.102 Thus Peter 
received a truncated version. However, he still set a whole machinery against the 
book and its alleged author in motion.  
Moscow demanded that Guarient should be relieved of his functions and never 
again sent to Moscow. And what was even more important, it claimed that the book 
should be forbidden and withdrawn from the market. But the Emperor refused to 
put Korb’s book on the Index, for he had given the publication his blessing in form 
of the imperial seal. In response Russian diplomats bought all copies they could get 
a hold of and burnt them (which is why the original Latin edition is a rarity to this 
day). Concerning Guarient, the situation was not that different. To dismiss him 
would have meant a loss of face for the Emperor. In his letter to Peter, Golitsyn 
complained about the protection the ambassador enjoyed from high-ranking nobles, 
namely from the earl of Kaunitz. In the end it was Guarient himself who yielded to 
the pressure and refrained from further missions to Russia. Muscovite diplomacy 
was not unsuccessful, but its victories were Pyrrhic in central aspects. The auto-da-
fé did not extinguish public interest in the book, on the contrary. In educated 
circles, the few surviving copies were passed around, and the content was widely 
debated.  
But again: why such a harsh reaction altogether? What was the bone of 
contention for Peter and his court? Why did they attack this book at that particular 
time? In the historical literature, the objections to blunt descriptions of the 
executions have been put forward as the main motive. But the executions were 
staged in public, and in the presence of foreign delegates. Apparently Peter even 
aimed at Western reception of these brutal events. As we have seen, Leibniz even 
supposed (and he did so well before the publication of Korb’s diary) that Peter 
wanted to boast of his absolutist power over his subjects in front of the Emperor.103 
Another argument focuses on the representation of Peter’s personal participation in 
the executions: Korb was the only contemporary who referred to these scenes. This 
alone, goes a current argument in historiography, would have undermined the 
Tsar’s dignity and have been enough for him to do anything he could in order to 
                                                 
102 Dukmeyer, Korbs Diarium itineris, 1: 10-13. Dukmeyer has consulted the translation in 
Moscow. 
103 See above. 
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prevent the circulation of the book.104 But on the other hand, even after the scandal 
over Korb’s diary Peter would still not refrain from referring to his direct 
implication in such bloody events. More than a decade later, in 1711 he would tell 
the Danish envoy Just Juel about his scientific observations during the course of 
decapitations. He described in detail the execution procedure against one rebel. His 
case had been exceptional, for, after having been beheaded, his corpse straightened 
up and remained erect for a minute or so. This account “is credible”, notes Juel: 
 
I heard it from the lips of the Tsar himself, and the Tsar is not prone to inventions. To 
conclude, the Tsar, who judges soundly on everything, expressed the idea that this criminal 
undoubtedly had narrow veins – a circumstance that slows down the hemorrhaging and thus 
longer conserves vitality in the body. Similar phenomena, occurring for the same reason, can 
be observed with birds, and particularly with hens, that sometimes continue to run for quite a 
while after their heads have been chopped off.105 
 
Given such vivid accounts, it seems unlikely that Korb’s descriptions of the 
executions provoked the strong reaction against his book. Peter was rather 
concerned to propagate his mercilessness abroad – and he relied to a considerable 
extent on foreigners’ accounts to purport his fame. Both at home and through his 
trip abroad, when supposedly incognito, he invested a lot into disseminating the 
image of himself as a Tsar who literally took into his hands the destiny of the 
country. This activity was probably the main novelty he embodied; and it earned 
him greatest reverence among European enlighteners.106 Even his cutting off of 
“five rebel heads” fitted into this model. Active and vigorous initiative included 
“over-due tasks”, such as punishing those who remained stubbornly opposed to the 
                                                 
104 On Peter I.s active participation in the execution see Ibid., 2: 101–163. Dukmeyer gives 
detailed appreciation of the different views expressed in historiography until the end oft 
he 19th century. For more recent treatments of the matter see Reinhard Wittram, Peter I. 
Czar und Kaiser; zur Geschichte Peters des Großen in seiner Zeit (Göttingen, 1964), 1: 
178; and Brockmann, Der Bruch Peters mit Alt-Moskau, 501-503. 
105 See Juel's diary entry of January 30, 1711, Zapiski Iulia Iusta, datskogo poslannika pri 
Petre Velikom (1709-1711)', in Lavry Poltavy, ed. V. P. Naumov (Moskva 2001), 235. 
However, it has to be said that Juel refrained from publishing his diary. See below. If 
Peter I boasted of his cold-bloodedness in front of the Danish diplomat, this latter might 
have suspected that the Tsar wanted such stories to be circulated through rumors, but not 
in print. Like anybody else, Juel seems to have been alarmed by the Korb scandal. 
106 So Leibniz was particularly impressed when he learned that Peter carpentered himself in 
the Netherlands. In a letter from 1697 he wrote admiringly to Sparvenfeld: “il travaille 
de sa propre main”. Keller, Wegbereiter der Aufklärung, 400. 
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country’s common good and future development. It was the amputation of rotten 
limbs designed to save the organism from degeneration. Beyond that, Peter did so 
for pedagogical reasons. According to Korb’s narrative, Peter had to teach and 
discipline his disloyal and anti-reformatory boyars. Obliging them to emulate him 
in performing the strel’tsy’s executions was a most effective means of putting them 
into their place.  
Visual Representation as the Bone of Contention? 
In view of the fact that the cruelties in Russia had been described in newspapers 
well before the publication of Korb’s diary, I would argue that the scandal over 
Korb’s book was provoked mainly not by textual, but by visual portrayals. The 
book contains quite a detailed copperplate engraving of the galleys with the hanged 
strel’tsy all around the town wall. Perspective is awkward and the engraving 
artistically poor. But everything is presented in a very orderly and graphic manner: 
collective galleys each for ten persons are placed neatly in a row, and smaller 
galleys for two persons each are pointing out of the embrasures in the town wall. In 
the background, one can see another huge collective galley built in a rectangle and 
placed close to the fence of the New Virgin Monastery court. In the garden 
immediately in front of the walls of the monastery, a smaller galley with three more 
victims is placed – apparently those who were hanged near the window of the 
monastery, where Sofiia was taken into custody. In another fenced-in area within 
the town walls people are shown being tortured and others executed with axes. In 
the foreground, apart from crying wives and a group of men that apparently 
welcoming an arriving high dignitary in a carriage pulled by six horses (the Tsar?), 
two women (probably Sofiia’s ladies-in-waiting) are depicted as buried alive with 
only their heads showing up out of the ground. The illustration represents more or 
less what was described in the Diary (and in several German newspapers of 1698 
and 1699), although some characteristic aspects of the cruelties seem to be missing, 
for instance the innumerable fires, on which the strel’tsy were roasted to make them 
confess their crimes.  
“So what?” one might ask. Visual representation of the like was widespread in 
European books, broadsheets, newspapers and other publications at that time. It was 
common to illustrate punishments of such crimes of lese majesty, much more than 
illustrating the revolt itself. This was part of the practice of damnatio memoriae. 
The defamation aimed at obliteration of mass-crime and treason.107 Punishment was 
visualized as deterrence, which was supposed to have a more immediate impact 
                                                 
107 Cf. Angela Rustemeyer, Dissens und Ehre. Majestätsverbrechen in Rußand (1600-1800) 
(Wiesbaden 2006): 253-254.  
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than written texts in an age of essentially oral communication. Also, illiterate 
persons clearly understood – and literally saw – what had happened to the traitors. 
When preparing the copperplate engravings for his book (or when ordering them), 
Korb conformed to standards of visual representation he knew from his own 
cultural background. The picture resembles many other visual representations of 
executions in the aftermath of 17th-century revolts, often commissioned works 
created by professionals on the basis of a written text alone.108 
However, Russian standards of visual representation differed fundamentally 
from those of its Western neighbours. Neugebauer, former tutor of Peter’s son 
Aleksei who had been recently fired, wrote a pasquinade, in which he pointed up 
Peter’s anger at Korb’s book and noted in particular the “clean copper where his 
Majesty the Tsar is standing with axe and sword slaughtering [one of the rebels].”109 
In fact, on the copperplate there are people with axes chopping off heads, but it is 
not at all clear that Peter I is supposed to be one of these executioners. This can 
only be deduced from the text. Be that as it may, even without the portrayal of the 
Tsar as executioner the picture was perceived as an enormous offense. Visual 
tradition in Russia was dominated by hagiographic representation of saints in icons 
and by panegyric portrayals of the sovereign, which also closely followed the 
hagiographic model. Acts of secular violence were an extraordinary object for 
engravings, and pictures of punishment scenes were practically unknown.110 
Punishments were staged in public, as had been done in the reprisals for the 
strel’tsy uprising, similar to many cases of punishments for former revolts in 
Muscovy. These were vivid and appalling examples that spoke a clear language. 
The scenes continued to live in the spectators’ memories – and certainly they spread 
rapidly in whispering campaigns: nonetheless they were not visually fixed once and 
forever and could not be re-regarded.  
One innovation is noteworthy in this context: the erection of pillars of shame, 
i.e. a symbolical representation of punishment. Apparently, these pillars were meant 
                                                 
108 See Karl Härter's contribution to this volume. At our workshop André Krischer has 
shown similar pictures for England.  
109 At the same time Neugebauer referred to the depictions of the princesses that would 
have disgusted Peter. His judgment is interesting, but it would be highly problematic to 
take Neugebauer for an objective informant, for he apparently tried to revenge himself 
for the treatment he had suffered. In this sense he also predicted further publications that 
would present Peter and the Russians in a still less favorable light. Dukmeyer, Korbs 
Diarium itineris, 2: 17-18. 
110 On the visual representations of the Tsar see Frank Kämpfer, Das russische Herrscher-
bild. Von den Anfängen bis zu Peter dem Großen; Studien zur Entwicklung politischer 
Ikonographie im byzantinischen Kulturkreis (Recklinghausen, 1978). 
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as a belated response to columns the strel’tsy had built in 1682 on what is now Red 
Square, when they had held power for a few months. The columns of 1682 were 
actually intended to justify the insurgents’ actions against a range of high-ranking 
boyars. The names of these “traitor-boyars” [vory-boyary] were engraved on the 
columns, thus presenting them as traitors to the Tsar(s) and the common good. Thus 
the previous killings by the strel’tsy were qualified as righteous executions, i.e. as 
legitimate juridical measures.111 In function these columns resembled the pillars of 
shame in Western and middle-European countries in early modern times, where 
they were erected at the places of the culprits’ razed houses and sometimes lasted 
for centuries.112 However, in Russia before 1682, pillars of shame were 
unprecedented. In 1698 Peter apparently ordered them to be built in order to stress 
the indictment of the strel’tsy for ongoing criminal activity and high-treason. But 
they failed to become a regular institution and were not followed up in the further 
course of the 18th century.113  
However ephemeral they in the long run, Peter’s pillars stood for a fixation and 
perennization of memory, in some way analogous to pictures. However, since the 
representation was abstract and rather symbolic than concrete, the pillars were 
apparently not regarded as equivalent to a drawing, as found in Korb’s publication. 
Pictures had an immediate sensual and emotional appeal, especially in a largely oral 
culture with an overwhelming majority of illiterates. In medieval and early modern 
Russia, pictures were expected to be an iconography in the most literal sense. They 
belonged to the domain of worship. Conversely, church and worship, matters of 
religion were to be kept away from fundamentally secular concerns such as the 
punishment of traitors. This could be seen from Peter’s reaction to the patriarch’s 
attempt to calm his fury with the icon of the Holy Virgin: 
 
[The patriarch] thought the best thing was to take an image of the Most Blessed Virgin, the 
sight of which might remind him [the Tsar] of the common lot of man, and bring back the 
common feelings of pity to a mind that was almost degenerating into savagery. But the 
weights of real justice with which his Majesty the Czar measured the magnitude of this 
heinous crime were not to be altered by this exhibition of sham pity. For it had come to that 
pass that Muscovy was only to be saved by cruelty, not by pity. Yet is this severity of 
                                                 
111 Volksaufstände in Rußland, passim. 
112 In the case of the Frankfurt Fettmilch uprising (1612-16) the pillars of shame remained 
until the 19th century. See Rudolf Frank, Vincenz Fettmilch: Eine historische Erzählung 
aus der Geschichte der freien Stadt Frankfurt am Mein  (Leipzig, 1861): 1. 
113 A. V. Lavrent'ev, “Moskovskoe 'stolbotvorenie' kontsa XVII veka. Pervye grazhdanskie 
pamiatniki v Rossii i politicheskaia bor'ba v pokhu Petra I.”, Arkhiv russkoi istorii 2 
(1992); Rustemeyer, Dissens und Ehre, 254. 
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chastisement falsely called tyranny; for sometimes even equity and severity are one and the 
same: more particularly when disease or obstinate gangrene has taken such firm hold of the 
members that there remains no other remedy for the general health of the body politic than 
iron and fire to cut them off. Thus the Czar’s invective against the Patriarch was not unworthy 
of his sovereign office: ‘What wilt thou with thy image? Or what business is it of thine to 
come here? Hence forthwith, and put back that image in the place where it should be 
venerated. Know, that I reverence God and his Most Holy Mother more earnestly perhaps 
than thou dost. It is the duty of my sovereign office, and a duty that I owe to God, to save my 
people from harm, and to prosecute with public vengeance crimes that tend to the common 
ruin.’114 
 
The Tsar urged the Patriarch to bring the icon immediately back to its place, the 
church. He thus made a clear distinction between ecclesiastical and worldly matters. 
Taking the icon away from its place of worship seemed an undue intrusion into 
secular space, a sacrilege, an abuse of a sacred object exclusively used for worship. 
In his reflection on the necessity of cruelty Korb tried to clear Peter of the reproach 
of tyranny. At the same time his interpretation of the confrontation between the 
Patriarch and the Tsar demonstrates that the diarist was completely unaware of the 
significance of pictures in Orthodox culture. Icons were not mere symbols, but the 
depicted persons and events were deemed to be really present.115 
The execution of priests was probably one of the most unprecedented 
undertakings in Peter’s orgy of repression. The extraordinary measures have also to 
be seen as a response to an abusive use of pictures to arouse rioters, since the 
beheaded priests were accused of having led the insurgents with icons. Peter’s court 
regarded the illustrations depicting the executions and torture scenes in Korb’s book 
as a similar encroachment of iconography into the secular sphere. Apart from the 
explicit authorship that linked the book to the imperial embassy (and made it easier 
to intervene than with regard to anonymous news correspondents) it was the visual 
                                                 
114 Korb, Diary of an Austrian secretary, 199-200 (Entry October 6, 7, 1698). 
115 In fact, there had been earlier attempts to curtail the flow of information through diplo-
matic channels. We know about Moscow's attempts to take action against Swedish 
“hack writers” who were accused of having spread the rumour of an alliance between 
Razin and Nikon in 1670/71. See S. M. Shamin, “'Klevety mnogie' o Rossii (o pervykh 
popytkakh russkogo pravitel'stva borot'sia protiv rasprostraneniia v evropeiskikh infor-
matsionnykh izdaniiakh negativnykh i lozhnykh svedenii o Moskovskom gosudarstve)”, 
XXV Pushkinskie chteniia. A. S. Pushkin i Rossiia. Sektsiia 4: Sovremennaia kul'turol-
ogiia i mezhkul'turnaia kommunikatsiia (Moskva, 2006). This attempted intervention 
had taken place on a smaller scale, but probably it is not a coincidence that it was a rep-
resentative of the church who was concerned. 
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representation of the secular act of punishment that distinguished Korb’s 
publication from standard accounts in newspapers that the court had subscribed to 
and that generally did not contain illustrations.116 Visual representation was 
undoubtedly an extremely delicate issue in the medieval and early modern Russian 
tradition. When Peter saw the illustrations in Korb’s book, he reacted, similar to his 
diplomats, with an instant defensive reflex. In the longer perspective this reflex 
action was not counter-balanced by a sober reconsideration.  
A Revaluation of Public Opinion?  
Guarient’s Unsuccessful Quest for Justification 
While the iconographic dimension of the scandal over Korb’s book hints at deep-
rooted traditions and expectations that were unwittingly offended, we can see 
aspects of change in Tsarist government’s positions on publicity and to the public 
sphere. These changes can be seen from Guarient’s correspondence with Muscovite 
officials. Like everything else, the letters remain vague about the actual bone of 
contention, but Guarient’s strategies of defence and justification reveal a lot about 
the shifting paradigms.  
First of all the ambassador denied his authorship. In a letter to Peter’s prime 
minister, Fedor Golovin, he dissociated himself from Korb and took a more or less 
juridical stance. He refused responsibility for a work that was not written by a 
subject of the Emperors crown lands (Korb came from Neumarkt in Lower 
Bavaria): 
                                                 
116 An objection against my emphasis on the importance of visual representation could be 
made with regard to two other publications. Paul Rycaut, Giovanni Battista Donado, 
Michele Foscarini and Berengano, Der Neu-eröffneten Ottomannischen Pforten Fortset-
zung. Oder: Continuirter Historischer Bericht … Beydes aus deß Herrn Ricaut, Donado, 
Foscarini, Berengano, &c. Und andern glaubwürdigen Schrifften und Uhrkunden, aus 
dem Frantzösischen, Italienischen und Holländischen in das Hoch-Teutsche übersetzt 
und zusammen getragen; Zugleich mit kunstreichen Kupffern und wahrhafften Conter-
faiten … außgezieret (Augspurg, 1700) contains an engraving representing Sofiia's mo-
nastery with the gallows around. And another description of the Muscovite state, a small 
brochure that was published about a year after Korb's diary, Der Moszkowitische Staat 
Unserer Zeit. Worinnen unpartheyisch beschrieben Dieses grossen Reichs Beschaffen-
heit und weitläufftigen Gräntzen…; Insonderheit, Was bey dem Lieffländischen Kriege 
zeithero zwischen Moßkau und Schweden… vorgegangen sey (Cölln, 1702) reproduced 
Korb's illustration even on the cover; See also Dukmeyer, Korbs Diarium itineris, 1: 17. 
I can only presume that the brochures, published in Augspurg and Cölln (Brandenburg), 
went unnoticed by Russian diplomats.  
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I beg you not to accuse me of an affair that is not mine: I have no part in that, neither by my 
words, nor by my deeds. It is the story of my secretary and it would have been impossible to 
forbid him to print anything even without my knowledge, because he is not born here, but in 
another region of the Reich.117  
 
In a letter of the same day (24.12.1701) to P. P. Shafirov, the chief translator of the 
Tsar’s foreign office [posol’skij prikaz] and one of Peter I’s leading diplomats, 
Guarient repeated his argument, but the ambiguity of his further reasoning deserves 
closer attention: 
 
Since in this book there is not a single letter from my quill, and since I have reported to His 
Imperial Majesty in a completely different key in regards to the Tsar’s grace [than Korb has 
done in his book] and the imperial ministers are also informed differently, I hope that in 
Moscow you will laugh about such an account and will not accuse me of it [the account]. […] 
On the other hand, in my opinion, the book contains many laudable things, apart from some 
ridiculous and untrue descriptions.118  
 
Guarient’s defence has to be situated at the threshold of a new era in imperial 
diplomatic relations with Russia. This does not mean that the ambassador’s 
argumentation was new. It rather appealed to old and well-tried patterns in bilateral 
relations with Russia. What was new is that it did not work anymore for the Russian 
court. Guarient basically downplayed the significance of Korb’s book: why did the 
Tsar and his diplomats care about this diary? Even if the book was full of lies,119 the 
essential thing was that he, the imperial Ambassador, had informed the Emperor 
and his ministers correctly. This was what counted and what prevented imperial 
diplomats from getting a faulty negative image of the Muscovite court. If Leopold I 
had ever read this book, he wouldn’t have paid attention to it, said Guarient, as the 
Emperor relied on the information he got through his diplomatic channels. 
Consequently his attitude towards the Tsar remained unspoilt and absolutely 
positive. Relevant in Guarient’s reckoning was the Emperor, his court and 
diplomatic corps, i.e. the policy-makers. This position did not necessarily reflect 
                                                 
117 Quoted from Ibid., 1: 12. 
118 Quoted from Ibid., 1: 13. Guarient waited for this laughter in vain. A few months later 
he wrote directly to Peter I. to give up and announce his decision to resign from his po-
sition as ambassador. 
119 Guarient does not entirely condemn the book. If his foremost concern towards Shafirov 
is to repudiate the accusation against him by renouncing the authorship of the book that 
has caused such a scandal, he nevertheless tries to rehabilitate Korb's book through a 
loophole, saying that it contained “many laudable things”, see above.  
STATE-ARCANUM AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES | 251 
 
Guarient’s personal opinion, but an adopted strategy reflecting what he anticipated 
to be his interlocutors’ point of view. 
Guarient’s strategic choice was not ungrounded; it was based on experience 
with Muscovite diplomats and their behaviour in the past. Western newspapers 
(kuranty) were translated at the Tsar’s court in order to learn what Western 
politicians knew and thought (including their views about events in Russia). To the 
Tsar publicity had been important only insofar as it reflected the policy-makers’ 
extent of knowledge. In the 1660s the imperial diplomat Meyerberg, one of 
Guarient’s predecessors, mocked his Muscovite colleagues for referring to Western 
newspapers as to the Delphian oracle.120 Accounts in the press only mattered as a 
source of information for diplomats and politicians. But Guarient claimed that 
through his secret bulletins the Emperor was much better informed than through 
newspapers or a book like Korb’s. The ambassador was convinced that the 
Muscovite court did not consider public opinion and public debate to be an 
independent force that had to be reckoned with.121 In the European imagination the 
Tsar was the incarnation of unlimited autocracy, who would not (and did not need 
to) care about his own population’s opinions: there were not even newspapers in 
Muscovy. Why then should the Tsar care about public opinion abroad? In this 
sense, Guarient thought or hoped that he only had to clear up a misunderstanding: 
he assured his correspondents in Moscow that Korb’s book did not reflect the 
reports he, Guarient, had sent to the imperial court in Vienna during the Embassy 
(hence the dissociation from his secretary Korb) and that the contents of the book 
were far from being a source of the Emperor’s view of Russia and its monarch.  
But this reasoning no longer cut any ice with the Tsar. Guarient was not listened 
to and in 1702 he gave up. Once again he wrote directly to Peter I. Reaffirming his 
innocence, he concluded “I have finally renounced the position of ambassador to 
your court that was offered to me, in order not to meet your discontented eye and 
not to harm affairs.”122 Guarient’s defence was based on a miscalculation. It turned 
out that for the Muscovite court, public opinion had become a force to reckon with; 
this was new. But did it mean that the old way of policy-making over the 
                                                 
120 Quoted in Vesti-kuranty, 1: 9. 
121 David Hume was not even born and if governments already realized that they rested to a 
certain extent “on opinion”, as the Scottish philosopher would later claim it in his path-
breaking Treatise on the Human Nature (1739/40), this was principally a question of 
domestic policy. The state-run Gazette in France, founded still in the 1630s, was a mani-
festation of the state's attempts to influence his citizens' opinions through propaganda. 
Nobody would have tried to bridle public opinion abroad (only in cases of personal in-
sult it was a question of honour to intervene). 
122 Quoted from Dukmeyer, Korbs Diarium itineris, 13. 
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population’s heads was abandoned? To answer in the affirmative would be jumping 
to conclusions. For what we can observe is a concern with public opinion abroad.  
One reason for this shift in the priorities of Muscovite diplomacy was certainly 
Peter’s recruitment policy. The increased efforts to attract foreign specialists to 
Russia to work indeed addressed a Western public well beyond the field of political 
decision-makers. Peter’s government was afraid of dissuading foreign specialists 
from coming to Russia. But it was not mainly the brutal reality of punishment that 
was deemed prone to repel the candidates; it was the visual representations of such 
scenes of state violence. This was definitely a wrong assessment: a picture as it was 
printed in Korb’s book was absolutely familiar to occidental Europeans. It would 
hardly bias him exceedingly against Muscovy.  
Although much of the scandal had probably been provoked by cultural 
differences and ensuing misunderstandings, the affair entailed a more general 
confrontation concerning the idea of publicity and the public sphere. In the 
immediate aftermath of the scandal Russian media policy made a quantitative and 
qualitative leap that would greatly affect foreign relations for generations.  
A NEW RUSSIAN MEDIA POLICY 
In the Korb case, the intervention was purely to prohibit: Muscovite diplomats 
demanded that the book should be forbidden and destroyed. In the short term this 
strategy remained unsuccessful.123 In addition to the intransigence of the imperial 
court in Vienna that would not allow a loss of face by giving in Russian demands, 
the affair stirred up curiosity in European educated circles. The scandal attracted 
interest in the diary, rather than keeping potential readers away, however difficult it 
was to get access to the few remaining copies. An episode reported in 1705 by the 
English ambassador in Muscovy Charles Whitworth shows that Peter did not give 
up. Whitworth wrote to his compatriot Wich in Hamburg about the Tsar’s fury 
when learning of a recent article published abroad, whose author asserted “that 
great numbers of people had been put to death by strange Torturers for a Rebellion” 
in Smolensk. Peter raged: the accounts of “both the Execution and the Rebellion 
were entirely false, nor was there ony the least Ground for such a scandalous 
                                                 
123 The Europäische Fama asserted that, thanks to his persistence, Golitsyn had worked a 
prohibition of the book. But this is quite doubtful and seems to be rather a piece of Rus-
sian propaganda, for Huyssen, who apparently had a function analogous to Böttiger's, 
was particularly influential in this journal and prescribed what had to be written on Rus-
sia.  
STATE-ARCANUM AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES | 253 
 
report.”124 The message for the ambassador was clear: Peter was not willing to 
tolerate such interference into the representation of his country. 
Such restrictive interventions were not entirely new. But from there on they 
were increasingly accompanied by proactive measures to create images and to 
shape public opinion. This was an innovation. At first glance the new policy only 
aimed at internal Russian representation. At the end of 1702, less than two years 
after the Korb affair, the first newspaper was issued in Russia, the Vedomosti 
[Gazette, Bulletin]. If reforms of dress and ceremonial largely copied what Peter 
had seen in Western Europe, his Vedomosti (Gazette) were far away from German 
or Dutch counterparts that had to assert themselves into the pluralism of the printing 
market. Maybe the paper rather followed the French model of the state-run Gazette, 
founded in the 1630s by Théophrast Renaudot under the auspices of Richelieu and 
Louis XIII.125 Even more so, during the first years of the Vedomosti’s existence, the 
Tsar wrote most accounts himself. He apparently attached great importance to this 
matter. Printed in Moscow and in the new capital (St. Petersburg), the paper had 
very limited circulation (wavering between fewer than 100 and 4000 copies in 
1702-1728).126 
For instance, in July 1708 contemporaries could read a report on the current 
revolt of the Don Cossacks under Bulavin in the Vedomosti. The chief rebel was 
presented as an apostate (bogootstupnik) and traitor (vor) who 
 
planned an uprising in the Ukrainian towns and among the Don-Cossacks. He assembled 
several traitors [vory] and accomplices and sent ‘letters of enticement’ [prelestnye pis’ma] 
into many towns and villages to summon [the people] to become his treacherous accomplices 
[vorovskomu edinomyshleniiu]. And many such traitors and all the Don-Cossacks rallied to 
him, some out of need, some because they were under a spell [prelesti]. And in a throng the 
assembled went on to many towns and villages – for ravage and in order to urge still more 
people to join them. 
 
But the Tsar sent his troops under the command of Prince Ya.F. Dolgorukii, in 
order to “catch Bulavin and to destroy his evil treacherous council.” Then the report 
                                                 
124 The letter is dated May 13/2, 1705. Quoted from Astrid Blome, Das deutsche Rußland-
bild im frühen 18. Jahrhundert. Untersuchungen zur zeitgenössischen Presseberichter-
stattung über Rußland unter Peter I (Wiesbaden, 2000), 44-45. We know neither the ar-
ticle nor what it refers to and if something comparable did or did not take place.  
125 For the history of the French Gazette see Gilles Feyel, L'annonce et la nouvelle. La 
presse d'information en France sous l'Ancien Régime, 1630-1788 (Oxford, 2000). 
126 Ingrid Maier, “Pervaja russkaja pechatnaja gazeta i ee inostrannye obrazcy”, in La 
Russie et les modèles étrangers, ed. Serge Rolet (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2010). 
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enumerated the successes of the Tsar’s force, stressing how many rebels were 
beaten or killed. But probably the decisive message of the account was that 
Bulavin, in a militarily hopeless situation, committed suicide. Today the story of 
Bulavin’s suicide on July 7 is considered a rumour.127 But it is important to note 
that this rumour was apparently launched by the Russian government – via its 
newspaper. The chief rebel’s alleged suicide was a suitable means of discrediting 
him and with him the remnants of the rebellion not yet extinguished in some places.  
In Russia it was a novelty to write about revolts that were still going on. 
Formerly, the population not immediately in danger of being won over to the 
rebels’ side had been provided with official information on current revolts only by 
priests in their sermons.128 Written secular accounts had been rare and the medieval-
style chronicles had only emerged many years after the events. Abandoning former 
taboos, Peter’s new media policy seemed, at first glance, to adopt European 
standards: similar to Western governments it tried to assert an interpretative 
monopoly, in order to forestall the propagation of alternative narratives through 
whispering campaigns.129 But due to widespread illiteracy and the low print run the 
pillars of shame were more likely to reach the population.  
This makes it likely that Peter’s account on Bulavin in the Vedomosti aimed not 
least, and maybe even primarily, at a foreign public. Concomitant measures were 
taken in order to influence public opinion abroad. Peter’s government opened a 
proverbial second front and started to install “watchdogs” at critical spots that were 
particularly prone to disseminating news on Russia. We know that shortly after the 
Bulavin events and the subsequent Russian victory against the Swedes at Poltava 
(1709), Johann Friedrich Böttiger was put into action in Hamburg. He was resident 
in Hamburg and paid by the Russian court. He was a key figure in observing and 
eventually curtailing the German press on anything related to Russian themes. His 
tasks seem to have been multiple. Of course, he issued official disclaimers, when a 
newspaper had touched upon a subject that was deemed delicate by the Russian 
government. But in these cases, the damage had already been done. His main 
                                                 
127 Vedomost' no. 8. Moskva [Pechatnyi dvor], July 20, 1708. The paper was issued in 300 
copies. Cf. http://imwerden.de/cat/modules.php?name=books&pa=showbook&pid= 
2154, consulted 12.11.2009. For the classification of the suicide story as a rumour see 
Blome, Das deutsche Rußlandbild, 256; Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, “Der Aufstand der Don-
Kosaken unter Kondratij Bulavin, 1707-1708”, in Volksaufstände in Rußland, 255. 
128 This was namely the condemnation of the insurgents and particularly the pronunciation 
of the anathema against the leaders in liturgy. See Rustemeyer, Dissens und Ehre, 254-
255. As to the war of information within the realm of revolt see André Berelowitch's 
contribution. 
129 Würgler, Unruhen und Öffentlichkeit. 
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activity consisted in preventive measures. These were both reactive and proactive. 
On the one hand he tried to prevent unwelcome news about Tsarist Russia from 
spreading; on the other hand, he increasingly fed newspapers with “proper” news 
from the Russian court. In this sense he and his colleagues in other places can be 
seen as the extended arm of the press policy pursued by the Vedomosti. Often 
publishers did not even realize being provided with “information” from 
representatives of the Tsar’s court.130 
Apparently Böttiger did not only focus on the press. Even a German baroque 
composer like Johann Mattheson (1681-1764) in Hamburg seems to have come into 
trouble. In 1710 he wrote his opera Boris Goudenow about the prelude to the 
Muscovite Time of Troubles (Godunov’s reign was 1598-1605). Mattheson’s 
libretto followed the typical intrigue-, love- and power-pattern and did not even 
include the story of the first False Demetrius, who had conquered the throne from 
the Godunov family. But the very subject was suspect. It might have included social 
upheaval and the challenge to dynastic legitimacy, which was particularly dreadful 
when staged in an audio-visual representation. Mattheson was in contact with 
Russian circles in Hamburg. He had met Böttiger, who must have given him to 
understand that the Russian government did not approve the production of the 
opera. We don’t know exactly what happened, but in the end Mattheson refrained 
from putting the work on stage. The premiere would not take place until 2005 (!) in 
Hamburg. In his autobiography the composer referred only vaguely to “certain 
circumstances” that had made him withdraw the opera.131  
                                                 
130 Blome, Das deutsche Rußlandbild, 20-21. Residents with similar tasks seem to have 
been working in England and France. See ibid., 46. 
131 Johann Mattheson, Grundlage einer Ehren-Pforte, woran der Tüchtigsten Capellmeister, 
Componisten, Musikgelehrten, Tonkünstler etc. Leben, Wercke, Verdienste etc. er-
scheinen sollen (Hamburg, 1740), 197, quoted from Stephen Stubbs, “Johann Mattheson 
- the Russian connection. The rediscovery of Boris Goudenow and his other lost oper-
as”, Early Music 33, 2 (2005): 283-292, 286. Cf. also Dorothea Schröder, Zeitgeschichte 
auf der Opernbühne. Barockes Musiktheater in Hamburg im Dienst von Politik und 
Diplomatie (1690 - 1745) (Göttingen, 1998), 38, 80, who supposes that “Russian tradi-
tion” forbade the portrayal of tsars living or dead on the theatrical stage. But this seems 
unlikely, if we consider that Lope de Vega's El Gran Duque de Moscovia y Emperador 
Perseguido on the Demetrius topic had been staged already a hundred years earlier. Not 
only appeared the False Demetrius on stage (whom Lope considered as the true Tsar!), 
but also Boris Godunov and Vasilii Shuiskii. On Lope de Vega's piece cf. Ervin C. Bro-
dy, The Demetrius legend and its literary treatment in the age of the baroque (Ruther-
ford, 1972). See also Maureen Perrie's contribution to this volume. For pictures of the 
Muscovite sovereign see Kämpfer, Das russische Herrscherbild. We rather have to as-
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Korb’s account itself was remembered for a long time in Europe,132 which 
seems to have been traumatic for the Russian government. Peter’s  administration 
made any effort to correct this supposedly negative image by “proactive” 
representational measures. The main strategy consisted in attributing petty motives 
of revenge to the author, which would explain his nasty “lies”. Still, even before the 
installation of the Russian emissary in Hamburg, the protestant and pro-Petrine 
Europäische Fama tried to discredit Korb’s book. The journal claimed that both, 
Korb and Guarient, had denied their authorship, but that Guarient had at least 
financed the publication in his Catholic overzealousness. In reality it would have 
been “the papal missionaries in Moscow, Dr. Carbonarius and Dr. Pleyer” who had 
 
scrawled it [the book] and filled it with so many unfounded things and untruths, for they were 
jealous that the Protestant religion enjoyed so many privileges in Moscow, almost more than 
theirs [the catholic religion], of what the connoisseurs of the Muscovite state can give the best 
account.133  
 
Shortly after Peter’s death (1725), at the beginning of Catherine’s I reign, a 
mysterious treatise in form of a Conversation between Three Friends who come 
together in one Town, Namely between Menard, Talander and Varemund delivered 
such an explanation of the diary’s malevolence. Apparently the treatise was 
commissioned by the Russian government, probably still under Peter I,134 in order 
to refute a whole range of allegedly slanderous rumours supposedly circulating 
abroad. The dialogical form and even the protagonists’ grecophile names were 
characteristic of European Enlightenment discourse. Not only form and content, but 
also the language, suggest that the pamphlet might have been first published abroad 
                                                                                                            
sume that the sensibility of Russian authorities has augmented considerably, especially 
in the times of Peter I., who was particularly concerned with image building. 
132 Dukmeyer, Korbs Diarium itineris, 1: 17-33.  
133 Europäische Fama, 51. Theil, 1706, reprinted in 1710. Quoted from Ibid., I, p.19-20. 
134 Could this have been a reaction to David Fassmann's very popular Conversations in the 
realm of the dead (“Gespräche in dem Reiche der Todten”)? Fassmann started to issue 
this regular publication in 1725, just after Peter's death and gave fictive conversations, 
generally between Ivan IV and Peter I. He drew much of his information on Peter from 
Korb's Diary and was thus an important disseminator of Korb's representations on Rus-
sia, especially because he successfully addressed to a larger public. Cf. Eckard Matthes, 
“Das veränderte Rußland und die unveränderten Züge des Russenbilds”, in West-
östliche Spiegelungen, 109-135. 
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and only then translated into Russian (probably from German).135 In the tale one 
Varemund,136 a lieutenant, who left his home country (which remains unspecified) 
for service in Russia, where he eventually became a major general, then 
“enlightens” his compatriots. Influenced by anti-Russian pasquinades his two 
friends are full of prejudice about his host country. Talander refers to:  
 
a book published in Latin under the name of the secretary of the imperial inter-nuncio 
Gvarnent’s [sic!] Embassy, in which all occurrences that have taken place at court during 
their stay in Moscow, are described at length in day-to-day entries. Among them turn up 
several very strange ones, many full of bloodshed, from which the reader gets insight into the 
extraordinary behaviour of this court and into the cruelty of this government137 [… 
particularly] the brutal execution of several regiments of the former Russian infantry, called 
strel’tsy. 
 
In contrast to all the other foreign slanderers of the Russian Empire, whose 
pasquinades turn out to be acts of vengeance by people, who came to Russia as 
specialists (often military) and have been punished or simply degraded for misdeeds 
and committed crimes, Menard claims “that such a stranger [like Korb] had no 
reason to write anything but the truth in his diary.”138  
In response, Varemund maintains that Korb’s book was written “with malicious 
fervour” and was full of “exaggerations and lies”. Varemund justifies at length the 
brutal repressions against the insurgent strel’tsy who at any occasion had 
                                                 
135 “Razgovor mezhdu trekh priiatelei soshedshikhsia v odnom gorode, a imenno Menarda, 
Talandra, Varemunda”, Russkii vestnik T.4, no. 12 (1841). I am referring to the 19th 
century reprint of the pamphlet. To judge from the context the pamphlet must have been 
written between May 1726 and March 1727. Cf. the arguments on 
http://gorchev.lib.ru/ik/Predystoriya%20SPb_1703god/B2_Razdel_2/2_2_07.html, con-
sulted March 27, 2010. Unfortunately I could not find the original publication, neither 
foreign nor Russian. The editors do not indicate their source: they only note that it “has 
probably been composed on the initiative of the government that wanted to refute unof-
ficially the calumnies and false rumours on Russia that were circulated by malicious 
people abroad”. But the complementary information they provide, namely that “a part of 
it has been published, a long time ago, in one of the Muscovite journals, but here it is 
printed in its entirety” strengthens my hypothesis that the original text was published 
abroad in a foreign language, most probably German to judge from the numerous (com-
pletely un-Russian) foreign words.  
136 Varemund, German: wahre Mund, “true mouth”, i.e. the one, who tells the truth. 
137 Ibid., 320-321. 
138 Ibid., 336-337. 
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manifested their “wilfulness and insubordination” through dangerous rebellions. 
The fervent defender of Peter’s policies picks up the rumours that had circulated 
during the 1682 uprising when he asserts that the strel’tsy had attempted the life of 
the sovereign, not only in Peter’s reign, but earlier during his father’s (Tsar Aleksei) 
and brother’s (Tsar Fedor) reigns. Although Peter had declared an amnesty in the 
strel’tsy’s favour after previous revolts, they had abused his goodwill with 
malicious aforethought. In view of the extraordinary threat they presented, Peter 
had been forced to proceed in an extraordinary way, “to set an appalling example.” 
He would not be able to relieve the country “from these rebellious strel’tsy [ot tekh 
rebeliatnikov Strel’tsov], until the very name of the strel’tsy infantry was 
abolished.” Furthermore, 
 
subsequent uprisings in Astrakhan139 and elsewhere showed clearly that even the cruelty, with 
which [the regime] had proceeded against them at that time, did not heal them of their inborn 
wilfulness and insubordination [ot vkorennogo v nikh svoevol’stva i neposlushaniia] and 
would not retain them 
 
from their evil deeds. Varemund remains vague about what Korb’s lies precisely 
were, but in response to his interlocutor’s question about the reasons for the dairy 
author’s “malice” he explains: “it was said in Moscow that the commission [i.e. 
Guarient’s Embassy] had not been successful at the Russian Court.” As the peace of 
Karlowitz (1699) had been “made without Russian participation”, the Tsar had 
“concluded a two-year armistice with the Turks” separately. In Varemund’s opinion 
this armistice ran counter to the Emperor’s interests: “maybe the envoy wanted to 
take revenge for the failure of his commission.”140  
How did publishers abroad react to these attempts of intervention by Peter I and 
his successors? Did they comply with Russian lobbyists’ interventions? One has to 
                                                 
139 The Astrakhan uprising (1705-06) was mainly a matter of the townspeople, merchants, 
commoners, but indeed, as the main military guard of the town, the strel'tsy played an 
important role again. However, the strel'tsy of the South probably had not that much in 
common with the Moscow strel'tsy, who had not been admitted to their homes and fami-
lies. On the Astrakhan uprising see Nina Borisovna Golikova, Astrakhanskoe vosstanie. 
1705-1706 gg. (Moskva, 1975).  
140 Razgovor mezhdu trekh priiatelei, 336-338. From Varemund's explanation it does nei-
ther become clear why he regarded Guarient's Embassy as a failure nor in what respect 
the Russian separate armistice with the Ottoman Empire was such a problem for the 
Roman Emperor and his delegation. On Russian foreign policy with regard to the peace 
of Karlowitz see Handbuch der Geschichte Rußlands, 257-259 with further bibliograph-
ical references. 
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take into account that ideas about public opinion on parts of the Russian 
government differed quite fundamentally from those of publishers in the Reich. 
Guarient’s half-hearted efforts to protect his secretary had not impressed his 
Russian addressees: in spite of some “untrue description” Korb’s book “contained 
many laudable things.”141 This implied that since errors were almost inevitable, they 
were pardonable. The reader would judge for himself about the value of the 
accounts. The argument corresponded to the position adopted by the publishers of 
several German newspapers when defending themselves against disclaimers issued 
by Russian emissaries like Böttiger, who accused the papers of distorting facts. Due 
to the curtailed flow of information, claimed many publishers, arriving news 
accounts from Russia were often contradictory. Under these circumstances, they 
would print what they received, even contradictory information, in order to leave it 
for readers to judge on their own. Short introductory comments informed readers 
about both, the scarcity and contradictoriness of available information, and about 
the pluralist approach the newspaper adopted to cope with those constraints.142 In 
contrast to that the Russian government held that there was only one (its own) 
“truth” and that everything else had to be rigorously suppressed.  
We have seen that Guarient’s justifications showed willingness to compromise. 
In contrast to him, some newspaper agents resisted and tried to keep to their 
pluralism, at least initially. But pluralism was not a matter of principle; it was a 
matter of commercial interest. Boring and monotonous articles would not sell and 
readers were curious to read about Russia. But at the same time, among the readers 
were merchants engaged in long-distance trade with Russia. They became 
particularly prone to compromise, once they realized that Peter’s government was 
not kidding. Readiness to yield to Russian pressure in the field of censorship 
extended well into the political sphere, for the whole commercial community 
profited from trade activity. Facing increasing complaints from the Russian 
government that threatened to sanction their commercial privileges, the merchants 
of Hamburg who traded in Russia did not refrain from petitioning to the Senate and 
from demanding the arrest of the news printer in order to “satisfy His Majesty the 
Tsar”.143 And they were heard. At the beginning of the 1720s, the Hamburg Senate 
even issued a general law interdicting publishers from printing news items on 
Russian affairs that were not preapproved by the Russian resident-censor. Without 
the Russian government’s approbation nothing could be published any more. This 
                                                 
141 Dukmeyer, Korbs Diarium itineris, 1: 13. 
142 For examples of such introductory remarks see Blome, Das deutsche Rußlandbild, 40-
52. 
143 Quoted in ibid., 45. 
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had far-reaching consequences for the media coverage on Russia, apparently not 
only in Hamburg.144 
However, it would be too easy to interpret this confrontation in terms of the 
proverbial East-West dichotomy. It was rather a clash of the emerging state-
Arcanum with a market of unbridled public opinion, which was closely entangled 
with commercial interests. The numerous newspapers in the Reich published 
extensively on all sorts of seditions, but tellingly not on those taking place within 
their own principality or town. Public interest in these events was enormous and 
rulers proved to be simply incapable of muzzling publishers outside their realm, 
although they might have wished to do so. During seditions both sides, authorities 
and rebels alike, therefore tried to win over newspapers and other disseminators of 
information in neighbouring principalities. The search for legitimacy took thus 
place under conditions of competition, and sometimes in a veritable war of 
information.145 As a matter of fact, the rugged political landscape of the Reich 
imposed conditions that differed from the informational monopoly (or the 
monopoly of silence) in Russia.146  
                                                 
144 See ibid., 50-51. 
145 This was not so much different in Russia, but the use of the written word was more 
limited and both sides recurred to prohibitive measures. Reading the appeals of the other 
side, and sometimes even talking about the very fact of its issuing of appeals was fre-
quently punished severely during the Razin revolt. See André Berelowitch's contribution 
to this volume. On the concept of a “war of information” see the ongoing PhD of the so-
ciologist Dario Chi at the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS). 
146 Dutch newspapers were similarly commercialized. In the United Provinces, diplomatic 
records were even considered public documents: throughout the 16th and 17th centuries 
every member had access to them. Since 1651 financial questions had been excluded 
from publication and only at the end of the century secrecy became obligatory. See Be-
lov, Pis'ma Ioanna fan Kellera, 377-378. Elsewhere, diplomatic records made their way 
into the press as well during the 17th century: residents sent reports not only to their sov-
ereign, but also to newspapers that published them often without specifying their source 
of information. A major change thus occurred around the turn of the century, roughly at 
the same time when Peter started his media-political campaigns in the context of Korb's 
publication. 
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CONSEQUENCES FOR FOREIGN COVERAGE  
OF SOCIAL UNREST IN RUSSIA 
What were the consequences of this new media policy? To what an extent did it 
have an impact on the coverage of social conflict in Russia abroad?  
Foreign accounts of 17th-century revolts had been numerous and substantial, to 
the extent that scholars use them to the present day as first-rate sources. For the 
revolts of the 18th century, the accounts dried out and almost disappeared. The 
boundary between arcane and public information became more clear-cut. The 
Danish envoy Just Juel is a case in point. He stayed in Petersburg from 1709 to 
1711, and like most diplomats, he kept a diary in which we can find Peter’s I above-
mentioned “scientific” observations on hens’ and humans’ (i.e. executed rebels’) 
behaviour immediately after decapitation. But while predecessors like Butenant had 
published their accounts as a matter of course, Juel wrote a little preface to the King 
Frederic IV stating that his notes were definitely not designed for the public: “If I 
wanted to make them generally accessible through the press, of course I would take 
precautions and remove all paragraphs in which the Tsar and his subjects are 
painted in a not too attractive light.” He was even convinced that, if the Tsar took 
notice of the diary, he would complain to the Danish king and accuse him of 
“deliberately disgracing the Russian nation.”147 
The effect was already palpable during the Astrakhan (1705-06) and the 
Bulavin (1707-08) uprising. For German readers, the nature of the Astrakhan 
uprising remained vague: the regime’s application of both carrot and stick were 
presented in a quite schematic way. In 1706 German newspapers stressed the 
government’s clemency. The Hamburger Relations-Courier reported that “the 
Astrakhan rebels have finally submitted, and a part of them has been pardoned and 
released from punishment”. There was no comment on “the other part”. The 
accounts in the Europäische Fama were virtually panegyrics to the Tsar. According 
to its editor Sinold von Schütz, one of the first publishers who absolutely toed 
Peter’s line, news about a huge rebellion in Muscovy in 1706 could not be anything 
but false rumours (“Spargamente”). In one editorial he played down the scope of 
the events and asserted that the Russian subjects “were too much devoted to their 
sovereign and understood too well that his fatherly sorrow aimed only at the 
prosperity and cultivation of the great Muscovite Empire for such to occur.” 
Nevertheless. he could not deny that something had happened; so he praised “his 
Majesty the Tsar’s unrivalled mercy, with which he pardoned the accomplices”, 
with the effect that “the said Astrakhan rebels were ashamed of their own vice. So 
they reaffirmed their submission and promised to compensate for the ‘eyesore of 
                                                 
147 Zapiski Julja Justa, 417. 
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rebellion’ by more braveness and unswerving fidelity, declaring their readiness to 
joyfully sacrifice their lives for the sovereign’s glory”148 Only after considerable 
delay, when the town rebellion on the Volga had already been over for almost two 
years and the Bulavin uprising already in full swing, did the Hamburger Relations-
Courier mention the “stick” that has been applied to (another group of?) the rebels. 
It stated the execution of “300 of the Astrakhan and Azov rebels”, whose “hanged 
corpses were exposed in the most exclusive streets.”149  
The German coverage of the Bulavin revolt (1707-08) had even less to do with 
the actual events in the huge region of the Don Cossacks. The Hamburger 
Relations-Courier and the Kern-Chronik unanimously reported a peasant rebellion. 
The miseries that generally drove peasants into revolt were much more familiar to 
Western authors and readers than the situation of the Cossack hosts, from which the 
movement actually emerged. The factually wrong assertion about the peasants’ role 
as instigators and principal actors of the uprising led to observations on the flight to 
the peripheries of the empire, a centrifugal movement that was indeed characteristic 
of peasants’ reactions to serfdom and encroachment of the state. The Russian 
peasants, so goes the account, “had fled to the Don and wanted to live like the 
Cossacks”. Then the Cossacks refused to accept them and even served instead as 
the principal tools of repression,150 in one account even in cooperation with Tartars. 
Consequently the peasants could be subdued and “brought back to their 
obligations.” In reality the Don-Cossacks were the main instigators and actors of 
the rebellion. Cossack unrest was mentioned, but vaguely and, strangely enough, 
only for the years preceding the actual Bulavin uprising. The long-lasting Bashkir 
uprising in the Urals region (1704-11) occurred as well.151 But Bulavin’s name was 
mentioned neither in relation to the “rebellious peasants” or insurgent Cossacks, nor 
to the Cossack repressive force that was said to have defeated the peasants. Bulavin 
was quoted as the leader of “rebellious Tartars” (apparently others than those who 
allegedly supported the subjection of the rebellious peasants). They would have 
                                                 
148 Europäische Fama, 50. Theil (1706): 133. A shortened version is reprinted in ibid., 55. 
Theil (1706): 505. 
149 Hamburger Relations-Courier 19 (2.2.1708), quoted from Blome, Das deutsche Ruß-
landbild, 255. 
150 This is grist to the mill of Soviet historiography and the hypothesis of class-struggle, 
peasant war and clear-cut social division between the peasant refugees that had recently 
arrived and the upper class of the well-established and prosperous Cossacks. Cf. Viktor 
I. Buganov, Bulavin (Moskva, 1988). Nevertheless, even though this fitted well the in-
terpretative framework of Marxist historiography, Soviet historians were serious enough 
not to rely on such sources. 
151 Hamburger Relations-Courier (16.3.1708). 
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tried to rally support from the Ottoman Empire. And in the end Bulavin, their 
leader, was said to have committed suicide.152 This was purported months before he 
actually died and before his “suicide” was propagated in the Vedomosti. We do not 
know if this rumour was launched by the Russian government already at that time 
in order to downplay the significance of the movement. Anyway, most of these 
Western representations of Russian revolts after the Korb scandal were vague and 
painted a confusing and contradictory picture. Many different resisting groups were 
mentioned: peasants, Cossacks, Tartars and Bashkirs. But as reported in Germany 
their actions seemed to have been completely chaotic, uncoordinated and rather 
senseless. The different groups often struggled internally against each other. 
Nothing concrete was said about their motives, grievances or claims – a notable 
difference from the accounts of the 17th century.  
In contrast to the profoundly evil image of the strel’tsy that was held up by 
Peter’s government, many foreign representations, when depicting the very 
existence or potential for revolt in Russia, increasingly referred to a civilization-
backwardness pattern. Peter was the incarnation of the enlightened sovereign. 
Resistance to his efforts at modernizing the country was presented as a 
manifestation of profound backwardness. If persuasion turned out to be fruitless, 
the struggle against backward resistance justified the use of violence, especially if 
the larger project of modernization was endangered. The following reflections in 
the Europäische Fama on prejudice, justice and violence are paradigmatic, 
especially for how they relate these questions to the character of particular peoples 
and nations: 
 
The stubbornness of the human heart, the obstinacy and the foolish love of old habits often 
tempt the subjects into ignorant disobedience, into secret and irresponsible attacks and into a 
dangerous rebelliousness. The greatest monarchs could never be sure, if justice had not given 
them the sword, with which they could punish and eliminate the troublemakers who disdain 
general order and peace and good institutions. Frequently violent means are more necessary 
for one nation than for another: this has to be taken into account. For a good government one 
does not only need clemency, but sometimes one has to be severe and resort to force. Some 
peoples are so deeply submerged in prejudice, that [this prejudice] cannot be removed by 
rational reasoning; all the more if those who think they are conserving religion, i.e. the 
clergymen, try to win over the spirits of the credulous with all sorts of teachings that are 
adverse to the state [my emphases, M.G.].153 
 
                                                 
152 Hamburger Relations-Courier (2.2.1708). 
153 Europäische Fama 212. Theil (1718), 628-29. Quoted from Blome, Das deutsche Ruß-
landbild, 262. 
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Peoples (Völcker) and nations (Nationen) are distinguished on the basis of their 
developmental level. Prejudice, ascribed to some peoples more than to others, is 
partly related to religion, whose adepts are presented here almost as the preachers of 
backwardness, in contrast to the state that appears as the promoter of reason and 
rationality. This view would fit into claims about the priests’ alleged key role in the 
strel’tsy uprising (as they were said to have led the rebels with icons). The 
accusation of the clergy as the exponent of backwardness also justified the 
enhancement of state power to the detriment of the Orthodox Church, insofar as the 
Patriarchate was replaced by the Holy Synod and the administration of church 
property handed over to the Monastical Prikaz, i.e. to a state office.154 But while 
curtailing the clergy’s powers in the Orthodox centre, Peter allowed missionaries to 
act freely in the periphery among the Islamic and pagan tribes. If they had hardly 
been touched by Peter’s predecessors,155 the Church now launched huge campaigns 
of forced Christianization, for instance among the Muslim Bashkirs, a major 
provocation that fuelled their revolt of 1704-1711. Western representations, 
normally not particularly favourable towards the Orthodox Church, then seemed to 
justify its missionary activity in the light of a civilizational gradient between more 
or less backward peoples of the Russian Empire. In the centre the influence of the 
Orthodox Church was already considered backward and therefore harmful: for this 
reason, Peter was thought to be right when curbing the clergy’s power there. But in 
the more backward periphery the influence of the Church was still the harbinger of 
progress. In this light, to quote just one example, Swedish officer Johann Bernhard 
Müller156 described the Ostyaks and Voguls, nomad pagan tribes roaming between 
the Urals and the Enisei, almost as animals, which was not an entirely new slant: 
“They lick their wounds like dogs.” According to his account there would be no 
hope “that they will ever be civilized”, 
 
                                                 
154 For a survey of Peter's church policy see Handbuch der Geschichte Rußlands, 333–40. 
For a more detailed account see James Cracraft, The church reform of Peter the Great 
(London, 1971). 
155 This imperial practice of expansion and rule with a rather tolerant religious policy was 
inherited from the Mongolian system of rule. The imperial centre contented itself with 
co-opting the elites of the conquered peoples and did not interfere into the internal so-
cio-economic, cultural and religious structures of the newly incorporated territories. 
Such an allowance of heterogeneity seems to have been an alternative to the Western 
model of homogenization in early modern times. See Andreas Kappeler, Russland als 
Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall (München, 2001). 
156 Müller had been captured after the battle of Poltava, sent to Tobol'sk, and in 1712 
charged by Peter to travel to the Siberian North along the Ob'. 
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unless it be by embracing the Principles of Christianity, and submitting to these Regulations 
which the Metropolitan is now endeavouring to introduce among them in order to bring them 
to a more regular way of Life than they have led hitherto. If this laudable Attempt takes 
Effect, there is no doubt it will at the same time considerably alleviate their extreme Poverty 
and Misery, which is in great measure owing to their irregular Life.157 
 
This perspective that development should relieve them of an animal-like existence 
was a new dimension, characteristic of Enlightenment projections. Only 
Christianity could bring these savages from ignorance and push them from the 
darkness and obscurity of their brutish nature towards the light of civilization. And 
for nomad heathens it seemed not to make a difference that the promoter of 
Christianity was the Orthodox Church. However, those Ostyaks were not ready to 
voluntarily give up “the Vanity of the idolatrous Worship of wooden Images”, in 
order “to adore the true living God”:  
 
[T]hose People, prepossessed with the Antiquity of that Service, opposed all the 
Metropolitan’s Endeavors, alledging, that their Ancestors had, Time out of Mind, maintained 
the Worship of their Sheitans [idols], and fared well by it; that as for themselves, they were 
from their Childhood brought up to it, and were unwilling to change it for another, which 
would make them believe the Souls of their Ancestors to be in a State of Damnation, or at 
best in a very dubious Condition: So that at first they seemed resolved rather to venture upon 
the last Extremities, than to renounce the Religion and Customs of their Fore-fathers. […] 
Those who lived in more remote Parts, shewed still greater Obstinacy in forsaking their 
Idolatry. Some Priests of their Sheitans were very active in countenancing the Sticklers for 
the ancient Worship, by making them believe, that the Idol had foretold what would happen, 
eight Days before the Metropolitan’s Arrival, and warned them to withstand the Attempts of 
the Christians, which he [the idol] would certainly baffle and disappoint by his powerful 
Protection. 
 
Müller would not specify exactly what it meant when these peoples stood up to “all 
Extremities in maintaining their Religion”. We can only guess about the extent of 
violence the Orthodox missionaries resorted to in order to break the resistance of 
the population. To judge from foreign accounts the aim of the civilizing project 
                                                 
157 I quote from the English translation of Weber's account that reproduces large sections of 
Müller's descriptions of Russian Christianization efforts. Friedrich Christian Weber, The 
present state of Russia. In two volumes. Being an account of the government of that 
country, both civil and ecclesiastical; of the Czar's forces by sea and land, … The whole 
being the journal of a foreign minister who resided in Russia at that time. With A de-
scription of Petersbourg… (London, 1722-23), 2:70. 
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justified all means, even if, in the end, “the pious Zeal and convincing Arguments” 
of the metropolitan “were of such Weight with those People, that they also 
consented to the burning of their Idol.”158 In confrontations with idolaters, the 
Orthodox missionaries were viewed as champions of progress and of a civilizing 
mission. The greater the opponents’ backwardness, the more crucial were their 
ringleaders. Only the “priests of the Sheitans” could transform that stubborn 
backwardness of the nomad population into a dangerous rebellious force. They thus 
had to be neutralized, no matter by which means. Using violence for that purpose 
was far from being taboo, although non-violent methods were preferable.  
In similar key the Danish envoy Just Juel depicted Peter’s cordial treatment of 
“a Siberian prince, who was called tsarevich like the Tsar’s son”, because “his 
ancestors had been Tsars of Siberia, before they came under Russian dominion”. 
This Siberian prince often accompanied the Tsar or his ministers on their travels – 
all this at the expense of the court. According to Juel, Peter did so “partly out of 
pity, and partly [out of fear] that [the tsarevich] might make his way back home, stir 
up a rebellion and try to regain the status and power of his ancestors.”159 Such 
illegitimate lust for power had to be nipped in the bud and potential ringleaders had 
to be contained and neutralized. But the breeding ground that made them so 
dangerous was ignorance and backwardness. In order to foment uproar and revolts 
shamans, the tsarevich and others could rely on a backward and credulous 
population, who did not understand that they were only being exploited by evil 
villains, whereas the enlightened Tsar and his missionaries were fighting for their 
bright future. This made it a paramount task to civilize the local population.  
EPILOGUE 
Such interpretations by foreigners seemed to be acceptable to Peter’s and his 
successors’ governments, especially when the observers wrote about potential 
rather than actual upheaval. Benign methods of education were to be highlighted, 
while a scenario of looming backward revolt constantly threatening the 
government’s civilizing efforts pre-emptively legitimated harsh measures of 
repression.  
Peter I was actually perceived as the first enlightened monarch in Europe, well 
before Frederic II of Prussia or Joseph II of Austria and Catherine II of Russia. This 
image was fostered by Russia’s stereotypical barbarism which was gradually 
transformed into backwardness. From the vantage point of Western perceptions of 
                                                 
158 Ibid., 2: 89-91. 
159 Zapiski Iulia Iusta, 58-59. 
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Russian revolts we have seen that this shift announced itself already before Peter’s 
actual reign. But Peter’s personality became the main focus that helped to 
crystallize the crucial dichotomy of a backward population and an enlightened ruler, 
who would be able to launch an effective mission civilisatrice. The ferocity of 
repression might have been a temporary irritating factor for some – and Leibniz 
showed slight irritation in his correspondence –, but in comparison to other 
European countries this sort of reprisal was not exceptional at all: just at the same 
time “domestic state violence” reached a climax in Louis XIV’s France with the 
repression of the Huguenot Camisards in the Cevennes160 – and France was rather 
seen as a model of absolutist progress. No doubt, Peter’s active participation in the 
executions that Korb referred to in his Diary was extraordinary. But Peter was 
generally perceived as an extraordinary monarch. His reputation as a sovereign who 
took into his own hands the destiny of his country was largely supported by his own 
self-representation. To a certain extent, Western, especially German, perception of 
Peter I helped to bring about Enlightenment thinking and the very idea of 
aufgeklärter Absolutismus (enlightened absolutism). The current English 
(enlightened despotism) and French terms (despotisme éclairé) sound even more 
paradoxical to our ears. But they mirror what leading enlighteners deemed 
necessary towards a “backward” population such as the Russians, and even more so 
the savage non-Russian peoples further to the East. The image of Peter’s 
government and policy thus had a cathartic effect to the emergence of such 
notions.161 
The Russian government’s attempts to monopolize representation of revolt or, 
more precisely, to obliterate memory and put the very event of revolt under taboo, 
remained dominant throughout the Enlightenment period, while contacts to the 
West significantly intensified. This policy of taboo culminated in Catherine II’s 
reaction to the Pugachev uprising (1773-75). Immediately after the repression of 
this last and biggest revolt since the Time of Troubles that again started from the 
Cossack periphery and temporarily took hold of huge territories, including vast 
peasant-dominated black-earth lands – Catherine II forbade any mention of these 
events for half a century, to the effect that Pushkin would be the first Russian to 
write on this major social upheaval. But such a practice was not exceptional, 
neither. All over Europe governments tried to impose damnatio memoriae, 
                                                 
160 Howard G. Brown, “Domestic State Violence. Repression from the Croquants to the 
Commune”, The Historical Journal 42, 3 (1999), 597-622. 
161 Grosso modo this is the line of the argument in Astrid Blome and Volker Depkat, Von 
der 'Civilisirung' Rußlands und dem 'Aufblühen' Nordamerikas im 18. Jahrhundert. 
Leitmotive der Aufklärung am Beispiel deutscher Rußland- und Amerikabilder (Bre-
men, 2002), referring simultaneously to the Wild West and the Wild East. 
268 | MALTE GRIESSE 
 
generally by an exclusive representation of public punishment and executions, in 
order to supersede anything related to the rebels’ very actions and (maybe even, to a 
certain extent, legitimate) motives. Like in Russia, success was limited. Dissident 
narratives of the events, including panegyrics of revolt-leaders were bequeathed 
orally, often in folklore.162 But it was extraordinary that a government tried to 
manipulate and control foreign representations of domestic revolts. And for this 
reason the Russian diplomacy’s harsh reaction to the publication of Korb’s diary 
aroused much curiosity all over Europe. Again there had been precedents in the 
second half of the 17th century. But in the Korb case the consecutive measures of 
establishing Russian resident-agents such as Bötticher in Hamburg who were in 
charge of muzzling foreign representations made clear that Peter was not kidding. 
And this foreign-press policy seemed to have a long-lasting impact throughout the 
whole 18th century, when foreign accounts of Russian revolts became almost 
insignificant, sometimes merely inexistent. Of course, the Pugachev-revolt of 1773-
75 was a major event that could not be ignored in Europe. But Catherine’s 
commemorational prohibition definitely scared European commentators. The few 
accounts of the events were published anonymously.163 
The case of Korb’s Diary played an important part for this shift of paradigms in 
foreign coverage of Russian revolts. Of course, the Russian government’s foreign-
press-policy was still amplified by the experience of the great Northern war, when 
both sides tightened their propaganda measures, bot restrictive and proactive. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that the Korb scandal was due to a considerable extent 
                                                 
162 This clandestine commemoration has been studied by Suter  on the example of the 
Swiss peasant war (1653). Suter, Der schweizerische Bauernkrieg von 1653. To be sure, 
for Russia we know of such narratives, poems and songs, for the big Cossack revolts, 
see Aleksandra Nikolaevna Lozanova, Pesni i skazaniia o Razine i Pugacheve (Moskva, 
Leningrad, 1935), but not for the strel'tsy uprising of 1698. Often popular commemora-
tion centered on the officially defamed leaders. For 1698, such outstanding leaders seem 
to be lacking, at least in official memory. 
163 Apart from newspaper reports there seem to have been only two detailed accounts of the 
events, one in French, sort of a historical novel published immediately after the end of 
the revolt, one in German, probably written by the famous geographer Gerhard Friedrich 
Müller, who worked in Russian. His friend Anton Friedrich Büsching waited until Mül-
ler's death, and even then he published the account only anonymously. “Zuverläßige 
Nachrichten von dem Aufrührer Jemeljan Pugatschew und der von demselben angestif-
teten Empörung”, in Magazin für die neue Historie und Geographie. angelegt von D. 
Anton Friedrich Büsching, Königlich-Preusischen Oberconsistorialrath, Director des 
Gymnasiums im grauen Kloster zu Berlin, und der davon abhängigen beyden Schulen. 
Achtzehnter Theil (Halle, 1784): 3-70.  
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to cultural misunderstanding, notably the incompatibility of visual cultures. The 
first thing Russian diplomats and Peter himself could see in Korb’s Latin work was 
the copperplate with the panorama of Moscow entirely dominated by gallows, 
execution and torture scenes. For European spectators this was a completely usual 
form of representation. For Russians it was not. For them such pictures were 
shocking, since they did not correspond at all to their own visual culture that 
remained largely dominated by iconography and ecclesiastical representation, 
where even the suffering of the Christ was depicted only in very veiled symbolical 
forms. In this domain further research will be necessary, especially focusing on 
zones of contact between Western and Orthodox visual cultures. A focus on contact 
zones: clashes and conflicts on the one hand, rapprochement and syncretism on the 
other, would be particularly promising strategy in order to decipher the 
particularities of the early modern visual languages that are far from disclosing 
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Quietis publicae perturbatio:  
Revolts in the Political and Legal Treatises of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth Centuries 
FABRIZIO DAL VERA 
 
1. CRIMINALIZATION OF THE COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: 
AN OVERVIEW 
The evolution of penal law during the early modern age in Europe shows that from 
the beginning of the sixteenth century there was an extensive use of crimen laesae 
maiestatis in order to punish and repress many kinds of crime.1 Even minor crimes, 
previously not seen as a problem by the authorities, began to be considered as an 
offence against the State and a threat to political order. As has been clearly proven 
by legal historians, there was a shift in the penal relevance of actions from the level 
of damage to the level of disobedience. In this way, the repressive procedure of 
political crimes was used to deal with any kind of penal infraction perceived as a 
danger to public order.2 
Revolts and insurrections became the focus of attention for jurists concerned 
with problems of public order and with the legal instruments to defend inner 
stability and repress any form of criticism of authority. There was increased interest 
in collective episodes of violation of maiestas, which were punished by crimen 
seditionis and understood as a concrete manifestation of the broader crimen 
maiestatis. 
                                                 
1  For an analysis of the development of political crimes in the early modern age see: Mario 
Sbriccoli, Crimen laesae maiestatis. Il problema del reato politico alle soglie della scien-
za penalistica moderna (Milano, 1974). 
2  See Mario Sbriccoli, “Giustizia criminale”, in Lo Stato moderno in Europa. Istituzioni e 
diritto, ed. Maurizio Fioravanti (Roma, 2002) 178-182. 
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The use of crimen seditionis to cope with all episodes of collective violence 
must to be understood as a reaction to the increase in peasant insurrections, 
characterising the beginning of the sixteenth century. Peter Blickle underlined that 
“in the late medieval society peasant resistance was accepted. This can be seen in 
the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, on the one hand, in the increasingly 
numerous refusals to pay homage and, on the other, in the many agreements 
reached in territories and principalities to settle peasant complaints”.3 The ongoing 
rise of peasant protests during the first quarter of the sixteenth century produced a 
general and uninterrupted situation of conflict, with a consequent destabilization of 
the political orders. The epidemic of peasant resistance spread and its increasingly 
focused demands led to the revolution of the common man of 1525.4 In reaction to 
that uncontrolled movement of uprisings, the authorities changed their strategy. 
Where they had formerly searched for compromise with the protesting peasants, 
they now shifted to vigorous repression and criminalization. This change led to the 
penal ordinance of 1532 of Emperor Charles V (the Constitutio Criminalis 
Carolina), which stated in article 127: “Whoever incites dangerous, illegal, and 
malicious rebellion of the common people against authorities in a territory or city 
shall, according to the circumstances of his misdoings, be punished with 
decapitation or flogging and shall, in all cases, be exiled from the territory or city in 
which he incited rebellion”.5 
2. LEGAL SOURCES:  
TRACTATI, DISSERTATIONES, DISPUTATIONES 
This process of criminalization is reflected in the development of penal doctrine. By 
analysing the legal understanding of the term seditio – the way in which the crime 
was defined – it is possible to reconstruct the development of the legal 
argumentations, which led the jurists to legitimate severe repression of peasant 
protests. During the late Middle Ages the problem of political crime, namely the 
theory of crimen maiestatis, had been continuously analysed by glossators, 
commentators and jurists heavily involved in the praxis. Carlo Ghisalberti 
                                                 
3  Peter Blickle, “The Criminalization of Peasant Resistance in the Holy Roman Empire: 
Toward a History of the Emergence of High Treason in Germany”, Journal of Modern 
History 58, suppl. (1986), 88-89. 
4  See Horst Buszello et al., ed., Der Deutsche Bauernkrieg (Paderborn, 1995); Peter Blick-
le, Die Revolution von 1525 (München, 2004). 
5  “Die peinliche Gerichtsordnung Kaiser Karls V. Contitutio Criminalis Carolina”, in Die 
Caroline und ihre Vorgängerinnen, ed. Josef Kohler, vol. 1 (Halle, 1900), 65. 
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underlined that this process of interpretation came to a close in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, when a series of treatises entitled de crimine laesae maiestatis 
and de seditionis was published.6 These treatises, later collected and published 
together in the eleventh volume, first part, of the Tractatus Universi Iuris,7 
represent the first attempt to offer a systematic analysis of the doctrine on crimes 
against the security of the State. In this volume we find two treatises on sedition, 
the Tractatus de seditiosis by Nicolas Bohier8 (1469-1539) and the treatise De 
seditionisbus libri sex by Konrad Braun9 (ca. 1495-1563), which became a common 
reference in the following legal debate. 
The treatises published in the Tractatus Universi Iuris brought order to the 
problem of political crimes, but the legal and political analysis on sedition kept 
evolving for more than a century. The two treatises already mentioned were 
followed by the treatise De seditiosis. Liber singularis by Claude Mondain10 (d. 
1594), the Tractatus de seditione by Andreas Dalner11 (d.  1618), De Seditionibus, 
Seu Discordiis domesticis by Martin Schoock12 (1614-1669) and Tractatus iuridico-
politicus de rebuspublicis turbidis in tranquillum statum reducendis by Philipp 
Andreas Oldenburger13 (d. 1678). 
In addition to these works, there are other sources which must be considered in 
order to follow the legal debate on sedition. The problem of collective political 
                                                 
6  See Carlo Ghisalberti, “Sulla teoria dei delitti di lesa maestà nel diritto commune”, in 
Archivio giuridico 149 (1955), 100-177, 101. 
7  Tractatus Universi Iuris, XI, pars I (Venetiis, 1584). 
8  Nicolas Bohier, “Praeclarus et elegans tractatus de seditionis omnibus civitatum villarum 
vel castrorum dominis scabinis seu consulibus ac ceteris reipublicae administratoribus 
utilis, quotidianus ac necessaries”, in Rerum Criminalium praxes, et tractatus omnium 
nobiliorum qui ad hunc diem exiverunt iureconsultorum, in quibus processus publicorum 
iudiciorum, maleficiorumque et supliciorum omnium, quae in usum cadere possunt, ratio 
non minus succincte quam docte traditur (Francofurti, 1588), 1. ed. 1515, 104-133. 
9  Konrad Braun, De seditionibus libri sex, rationibus et exemplis ex omni doctrinarum et 
authorum (Moguntiae, 1550). 
10  Claude Mondain, De seditiosis. Liber singularis, ad interpretationem Iuris (Lutetiae, 
1567). 
11  Andreas Dalner, Tractatus de seditione cum ex sacra et profana historia, tum ex iure, 
eiusque interpretibus desumtus (Viennae Austriae, 1599). 
12  Martin Schoock, De Seditionibus, Seu Discordiis domesticis: Libri Tres; Quibus omnia, 
huc pertinentia, distincte proponuntur: non modo per præcepta, verum etiam exempla; 
tum antiqua, tum recentia (Groningæ,1664). 
13  Philipp Andreas Oldenburger, Tractatus iuridico-politicus de rebuspublicis turbidis in 
tranquillum statum reducendis, in eoque conservandis (Genevae, 1678). 
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crimes was also analysed in general works on penal law, like the treatises written by 
Tiberio Deciani and Pierre Gregoire14. Moreover, from the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, within the literature analysing the Politica by Aristotle, it is 
possible to find chapters dedicated to the problem of the mutatio reipublicae, where 
the reasons for sedition are analysed in different constitutional contexts15. Lastly, 
this topic is also addressed by several dissertationes and disputationes on this topic, 
which are short works produced in German universities in order to achieve the 
doctoral title.16 This kind of source is particularly relevant for the study of the 
debate’s development: their authors had to prove they knew the legal debate on the 
topic, but at the same time they also had the chance to contribute to debate by 
integrating new perspectives offered by contemporary political theory.17 
Focusing on treatises, dissertations and disputationes in order to study the 
development of legal and political wisdom on sedition is justified by the fact that 
these texts aimed, as aforementioned, to summarize the former doctrinal tradition 
                                                 
14  See Tiberio Deciani, Tractatus criminalis, Tomus Primus, liber 7, cap. 7 (Francofurti, 
1613), 143-147 and Pierre Gregoire, Syntagmatis iuris universi, Pars Tertia, liber 35, cap. 
6 (Venetiis, 1593), 362-364. 
15  See Frideric Tilemann, De eversionibus rerum publicarum politica dissertatio (Witten-
berg, 1597); Henning Arnisaeus, Doctrina politica in genuinam methodum, quae est Aris-
totelis, reducta (Lugduni Batavorum, 1606); Bartholomaeus Keckermann, Systema disci-
plinae politicae publicis praelectionibus anno MDCVI. propositum in gymnasio Dantis-
cano […]. Seorsim accessit Synopsis disciplinae oeconomicae, dispositionem eius brevi-
ter adumbrans […] (Hanoviae, 1608); Bernhardus Zieritz, Dissertatio de conversionibus 
et eversionibus rerumpublicarum (Lipsiae, 1609); Hermann Conring, Disputatio politica 
de Mutationibus Rerumpublicarum (Helmestadt, 1635); Hermann Conring, Dissertatio 
politica de morbis ac mutationibus rerumpublicarum (Helmestadt, 1640). 
16  See Christianus Taubmann, Disputationem hanc inauguralem de turbatoribus pacis publi-
cae, ex iure publico & practicorum observationibus desumptam […], (Wittebergae, 
1640); Georgius Gulielmus Zapf, De origine, progressu ac remediis seditionum (Ienae, 
1659); Georg Friedrich Glandorff, Dissertationem historico-politicam de rebellibus (Wit-
tenberg, 1675); Johann Balthasar Mylius, Disputatio juridica de seditione (Leipzig, 
1682); Achilles August von Lersner, Disputatio politico-juridica de seditionibus, occa-
sione tit. 30 lib. 9 C. de seditiosis (Basileae, 1688); Johann Christian Schmids, Dissertatio 
politico-juridica De tumultibus (Jena, 1714); Georg Heinrich Ayrer, De multitudine sedi-
tiosa (Gottingae, 1747). 
17  On legal dissertationes in the early modern time see Karl Härter, “Ius publicum und 
Reichsrecht in den juristischen Dissertationen mitteleuropäischer Universitäten der Frü-
hen Neuzeit”, in Juristische Zeitschriften in Europa, ed. Michael Stolleis and Thomas 
Simon (Frankfurt/Main, 2006), 485-528. 
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and to bring order into the understanding of the phenomenon. The jurists involved 
in this debate were educated in the system of common-law (ius commune) and 
naturally looked back to that tradition in order to find legal concepts to describe the 
collective protests they witnessed and, at the same time, to control and repress 
them. 
The treatises mentioned, and the other shorter works produced within the 
universities, can be considered as a homogeneous corpus of sources, not only 
because of their topic, but also because of the way in which the topic was analysed. 
Indeed, it is also possible to look at the development of political thought by 
analysing the form of the political languages used, namely how the themes and 
problems are grouped, systematized and communicated. Moreover, the context of 
production should be considered, as well as the use and circulation of the sources. 
Who were the authors? Where were they working and for whom were they 
writing?18 While acting in different countries, the jurists were part of the same 
‘community of discourse’ that investigated collective forms of protest. This 
community was clearly the result of the common-law tradition as a shared 
background; nevertheless, these jurists were also personally connected because 
almost all of them were working at university and facing, in different times and in 
different contexts, the same problems related to the control of public order: their 
works were well-known within their circle and later authors quoted their 
predecessors extensively, often without regard to confessional borders. 
As aforementioned, the ius commune was a shared background that ensured a 
cross-border diffusion of treatises. The jurists referred to the same legal tradition 
and therefore used the same language and the same concepts. Investigating episodes 
of collective revolts they were interested in collecting historical examples mostly 
from ancient history, but also from contemporary chronicles. Indeed, all the 
treatises refer to revolts that affected communities and cities of the whole European 
continent. 
 
Moreover, the genre tractatus follows a formal pattern, a shared and accepted 
model to organize the content and present argumentations. First of all, these sources 
on sedition are concerned with the problem of the legal understanding of the 
phenomenon, namely with the definition of the crimen seditionis according to the 
tradition of ius commune. The jurists used a very rich lexicon to describe the 
different forms of collective rebellion. Seditio, congregatio armatorum, concitatio 
                                                 
18  See Merio Scattola, Dalla virtù alla scienza. La fondazione e la trasformazione della 
disciolina politica nell'età moderna (Roma, 2003); id., “Zur einer europäischen Wissen-
schaftsgeschichte der Politik”, in Werkstatt Politische Kommunikation. Netzwerke, Orte 
und Sprachen des Politischen, ed. Christina Antenhofer et. al. (Göttingen,  2010), 23-54. 
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populi, tumultus, factiones, partialitates, facinus, rixa were the concepts borrowed 
from Roman law and from medieval glosses and commentaries.19 Secondly, they 
analysed the causes of insurrections and used historical knowledge extensively to 
investigate past incidents of unrest. All the treatises quoted a multitude of sources, 
from the Bible to secular chronicles, in order to provide examples of the various 
factors provoking inner discord and consequently producing violent and organized 
protests against the authorities. Finally, the investigation of the causes of inner 
discord was always used to elaborate political strategies in order to repress or to 
intervene preventively. The jurists were indeed trying to provide public officers 
with adequate knowledge to avoid conflicts within society or at least to control all 
the situations characterised by diffuse discord (discordia civilis). All the treatises 
considered are characterised by this recursive structure, with no particular 
variations. 
The opportunity to consider these sources as a corpus also depends on the fact 
that the jurists were moved by concrete problems related to the maintenance of 
public order. They had to face questions such as: how to repress insurrections? How 
to legitimize the use of violence in repressing them? How to prevent inner discord? 
How to act within the political community in order to control political commotions? 
The increase of social and political conflict from the end of the fifteenth century 
forced the authorities to elaborate the necessary political concepts to cope with 
unquiet political situations. In writing these treatises the jurists moved from their 
immediate experience of conflict to conceiving political strategies of intervention to 
deal with the development of protests and uprisings. They focused on concrete 
instruments to repress ongoing rebellions by force and, at the same time, on the 
elaboration of preventive policies to avoid the formation of discord and dissent. As 
Winfried Schulze has pointed out, the authorities’ reaction to peasant resistance and 
subsequent criminalization gave rise to the substantial literature on the problem, 
which is characterised by a practical approach to social conflicts. Schulze suggests 
that these treatises should be considered as a “praktisch orientierte Poli
tikwissenschaft” : they concentrated on the definition of the crime, namely on 20
the legal concepts used to repress uprisings, but at the same time they also 
                                                 
19  See Sbriccoli, Crimen laesae maiestatis, 283-305.  
20  Winfried Schulze, “Die veränderte Bedeutung sozialer Konflikte im 16. und 17. Jahrhun-
dert”, in Europäische Bauernrevolten der frühen Neuzeit, ed. id. (Frankfurt/Main, 1982), 
287; see also id., “Geben Aufruhr und Aufstand Anlass zu neuen heilsamen Gesetzen. 
Beobachtungen über die Wirkungen bäuerlichen Widerstands in der Frühen Neuzeit”, in 
Aufstände, Revolten, Prozesse. Beiträge zu bäuerlichen Widerstandsbewegungen im 
frühneuzeitlichen Europa, ed. id. (Stuttgart, 1983), 261-285. 
-
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elaborated strategies to prevent and control such crime, producing what can be 
labelled as a doctrine of prevention. 
These developments in the doctrine on sedition can be studied by analysing how 
different categories of crime were applied to different forms of protest and how 
these attributions changed over time. Following the methodological approach of 
conceptual history, as it has been defined and applied by Reinhart Koselleck, the 
term seditio can be considered as a central concept, dense in social and political 
meaning. First of all, it is necessary to analyse how the term has been defined and 
used within a specific context, by jurists working in a concrete troubled situation. 
Therefore, the treatises will be analysed using the method of historical and lexical 
semantics: the semantic field of the concept of seditio will be studied in order to 
understand the relationship between the changes in the doctrine, based on the 
historical interpretation of the legal tradition, and the broader social context. Then, 
the changes within the crimes will be compared over a broader period of time in 
order to trace the development of the processes of criminalization.21 
Sedition is indeed an inherently political offence, encompassing all behaviour 
threatening the government or political authorities in general. In the early modern 
period crimen seditionis was aimed at punishing a wide range of unlawful actions. 
It was therefore flexible and open to extensive interpretations. Following an 
underlying interpretative hypothesis to explain development and changes in the 
doctrine of sedition, I assume that there is a direct interdependence between the 
definition of crimen seditionis and the broader political context that needs to be 
explained for each treatise. An overview of the development of the doctrine reveals 
that in times of endemic conflict and political crisis the jurists were interested in 
harshly repressing any acts directed at overthrowing the established order. Due to 
this will to react strongly to dissent, they tended to extend offences against maiestas 
to include any episodes of violence, even against minor magistrates. This extensive 
definition of the crime provided legal resources for inflicting capital punishment 
even for minor unrest. This interpretative development of the doctrine was 
characteristic of the sixteenth century and is particularly salient in the treatises 
written by jurists directly involved in rebellions – not as participants, of course, but 
as witnesses or persecutors. 
The doctrine developed partially in a different way during the seventeenth 
century, when jurists were no longer working in a “state of emergency” – although 
                                                 
21  See Reinhart Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte”, in Vergangene 
Zukunft: zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten, ed. id. (Frankfurt/Main, 1995), 107-129. 
For an example of the application of lexical semantics to the study of the political lan-
guages see Pietro Costa, Iurisdictio: semantica del potere politico nella pubblicistica me-
dievale: 1100-1433 (Milano, 1969). 
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incidents of unrest remained highly problematic. The doctrine of sedition reached a 
new stage at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when jurists dealing with the 
problem were all working at university and writing for an academic audience. They 
therefore had the possibility to reconsider previous doctrine – with less pressure 
coming from the external political situation – in order to define a sharper 
conceptual instrument that was able to differentiate between various forms of 
collective violence. 
3. THE FOUNDATION OF CRIMEN SEDITIONIS 
IN THE ROMAN LEGAL TRADITION 
In its more general meaning and without further connotations, the idea of sedition in 
the early modern period was used to describe a general perturbation of the public 
order, which meant an infraction of public peace (quietis publicae perturbatio) and 
a subsequent state of confusion. As Mario Sbriccoli clearly summarises, the notion 
of seditio defined a collective revolt, which usually arose in an urban setting, but 
could also occur in other contexts, wherever there was a concentration of people. 
Generally it was preceded by a minimum of preparation and organization and led to 
a series of lootings and devastation that sometimes culminated in murders and 
massacres.22 Since this first attempt to define the crime, we can see that sedition 
was a very flexible concept that could refer to a variety of acts, ranging from the 
first steps of the perturbation of public order to much more dangerous and serious 
behaviours, which could also lead to a veritable civil war.23 
The term seditio emerged in the Roman republic and developed well into the 
Roman Principate.24 In the early modern age it was rediscovered by jurists looking 
for a legal understanding of endemic violent movements against the authorities. In 
the context of ius commune, the description of what can be considered as sedition 
started from the reference to the Codex Iustiniani (promulgated for the first time in 
529), according to which seditio was indeed defined as general perturbation of the 
public peace.25 
                                                 
22  Sbriccoli, Crimen laesae maiestatis, 274. 
23  See Reinhart Koselleck, “Revolution. Rebellion, Aufruhr, Bürgerkrieg”, in Geschichtli-
che Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, 
ed. Otto Brunner et al., vol. 5 (Stuttgart, 1984), 653-685. 
24  See Gerard Osthoff, “Tumultus – Seditio. Untersuchungen zum römischen Staatsrecht 
und zur politischen Terminologie der Römer” (Ph.D. diss., Universität Köln, 1953), 102-
150. This study is unfortunately not available in print. 
25  C. 9. 30: De seditiosi et his qui plebem audent contra publicam quietem colligere. 
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In Roman law, namely in the lex Iulia maiestatis (about 48 B.C.) one can 
identify “the historical and legal foundation of the dogmatic construction of crimen 
laesae maiestatis”,26 which remained in use for all the centuries of ius commune. 
Consequently, the lex Iulia represents the doctrinal and theoretical model for the 
definition of the concept of seditio.27 However, the Roman legal tradition took two 
approaches to criminalising episodes of public violence. Resisting authorities with 
recours to violence could thus be punished either as crimen laesae maiestatis or as 
crimen vis. 
Since the titles in the Codex Theodosiani (promulgated in 439) and later in the 
Codex Iustiniani, the behaviour disturbing the public order of the political 
community was always related to the crimen laesae maiestatis. This becomes 
evident from the commentaries of the titles of the Codex concerning attacks against 
the maiestas. Indeed, the criminal behaviour punished on the basis of crimen 
maiestatis referred to any action designed to provoke inner discord and civil wars, 
namely to all behaviour relating to the idea of sedition. According to the definition 
of the crimen offered by the Roman jurist Ulpianus (170-228) and lately collected 
in the Justianian’s Digest (promulgated in 533): 
 
D. 48. 4. 1pr. (Ulp. 7 de off. proc.): Proximum sacrilegio crimen est, quod maiestatis dicitur. 
§ 1 Maiestatis autem crimen illud est, quod adversus populum Romanum vel adversus 
securitatem eius committitur. Quo tenetur is, cuius opera dolo malo consilium initum erit, quo 
obsides iniussu principis interciderent: quo armati homines cum telis lapidibusve in urbe sint 
conveniantve adversus rem publicam, locave occupentur vel templa, quove coetus 
conventusve fiat hominesve ad seditionem convocentur: cuiusve opera consilio malo 
consilium initum erit, quo quis magistratus populi Romani quive imperium potestatemve 
habet occidatur: quove quis contra rem publicam arma ferat: quive hostibus populi Romani 
nuntium litterasve miserit signumve dederit feceritve dolo malo, quo hostes populi romani 
consilio iuventur adversus rem publicam: quive milites sollicitaverit concitaveritve, quo 
seditio tumultusve adversus rem publicam fiat.28 
                                                 
26  Ghisalberti, Sulla teoria dei delitti di lesa maestà nel diritto comune, 146. For the history 
of the development of the title Ad legem Iuliam Maiestatis see Richard A. Bauman, The 
Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustian Principate (Johannesburg, 
1970), 266-292. 
27  See Theodor Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht (Leipzig, 1899), 562-565. 
28  “The crime of lese majesty may closely resemble that of sacrilege. § 1 The crime of lese 
majesty is committed against the Roman people, or against their safety, and he is guilty of 
it by whose agency measures are maliciously taken for the death of hostages, without the 
order of the Emperor; or when men armed with weapons or stones appear in the city, or 
are assembled against the State, and occupy public places or temples; or where assem-
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This broad definition provided all the basic elements of the concept of seditio, 
which were used in early modern doctrine to discipline the use of collective 
violence. Indeed, the crimen maiestatis was meant to punish all the behaviour and 
actions against the populus romanus29 and its security; among those actions 
Ulpianus also included the congregation of armed men, moved by the conscious 
will to fight against the res publica and the common good. Killing a public officer 
(magistratus), carrying arms in order to occupy public spaces, encouraging sedition 
or tumult and inciting violence were all actions that could be punished by the 
crimen maiestatis. Such a commentary made available a legal argument to sustain 
that the infraction of the public order represented an attack against the security of 
the Roman people: all forms of collective violence were potentially perceived as a 
threat to the stability and continuity of the political community and, for this reason, 
they could be criminalized as crimen maiestas and consequently punished with 
death. 
As has been mentioned before, Roman law also provided a more general crimen 
vis to punish the unlawful use of violence in public spaces. The lex Iulia de vi 
publica (17 B.C)30 was used to repress violent acts against public officers, anything 
disturbing their political functions, or, more generally, any action aiming to 
interrupt the normal course of political life. Although the kind of behaviour 
criminalized by the crimen vis could be recognised as a form of perturbation of 
public peace, it was not stigmatised as a politically structured attack against the 
Roman people and, therefore, not perceived as a threat to the entire political 
community. Consequently, the punishment for this crime consisted of the 
confiscation of goods and forced exile. As can easily be seen, the Roman law 
offered different ways of reacting to public violence, according to the 
dangerousness attributed to the different types of behaviour. 
                                                                                                            
blies have been called together, or men convoked for sedition; or where, by the malicious 
aid and advice of anyone, plans have been formed by which the magistrates of the Roman 
people, or other officials invested with command or authority may be killed; or where an-
yone bears arms against the government, or sends a messenger or letter to the enemies of 
the Roman people, or communicates to them any password; or commits any act with ma-
licious intent by means of which the enemies of the Roman people may be assisted in 
their designs against the government; or where anyone solicits or inflames soldiers, in or-
der that a sedition or a tumult may be excited against the State”. 
29  The notion of maiestas refered to the dignitas attributed to the populus romanus, which 
originally held it; during principate time maiestas shifted from populus to princeps, be-
coming a personal attribute of emperor. 
30  C. 9. 12. 
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The crimen vis was an alternative option to criminalize and repress violence: it 
aimed at protecting minor magistrates and, as such, was a flexible instrument to 
control violent behaviour in everyday political life. In contrast to that, the crime 
maiestatis covered only attacks against the top figures of the political hierarchy and 
left the intermediate levels of power without legal protection. For the jurist of the 
early modern age, who accepted the lex Iulia maiestatis as a doctrinal model for the 
definition of political crimes, this feature represented a problematic aspect to be 
reconsidered and integrated based on contemporary needs.31 Indeed, they had to 
provide legal defence for all the intermediate public officers – members of local 
government, tax collectors, representatives of central authorities – which were not 
protected by crimen maiestatis as it was defined in the Roman law. 
 
The process of adaptation of the titles of the Codex and the Digest related to the 
changed political context led to an extensive application of the crimen maiestatis in 
order to punish all manifestations of resistance against the authorities. This 
extension was based on the idea that all members of the power’s hierarchy, even 
minor magistrates holding only a derivate maiestas, had to be protected by it. This 
led to a considerable increase of occasions and possibilities to oppose an authority 
invested with maiestas and therefore to commit the crime. Importantly, a proper and 
exhaustive definition of the crimen maiestatis was missing in the juridical doctrine: 
rather than elaborating a definition, jurists compiled extensive lists answering the 
question crimen laesae maiestatis quid sit. Due to this, instead of a theoretical 
understanding of the qualitas rei of the crime they indicated concrete ways in which 
it was committed; therefore, starting with the cases specified in the Roman law, 
they extended the behaviour which was punishable as crimen maiestatis. Finally, 
during the development of the early modern penal law, the doctrine started to 
consider behaviour with a minimal political connotation as political crimes; this 
behaviour was previously not considered as a threat to the authority and 
consequently not yet assimilated to the crimen maiestatis.32 
These three developments led to an extensive interpretation of the concepts of 
rebellio and seditio, which were the two crimes subsumed under the broader crimen 
laesae maiestatis, namely the two concrete manifestations of the crime.33 The 
                                                 
31  Ghisalberti, Sulla teoria dei delitti di lesa maestà nel diritto comune, 146-150. 
32  Sbriccoli, Crimen laesae maiestatis, 258-266. 
33  In order to define the notion of rebellio, the early modern doctrine constantly referred to 
the comment by Bartolus de Saxoferrato to the Imperial Constitution Quis sit rebellis 
(1313) promulgated by Henricus VII. According to Bartolus, rebelling was like resisting 
and resisting meant to do something against, to refuse to do something or to disobey. See 
Bartolus de Saxoferrato, “Tractatus super Constitutione Extravaganti, Ad Reprimendum”, 
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process of extension that has been briefly described, involved indeed both notions: 
on the one hand, during the sixteenth century penal doctrine started to increasingly 
equalise crimen maiestatis and crimen rebellionis, thereby abandoning the 
differentiations made by previous doctrine.34 For political conflicts this meant that 
one could be accused of rebellion more often and, at the same time, a clear and 
indubitable subsumption of that accusation under the crimen maiestatis. On the 
other hand, the enlargement of the concept of seditio was based on the idea that 
every form of perturbation of the public order, even minor episodes of violence, 
must be recognized as a direct strike against the authority. 
4. DEFINITION OF SEDITIO IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
a) Nicolas Bohier 
In 1515 Nicolas Bohier,35 a French jurist, member of the Grand Conseil and 
President of the Parlement de Bordeaux, wrote his aforementioned treatise De 
seditiosis. Just one year before he had been sent to repress an insurrection in Agen 
and was directly involved in the organisation of the trial against the insurgents. The 
experience gained on that occasion represented the starting point to reconsider the 
former legal tradition dealing with collective forms of discord and to elaborate a 
first systematic attempt to bring order to the topic. The first part of the treatise is 
dedicated to a general analysis of the causes of civil discord. This is followed by a 
depiction of the revolt he had recently repressed.36 
The revolt in Agen in July 1514 was provoked by a new impost on wine and 
other goods for consumption. The town consuls had levied the tax in order to pay 
back a municipal debt. The burghers perceived this as unfair and unjust. After 
initial murmurings people met to discuss a common reaction and some minor 
                                                                                                            
gl. Tenore, in Consilia, Quaestiones et Tractatus (Venetiis, 1585), 104r: “…rebellare 
idem est quod resistere, secundum Hug. C. de seder. L. 2. Lib. 12, et hoc resistere potest 
fieri faciendo aliquid contra, vel non faciendo, et non obediendo […]”. On Bartolus' 
comment on the Imperial Constitution see Diego Quaglioni, “Rebellare idem est quam re-
sistere”. Obéissance et résistance dans les gloses de Bartolo à la constitution “Quoniam 
nuper” d'Henry VII (1355), in Le Droit de résistance XIIe-XXe siècle, ed. J.-C. Zancarini 
(Lyon, 2001), 35-46. 
34  Ibid., 263 f. 
35  On Bohier see G.D. Guyon, “Bohier (Boyer, Boerius), Nicolas”, in Dictionnaire histo-
rique des juristes français (XIIe-XXe siècle), ed. P. Arabeyre et al. (Paris, 2007), 95-97. 
36  Bohier, De seditiosis, § 1, pp. 104-114. 
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incidents followed; the revolt began with the ringing of the bells which summoned 
the crowd to gather in the main square, who then besieged the town hall and 
captured some members of the local elite. Attacks against the town consuls 
continued for days, while the widespread violence led to the destruction of several 
buildings and parts of the city wall. The insurrection lasted for two weeks until it 
was brutally repressed. 
According to Giovanni Procacci, the uprising should be understood within the 
framework of a broader conflict: the protest was the result of the growing burden of 
taxes and a direct act against the local oligarchy and rich families, who were 
accused of monopolizing offices, pursuing their particular interests in running 
public affairs and profiting from the unequal distribution of taxation.37 
After his description of the unrest, Bohier used the words seditio and discordia 
civilis indifferently, implying a convergence between the two concepts.38 It is only 
in the passages that follow, that two terms are explained separately: sedition is 
described as a form of violent and degenerated discord, while discordia is defined 
as a precondition to the explosion of a widespread conflict, which could also lead to 
armed insurrection. This introduction to the topic and the narration of the revolt in 
Agen are functional to the following definition of the crime, insofar as sedition is 
presented not as a unique violent act against the authority, but rather as a series of 
related behaviour aiming to plot against the res publica. Seditio, according to the 
formula offered by the Roman law is a form of perturbation of the public peace.39 
Bohier, referring to the medieval glosses and commentaries, tries to explain the 
etymological origin of the term:”seditio dicitur quasi seorsum itio, quia in diversum 
vadunt aliosque trahunt: vel dicitur a sedo per contrarium, plerumque populo 
                                                 
37  See Giovanni Procacci, Classi sociali e monarchia assoluta nella Francia della prima 
metà del secolo XVI (Torino, 1955), 161-173. See also David F. Burg, A world history of 
tax rebellions. An encyclopedia of tax rebels, revolts and riots from antiquity to the pre-
sent (New York, 2004), 144; Perez Zagorin, Rebels and rulers 1500-1660, Society, states 
and early modern revolution, agrarian and urban rebellions, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1982), 
237 ff. 
38  On the concept of seditio in Bohier and Braun see David von Mayenburg, “Ubi est inco-
lumitas obedientiae, ibi sana est forma doctrinae – Aufruhr und Revolte im kanonischen 
Recht”, in Der Einfluss der Kanonistik auf die europäische Rechtskultur, vol. 2: Öffentli-
ches Recht, ed. Franck Roumy (Köln, 2011) 217-266. 
39  Bohier, De seditiosis, § 2, n. 1, 114: “seditio est quietis publicae perturbatio”/”sedition is 
a perturbation of public order”; the reference to the Roman law is C. 9. 30. 
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discordante itur ad manus”.40 As well as an unsuccessful attempt to link the term to 
the Latin verb sedare, meaning the opposite of sedition, the term is explained as 
referring to a movement that divides the people and splits them up. 
In order to better understand the meaning of the concept and to clarify the 
relationship between seditio and discordia, Bohier quotes three authorities: 
Antoninus Florentinus, Thomas Aquinas and Isidore of Seville. They are central to 
an understanding of the medieval representation of sedition. According to Antonius 
Florentinus’ Summa Theologica, seditio is a particular form of discord, namely the 
discord that arises within the multitude.41 Florentinus referred to the Summa 
theologiae by Thomas Aquinas, where the seditiosus was described as 
 
qui seditionem excitat. Et quia seditio quandam discordiam importat, ideo seditiosus est qui 
discordiam facit non quamcumque, sed inter partes alicuius multitudinis. Peccatum autem 
seditionis non solum est in eo qui discordiam seminat, sed etiam in eis qui inordinate ab 
invicem dissentiunt.42 
 
The discord produced by a seditious man was in this way characterised as of public 
nature: not just a disagreement between two private parties, but discord triggered by 
political reasons and involving the “multitude”. The understanding of what should 
be considered as seditiosus was based on what Isidore of Seville had already written 
in his encyclopaedic work Etymologiae. According to Isidore, “qui dissensionem 
animorum facit et discordias gignit”43 can be accused as the author of sedition. 
Starting from this definition, Thomas Aquinas claimed that fomenting civil discord 
in general or committing sedition could be considered as the same sin. By referring 
to these definitions, Bohier presents an extensive interpretation of the crime, which 
allowed him to criminalize several types of behaviour which cause dissension 
                                                 
40  Ibid.: “sedition derives from going a part, because they go away and bring others with 
them, or it derives from the verb squash (as its contrary) and generally it comes from the 
idea of the people fighting among themselves”. 
41  Antonius Florentinus, secunda pars summae, tit. 4, c. 8, § 1 (Basilee, 1511): “seditio 
importat discordiam, non quancunque sed inter partes alicuius multitudinis”/”sedition 
does not refer to every discord, but to discord developing among parts of a multitude”. 
42  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 ad 1: “A seditious man is one 
who incites others to sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that 
a seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a 
multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only in him who sows discord, but also in those 
who dissent from one another inordinately”. 
43  Isidore of Seville, “Seditiosus”, in Etymologiae sive origines, X, 250: “a seditious man is 
who sows dissent among minds and begets discord”. 
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within the political community, from the first murmuring against members of the 
government up to more explicit appeals to resist the authorities. This position was 
far from unique in the debate. On the contrary, it was the standard argumentation 
used by several jurists; the authorities quoted by Bohier were indeed a shared 
reference for all jurists dealing with collective forms of protest, insofar as their 
definitions were always the background for further analysis of the phenomenon. 
In this preliminary attempt to retrace a definition of seditio in Bohier, we see 
that its core concepts were dissensio and discordia and that a sedition was 
understood as a form of division of or within the multitude, although the word 
multitudo was not yet specified and therefore used in a general way. A further effort 
to clarify the crime was the distinction between sedition and the other forms of 
division and opposition, which were not to be confused. 
Thomas Aquinas, in a passage quoted later by all the jurists, wrote that a seditio 
was different from a war, which was a conflict against foreign people, namely 
against people not bound to the same political obligations and loyalty. Seditio was 
thus described as a clash or division taking place within a singular people, i.e. when 
one part of it stood against the other. Moreover, since a multitude referred to a large 
number of persons, seditio was different from a simple strife  (rixa) between two or 
a few individuals.44 Private strife was not perceived as a political problem and was 
therefore considered as different from sedition, which was strongly connected to the 
idea of a multitude in action. Indeed, sedition could happen in different contexts – 
and Bohier specified “in exercitu, in classe, in campo, in schola”45 –, but a large 
number of people always had to be involved. 
War and strife were also different from sedition for another reason, which had 
considerable consequences on the possibility of intervention and repression. Again 
                                                 
44  Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 co.: “Secundo differunt, quia bellum 
proprie est contra extraneos et hostes, quasi multitudinis ad multitudinem; rixa autem est 
unius ad unum, vel paucorum ad paucos; seditio autem proprie est inter partes unius mul-
titudinis inter se dissentientes, puta cum una pars civitatis excitatur in tumultum contra 
aliam. Et ideo seditio, quia habet speciale bonum cui opponitur, scilicet unitatem et 
pacem multitudinis, ideo est speciale peccatum”/”Secondly, they differ in that war is, 
properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one people 
and another, whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few people 
on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between mu-
tually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against 
another part. Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely the 
unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin”; Bohier, De seditiosis, § 2, n. 2, 
114. 
45  Bohier, De seditiosis, § 2, n. 4, 115. 
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Bohier quotes Thomas Aquinas, who wrote that “bellum et rixa important mutuam 
impugnationem in actu, sed seditio potest dici sive fiat huiusmodi impugnatio in 
actu, sive sit praeparatio ad talem impugnationem”.46 Following this interpretation, 
the term war is applied only to an open conflict, whereas the concept of sedition is 
rather different: it refers indeed to unrest and insurrections, but also to all the 
activities that usually precede them, such as murmuring against authorities, 
gathering people or plotting. This position is sustained by the gloss to Paulus’ 
Second Epistle to the Corinthians47 that has already been quoted by Aquinas and 
was now taken up by Bohier. Aquinas, according to the gloss, wrote that “seditiones 
sunt tumultus ad pugnam, cum scilicet aliqui se praeparant et intendunt pugnare”.48 
Therefore, sedition was defined as the will of plotting against authorities and the 
term could also be applied to describe all the unlawful behaviour preceding an 
insurrection. 
This is a core passage that helps to comprehend how the process of 
criminalization of collective forms of protest was connected to the enlargement of 
the semantic field of crimen seditionis. Not only concrete violent actions were to be 
considered as a crime, but also types of behaviour, which could be interpreted by 
the authorities as a form of organised malcontent and a way to prepare a protest. 
Such an effort to produce an extensive idea of sedition is the result of the 
practical approach assumed by the jurists. Bohier, as well as other authors of 
treatises on sedition, had been directly involved in the repression of insurrections. 
He was well aware of the different steps producing a collective disagreement and 
wanted to develop legal instruments to nip sedition in the bud. We can see here how 
the legal doctrine was forced to serve political needs and how it was used to define 
strategies to control public spaces and to repress political protest. Indeed, by 
classifying the initiation of disagreement and discord within the political 
community as part of the crimen seditionis, Bohier wanted to legitimize preventive 
action taken by the magistratus. The jurists embraced the idea that it was necessary 
to consider a seditious man as not only one who actively took part in sedition, but 
also anybody involved in its preparation. This was aimed to criminalise the very 
intention to disturb public order as well as all behaviour perceived as a threat to 
established authority. It emerges here that the will of plotting was recognised as a 
core element in defining the crime. Jurists implied that any possible criticism of the 
                                                 
46  Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 co.: “war and strife denote actual aggres-
sion on either side, whereas sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the 
preparation for such aggression”. 
47  2 Corinthians 12. 
48  Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 co.: “seditions are tumults tending to 
fight, when a number of people make preparations with the intention of fighting”. 
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authorities should be characterised as a plot to consciously damage them. At the 
same time, they perceived any episode of collective violence as a concrete 
manifestation of a more or less shared will to destabilise the public order. 
Therefore, not only violent acts were unlawful, but also all behaviour producing 
discord and considered as a preliminary phase of unrest.  
As we can see, the extensive interpretation of the term seditio was grounded in a 
broad definition of seditiosus. Bohier quoted a long extract from the Tractatus de 
maleficiis by Bonifazio Vitalini: 
 
Seditiosus autem dicitur ille, qui seditionem vel proditionem tractat de aliqua civitate vel 
castro habendo, vel dando causam faciendi guerram contra publicam utilitatem, vel tractat 
facere novitatem in civitatem, vel novitatem contra publicum et bonum statum civitatis, vel 
tractat se fieri dominum terre, vel loci alterius ad turbam populi, vel similia contra publicam 
utilitatem.49 
 
The seditious man was defined as whoever was involved in sedition or treason 
(proditio), whoever waged war against the common good or tried to introduce 
something new into the political body; in general, a person who produced discord 
among the people and acted against public unity was considered as seditiosus. This 
extensive definition offers several points to be analysed and clarified. For the first 
time in Bohier the convergence between sedition and treason was made explicit and 
clear and, in this way, the crime was connected to the crimen laesae maiestatis. 
Political treason is evidently something different from public disorder produced by 
the public use of violence. By introducing the concept of treason jurists 
considerably changed the crime and assigned new meaning to all the activities 
preceding unrest. Murmuring against authorities or the meeting of people were 
considered as evidence of a will to plot. Disorder produced by violence, and the 
consequent damage of the bonus publicum, were not collateral effects, but the real 
aim conceived by insurgents.50 
                                                 
49  Bonifazio Vitalini, Tractatus de maleficiis, tit. De seditiosis, 396r: “A seditious man is 
defined whoever manages to set a sedition or treason within a city or stronghold by wag-
ing war against common good or by giving reason for it; he is whoever wants to intro-
duce changes in the city or against the government or wants to take domain and control of 
a territory in order to bring discord among the people and against the common good”. 
50  Bohier, De seditiosis, § 1, 104-114. 
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b) Konrad Braun 
The treatise of Bohier was well known to the Catholic German jurist Konrad 
Braun,51 who, in 1550 wrote his De seditionibus libri sex.52 In a first attempt to 
answer the question quid sit seditio, the jurist referred to the ancient classics. 
According to Cicero, who considered the phenomenon in several passages in his 
works, sedition occurs when there is a division within the people, because of an 
inner disagreement or a conflict with the authorities.53 This first definition also 
introduces the leading theme of discord within the people. Referring to classical 
political thought, the jurist had the possibility to list several terms used to 
circumscribe the concept of seditio. Sedition was the result of a violent movement 
of the people and could be defined as impetus, motus, incursio, concitatio plebis, vis 
multitudinis. This movement of the multitude was associated with the idea of 
uncontrolled violence and illustrated with violent images designed to appal the 
reader. Many metaphors were used to describe movements of protest. Apart from 
Cicero, Braun referred to the works of Sallust, Cyprian, Pindar, Livy and Virgil, 
where the movement of the people was described as a disease, a fire and as a storm. 
All these metaphors were based on antonymous conceptual couples such as 
order/disorder, stillness/movement, unity/division and health/illness.54 
                                                 
51  See Theobald Freudenberger, “Braun, Konrad”, in Neue Deutsche Biographie 2 (1955), 
556; Maria Barbara Rößner, Konrad Braun (ca. 1495-1563) - ein katholischer Jurist, Po-
litischer, Kontroverstheologe und Kirchenreformer im konfessionellen Zeitalter, (Müns-
ter, 1991). 
52  On the concept of seditio in Braun see Jörn Johannsen-Reichert, Das Thema “Aufruhr” 
aus religiöser, juristischer und politischer Sicht im deutschen Raum wärend des konfessi-
onellen Zeitalters (1517-1617) (Aachen, 1996), 32-56. 
53  Braun, De seditionibus, 1: “Seditio à seorsim eundo dicta est, ut Ciceroni placet, quod 
plebis vel inter se, vel cum magistratibus dissentiens, seorsim secedat”/”Sedition derives 
from the idea of coming asunder, as Cicero wrote; this occurs when the people disagree 
among themselves or with public officers”. 
54  Ibid.: “[…] seditio, nunc vehementiori morbo, nunc incendio, turbini, et à Pindaro tem-
pestati maris comparatur: Quam et tempestatem aliquoties appellat Livius. Ad quam 
comparationem, etiam Poeta noster allusisse videtur, qui Aeolum ventos oratione sua pla-
care fingens, eos seditioso populo comparatur. Ac veluti (inquit) magno in populo cum 
saepe coorta est,/Seditio, saevitque animis ignobile vulgus,/Iamque faces et saxa volant, 
ac meritis si forte virum quem,/conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant,/Ille regit 
dictis animos, et pectora mulcet./Sic cunctus pelagi cecidit fragor, aequora 
postquam/Prospiciens genitor, coeloque invectus aperto./Flectit equos, curruque volans 
dat lora secundo (Virgil, Aeneid, 1, vv. 147-154). Hinc etiam concitari, incendi, flagrare, 
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At the end of his brief historical overview Braun discusses and criticizes the 
definition offered by Bohier. As it has been stressed, the French jurist, with his 
background of education in Roman law, identified sedition as a perturbation of the 
public peace. According to Braun, this was not acceptable as a definition, but 
simply as a description of the phenomenon. Moreover, if sedition produces a 
perturbation of the internal order of the respublica, it is also true that not every 
disorder could be related to it. It was therefore necessary to provide a legal 
definition of the phenomenon, able to suit different situations. For that, Braun 
proposes a complex explanation of the concept, composed by a series of elements 
that need to be clearly defined. He wrote that: 
 
verius itaque definitur seditio, ut fit motus populi et subditorum, eorumque qui eiusdem 
multitudinis partes sunt, vel in eadem multitudine versantur, quo vel plures inter se, vel unus 
pluresve adversus eos, quibus fidelitate astricti sunt, utilitatis alicuius consequendae, vel 
damni alijs aut iniuriae inferendae causa, scientes et volentes in detrimentum et damnum 
Reipublicae, ad dissensionem concitatur.55 
 
Sedition is presented as a movement of the people, namely of those who were part 
of a multitude. This movement could take place within the multitude itself or 
against the authority, to which the subjects were bound by political obligation. Such 
a movement consciously and willingly produced discord in order to take advantage 
of it or to damage the respublica. The jurist’s attempt to define seditio exceeded the 
simple description of the phenomenon we have seen in Bohier’s writings. For 
Braun the definition had to be sufficiently abstract and formal, in order to be valid 
                                                                                                            
aestuare, saevire seditiones apud autores dicuntur: ab incendio videlicet, et morbo sumpta 
metaphora: et seditiosi ipsi turbolenti, et tumultuosi appellantur”/”sedition is sometimes 
compared to the most violent illness, sometimes to a whirlwind and by Pindar to a storm. 
Livy as well calls it storm. We see that also our Poet, Virgil, alluded to that similarity: 
“And when – he wrote – seditions rise among great people, and low people enrage, and 
flames and rocks fly, then if the people see a serious and virtuous man, they calm down 
and listen, he soothes their anger, thus the storm's commotion quietens: the father squash-
es the horses and drives the coach”. Therefore, other authors also refer to sedition as the 
act of instigating, inflaming, burning, enraging; the metaphors come from blaze and ill-
ness and seditious men are called turbulent and tumultuous”. 
55  Ibid., 2: “sedition is more correctly defined as a movement (commotion) of the people 
and subjects, namely of whoever is or becomes part of a multitude; this movement takes 
place among the people or against those, to whom the people are tied by a fidelity bond; 
finally, this movement is provoked in order to provoke dissension and to willingly 
achieve an advantage or to damage the political community”. 
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for different conflicting contexts. Therefore, he offered a flexible model for a 
general theory of sedition. 
The semantic field of the concept defined by Braun was partially different from 
the one elaborated by Bohier and responded to different needs. Specification was 
achieved through the combination of the term with other concepts. At the base of 
sedition there was the idea of a movement, which was not to be understood as just 
an ordinary change in the political order. The Latin word he used was motus, but 
according to Braun, to understand the meaning of this movement, it was necessary 
to link it to the words studium and conatus.  
 
Motum in hac definitione pro genere ponimus, non quidam ut generaliter mutationem in 
Republica designet, ut generationem, corruptionem et similia: nec ut quemlibet etiam animi 
motum denotet, ut in illo Iureconsulti [Callistratus : D. 1. 18. 19]. […] Item in illo Ciceronis 
[Cicero, De claris oratoribus] […]. Nunquam animus agitatione et motu vacuus esse potest. 
Sed ut studium et conatum ardentius aliquid machinandi significet.56 
 
The notion of a sudden movement, representing the violent action of the insurgents, 
was combined with the idea of an effort to change the political order or to plot 
against authority. The motus was a conscious motion aimed at changing the 
political order. It should be understood as a passion, a desire to conspire. The given 
description conveys the idea of purposeful and deliberate participation in the 
protest, not only a generic malcontent, but also a will to intervene and to achieve a 
specific result. 
The crowd (hominum multitudo) was the collective subject of this movement. 
Braun, as well as Bohier, wrote that sedition was always associated with a 
multitude of people assembled. If it was possible to simply list situations in which 
people gathered, it was difficult to specify a number that would define a 
congregation, or other more rigorous definitions of such a collective subject. Braun 
was sure that it was not possible to establish a general rule and left it to the 
magistrate to decide case by case.57 
                                                 
56  Ibid.: “The term movement does not indicate a general change in the political community, 
like generation or corruption, or a general commotion like in Callistratus (D. 1. 18. 19) or 
in Cicero (De claris oratoribus). This movement cannot be without an aim, but, on the 
contrary, it is a passion and an effort to plot”. 
57  Ibid.: “Addidimus in definitione: Populi, Cuius appellatione hoc loco omnis hominum 
multitudo venit. Nam seditio esse potest, ubicunque est hominum multitudo, ut in populo, 
in gente, in collegio, in exercitu, in classe, in schola, et in quolibet coetu et congregatione 
[…]. Caeterum, quot homines multitudinnem, quot populum, quot collegium, quot gen-
tem, quot exercitum, quot caetum et congregationem faciant: certa quidam regula dari 
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The core of the definition is the infraction of political loyalty, to which all 
subjects are bound. The basic element of the crime thus consisted of the resistance 
of authority. This allowed the jurist to directly link the concept of seditio to 
rebellion. Braun wrote that it was not even important to determine the number of 
the people taking part in the action: the relevant point was the rebels’ behaviour 
towards legitimate superiors.58 
Braun further discussed the problem of conscious and willing participation in 
sedition. In order to sustain that the phenomenon had to be subsumed under the 
broader idea of high treason he kept arguing that all sedition was aimed at achieving 
an established advantage or damaging the political body. Every violent action 
against authority potentially weakened the whole community and thus had to be 
considered as a threat to the respublica. The injury inflicted to the community was 
the result of civil discord, which was understood at the same time as a means to 
perturb the inner equilibrium and as the outcome of sedition: 
 
vel Utilitatis consequendae, vel damni alijs, aut iniuriae inferendae causa: Haec verba finem 
seditionis denotant. Omnis enim seditio fit aut ob utilitatem aliquam consequendam, aut 
damnum iniuriamue a nobis repellendam, alijsue inferendam. Inter se ad dissensionem 
scientes et volentes in detrimentum et damnum Reipublicae concitantur: His verbis forma 
seditionis explicatur: Quippe à discordia seditio et nomen et formam accipit. Nam quid aliud 
est seorsum ire, quàm cum alij dissentire. Nec omnis discordia seditionem parit, set ea 
                                                                                                            
non potest. […] Est igitur in arbitrio Iudicis, et boni viri positum, ut ipse, quot homines 
multi sint vel pauci, quot populus, turba, gens, caetus, congregatio et c. interpretetur: 
eamque rem ita arbitretur, ut materie subiectae convenire existimabit”/”We add to the 
definition: people, this term comes from the idea of a multitude of men. Indeed, sedition 
can occur wherever there is a multitude of men, like among the people, in an assembly, in 
the army, in a battlefield, inside a union and in any congregation. It is not possible to give 
a rule in order to determine how many men make a multitude, a people, an assembly, an 
army or a congregation. Therefore, the judge has to interpret it and decide how many men 
make a multitude or a congregation”. 
58  Ibid.: “Sed et propter rebelles, additur verbum Subditorum. Rebellio siquidem subditorum 
est erga Dominos suos, nec ad numerum vel multitudinem hoc casu respicitur: Sive enim 
multi sunt, sive pauci, Si obedientiam dominis suis subtrahunt, seditiosi et rebelles appel-
lantur”/”In order to explain the term “rebels” we add the term “subjects”. Indeed rebel-
lion against authorities does not depend on the number of men taking part in it. Even if 
they are many or few, if they deny obedience to the authorities, they have to be consid-
ered rebels and seditious men”. 
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tantum, quae Reipublicae detrimentum, et damnum affert, et quietem illius et tranquillitatem 
perturbat.59 
 
Moreover, Braun specified that not all kinds of discord should be criminalized and 
repressed, only those aimed at damaging the community.60 
The general theory proposed by Braun was a flexible instrument to criminalize 
different forms of unrest. The perturbation of the public order could develop indeed 
in both horizontal and vertical direction.61 On the one hand, the concept could be 
used to criminalize all the horizontal forms of disagreement within the people, 
namely any division produced by inner discord such as, for instance, the existence 
of factions. The crime associated with sedition could be applied to political discord 
within the people even without any direct attack against the authority. Disorders 
and violence within the community were enough to perturb the public order and, 
consequently, to be considered as a threat. On the other hand, seditio was also a 
concept suitable to describe attacks against the vertical structure of power, namely 
when the multitude moved against the established government. Despite these two 
possibilities, the crimen seditionis was always considered as an act of rebellion 
against the legitimate authority and therefore likened to the crimen rebellionis. The 
core of the crime was indeed, according to Braun, subtraction from the political 
obligation to which all the subjects were bound. The convergence between seditio 
and rebellio was functional to legitimise the repression of every form of collective 
dissent. 
                                                 
59  Ibid., 4: “Achieving advantages, provoking damages or injuries: these words indicate the 
aim of sedition. Indeed, any sedition is made in order to achieve an advantage, to avoid 
damages or to inflict them to others. Willingly provoking dissension in order to create 
damages to the political community: these words explain the form of sedition. Certainly, 
sedition derives its name and form from disagreement. Moreover, dividing and disagree-
ing are different: not every kind of dissent produces seditions, but just the one aimed at 
inflicting damages to the political community and at perturbing the public order”. 
60  There were indeed also forms of positive competition between the people, which have to 
be tolerated and even encouraged by the authority: ibid.: “Sic nec mutua inter civesa 
aemulatio et dissensio, qua alter alterum prudentia, consilio, et rebus gerendis, superare 
intendit, seditio est: Nam et ipsa Reipublicae, non solum non noxia est, sed etiam uti-
lis”/”So, competition and discord among people, aimed at improving prudence and judg-
ment, are not sedition: indeed, these kinds of competitions not only are not noxious for 
the political community, but in fact are useful”. 
61  Johannsen-Reichert, Das Thema “Aufruhr”, 41-43. 
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5. DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMEN SEDITIONIS 
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
During the seventeenth century the legal debate on sedition revealed increasing 
attention on the forms of collective violence that did not immediately aim to oppose 
or criticise the top level of the political hierarchy. The treatises dealt with the 
emergence of dissent within the crowd and attempted to provide the public officer 
with the necessary wisdom to cope with all unlawful uses of violence that might 
incite disorder within the community, from minor riots to more structured and 
organized rebellions. Jurists like Bohier and Braun were mostly interested in 
defining a crime that was suitable for brutal repression of any forms of protest 
against authority. Apart from this aspect, subsequent authors rather concentrated on 
conflicts among the people that were threatening to result in a generalized state of 
violence. They were particularly concerned with violence itself and focused on all 
kinds of infraction of public peace. Therefore, they elaborated a concept of seditio 
that was appropriate to provide a more adequate punitive reaction to a wider range 
of violent behaviours. 
From outside the legal debate, in 1589 in his Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae 
libri sex Justus Lipsius briefly defined sedition as a “multitudinis in Principem aut 
magistratus, subitus et violentus motus”,62 describing therefore the crime as a 
violent assault on the authorities. This definition synthesized former doctrinal 
elaborations, focusing on violence as a core element of the crime and indicated that 
sedition could be directed against both the top level of the political hierarchy, or 
against a public officer of a lower rank. A more nuanced distinction between strikes 
against the princeps and offences against a public officer received more attention in 
the ensuing debate in which jurists tried to achieve a more refined calibration of the 
authorities’ reactions. 
A few years later, in 1599, Andreas Dalner, who like Bohier was a direct 
witness of peasant protests,63 wrote in his tractatus that “seditio nihil aliud est, 
                                                 
62  Justus Lipsius, Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex (Antversiae, 1598), 210. 
63  Dalner was a councillor in Lower Austria and witnessed the peasant uprising of 1597. He 
was deeply impressed by the violence of that event and wrote his treatise under the influ-
ence of his immediate experiences. Two years after its first edition in Latin, the treatise 
was published in German translation under the title Ein Tractat: Von Aufruhr und 
Empörung auß geistlichen und weltlichen Historien (Ingolstadt, 1601). See Roth, Kollek-
tive Gewalt, 125 and Schulze, Die veränderte Bedeutung sozialer Konflikte, 299. On the 
peasant uprising of 1597 in Lower Austria see Otto Kainz, “Das Kriegsgerichtsprotokoll 
im niederösterreichischen Bauernaufstand aus dem Jahre 1597” (Ph.D. diss., University 
of Wien, 2008). 
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quam in provincia, territorio, urbe, castro, vel alio aliquo loco, contra publicam 
quietem et disciplinam, consulto animo, facta populi suis legibus uniti concitatio”.64 
Dalner, distinguished between sedition committed against the respublica or the 
Emperor and sedition committed against a minor part of the political body that 
might produce some sort of inner disorder.65 This second case was not subsumed 
under the crimen maiestatis, but it was punished according to the law concerning 
public use of violence, namely the lex Iulia de vi publica.66 
In his work De Seditionibus seu discordiis domesticis, published in 1664, 
Martin Schoock67 made great efforts to analyse the genesis and development of 
inner discord. According to him the best definition of a state of sedition was the one 
offered by the rhetorician Libanius (ca. 314- ca. 394), who wrote, in his Oration pro 
                                                 
64  Dalner, Tractatus de seditione, 5: “sedition is nothing else than a commotion in a region, 
a city, a, stronghold against public order and established rules; this commotion is based 
on a deliberate union among the people”. 
65  Ibid., 7-8: “Seditio autem duplex est; una adversus Rempublicam vel Imperatorem com-
mittitur: altera eiusdem membra fit. Illa quidem […] est, quando quis opera sua, 
fraudolentove consilio, non modo paganos, verum etiam milites, […] solicitat, concitatve, 
quo telis et armis instructi seditionem seu tumultum in Reipublicae seu Imperatoris exit-
ium moturi conveniant. […] Item si quis per seditionem Reipublicae seu Imperatoris sub-
jectam civitatem oppugnet, occupetque; nam et ipse crimen laesae majestatis incurrit 
[…]. Haec vero est, quando quis opera, seu malo consilio suo, homines concitat, quo telis 
et armis convenientes, adversus Reipublicae seu Imperatoris membra, seditionem mo-
veant, civitatesve ad Imperatore non pertinentes oppugnent, vel bona rapiant: quo pertinet 
l. in eadem causa. 3. in princ. et §. in eadem causa, his verbis: in eadem causa sunt, qui 
pessimo exemplo, convocta seditione villas expugnaverint, et cum telis et armis bona ra-
puerint. ff. ad legem Iuliam de vi publica [D. 48. 6]”/”Sedition is double: one I committed 
against political community and emperor, the other against political body's parts. The first 
one occurs when people, armed with weapons and spears, organise seditions and tumults 
against political community and emperor, or when the people occupy or assault a city that 
is subject to the emperor. This is a case of lese majesty. The second one occurs when the 
armed people organise seditions and tumults against a part of the political community or 
against a city that is not subject to emperor. This sedition is covered by the Julian law on 
public violence”. 
66  C. 9. 12; D. 48. 6. 
67  Schoock was born in Utrecht in 1614. He had a very “cross-disciplinary” education and 
became professor of Classic Literature, Oratory, History and Logic in Deventer and Gro-
ningen. After 1664 he became the official historian of the prince-elector of Brandenburg 
and worked as professor in Frankfurt (Oder) until his death. See Jacob Cornelis van Slee, 
“Schoock, Martin”, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 32 (1891), 324-325.  
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Thalassio of 388, that “seditio est, quando diversitas cupiditatis perturbato inter se 
committit: quando scinditur incerti in studia contraria: ut hi arces occupent, alii 
portus detineant: quando muniunt se muris et propugnaculis: quando in se invicem 
auxilia vocant: quando civitas non una manet”.68 Schoock understood sedition as an 
intermediate step between factio and bellum civile, which he perceived as the last 
and most dangerous stage of the disruption of political unity.  
In order to better understand what sedition meant for the political community, 
the jurist compared it with rebellio and perduellio. Starting from the explanation of 
rebellio provided by Henricus VII in the Imperial Constitution Quis sit rebellis69 
(1313) and from Ulpianus’ comment on the lex Iulia de maiestate,70 Schoock 
emphasised the convergence of the two terms and concluded that 
 
qui perduellionis reus est, hostili animo adversarius rempublicam vel principem animatus. Ex 
quibus patet, seditiosos, quatenus tumultuantur illegitime contra legitimum suum 
                                                 
68  Schoock, De Seditionibus, Seu Discordiis domesticis, 63.The passage quoted is Libanius, 
Libanii Opera. Orationes XXVI-L, vol. 3, ed R. Foerster (Lipsiae, 1906), 308-333. 
69  Heinrich VII, “Declaratio Quis sit rebellis”, a. 1313, in Monumenta Germaniae Historia. 
Legum sectio IV. Constitutiones et acta publica imperatotum et regnum, Tomi IV. Pars 
II., ed. Jakob Schwalm (Hannoverae/Lipsiae, 1909-11), n. 931, 967: “…quod illi omnes 
et singuli sunt rebelles et infideles nostri et imperii, qui quomodocunque publice vel oc-
culte contra nostrum honorem infidelitatis vel rebellionis opera faciunt et in nostramseu 
imperii prosperitatem aliquid machinantur contra nos sive nostros officiales in hiis, que 
ad commissum eis offitium pertinent…”/”…are rebel and unfaithful to us and the empire 
all those that organise publicly or secretly rebel or unfaithful activities against our hon-
our, or plot against our prosperity, against us or our public officers…”. 
70  D. 48. 4. 11: “Is, qui in reatu decedit, integri status decedit: extinguitur enim crimen 
mortalitate. nisi forte quis maiestatis reus fuit: nam hoc crimine nisi a successoribus 
purgetur, hereditas fisco vindicatur. plane non quisque legis iuliae maiestatis reus est, in 
eadem condicione est, sed qui perduellionis reus est, hostili animo adversus rem publicam 
vel principem animatus: ceterum si quis ex alia causa legis iuliae maiestatis reus sit, 
morte crimine liberatur”/” He who dies while an accusation against him is pending retains 
his civil status unimpaired, for the crime is extinguished by death, unless he was accused 
of lese majesty; for if he is not cleared of this offence by his successors, his estate will be 
forfeited to the Treasury. It is evident that not everyone accused of lese majesty under the 
Julian Law is in this position, but only he who is guilty of high treason, and is animated 
by hostile intent against the State or the Emperor. For if anyone is accused under any oth-
er section of the Julian Law on lese majesty, he will be released from the charge by 
death”. 
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Magistratum, habendos quoque esse Rebelles et perduelles. Licet aliquis, imo plures quoque 
crimen perduellionis incurre possint citra seditionem.71 
 
Despite this statement, he underlined that the Roman jurist Modestinus – a student 
of Ulpianus – in the Digest defined episodes of sedition subsumed under rebellion 
as atrox seditio72, implying that it was different from simple sedition. Although 
Schoock did not develop this argument, this quotation reveals a breach with the 
former understanding of crimen seditionis that was always thought to be a concrete 
manifestation of the broader crimen maiestatis. Modestinus suggested dividing the 
concept of seditio into two subcategories: atrox seditio, which is properly a case of 
rebellion, and simplex seditio, which is an episode of collective violence but not 
necessarily an offence against maiestas. Embracing this specification of the crime, 
Schoock seems to be interested in describing sedition as a form of civil discord that 
did not always lead to crimen maiestatis. 
This distinction was made clear and more explicit by Achilles Augustus Lersner 
(1662-1732)73 in his Disputatio politico-juridica de seditionibus,74 published in 
1688. In order to understand the doctrine of sedition, the jurist explains the meaning 
of concepts used in the legal debate that, according to him, were often confused, 
producing an inaccurate idea of crimen seditionis. Tumultus civilis, turba or 
discordia domestica were used as synonyms of seditio, although they indicated 
previous stages of inner discord, that usually occurred before the explosion of the 
real sedition. Lersner states a lack of accuracy in how the perturbation of the public 
order was expressed: he sustained that often the term seditio was confused with 
conjuratio and rebellio, which were not necessarily the same offences. 
According to Lersner, sedition is different from a plot (conjuratio) and therefore 
should not be confused with treason. People taking part in a sedition do not 
necessarily share the will to damage the government or strive for a common 
purpose. The argumentation here is the opposite of what we have seen in Bohier: 
                                                 
71  Schoock, De Seditionibus, Seu Discordiis domesticis, 79-80: “Whoever is guilty of 
treason is moved by hostile will against the political community or against the princeps. 
Among them, those who take part to sedition rebelling against lawful officers have to be 
considered rebels and betrayers. Though, it is also possible to commit treason without 
taking part to sedition”. 
72  D. 49. 16. 3. 19: “Qui seditionem atrocem militum concitavit, capite punitur”/”Whoever 
excites a violent sedition among the soldiers is punished with death”. 
73  Lersner was born in Frankfurt am Main and worked there as a chronicler. We do not 
know much about his life. See W. Stricker, “Lersner, Achilles August”, in Allgemeine 
Deutsche Biographie 18 (1883), 432-433. 
74  See footnote 16. 
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while the French jurist sustains that gathering together was already to be understood 
as evidence of an agreement between people, Lersner considers the possibility of 
spontaneous unrest, which is therefore not the result of a planned action. The two 
jurists are moved by different scopes: Bohier wants to assimilate any sedition to 
crimen maiestatis, sustaining that there is a shared will in any collective form of 
dissent. On the contrary, Lersner is interested in showing that it is also possible to 
have spontaneous sedition, which should not be punished as crimen maiestatis. 
At the same time, also the term rebellio was often incorrectly used to 
criminalise sedition. Indeed rebellion did not simply refer to the refusal of respect 
and fidelity to the magistrates: rebelling meant literally to wage war against the 
legitimate authority and against the entire political community. Lersner states that 
sedition is not always a collective case of rebellion. The term rebellio, he keeps 
arguing, is similar to perduellio, namely to high treason, and therefore seditio and 
rebellio should not simply be used as synonymous. Similarly to Schoock, Lersner 
wants to differentiate the concept of seditio into two subcategories, which 
correspond to different levels of sedition. He believes that sedition can be the result 
of a spontaneous commotion of the people without the conscious will to subvert the 
established authority and, in that case, he argues that the crimen maiestatis cannot 
be applied. Secondly, we have seditions that can be considered as collective 
rebellion and is characterised by the intention to plot against the government. Only 
an insurrection against the top level of the hierarchy, or aimed at damaging the 
entire community, should be considered, according to Modestinus and Schoock, an 
atrox seditio. 
As Lersner specifies 
 
est igitur seditio Commotio populi, qua pars civitatis vel exercitus adversus eos insurgit, qui 
rebus praesunt. Per eos qui rebus praesunt, tam principes summos, quam magistratus 
intellectos volo. Et quidem si commotio illa tendat adversus principem, vel directa sit in 
perniciem reipublicae incidit in crimen laesae Majestatis: si vero adversus inferiorem solum 
Magistratum sit esorta, et in eo subsistat, crimen Majestatis non est.75 
 
The jurist introduced again the distinction, known to the Roman law, between 
assaults against the princeps, namely the top of the hierarchy, and against minor 
                                                 
75  Ibid., 2-3: “Therefore sedition is a commotion of the people; with this commotion part of 
the political body or of the army rises against the government. Using the term govern-
ment I mean both the top level of the hierarchy (princeps) and lower officers. If the 
commotion is against the princeps or produces damages to the political community it is a 
case of crimen maiestatis; otherwise, if it is only directed against lower officers it cannot 
be considered a case of lese majesty”. 
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magistrates. Offences against minor magistrates should not be punished by the 
crimen maiestatis. Sedition could be considered a case of high treason (perduellio) 
– and therefore treated as a breach of maiestas – only when it was aimed towards 
ruinining or damaging the res publica or when it was an attempt to subvert or 
destabilise the political order.76  
To allow the application of the punishments provided by the crimen maiestatis, 
the sedition had to be motivated by the will to injure the political order. If the unrest 
was the result of private discord and the people involved did not intend to damage 
the authorities or break the political order, then the punishments to be applied were 
the ones provided by the lex Iuliam de vi publica et privata. Therefore, death was 
not the only punishment available and the magistrate was free to evaluate case by 
case, taking into account the state (dignitas) of the person accused.77 
                                                 
76  Lersner, Disputatio politico-juridica de seditionibus, 32: “Dicendum itaque eam demum 
seditionem in perduellionis crimen incurrere, quae tendit ad exitium principis aut senato-
rum ejus, vel subversionem ac immutationem reipublicae: non quae ad exitium priva-
torum, ut post alios docet Antonius Matthaeus, De criminibus. Commentarius ad Lib. 
XLVII et XLVIII Digesti, tit. 2, cap. 2, Vesaliae, 1679, Prospero Farinacci, Variae quaes-
tiones, quaest. 113. num. 183. et 192, Venetiis, 1584, ubi quod dictum est poena laesae 
Majestatis teneri qui tumultum concitat, ita declaratur, si ille tumultus tendat in damnum 
principis: sin vero concitetur absque animo offendendi aut laedendi principem, locum es-
se poenae arbitrariae. Ita si quis privato ductus odio plebem colligat, et excitato tumultu 
ad arma vocat, ad creandam adversario suo molestiam, licet in crimen Majestatis non in-
cidat, pro qualitate tamen dignitatis aut in furcam tollendus, aut bestiis objiciendus, aut in 
insulam deportandus est”/”Therefore, seditions that tend to ruin the princeps and his 
senators, or tend to subvert the political community, are considered high treason; but se-
ditions that tend to ruin private subjects are not considered high treason, as it is taught in 
Antonius Matthaeus and Prospero Farinacci, where it is said that whoever incites tumults, 
if they are aimed at damaging the princeps, is punished by crimen maiestatis. Otherwise, 
if they do not injure or damage the princeps, the punishments can be arbitrary. Therefore, 
if tumults are produced by private disagreements, it is lawful not to apply the crimen 
maiestatis: in this case, according to the status and honour of the people involved, they 
can be hanged, thrown to wild beasts or deported in an island”. 
77  Ibid., 33: “Nec dissentiunt ab hac sententia illi, qui tumultum in privatorum hominum 
perniciem et damnum concitatum in poenam legis Juliae de vi publica vel privata incidere 
censent, in quibus est Menochio, De arbitrariis iudicum quaestiones et causis, lib. 2. cas. 
394. n. 78, Venetiis, 1578, Antonius Matthaeus, De criminibus. Commentarius ad Lib. 
XLVII et XLVIII Digesti, tit. 2, cap. 2, Vesaliae, hujus enim criminis poena, quae olim fuit 
deportatio et publicatio bonorum, vel si privata fuerit, hodie aritraria est, et ad mortem 
quoque extendi potest”/”This position is also sustained by who, like Menochio and Mat-
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Lersner was concerned with an evaluation of the gradus of sedition, namely 
with the possibility to distinguish between different levels of dangerousness for the 
stability of the political community. 
 
(Seditiones) vero gradus quidam sunt: vel enim intra solam fidei et obsequii denegationem 
subsistit, moxque iterum sopitur: vel ulterius ad caedem puta magistratus vel ducis 
aliorumque ac rapinas progreditur: vel denique in bellum intestinum erumpit, quae omnium 
maxima et atrocissima species est seditionis et vere lerna malorum.78 
 
These passages show how the jurist tried to distinguish different forms of sedition, 
depending on how they were affecting the public order. Instead of reducing several 
different categories of collective protest to the crimen maiestatis, by considering 
every violent strike as a rebellion, he suggested that minor forms of discord be 
considered separately from violent assaults which threaten the security of the entire 
political order. The aim of this argumentation was to provide a better understanding 
of social conflict and consequently to calibrate the authorities’ repressive measures. 
6. UNLAWFUL VIOLENCE AND RESISTENTIA LICITA 
A further element of the concept of seditio, which did not enter the definitions 
offered by the jurists, but emerged from their political analysis of the causes of 
concrete insurrections, is the idea that sedition is usually provoked by the 
perception of an injustice committed by the authorities.79 The jurists criminalized 
any form of collective protest that was perceived as a threat by the authorities. As 
we can see from the treatises of Bohier and Braun, they classified revolts, seditions 
and rebellions indiscriminately as unlawful forms of violence against the authority 
that had to be severely criminalized and repressed. At the same time, they tried to 
limit the application of the crime and analysed situations in which it was even 
                                                                                                            
thaeus, claim that tumults provoked to damage private people have to be punished by the 
Juliam law on public violence. The punishment for this offence, with earlier was deporta-
tion and confiscation, is now arbitrary and can be also extended to death”. 
78  Ibid., 3: “Seditions differ in their degree: they can consist just in the refusal of fidelity 
and deference and can be quickly settled; they can proceed from this degree to murders of 
officers and robberies and they can finally become civil wars, which are the worst kinds 
of sedition”. 
79  On the problem of justice practices as reason of revolts see Andrea Zorzi, “Politiche 
giudiziarie e ordine pubblico”, in Rivolte urbane e rivolte contadine nell'Europa del Tre-
cento: un confronto, ed. Monique Bourin et al. (Firenze, 2008), 381-419. 
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lawful to resist the authority. What was not possible to punish as a crimen seditionis 
had to be recognised as resistentia licita.80 
While defining what violent actions led to the crime, the jurists also pointed out 
which behaviours should be considered as lawful. Indeed, the definition of the 
crime and the effort to understand the processes of organisation of dissent also took 
into consideration violent reactions that could not be legitimately punished. 
However, jurists were mostly concerned with the protection of the public order and 
left only little scope for the people to react lawfully to the government. As jurists, 
they were part of the intellectual elites legitimating the political authorities and 
defending them from strikes and criticism. Defining the crimen seditionis and 
providing strategies to intervene into problems of public order were part of the 
process of affirmation and consolidation of governmental policies towards different 
conflicting contexts. Therefore, all these authors were not interested in arguing to 
                                                 
80  On the right of resistance see Robert von Friedeburg, Widerstandsrecht und Konfessions-
konflikt: Notwehr und Gemeiner Mann im deutschen-britischen Vergleich 1530-1669 
(Berlin, 1999); id. (ed.), Widerstandsrecht in der frühen Neuzeit: Erträge und Perspekti-
ven der Forschung im deutschen-britischen Vergleich (Berlin, 2001); Angela De Bene-
dictis, “Supplicare, capitolare, resistere. Politica come comunicazione”, in Suppliche e 
“gravamina”. Politica, amministrazione, giustizia in Europa (secoli XIV-XVIII), ed. Ce-
cilia Nubola and Andreas Würgler (Bologna, 2002), 455-472; id., “Resistere: nello Stato 
di diritto, secondo il diritto 'antico', nell'Europa del 'diritto al presente'“, Quaderni fioren-
tini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno 31 (2003): 273-321; id., “Il diritto di re-
sistere. Una città della prima età moderna tra accusa di ribellione e legittima difesa (Bo-
logna, 1506)”, in Ordnung und Aufruhr im Mittelalter. Historische und juristische Stu-
dien zur Rebellion, ed. Marie Theres Fögen (Frankfurt/Main, 1995); id., “Sapere, 
coscienza e scienza nel diritto di resistenza. Le ragioni di un seminario e del suo titolo”, 
in Wissen, Gewissen und Wissenschaft im Widerstandsrecht (16.-18. Jahrhundert), ed. 
Angela De Benedictis and Karl-Heinz Lingens (Frankfurt/Main, 2003), 1-47; Luise 
Schorn-Schütte, “Obrigkeitskritik und Widerstandsrecht. Die politica christiana als Legi-
timitätsgrundlage”, in Aspekte der politischen Kommunikation im Europa des 16. und 17. 
Jahrhunderts. Politische Theologie – Res Publica – Verständnis – Konsensgestützte 
Herrschaft, ed. id. (München, 2004), 195-232; Angela De Benedictis, Una guerra d'Ita-
lia, una resistenza di popolo. Bologna 1506 (Bologna, 2004); id., “Narrare storie, difen-
dere diritti: ancora su “tumulto” o “resistenza”“, in Praktiken des Widerstandes: Suppli-
ken, Gravamina und Revolten in Europa (15.-19. Jahrhundert), ed. Cecilia Nubola and 
Andreas Würgler (Berlin, 2006), 29-50; id., “Resisting Public Violence: Actions, Law, 
and Emotions”, in Finding Europe. Discourses on Margins, Communities, Images ca. 
13th - ca. 18th centuries, ed. Anthony Molho et al. (Oxford-New York, 2007), 273-290. 
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sustain the people’s resistance – nor were they allowed to do so – and mantained a 
very detached perspective when considering the problem. 
I would like to summarize the argumentations of three of these authors in order 
to present only a few examples from the very rich and broad debate on resistance 
that unfolded during the sixteenth century, mainly in the wake of the Protestant 
Reformation. 
Bohier analysed this problem referring to the congregations within the political 
community. It was necessary to define criteria in order to evaluate the different 
kinds of congregations and to decide in which cases the people were entitled to 
assemble. The jurists started from a definition of congregatio, which was the 
generic term for any organised group bound together by an agreement. Such 
congregations among the people were subdivided into different categories, implying 
different degrees of legitimacy or illegitimacy: unio, confederatio, secta, 
conventicula or coniuratio.81 
Bohier dedicated several pages to answer the question “populus quando posit se 
congregare sine superioris, aut suorum iudicum auctoritate”.82 The analysis of the 
problem started from the clear prohibition of any congregation, which was 
sustained by several authoritative quotes: from 1 Maccabees 14, where it was said 
that the people have no right to make an assembly without the authority’s 
permission, to the reference to the Codex Iustiniani, namely to the lex Denuntiamus 
vobis and the lex Conventicula.83 
                                                 
81  Bohier, De seditiosis, § 2, n. 5, 115: “Item etiam de congregatione in qua aliqui pactioni-
bus vel statutus firmatur quae habent diversa nomina secundum quod congregati eis no-
men imponunt, vel secundum quos ius imponit. iam aliquando vocatur unio, aliquando 
confoederatio, aliquando secta, aliquando conventicula, aliquando coniuratio”. 
82  Ibid., 116: “…whenever people are allowed to lawfully assemble without permission of 
authorities”. 
83  Law Denuntiamus vobis omnibus, Codex, De his qui ad ecclesias confugiunt vel ibi 
exclamant (C. 1. 12. 5): “Denuntiamus vobis omnibus, ut in sacrosanctis ecclesiis et in 
aliis quidem venerabilibus locis, in quibus cum pace et quiete vota competit celebrari, ab-
stineatis omni seditione. nemo conclamationibus utatur, nemo moveat tumultum aut im-
petum committat vel conventicula collecta multitudine in qualibet parte civitatis vel vici 
vel cuiuscumque loci colligere aut celebrare conetur. nam si quis aliquid contra leges a 
quibusdam sibi existimet perpetrari, liceat ei adire iudicem et legitimum postulare prae-
sidium. sciant sane omnes, quod, si quis contra huius edicti normam aut agere aliquid aut 
seditionem movere temptaverit, ultimo supplicio subiacebit”/” We notify all of you to ab-
stain from every kind of sedition in the Holy Churches, and in all other venerated places, 
in which it is proper for you to offer your prayers in decent tranquillity, and let no one 
make use of loud cries, cause any tumult, commit any attack, or collect or hold any nu-
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According to Bohier, assemblies and congregations did not necessarily have to 
be considered as a negative phenomenon, but they had negative influences on the 
people and led them to discord.84 Any agreement between the people was perceived 
as a danger to the public order, insofar as it was always followed by fights, violence 
and, in general, discord among the people. From the perspective of the defence of 
public peace, every discussion or organisation was considered as a potential threat 
to authority.  According to  this,  a  congregation  could be  considered lawful 
depending on its scope and therefore all organised activity of the people aimed at 
weakening the authority or damaging the common good had to be banned.85 
Only against a tyrannical government the people had the right to assemble in 
order to resist. Bohier, quoting Aquinas, sustained that a tyrannical government is 
not lawful because it is not aimed at achieving the common good, but private 
interests. Therefore, the perturbation of this government must not be criminalized as 
sedition, unless this perturbation produces a worse situation for the people than the 
tyrannical government.86 Bohier thus claimed that in some cases resistance was 
                                                                                                            
merous assemblies in any part of a city or village, or in any other place whatsoever. For, 
if anyone thinks that the laws have been violated to his prejudice, he can go into court 
and demand the protection of the law; and all persons are hereby notified that if anyone 
disobeys, or contravenes the provisions of this Edict, or attempts to excite sedition, he 
shall be subjected to the extreme penalty”; law Conventicula, Codex, De episcopis et 
clericis (C. 1. 3. 15): “Conventicula illicita extra ecclesiam in privatis aedibus celebrari 
prohibemus, proscriptionis domus periculo imminente, si dominus eius in ea clericos no-
va ac tumultuosa conventicula extra ecclesiam celebrantes susceperit”/”We forbid hold-
ing religious assemblies in private houses, even outside the Church, under the penalty of 
confiscation of the house, if the owner of the same permitted ecclesiastics to hold new 
and tumultuous meetings therein outside the church”. 
84  Bohier, De seditiosis, § 5, n. 2, 117: “…quia istae conventions illiciunt subditos ad pec-
candum, et ad iurgia, quae licet per se non sint malae, temen quia malum ex eis sequi po-
test reprovantur a iure…”. 
85  Ibid., § 5, n. 4, 117: “…per finem licitum, licita cognoscitur congregatio, et contra, per 
finem illicitum quod sit illicita…”/”…assemblies are considered lawful if aimed at lawful 
purposes; on the contrary, they are considered unlawful if aimed at unlawful purposes”. 
86  Bohier quoted Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 3: “…quod cum regi-
men tyrannicum non sit iustum, quia non ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum 
privatum regentis […]. Ideo perturbatio huhiusmodi regiminis non habet rationem sedi-
tionis, nisi forte quando sic perturbatur inordinate tyranny regimen, quod multitudo subi-
ecta maius detrimentum patitur ex perturbatione sequenti, quam tyranny regimine”/”A ty-
rannical government is not just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the 
private good of the ruler. Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of 
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lawful, but he also put strict limitation to that possibility. Neither did he explain 
how the damage caused by a tyrant should be concretely evaluated and by whom, 
nor would he determine at what point it was legitimate for the crowd to intervene.  
In Braun, the possibility of lawful association of the people is analysed when he 
considers the problem of factions within the political body. The faction represented 
an organized form of discord, which was lawful or unlawful depending on its aim.87 
All factions aimed at defending the political body and private goods are considered 
lawful and useful for the entire community. Braun wrote that 
 
si enim ad defensionem rerum nostrarum amicos congregare possumus, quanto magis pro 
defensione Reipublicae, bonis inter se societatem inire, et adversus improbos cives 
Rempublicam tueri licebit: Sicut et iusta est factio, quae ob id inter bonos cives coalita est, ut 
Tyranni e republica eiiciantur, qui nulla alioqui ratione commode expelli possunt.88 
 
All alliances among people aimed at the defence of life and properties were 
considered coniurationes licitae and were tolerated and even desired. However, 
even in the case of a tyrant perturbing the community, the possibility for the people 
to organise themselves is presented as the extrema ratio, not as part of normal 
political life. 
In order to understand Braun’s analysis of the possibility to resist an illegitimate 
tyrannical government, it is necessary to consider how political hierarchy was 
legitimized in the treatise. According to Braun, all the subjects had to obey secular 
powers, which were subordinated to God. Indeed, “potestatibus quoque humanis 
obediendum est, Paulo Apostolo ita praecipiente. Omnis anima, inquit, potestatibus 
sublimioribus subdita sit. Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo: quae autem a Deo sunt, 
                                                                                                            
this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule is disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects suf-
fer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's government”.  
87  Braun, De seditionibus, 64: “Factio est divisio multitudinis alicuius per aemulationem, in 
diversa studia, cum inter ipso alii aliis priores esse volunt. Quod et honestis ex causis, et 
ex inhonestis fieri potest. Unde et faction in bonam et in malam partem accipitur, ac in-
izio quidem factio honestum vocabulum erat”/”Faction is a division among the multitude, 
produced by competition to prevail on others. Factions can be divided in lawful and un-
lawful according to their reasons. Therefore we have good and bad factions, although at 
the beginning the term had a positive meaning”. 
88  Ibid., 64-65: “if we can assemble to defend friends' properties, then we can even more 
assemble to defend the political community; we can create unions among people and pro-
tect the political community against plotters. For the same reason, a faction is right and 
lawful when it assembles good subjects in order to expel tyranny from the community – if 
there is no other more suitable way to do it”. 
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ordinata sunt. Itaque qui protestati resistit, ordinationi Dei resistit”.89 Quoting Saint 
Paul, Braun sustained that resisting secular authority was similar to resisting God.90 
This strong rejection of any resistance was partially outbalanced by another 
quote from the Bible, namely from the Acts of the Apostles, which states “we must 
obey God rather than men”.91 According to this passage, it was possible to conceive 
lawful resistance to an order that is unjust and against God. Combining these two 
passages, the Letter to the Romans and the Acts of the Apostles, Braun refers to the 
traditional Christian discourse on resistance: every man has to obey, but when the 
orders are against God he has to resist and accept to be persecuted for that.92 The 
possibility to resist was therefore presented by the jurist as a very abstract one and 
left to individual choice. Braun devoted comparably little attention to the problem: 
although he was referring to the Christian discourse on resistance, he actually did 
not conceive of any concrete and lawful opposition to power and did not quote any 
historical fact to illustrate how that doctrine could actually be applied. 
In 1678 Philipp Andreas Oldenburger93 published his Tractatus iuridico-
politicus de rebuspublicis turbidis in tranquillum statum reducendis,94 which in 
some respects can be considered a comprehensive synthesis of the entire debate 
(although it was not the last treatise on sedition). Analysing the causes of sedition, 
Oldenburger indicated two cases of lawful resistance. The violation of the subjects’ 
liberties and rights was considered an illegitimate government practice that 
provoked malcontent and discord among the people. Unrest aimed at protecting 
such liberties and rights was therefore considered lawful and labelled as legitimate 
defence.95 Tyranny was another cause of legitimate resistance. Violence against 
                                                 
89  Ibid., 13: “We have to obey also to secular authorities, as Saint Paul prescribes. Every 
person is to be in subjection to the governing authorities. There is no authority except 
from God, and those, which exist, are established by God. Therefore whoever resists au-
thority opposes the ordinance of God”. 
90  Epistle to the Romans, 13. 
91  Ibid., 17: “Oportet Deo magis obedire, quam hominibus”. See Acts of the Apostles, 5.  
92  Wolfgang Reinhard, Geschichte der Staatsgewalt: Eine vergleichende Verfassungsge-
schichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (München, 1999), 227-235. 
93  Oldenburger was a student of Hermann Conring and worked as professor of law in Gene-
va. He was known as an “enfant terrible” of his time for his polemical writings and for 
his disputes with Conring and von Pufendorf. See Goldschlag, “Oldenburger, Philipp 
Andreas”, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 24 (1887), 261-263. 
94  See footnote 13. 
95  Ibid., 37: “[…] quando in Rebuspublicis mistis Procerum libertas iura et privilegia vio-
lantur atque atteruntur: Sed eo in casu non est vera seditio, sed justa defensio”/” […] 
when in the mixed government the rights and privileges of the aristocratic people are vio-
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tyrannical government or against the brutalities inflicted by magistrates was often 
the starting point for commotions and unrest. Responding to illegitimate violence 
with violence was not a crime: the subjects had the right to fight an illegitimate 
government whenever their lives were endangered. Any attempt to protect their 
lives was a case of defensio licita.96 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The study of the development of legal and political concepts used to define 
collective forms of violence allows a better understanding of how the practices of 
control changed over time. During the sixteenth century the legal doctrine 
elaborated a concept of seditio based on the strong convergence of proditio, rebellio 
and collective violence. Any form of violent reaction to the authorities was 
understood as a threat to the entire political body and therefore labelled as crimen 
laesae maiestatis. Investigating offences perturbing the public order, jurists 
advanced an extensive definition of crimen seditionis, covering a wide range of 
collective forms of protest. All violent assaults on the government were attributed 
to a political will to damage the entire community: this allowed the jurists to relate 
every organised disagreement to proditio and perduellio and therefore to consider it 
as a rebellion against the authority. Moreover, even minor forms of violence, 
producing inner disorders, were considered episodes of sedition. 
In the early modern age the development of political crimes was characterised 
by the extensive use of crimen laesea maiestatis in order to repress any episode of 
dissent and any form of opposition to the authority. The legal perception of the 
collective forms of protests changed within this broader development of the penal 
law and produced a concept of seditio functional to the control of public order. 
The literature on sedition was characterised by a considerable effort to 
understand the reasons of inner dissension and political conflict. The jurists were 
                                                                                                            
lated and reduced, that is not a case of proper sedition, but it is a case of right and lawful 
defence”. 
96  Ibid., 44-47: “Sunt autem graviores et frequentiores rebellandi causae ex parte rectorum 
sive imperantium sequents; et quidem prima ac potissima Principum et Magistratum cru-
delitas […]. Adeo verum est illud: Violenta nemo imperia continuit diu; magisque acerba 
quam diuturna existunt. Et quidni defensio vitae humanae, qua nihil est carius in ejus-
modi casu esset licita et favorabilis”/”There are also serious and common reasons of re-
bellion created by authorities; the main one is cruelty. It is true that violent governments 
do not last long. In this case the defence of life – nothing is more valuable than life – is 
lawful”. 
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interested in studying all the phenomena related to collective forms of discord and 
protest, in order to provide the conceptual instruments for repressing and preventing 
unrest. This attempt to elaborate legal means of controlling insurrections influenced 
the development of the doctrine and led jurists to define, during the second half of 
the seventeenth century, a more articulated concept of seditio. They distinguished 
between different grades of sedition, depending on the dangerousness of the violent 
behaviour for the political order. In doing so, they provided the magistrate with the 
legal possibility to classify a concrete sedition at their own discretion either as a 
crimen maiestatis, or as a minor violent unrest, which could be punished in 
different ways, depending on circumstances. This change in the definition of crimen 
seditionis must be understood in relation to the development of a preventive 
perspective based on the analysis of the concrete political context. The preference 
for a preventive approach, instead of a merely repressive legal response to unrest, 
obliged the jurists to examine the processes of development of dissent and made it 
necessary to have a concept of seditio that was suitable for different situations. 
The treatises on sedition integrated two closely related levels: the legal doctrine 
and the political wisdom aimed at controlling public order. The earlier doctrine was 
always directed at giving concrete answers to contemporary conflicting situations, 
but was also influenced by the development of political theory. The study of the 
concept of seditio traces the development of legal and political strategies applied to 
control public order and to neutralise political dissent. 
 
 
Early Modern Revolts as Political Crimes in the 




The fruitful research on revolts in early modern Europe is still primarily 
characterised by a social historical approach, focussing on the socio-economic 
causes of social upheaval – especially in rural areas – as well as on the motives and 
activities of the disadvantaged groups or rebels.1 Recent studies also addressed the 
issue of how revolts and similar forms of social unrest were represented in public 
media, taking into account how the authorities as well as the rebels used the public 
sphere for their respective interests.2 However, only few studies paid thorough 
attention to the responses of the legal systems to revolt and similar phenomena – 
ranging from rural and urban revolts to rebellions and conspiracies of the nobility – 
and their long-term impact on the legal systems and the associated legal discourses 
in early modern Europe. Winfried Schulze argued that the harsh military 
suppression of the German Peasant War and other peasant revolts was followed and 
accompanied by preventative mechanisms of juridification (“Verrechtlichung”). 
This meant that throughout the early modern period conflicts between peasants and 
authorities did not only foster legislation, but were more and more dealt with or 
                                                 
1  For an overview see: Peter Blickle, Das Alte Europa. Vom Hochmittelalter bis zur Mo-
derne (München 2008), 186-206; Peter Zagorin, Society, states, and early modern revolu-
tion. Agrarian and urban rebellions, Rebels and rulers, 1500 – 1660, Vol. 1 (Cambridge 
1982); Peter Zagorin, Provincial rebellion. Revolutionary civil wars, 1560 – 1660, Rebels 
and rulers, 1500 – 1660, Vol. 2 (Cambridge 1982). 
2  Andreas Würgler, Unruhen und Öffentlichkeit. Städtische und ländliche Protestbewegun-
gen im 18. Jahrhundert (Tübingen 1995); Andreas Würgler, “Revolts in Print: Media and 
Communication in Early Modern Urban Conflicts”, in Urban Elections and Decision-
Making in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1800, ed. Rudolf Schlögl (Newcastle-upon-Tyne 
2009), 257-275. 
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even solved via the imperial courts and other legal mechanisms like supplication.3 
In addition, Peter Blickle has referred to the increasing legislation after the German 
Peasant War, pointing out the criminalisation of social protest, resistance and 
peasant revolts as “treason”, and therefore as political crimes which were not 
clearly legally defined and allowed arbitrary justice.4 Moreover, recent case studies 
by legal historians analysed the legal consequences of the German Peasant War and 
the trials and punishment of the ringleaders in the Bavarian uprising against the 
Austrian occupation in 1705.5 However, crime, law and justice do not achieve a 
prominent role in research on early modern revolts, and comparative studies on the 
different reactions and strategies of the legal systems in Europe to all kinds of 
revolts are almost non-existing. 
In this respect the following analysis decidedly follows the approach of legal 
and especially penal history, regarding revolts from the perspective of political 
crimes,6 which was not only a central viewpoint of the early modern authorities, but 
served also as a main representation of revolts in popular media such as pamphlets 
or illustrated broadsheets. Recent studies on the representation of crime and 
punishment in popular media, and notably in early modern illustrated broadsheets, 
proved the strong and complex interconnection between penal law, the actual 
                                                 
3  Winfried Schulze, Bäuerlicher Widerstand und feudale Herrschaft in der frühen Neuzeit 
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt 1980); Winfried Schulze, “Geben Aufruhr und Aufstand Anlaß 
zu neuen heilsamen Gesetzen. Beobachtungen über die Wirkungen bäuerlichen Wider-
stands in der Frühen Neuzeit”, in Aufstände, Revolten und Prozesse. Beiträge zu bäuerli-
chen Widerstandsbewegungen im frühneuzeitlichen Europa, ed. Winfried Schulze (Stutt-
gart 1983), 261-285. 
4  Peter Blickle, “The Criminalization of Peasant Resistance in the Holy Roman Empire: 
Toward a History of the Emergence of High Treason in Germany”, Journal of Modern 
History 58 (1986), 88-97. 
5  Malte Hohn, Die rechtlichen Folgen des Bauernkrieges von 1525. Sanktionen, Ersatzleis-
tungen und Normsetzung nach dem Aufstand (Berlin 2004); Christian Strasser, Der Auf-
stand im bayerischen Oberland 1705 - Majestätsverbrechen oder Heldentat? Eine Unter-
suchung der Strafprozesse gegen die Anführer der in der “Mordweihnacht von Sendling” 
gescheiterten Erhebung (Münster 2005). 
6  B. L. Ingraham, Political crime in Europe. A comparative study of France, Germany, and 
England (Berkeley 1979). See also the postulation for a more intense interchange 
between “Revoltenforschung” and “Kriminalitätsforschung” by Andreas Würgler, “Dif-
famierung und Kriminalisierung von “Devianz” in frühneuzeitlichen Konflikten. Für ei-
nen Dialog zwischen Protestforschung und Kriminalitätsgeschichte”, in Devianz, Wider-
stand und Herrschaftspraxis in der Vormoderne. Studien zu Konflikten im südwestdeut-
schen Raum (15.-18. Jahrhundert), ed. Mark Häberlein (Konstanz 1999), 317-347. 
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practices of criminal justice and the images of the legal responses in popular 
media.7 The latter did not solely mirror the intentions and purposes of the 
authorities, but, moreover, reflects common attitudes and perceptions of crime and 
order. The image of crime and punishment in illustrated broadsheets could evoke 
ambiguous effects: augmenting the legal construction of crimes and the 
authoritarian purposes of punishment, as well as reflecting on and influencing the 
common perception of order and security, furthermore satisfying the curiosity of the 
public as well as intensifying the public memorisation of crimes or revolts.8 Thus, 
interrelated analyses of revolts as political crimes in both legal discourses as well as 
in popular media could yield new insights into the representation of revolts in a 
European context and implicates a cross-border approach. Since early modern penal 
law was not restricted to any “national” law, it can be characterised as a European 
phenomenon, based on the “common law” (Gemeines Recht) and the writings of 
hundreds of jurists from different countries. And, likewise, the illustrated 
broadsheet can be considered as a European mass-medium, distributed sometimes 
multilingually in different European countries, and referring to events, crimes and 
revolts in other countries.9 For this analysis, I have chosen illustrated broadsheets 
                                                 
7  Karl Härter/Gerhard Sälter/Eva Wiebel (ed.), Repräsentationen von Kriminalität und 
öffentlicher Sicherheit. Bilder, Vorstellungen und Diskurse vom 16. bis zum 20. Jahrhun-
dert (Frankfurt am Main 2010). 
8  Dietmar Peil, “Strafe und Ritual. Zur Darstelllung von Straftaten und Bestrafungen im 
illustrierten Flugblatt”, in Wahrnehmungsgeschichte und Wissensdiskurs im illustrierten 
Flugblatt der Frühen Neuzeit (1450-1700), ed. Wolfgang Harms and Alfred Messerli 
(Basel 2002), 465-486; Harriet Rudolph, “Warhafftige Abcontrafactur? Die Evidenz des 
Verbrechens und die Effizienz der Strafjustiz in illustrierten Einblattdrucken (1550-
1650)”, in Evidentia. Reichweiten visueller Wahrnehmung in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. 
Gabriele Wimböck, Karin Leonhard and Markus Friedrich (Münster 2007), 161-183; 
Gerd Schwerhoff, “Kriminalitätsgeschichte - Kriminalgeschichten: Verbrechen und Stra-
fen im Medienverbund des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts”, in: Verbrechen im Blick: Perspek-
tiven der neuzeitlichen Kriminalitätsgeschichte, ed. Rebekka Habermas and Gerd 
Schwerhoff (Frankfurt am Main, New York 2009), 295-322; Karl Härter, “Criminalbil-
dergeschichten: Verbrechen, Justiz und Strafe in illustrierten Einblattdrucken der Frühen 
Neuzeit”, in Repräsentationen von Kriminalität, ed. Härter, Sälter and Wiebel, 25-88. 
9  David Kunzle, The Early Comic Strip. Narrative Strips and Picture Stories in the Euro-
pean Broadsheet from c. 1450 to 1825 (Berkeley et al. 1973); Wolfgang Cilleßen (ed.), 
Krieg der Bilder. Druckgraphik als Medium politischer Auseinandersetzung im Europa 
des Absolutismus (Berlin 1997); Wolfgang Harms and Michael Schilling (ed.), Das il-
lustrierte Flugblatt in der Kultur der Frühen Neuzeit. Wolfenbütteler Arbeitsgespräch 
1997 (Frankfurt am Main et al. 1998). 
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which were primarily published in Central Europe, but refer to revolts in the Holy 
Roman Empire of the German Nation as well as in other countries, selecting 
exemplary types and cases such as the “Fettmilch-riot” in Frankfurt (1612-1616) as 
a typical urban revolt, the “magnate-conspiracy” in Hungary (1670/71) as a typical 
revolt spearheaded by members of the nobility, and “Horea’s uprising” in 
Transylvania (1785) as a “late” peasant’s revolt. 
The selection is based on a sample of almost 100 illustrated broadsheets and 
pamphlets covering nearly 30 different revolts and political crimes in Europe 
between 1567 and 178510 as well as on a comprehensive study on the representation 
of ordinary crimes in early modern illustrated broadsheets.11 The three revolts 
alone, which I will be analysing in the following, evoked a strong media-response 
and were covered in 23 more or less different illustrated pamphlets and broadsheets. 
This was accompanied by other, non-illustrated, more voluminous publications, 
especially polemic pamphlets, “popular descriptions”, semi-official documents such 
as collections of court-records and authoritarian ordinances and laws. As far as 
possible, I have incorporated them into this study to demonstrate interconnections 









                                                 
10  The main sources are: Wolfgang Harms (ed.), Deutsche illustrierte Flugblätter des 16. 
und 17. Jahrhunderts, Vol. I-III, IV, VII (Tübingen 1985-1997); John Roger Paas, The 
German political broadsheet 1600-1700, Vol. 1-9 (Wiesbaden 1985-2007); Digitale Bib-
liothek Spezial: Deutsche Einblattholzschnitte (Berlin 2003) (CD-ROM: Directmedia 
Publishing GmbH), with 3400 woodcuts from: Max Geisberg, The German single-leaf 
woodcut: 1500-1550; ed. Walter L. Strauss, Vol. 1-4 (New York 1974); Walter L. 
Strauss, The German single-leaf woodcut: 1550-1600. Vol. 1-3 (New York 1975); Doro-
thy Alexander, The German single-leaf woodcut: 1600-1700, in collaboration with Wal-
ter L. Strauss, Vol. 1-2 (New York 1977). Many broadsheets are available on the internet: 
Bildarchiv Foto Marburg [http://www.fotomarburg.de/index_html]; Einblattdrucke der 
frühen Neuzeit: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek [http://www.muenchener-digitali
sierungszentrum.de]; Verzeichnis der im deutschen Sprachraum erschienenen 
Drucke des 17. Jahrhunderts [http://www.vd17.de]. 
11  Härter, Criminalbildergeschichten. 
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Political crimes and revolts in early modern illustrated broadsheets  
1567/1568 Treason / conspiracy, Count Egmont and Horn, Netherlands 3 
1575 Treason, Brandenburgischer Hofjude Lippold, Holy Roman 
Empire 
2 
1579 Assassination, Vizier Mohammed Sokullu, Ottoman Empire 1 
1584 Assassination, William of Orange, Netherlands 3 
1589 Assassination / regicide, Heinrich III, France 3 
1595 Treason / conspiracy, Count Hardach (Hardegg), Holy Roman 3 
Empire 
1601 Treason / conspiracy, Chancellor Nikolaus Krell, Holy Roman 
Empire  
2 
1605 Gunpowder-plot, England 5 
1610 Assassination / regicide, Henry IV, France 8 
1616 Women’s-riot, Republic of the Netherlands 1 
1612-1616 Fettmilch-riot, Holy Roman Empire 14 
1617 Treason / conspiracy, Count Concini, France 1 
1621 Rebellion, Bohemian Nobility, Bohemia / Holy Roman Empire 8 
1626 Peasant’s revolt, Austria / Holy Roman Empire 2 
1637 Treason, Wallenstein, Holy Roman Empire 3 
1637 Assassination, Mayor of Liège, Holy Roman Empire 2 
1650/51 Rebellion of the Fronde, France 1 
1653 Swiss Peasants’ War, Swiss Confederation 2 
1671 Rebellion of Razin, Russia 4 
1670/71 Magnate-rebellion, Hungary 7 
1672 Pika-revolt /Tököly, Hungary 1 
1672 Riot / treason, Johann and Cornelis de Witt, Netherlands 5 
1683 Assassination, Vizier Cara Mustapha, Ottoman Empire 3 
1705/06 Bavarian revolt against Austrian occupation, Holy Roman 
Empire 
6 
1757 Assassination of Louis XV, Damiens, France 3 
1758/59 Assassination / regicide, Joseph I, Portugal 4 
1785 Peasants’ revolt of Horea and Kloska, Hungary 2 
Fig. 1: Illustrated broadsheets dealing with revolts and political crimes 
LEGAL DEFINITIONS AND ELEMENTS 
It should be understood that a constricted perspective on the media representation of 
revolts as political crimes has to cross crucial and well researched issues such as the 
causes and motives of revolts or the subsequent actions undertaken. As a result, it 
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can make little use of such models like social protest or resistance.12 Despite the 
fact that many serious social or political conflicts, which could be or were 
considered as “revolts”, were dealt with or even solved by negotiation, mediation or 
via the mechanism of “Verrechtlichung”, early modern authorities or states reacted 
also within the legal framework of penal law, criminal justice and punishment. In 
this respect “revolts” and similar phenomena were mainly regarded as crimes such 
as rebellion, sedition, breach of peace (Landfriedensbruch), treason, perduellio, 
conspiracy, or lèse-majesty. This concise list of possible legal interpretations of 
revolts as different crimes already shows that at the end of the late middle ages no 
uniform or even clearly defined legal conception of political crimes and revolts 
existed in Europe. Only from the 16th century onwards did the legal systems in 
Europe – that is, the state based legislation and the actual practice of criminal 
justice, as well as the writings of the common law-jurists – gradually, often in 
reaction to social or political unrest, develop a more concise legal concept of 
political crimes.13 
Nevertheless, not before the beginning of the 19th century did these different 
efforts result in a juridically stringent “modern” legal codification of political 
crimes, implemented by the French code pénal of 1810, evolving into a model for 
European penal legislation in the 19th century and the “modern” legal definition of 
political crimes in particular.14 Thus, the early modern era can be seen as an 
incubation period of the legal implementation and differentiation of political crimes 
including the criminalisation and punishment of revolts. However, different and 
wide-ranging legal constructions were still used, influenced also by traditional 
conceptions and laws: the crimen laesae maiestatis and the perduellio in Roman 
                                                 
12  On resistance and Widerstandsrecht see: Angela De Benedictis and Karl-Heinz Lingens 
(ed.), Wissen, Gewissen und Wissenschaft im Widerstandsrecht (16.- 18. Jh.) / Sapere, 
coscienza e scienza nel diritto di resistenza (XVI-XVIII sec.) (Frankfurt am Main 2003). 
13  Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, Der Schutz von Staat und Verfassung im Strafrecht (Mu-
nich 1970); with regard to the concept of mass-delicts: Andreas Roth, Kollektive Gewalt 
und Strafrecht. Die Geschichte der Massedelikte in Deutschland (Berlin 1989). 
14  Dirk Blasius, Geschichte der politischen Kriminalität in Deutschland (1800 - 1980). Eine 
Studie zu Justiz und Staatsverbrechen (Frankfurt am Main 1983); Karl Härter, “Asyl, 
Auslieferung und politisches Verbrechen in Europa während der “Sattelzeit”: Modernität 
und Kontinuität im Strafrechtssystem”, in Dimensionen der Moderne. Festschrift für 
Christof Dipper, ed. Ute Schneider and Lutz Raphael (Frankfurt am Main u. a. 2008), 
481-502; Karl Härter, “Die Entwicklung des Strafrechts in Mitteleuropa 1770-1848: De-
fensive Modernisierung, Kontinuitäten und Wandel der Rahmenbedingungen”, in Ver-
brechen im Blick. Perspektiven der neuzeitlichen Kriminalitätsgeschichte, ed. Rebekka 
Habermas and Gerd Schwerhoff, (Frankfurt am Main and New York 2009), 71-107. 
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Law, the more English and Germanic treason, the crimen fractae pacis publicae 
(breach / violation of the peace: Landfriedensbruch), and seditio / sedition 
(Aufruhr).  
Because of their different social and political contexts – rural, urban, aristocrat-
ic – their various manifestations and their diverse aims, revolts could be and were 
subsumed legally under suchlike crimes or concepts, taking also in account the 
purposes of punishment the concerned states or authorities pursued. The crimen 
laesae maiestatis put the ruler in the centre of the definition of the crime; thus, 
every activity aiming at the violation of his person, honour or rule could be 
classified as lèse-majesty, ranging therefore from verbal insults and pamphlets to 
violent action, assassination and regicide.15 One of most serious crimes in the 
concept of the crimen laesae maiestatis was that of perduellio: high treason and 
violent action against the ruler committed with animus hostilis. Because the sacred 
body of the ruler represented the divine and secular order, the concept of crimen 
laesae maiestatis could easily be expanded to the state, its officials and all forms of 
upheaval and revolt against the ruling elite or the state. 
In the English and German legal traditions, the crime of treason was 
distinguished from that of crimen laesae maiestatis, putting the emphasis on such 
elements as conspiracy, plots, conjurations or collaboration with foreign powers and 
focussing stronger on the ruling elites.16 In this respect, revolts and rebellions of the 
nobility or towns against “their” ruler were often also considered as treason. 
Initially, the commitment of treason was restricted more or less to the elite, the 
office holders and military officers, but was extended in the 16th century in England 
and the Holy Roman Empire to political crimes and dissidents in the whole. A 
crucial element in the conceptualisation of the crime was the breach of loyalty 
(Treuebruch), which easily could be extended to every conspiracy, rebellion or any 
other dissident activity in which the nobility or office holders were involved. With 
the emergence of a more modern system of international relations between states, as 
well as the development of a professional military system, particularly revolts and 
                                                 
15  Mario Sbriccoli, Crimen laesae maiestatis. Il problema del reato politico alle soglie della 
scienza penalistica moderna (Milano 1974); Helga Schnabel-Schüle, “Das Majestätsver-
brechen als Herrschaftsschutz und Herrschaftskritik”, in Staatsschutz (= Aufklärung 2 
(1992)), ed. Dietmar Willoweit (Hamburg 1994), 29-47; Angela Rustemeyer, Dissens 
und Ehre. Majestätsverbrechen in Russland (1600-1800) (Wiesbaden 2006). 
16  Kenneth R. Minogue, “Treason and the early modern state: Scenes from a mesalliance”, 
in: Die Rolle der Juristen bei der Entstehung des modernen Staates, ed. Roman Schnur 
(Berlin 1986), 421-435; John G. Bellamy, The Tudor law of treason. An introd. (London 
1979); Simon H. Cuttler, The law of treason and treason trials in later medieval France 
(Cambridge u. a. 1981). 
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rebellions with a foreign element like the cooperation of rebels with rivalling states 
were considered as military treason (Landesverrat), thus adding a new “criminal” 
element to the legal definition of revolts as political crimes.  
Further developments and differentiation of political crimes resulted from social 
conflicts – especially peasant revolts – and the emergence of public security as a 
primary aim of the early modern state with regard to public law, internal politics, 
policing and the penal policy. In the late Middle Ages, the Holy Roman Empire 
established the crimen fractae pacis publicae – the crime of Landfriedensbruch – in 
several laws and public treaties (Landfriedensordnungen and Landfrieden). Initially 
aiming at the feuds of the nobility, the legislation and penal practice of the 15th and 
16th centuries much more emphasised the criminal activities of dangerous groups 
and bandits (landfriedensschädliche Leute) and social protest / upheaval of peasants 
as central elements of the crime. Therefore, public security superseded the older 
idea of common peace as the main intention of penal legislation and the purpose of 
punishment.17 Moreover, the legal concept of the crime’s definition allowed its 
application to social revolts and facilitated a broader range of flexible legal 
reactions, respectively the purposes of punishment: Not retaliation with respect to 
the sacred ruler but the restitution of the state’s order, deterrence and prevention 
gradually became more important. This resulted in a somewhat new legal definition 
of such mass-crimes or crimes against the state as sedition, appearing for the first 
time in the Holy Roman Empire in the imperial penal code of 1532 as “Aufruhr des 
Volkes” and in England in the middle of the 16th century.18 In first half of 16th 
century the English parliament passed over 60 treason statutes and riot acts, 
defining riots and revolts as treason and sedition, threatening capital punishment, 
but also milder penalties like fines to be imposed on so-called followers (Mitläufer), 
and therefore aiming at a flexible response to “mass-crimes”. Similarly, the penal 
law of the Old Reich and its members (the imperial estates and cities) did comprise 
in parallel the crimes of treason (Verräterei), revolt (Aufruhr), breach of peace 
                                                 
17  Karl Härter, “Von der Friedenswahrung zur “öffentlichen Sicherheit”: Konzepte und 
Maßnahmen frühneuzeitlicher Sicherheitspolicey in rheinländischen Territorien”, Rheini-
sche Vierteljahresblätter 67 (2003), 162-190; Karl Härter, “Sicherheit und Frieden im 
frühneuzeitlichen Alten Reich: Zur Funktion der Reichsverfassung als Sicherheits- und 
Friedensordnung 1648-1806”, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 30 (2003), 413-431. 
18  Die Peinliche Gerichtsordnung Kaiser Karls V. von 1532 (Carolina), 6th edition, ed. 
Arthur Kaumann (Stuttgart 1975), Art. 127; compare also Art. 124 (Verrat/treason) and 
129 (Fehde/feud). On England see Andy Wood, Riot, rebellion and popular politics in 
early modern England (Basingstoke 2002), 32-42. 
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(Landfriedensbruch), sedition and lèse-majesty.19 The German as well as the 
English example shows that the criminalisation of revolts took place in penal codes 
and the writings of the jurists – the “common law”. However, it was also developed 
in a growing body of single ordinances and public laws, as well as in the trials and 
practises of courts with respect to the actual punishment of revolts and political 
crimes.20 Flexible legislation and a flexible reaction of the penal systems in Europe 
originated not least from the intensification of “revolts” since the 16th century, 
which were to be quelled not only by military force, but by legal public action on 
part of the state, thus demonstrating the illegitimate causes of revolts as well as the 
reasonable and just reaction of the state in maintaining public order and security. 
With regard to these intentions and the necessity of flexible legal reactions, neither 
did the single laws and penal codes nor the common law jurists establish a clear and 
stringent legal definition of revolts or other social / political mass-crimes (upheaval, 
uprising, insurrection, riot, rebellion etc.). Instead, they provided a mixture of 
different elements and possible reactions / penalties corresponding with the 
different forms, manifestations and motivations of political crimes and revolts, 
respectively. 
The crucial elements or features of the legal conceptualisation and 
criminalisation of revolts as political crimes in early modern Europe also influenced 
the “legal representation” or “criminal image” of revolts.21 In principle, rebels from 
all social groups – subjects / peasants, burghers / citizens and members of the elite / 
nobility could be considered as political criminals and treated nearly equally with 
regard to trial and punishment. Not the social status, but the character of the 
“criminal group” and the role of the participants of a mass-crime lead to legal 
differentiation. Collectiveness and the formation of a “criminal dissident group” of 
a sufficient number of three or more members was considered a precondition of a 
mass-crime or mass-tort, whether form of gatherings of larger groups and public 
tumult or the subversive activities of secret groups, conjurations, cabals, or 
“criminal” sects. The necessity of flexible legal reaction and punishment lead to the 
legal differentiation of the participants and their roles in such groups or mass-de-
                                                 
19  Compare for instance Constitutio criminalis Theresiana oder der […] Mariä Theresiä 
[…] peinliche Gerichtsordnung, (Vienna 1769), Art. 61 (crimen laesae maiestatis) and 
Art. 62 (sedition). 
20  On the function of police ordinances (Policeyordnungen) with regard to the development 
of criminal law see: Karl Härter, Policey und Strafjustiz in Kurmainz. Gesetzgebung, 
Normdurchsetzung und Sozialkontrolle im frühneuzeitlichen Territorialstaat (Frankfurt 
am Main 2005). 
21  On the legal definition see: Ingraham, political crime, 19-36; Schroeder, Schutz; Roth, 
kollektive Gewalt. 
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licts / revolts, basically distinguishing ringleaders, riot leaders and instigators on the 
one, and the followers / satellites on the other hand, using also the concept of a 
seducer and the seduced. 
With regard to the activities of a criminal or revolting group, public actions 
were distinguished from the more secretive political activities. The former included 
a broad range of different punishable acts (offences) comprising symbolic and 
ritualistic actions such as the distribution of pamphlets, protest gatherings, 
assembling in public and submitting complaints or gathering and swearing an oath 
as well as more violent forms of open, dangerous tumult and armed revolt with 
excessive use of violence and weapons, or even military force in the case of 
military riot and mutiny. The symbolic, ritualistic and public dimension of the legal 
representation of revolts was complemented by the more “secretive” punishable 
activities, most commonly conceptualised as plots or conspiracies, especially of the 
nobility or dissident religious groups.22 The legal definition implied an appointment 
to commit a political crime and to instigate or spark a revolt, and therefore extended 
the punishment of revolts from the actual deed to their planning and preparation – 
even the intention – of a political crime. In this respect, regicide and attempted 
assassination of the ruler or a state official committed by a single person could also 
be considered as part of a conspiracy and the beacon to start a rebellion.23 This 
resulted in a preventative criminal law which allowed flexible arbitrary 
criminalisation and the punishment of political crimes or attempted revolt as 
anticipatory crimes (the so-called “Vorverlagerung der Strafbarkeit”).24 Moreover, 
conspiracy added a foreign dimension to revolts: hostile states and powers 
instigating, participating or supporting a conspiracy and a revolt with the aim of 
destabilising a state or taking over the rule. In this respect, participants of a 
conspiracy or revolt could be charged as traitors to their country (Landesverrat). 
The interconnection between conspiracy and revolt and the involvement of hostile 
foreign powers in its planning and preparation strongly influenced the legal 
representation and public image of revolts as political crimes. 
                                                 
22  Yves-Marie Bercé and Elena Fasano Guarini (ed.), Complots et conjurations dans 
l'Europe moderne. Actes du colloque international […] (Rome 1996); Barry Coward and 
Julian Swann (ed.), Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theory in Early Modern Europe From 
the Waldensians to the French Revolution (Ashgate 2004). 
23  Compare for example the case of Damien who's assassination of Louis XV was consid-
ered as part of a conspiracy and an attempted coup d'état: Dale K. Van Kley, The Dami-
ens affair and the unravelling of the Ancien Régime, 1750–1770 (Princeton, N.J. 1984). 
24  See the pre-modern English concept of “imaging the King's death” and the context of 
treason and revolt: Wood, Riot, 33; Bellamy, law of treason, 10-12; Schroeder, Schutz, 
238. 
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In contrast, the motivation of political crimes and revolts played only a marginal 
role in the legal conceptualisation and representation. They had to be considered as 
“political” in the sense that they threatened the monarch / ruler, the state or the 
existing order in general. As has been pointed out, in the early modern period we 
can observe a shift in the object of protection through penal law from the ruler / 
monarch to the state and the overall order. In this respect all kind of revolts – from 
social upheaval to rebellions of the nobility – were primarily considered as political 
crimes aiming at the state and its order. 
The different legal crimes did not result in fundamentally different concepts of 
punishment. Based on Roman Law, nearly all early modern penal laws and codes in 
Europe comprised the threat of capital and corporal punishment to be executed in 
public – the theatre of public punishment (Theater des Endlichen Rechtstags). This 
included strong symbolic elements and rituals, in particular additional and 
dishonourable forms of punishment such as hanging (from the arbor infelix), 
quartering, dismemberment, the confiscation of property, the razing of the houses of 
the delinquents and banishment of their families.25 In this respect the penalties not 
only mirrored the deed, as, for instance, with the dismembering of the “oath-finger” 
in the case of treason (breach of the oath of fealty). Moreover, they aimed at the 
elimination of the physical and social body of the rebel, i.e. his honour, property, 
social reputation, family and supporters, and intended to obliterate that the crime – 
or the revolt – possessed any legitimate reasons or aims. The death penalty could be 
extended by confiscation of property / real estate, the expulsion of relatives / 
families as well as the obliteration of the family-name. The punishment of revolt 
and rebellion aimed at infamy and defamation, and because of the special quality of 
a political crime – revolt as a public mass-tort or mass-crime – the damnatio 
memoriae achieved a crucial role in penal practice as well as in juristic and legal 
discourses. In short, a main purpose of punishing political crimes and rebels in a 
public context was the damnatio memoriae: the defamation and obliteration of the 
revolt, as well as the commemoration of just legal punishment. 
From the 16th century onwards we can observe a shift to harsher and more 
severe punishment of political crimes and revolts in penal law as well as in penal 
practice. However, this was paralleled by a more flexible application of penalties 
with regard to the role of a criminal or rebel (ringleader or follower), preliminary 
actions (conspiracy), the involvement of foreign powers, the actual performance 
                                                 
25  On the early modern “theater of punishment” and the penalties in case of political crimes 
see Richard van Dülmen, Theater des Schreckens. Gerichtspraxis und Strafrituale in der 
frühen Neuzeit, third edition (München 1988); Richard J. Evans, Rituals of Retribution. 
Capital punishment in Germany 1600-1987 (Oxford 1996); Ingraham, political crime, 39-
59; Strasser, Aufstand, 232-264. 
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and the use of violence etc. In this respect, punishment was executed as a public 
ritual and possessed a highly symbolic communicative function. Especially the 
public application of capital punishment obtained an exemplary and symbolic 
function with regard to ringleaders, conspirators and seducers, conveying 
retaliation, deterrence and general prevention as its main intentions (Strafzwecke), 
particularly with regard to the public, potential rebels and actual followers. The 
latter – the followers and those seduced – were often merely punished leniently or 
even pardoned if they renounced the “rebellion” and acknowledged the authorities. 
In using such strategies of flexible punishment, the state could communicate the 
message that it had the power to re-establish the rightful order and that it responded 
with equitable and just punishment to political crimes and revolts within a legal 
framework. 
However, the punishment of political crimes, revolts and rebels was 
characterised by ambiguities and problems, especially as concerns collectiveness 
and the role of the public, for both punishment as well as revolt depended on 
collectiveness and publicity. Concerning the problem of collectiveness, mass-crime 
and the punishment of rebels, it was often hard to distinguish between the 
ringleaders and the seduced in legal categories and to mete out proper punishment. 
Moreover, the public execution of ringleaders would mean that the vast majority of 
followers, who were only leniently punished, could or could be forced to watch at 
least to deter or “convert” (convince) them. But assembling a larger crowd in the 
theatre of public punishment could cause further tumult, as it provided the rebel 
with the last opportunity to speak to an audience, or it could help make the rebel 
leaders martyrs. In this regard, public punishment could augment the symbolic 
public dimension of a revolt and help communicate or memorise the “political” 
message or even the “just causes” of a revolt to followers or the public. 
Furthermore, political crimes and revolts aroused the curiosity of the public and 
therefore obtained a growing importance as a prominent topic in popular media. 
Broadsheets, newspapers, books and collections reported and depicted revolts and 
political crimes following commercial intentions, but also communicating and 
influencing a peculiar image of such occurrences. 
The authorities themselves also made use of the public, enhancing the legal 
responses to revolts and public punishment by using additional public rituals and 
media to communicate and co-memorise the just punishment of revolts. Sometimes 
public memorials, like the pillar of shame (Schandsäule) in the case of the 
Fettmilch-revolt in Frankfurt, were erected. In the 17th and 18th centuries, states and 
officials issued declarations, laws, collections of court records, as well as semi-
official reports, pamphlets and broadsheets which communicated and justified the 
legal responses to revolts and political crimes. In responding to political crimes or 
revolts, the authorities developed a distinct media policy, controlling public media 
and printings via censorship on the one hand, but, moreover, also communicating 
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their view of political dissent and order, effectively transmitting their image of just 
legal responses to political crimes and revolts. Because revolts implied a public 
challenge of the order, the state was not only dependent on symbolic public penal 
justice, but had to legitimate its reactions via different popular media. The 
suppression of a revolt and the punishment of the rebels had to be communicated to 
the public as a just reaction – and was supposed to be preserved in public memory 
as a means of re-establishing the order and the legitimate system of rule. On the 
other hand, the challenge of the revolt as well as the rebels needed to be defamed 
and possibly obliterated from public memory. Especially the illustrated broadsheets 
reflect these ambivalent intentions and the problem of the opinion leadership and 
interpretation – Deutungsherrschaft and Sinndeutung – of revolts as political 
crimes. 
IMAGES IN ILLUSTRATED BROADSHEETS 
Illustrated broadsheets with their typical “comic-strip”-like combination of 
illustrations and text on one sheet emerged as a new type of mass-media in the first 
half of the 16th century. They were produced by professional “printing shops”, 
which were normally located in an imperial city, often manufacturing 1-2000 copies 
of a single broadsheet. Authors and painters / engravers are often unknown or 
identical with the printer. Sold at more or less low prices, they were distributed 
widely. Though the rate of alphabetisation was very low, they reached a broader 
public because everyone could read the illustrations, and in addition, literate 
consumers and professional distributors read them to a wider public, for example in 
public houses, places or at festivities. The illustrations played a prominent role: 
often one to six large-sized pictures were placed in the centre or upper range of the 
sheet, telling a basic story which everybody was able to understand. Even if only 
one picture was used, it sometimes contained different illustrations (picture in 
picture) telling a story. Many broadsheets used a bold headline with typical key-
words and basic information (locations, date, involved persons) on the crime / 
revolt and the legal reactions. For instance a broadsheet dealing with the execution 
of the “rebellious” Bohemian nobles in 1621 was titled: Extract auß Prag. 
Warhafftige Zeitung/ welcher gestalt auff der Röm. Keys. Maj. gnädigisten befelch/ 
die Böhemischen Rebellen/ von Grafen/ Herrn Ritter: und Burgerstandts Personen/ 
auff einer am Altstätter Ring auffgerichten/ und mit schwartzem Tuch uberzognen 
Bühnen/ den 21. Junij dises schwebenden 1621. Jahrs zu Prag/ Iustificirt und 
hingericht worden (Fig. 2).26 
                                                 
26  Reprinted in: Harms, Flugblätter, Vol. II, 306; Paas, Broadsheet, Vol. 3, 362. 




Fig. 2: Extract auß Prag. Warhafftige Zeitung/ […], 1621 
 
Attributes like “true” and “newspaper” gave them an objective and official 
complexion, thus augmenting the official appeal of the broadsheet. Besides the 
difficult problem of discerning the “real” author, the contents and messages are 
clearly influenced by the interests of the authorities who could exercise control via 
censorship, or directly commissioned the printing. However, topics, messages, 
images and appeal were not only influenced by state but also by commercial 
interests and the curiosity or communicative needs (Kommunikationsbedürfnisse) of 
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their consumers. Accordingly, besides religious and political “propaganda” (in the 
Reformation or the Thirty-Years War) the broadsheets covered increasingly popular 
topics such as “marvels”, catastrophes, wars, news and crimes from all over 
Europe.27 
Among the common topics of early modern illustrated broadsheets, which were 
produced in the Holy Roman Empire (and therefore written in German), crime and 
punishment – especially serious ones – obtained a considerable proportion of 10 to 
15 percent with a certain continuity during the early modern period.28 One third of 
them can be classified as political crimes or crimes with an explicit political 
context: treason, conspiracy, assassination, regicide, and revolts; on the whole, 27 
political crimes are depicted in 99 broadsheets (see figure 1), many of them 
connected with revolt, riot, upheaval or rebellion. With regard to their legal 
representation and the elements of political crimes, all types of revolts are covered: 
peasants’ revolts, communal upheaval and rebellions of the elites / nobility, albeit 
the latter ones seemed to be over-represented in comparison with their actual 
emergency in early modern Europe. Though the broadsheets analysed were 
produced and mainly distributed in the Holy Roman Empire, they dealt with revolts 
and political crimes from different countries or regions: the Netherlands, the Swiss 
Confederation, France, Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire; many of these 
events possessed a certain public significance and a “European” dimension. 
The texts as well as the illustrations mainly focus on the reactions of the state or 
the authorities and on the public punishment of the criminals / rebels. The actual 
performance of a revolt or the actions of the rebels are seldom depicted and only 
sometimes described. Violent actions of the masses (“the revolt itself”) are 
displayed only in the case of the Women’s-riot in Delft 1614 (Republic of 
Netherlands), the Fettmilch-riot in Frankfurt (1612-1616), the peasants’ revolt in 
Austria 1626, the assassination of the Bürgermeister of Liège in 1637, and the riot 
in which the De Witt Brothers were executed as traitors (or lynched). One 
broadsheet dealing with the Swiss peasants’ revolt in 1653 depicts solely the clubs 
and bludgeons of the rebels, thus representing the violent image of the revolt as 
well as symbolising the savageness and backwardness of the rebels, who were using 
                                                 
27  Incidentally it is not possible to give a more comprehensive analyses on early modern 
broadsheets as mass-media; compare instead: Kunzle, Early Comic Strip; Michael Schil-
ling, Bildpublizistik der frühen Neuzeit. Aufgaben und Leistungen des illustrierten Flug-
blatts in Deutschland bis um 1700 (Tübingen 1990); Kristina Pfarr, Die Neue Zeitung. 
Empirische Untersuchung eines Informationsmediums der frühen Neuzeit unter besonde-
rer Berücksichtigung von Gewaltdarstellungen (Mainz 1994). 
28  For a comprehensive analyses see: Härter, Criminalbildergeschichten. 
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only archaic weapons.29 Only a few broadsheets illustrate the combat between 
armed rebel groups and military forces like, for example, the Austrian peasants’ 
revolt in 1626 (this however only in the background and using mockery), thus 
depicting and referring to the military suppression of revolt. Although this 
happened to be a frequent reaction of the early modern authorities to revolts, the 
image of military suppression – for instance dominating the few pictures of the 
German Peasants’ War – was superseded in the illustrated broadsheets by the image 
of crime and punishment within the legal space of the criminal justice system. In 
this respect, the development of the illustrated broadsheets as an early modern mass 
media reflected the legal differentiation and representation of revolts as political 
crimes by using crucial elements of the conceptualisation of revolts as crimes as 
well as the punishment of rebels. The following examples will verify this in more 
detail. 
COMMUNAL REVOLTS: 1612-1616  
Though the production as well as the readership of broadsheets was located mainly 
in towns and cities, which were often confronted with social unrest, protest, and 
upheaval, only a few illustrated broadsheets dealt with communal revolts. One 
prominent example that had a considerable political and public impact in the Holy 
Roman Empire was the so called Fettmilch-revolt (or riot / uprising) in the imperial 
city of Frankfurt am Main on the eve of the Thirty-Years War, starting in 1612 and 
ending with the punishment of the rebels in 1616.30 In many respects the Fettmilch-
revolt provides an outstanding, albeit typical example of an early modern urban 
uprising, distinctive legal responses of the involved authorities – especially the 
emperor of the Holy Roman Empire – and a broad resonance in the print-media. 
This ranged from official statements and documents to semi-official pamphlets, 
reports, and popular broadsheets, spreading the news in the whole of the Old 
Empire, as well as in other European countries like, for instance, France: “there was 
                                                 
29  Andreas Suter, Der schweizerische Bauernkrieg von 1653. Politische Sozialgeschichte - 
Sozialgeschichte eines politischen Ereignisses (Tübingen 1997), 155 f. 
30  On these events see: Christopher R. Friedrichs, “Politics or Pogrom? The Fettmilch 
Uprising in German and Jewish History”, Central European History 2 (1986), 186-228; 
Matthias Meyn, Die Reichsstadt Frankfurt vor dem Bürgeraufstand von 1612 bis 1614. 
Struktur u. Krise (Frankfurt am Main 1980); Rivka Ulmer (ed.), Turmoil, trauma, and 
triumph. The Fettmilch uprising in Frankfurt am Main (1612 - 1616) according to the 
Megillas Vintz: a critical edition of the Yiddish and Hebrew text including an English 
translation (Frankfurt am Main et al. 2001). 
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certainly an appetite for news about Frankfurt that extended far beyond the city 
itself”, emphasises Christopher R. Friedrichs.31 
The revolt broke out in 1612 because a large group of citizens (members of the 
guilds, craftsmen and merchants) was disaffected with the rule of the patrician 
families, the council’s administration, high taxes, the handling of the city’s 
privileges and especially with the presence of the large Jewish community. A 
committee was formed, complaints and supplications were submitted to the 
emperor and the city council. An imperial commission tried to mediate between the 
conflict parties, and eventually, a compromise settlement was negotiated but failed. 
In 1614, the upheaval took a turn to violent revolt with an attack on the city hall, the 
forced resignation of the magistrates and the establishment of a new council as well 
as the plundering of the Jewish ghetto and the violent expulsion of the Jews carried 
out by a group of citizens led, amongst others, by Vincenz Fettmilch, all of them 
craftsmen and merchants. The revolt was not only “simultaneously anti-Jewish and 
anti-patrician in character”,32 but also affected the emperor, who was not only 
formally the Stadtherr of Frankfurt but also the protector and legal guarantor of the 
Jews (or their imperial privileges). From this perspective, the basically urban revolt 
infringed the legal system of the Old Reich: the so called Reichsverfassung. The 
emperor reacted immediately, the imperial aulic court (Reichshofrat) declared the 
Reichsacht (imperial ban) on the rebels, and troops were mobilised, but it was the 
citizens themselves who re-established the old council, arrested Fettmilch and his 
comrades and handed them over to the imperial commission. The commission, on 
behalf of the emperor and the imperial aulic court, held an inquisitorial trial that 
ended with verdicts against seven ringleaders and 31 of their associates. They were 
found guilty for committing a crimen laesae maiestatis against the emperor as well 
as committing sedition, treason and conspiracy with regard to the city council and 
the Jews; the ringleaders were sentenced to death, their families and associates to 
flogging and banishment. 
The Fettmilch-revolt evoked a strong echo in the contemporary print media, 
with the involved groups also making use of popular media themselves.33 The 
                                                 
31  Friedrichs, Fettmilch Uprising, 195; see also the comprehensive survey and analyses by 
Würgler, Revolts in Print. 
32  Friedrichs, Fettmilch Uprising, 188. 
33  Robert Brandt and Olaf Cunitz (ed.), Der Fettmilch-Aufstand. Bürgerunruhen und Juden-
feindschaft in Frankfurt am Main 1612–1616. Ein Ausstellungsprojekt des Historischen 
Museums Frankfurt in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Historischen Seminar der Johann-
Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität (Frankfurt am Main 1996); Bernd Herbert Wanger, Kai-
serwahl und Krönung im Frankfurt des 17. Jahrhunderts. Darstellung anhand der zeitge-
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rebels printed pamphlets, supplications and petitions, and the authorities distributed 
printings of the imperial ban, their decrees and mandates, court records and the final 
verdict.34 Besides some newspaper reports several popular relations and pamphlets 
were printed between 1614 and 1617, some of them illustrated and explicitly 
naming the events a revolt or rebellion, like: Gründlicher Bericht Von dem Aufflauff 
unnd Tumult/ […]; Newe Zeittung: Warhafftiger Bericht/ was massen die 
Judengassen […] von den Handwercks Gesellen angeloffen/ gestürmet/ geplündert; 
or the Cursus Francofurdianus: Außbruch der Franckfurtischen Rebellion/ und 
Anfang der newen Empörung daselbst […]; and the Appendix […] Darinnen 
vermeldet wird, der Anfang und Verlauff der Empörung zu Franckfurt am Meyen as 
well as the comprehensive Diarium Historicum: Darinnen […] gefährlicher 
auffstandt/ und das schwürige Unwesen […] verzeichnet ist, published in two 
editions in 1615 and 1617.35 
                                                                                                            
nössischen Bild- und Schriftquellen und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Erhe-
bung des Jahres 1612 (Frankfurt am Main 1994); Würgler, Revolts in Print. 
34  Copia Der Kays. Achts-Erklärung/ so in deß heiligen Reichs Statt Franckfurt am Mayn/ 
Mittwochs den 28. Septembr. Anno 1614. Durch einen Kays. Herolden/ wider darin be-
nandte Personen publicirt worden (Frankfurt am Main 1615); Peinlich Urtheil wider die 
Franckfurtische Rebellen Vincenz Fettmilchen, Conrad Gerngroß, Conrad Schoppen und 
Consorten ergangen, exequirt und vollstreckt (Frankfurt am Main 1616). 
35  Gründlicher Bericht Von dem Aufflauff unnd Tumult/ welcher in der Stadt Franckfurt am 
Mayn geschehen/ und sich darinnen begeben und zugetragen hat. Wie allda die ledige 
Bursch oder HandwercksGesellen […] die Jüdengasse […] angelauffen/ mit Gewalt in 
die Jüdenhäuser gefallen […] und zum Theil etliche Jüden am Leibe beschädiget worden. 
Anno 1614 […] (Frankfurt am Main 1614); Newe Zeitung/ Warhafftiger Bericht auß der 
Statt Franckfurt am Mayn: was sich mit Bürgern .. auch mit den Juden verlauffen und zu-
getragen hat wie der Tumult und Lermen angangen/ auch wie sie die Juden gestürmet ha-
ben […] (Frankfurt am Main 1614); Cursus Francofurdianus: Außbruch der Franckfurti-
schen Rebellion/ und Anfang der newen Empörung daselbst. Das ist/ Hochbetrübter zu-
stand der Statt Franckfurt am Mayn/ unnd weiterer Verlauff/ wie/ an wem/ an wie vilen 
Personen .. das peinliche Urtheil an denselben exequirt unnd volstreckt werden soll […] 
(Frankfurt am Main 1616); Appendix, Der Historischen Relativen Gregorij Wintermo-
nats, Darinnen vermeldet wird, der Anfang und Verlauff der Empörung zu Franckfurt am 
Meyen, Auch wie die Aechter den 28. Februarij dieses 1616 jahrs sind justificirt worden, 
ordentlich und kürtzlich nackelnander beschrieben […], (Frankfurt am Main 1616); Dia-
rium Historicum: Darinnen Deß Heyligen Reichs Statt Franckfort an dem Meyn gefährli-
cher auffstandt/ und das schwürige Unwesen […] ordentlich verzeichnet ist […] (Frank-
furt am Main 1615 und 1617). 
EARLY MODERN REVOLTS AS POLITICAL CRIMES IN THE POPULAR MEDIA | 327 
 
In sheer quantity the illustrated broadsheets outnumbered all other printings; 
more than 20 different were distributed, covering essential events and stages of the 
revolt, as well as the responses of the authorities, from the outbreak in 1612, the 
violent plundering of the Jewish ghetto in 1614, and the severe punishment in 1616. 
Most of them were produced in Frankfurt itself; however there are also examples of 
broadsheets printed in Darmstadt and Augsburg. They were distributed all over the 
Holy Roman Empire; one was even written in Dutch and produced for the 
Netherlands. At least three broadsheets dealt with the revolt itself, the violent 
actions and the plundering of the Jewish community, but more than ten covered the 
punishment of the rebels and therefore focused on the legal reaction to the revolt as 
a political crime.36 
One of the first broadsheets appearing in 1614 was the Zeytung des verlauffs zu 
Franckfurt am Meyn von der blünderung der Juden Gasse, produced by the printer 
and painter Johann Ludwig Schimmel.37 The two sheets with two large pictures and 
a rhyming text dealt only with the violent plundering of the Jewish ghetto (the 
Judengasse) and the expulsion of the Jews. The text draws a clear relationship 
between the Jews and the authorities (emperor and city council), describing them as 
protectors of the Jews: “Niemandt dörfft ihn [the Jews] halt ein krumb wort/ Zu 
reden/ sie lieffen zu der Obrigkeit fort/ Da wahren sie beschützt als fromme Kindt/ 
Daher der Neyder viel kommen sindt.” In this respect, the Jews were blamed as a 
cause of the revolt and the violence against them received the character of a 
rebellious political action aiming at the authorities. In the first sheet the plundering 
is described as a violent fight between burghers and Jews, the latter defending their 
houses and the Judengasse and wounding one of the aggressors. The attacking 
burghers are illustrated as a tumultuous, rioting group, using weapons and 
firebrands as well as carrying away several objects and goods. 
                                                 
36  Some of them reprinted in: Daniel Dornhofer, “Matthias 1612-1616: Vertreibung und 
Rückkehr”, in Die Kaisermacher. Frankfurt am Main und die Goldene Bulle 1356-1806. 
Katalog, ed. Evelyn Brockhoff et al. (Frankfurt am Main 2006), 476-499, 490-492; 
Brandt/Cunitz, Fettmilch-Aufstand. There are at least 23 broadsheets reported, however, I 
did not have the opportunity to examine them all and therefore restricted the analyses to 
13 different broadsheets. 
37  Zeytung des verlauffs zu Franckfurt am Meyn von der blünderung der Juden Gasse, 
geschehen im Jahr Christi 1614 den XXII. und XXIII. Augustus (Frankfurt am Main 
1614). 





Fig. 3 and 4: Zeytung des verlauffs zu Franckfurt am Meyn von der blünderung der 
Juden Gasse 
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The second illustration shows a different scenario: armed men controlling the flight 
and expulsion of the Jews, who are leaving the city by boat; some burghers are 
watching from a bridge and their windows. Order is re-established – underlines the 
text – because the soldiers of the imperial commission as well as many burghers 
themselves kept the rebels at bay, calmed them down and resolved the cause for 
violent escalation of the revolt by expelling the Jews in an orderly manner. 
However, the broadsheet depicts and names grief and harm of the Jews and claims 
that some burghers gave them shelter and protection. 
A second broadsheet from 1615 – depicting and describing 16 stages of the 
revolt in 12 pictures and additional text – consolidated the image that the violent 
revolt was the fault of a minority of rioting burghers – the gemeine Pöbel (mob) – 
lead by a few ringleaders, whereas the majority made use of mass meetings and 
complaints only to negotiate a new constitutional arrangement. Its failure, the 
unruly Pöbel and the agitation of the ringleaders led to violence and the plundering 
of the Jews, but also to a new government via customary public vow. After the 
publication of the imperial ban and several mandates, one of the ringleaders as well 
as the majority of the burghers realised their error, arrested the ringleaders and 
handed them over to the imperial commission. This broadside also emphasises that 
the burghers re-established order together with the authorities, which had been 
endangered by an opposition under the control of power-hungry leaders making use 
of mass meetings and stinging an unruly mob, which then resulted in an illegitimate 
revolt. Though there is no decisive statement that the events altogether constituted a 
serious political crime, the criminal elements – mass-tort, violence, conjuration, 
disregard of imperial authority – are present and depicted.38 
In 1616, after the verdict and the actual punishment of the rebels, all following 
broadsides are dominated by the image of the Fettmilch-upheaval as a criminal 
revolt and a political crime. Every woodcut depicts nearly the same scenario: the 
punishment of the rebels and their ringleaders, using a large picture showing the 
different penalties and additional scenes. The one of Johann Ludwig Schimmel 
(Fig. 5) comprises crucial elements and icons symbolising the political crime, the 
punishment and the response of the authorities to the revolt, also to be found in 
other broadsides.39 
 
                                                 
38  Wahrhafftige vnd eigendliche Abbildung deß gantzen Handels/ so sich in der Keyserl. 
Reichstatt Franckfurt am Mayn vnd Sachsenhausen zwischen dem Raht vnd Bürger-
schafft von 1612. biß ins 1615. Jahr zugetragen vnd verlauffen hat (Frankfurt am Main 
1615). 
39  Kurtzer Abriß vnd Bericht der Keyserlichen Execution vnd Verfahrung mit den Aechtern/ 
vnd dero anhenger/ sampt einführung der Jüdenschafft […] (Frankfurt am Main 1616). 
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Fig. 5: Kurtzer Abriß vnd Bericht der Keyserlichen Execution vnd Verfahrung 
 
In the middle of the picture we see the scaffold set up at the market place of 
Frankfurt cordoned by heavily armed soldiers and railings with posts showing the 
imperial eagle: The punishment of the rebels is taking place within the separated 
legal space of the empire, where only the delinquent, the executioner, the judge and 
several officials (representative of the imperial commission) and the soldiers 
appear. The city council and the representatives of the guilds on the two platforms 
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in the centre of the background as well as the burghers of Frankfurt surround that 
space, watching from the outside. The executioner decapitates one of the 
delinquents, the recently severed finger of whom can be seen in front of him. The 
dismembering of the finger – the Schwurfinger – clearly points at the illegal 
conjuration or conspiracy in terms of penal law. Two more decapitated corpses of 
ringleaders are positioned on the scaffold. In the background on the left, outside the 
city three gallows are set up; one with a corpse hanged at the feet and another 
exposing part of quartered corpse. Both death penalties – reverse hanging and 
quartering – are typical of the aggravated and infamous punishment of treason. In 
the case of the Fettmilch-revolt, the four main ringleaders were dismembered, 
decapitated, quartered and parts of their corpses were exposed at the gallows 
outside of town. Furthermore, their heads were impaled and exposed on the gate 
tower on the Rhine side, which was the main entrance to the city, depicted with the 
four decapitated heads and a super-sized imperial eagle in the left background of 
the broadsheet. The symbolic implication, communicated and enhanced by the 
broadsheet, is quite obvious: The ringleaders and the revolt are to be 
commemorated as a serious political crime. This was emphasized by the total 
demolition of Fettmilch’s house shown in the foreground of the illustration on the 
right and the infamous shaving, flogging and banning of his family depicted in the 
background on the right: the total social disintegration and exclusion of the main 
ringleader – comprising his family, his name, his house – for eternal memory (“zum 
ewigen Gedächtnuß”). Apart from the ringleaders and their families, the 
punishment of other rebels (17 associates and followers) by flogging and banning, 
shown in the background on the left, seems almost lenient. In addition to the 
punishment of the rebels, the restitution of the legal and imperial order is 
represented by the re-entry of the Jewish community in form of a procession, just 
passing the scaffold. 
All other broadsides dealing with the punishment of the rebels depict the same 
scene and make use of similar iconic elements: scaffold, armed soldiers, imperial 
posts and eagle, the dismembering of the Schwurfinger and decapitation, the tower 
with the heads, the gallows with the quartered corpses, whipping and expulsion, the 
demolition of the house, the re-entry of the Jews etc. However, there are slight 
differences. The Wahre und eigentliche Contrafactur der Kayserlichen Execution 
printed 1616 in Augsburg by Krebs shows a much larger number of imperial 
soldiers surrounding the scaffold as well as accompanying and protecting the Jews 
on their re-entry into the city, in a similar manner to the entry of the emperor and 
the estates of the Empire (Reichsstände) on the occasion of the imperial election in 
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Frankfurt.40 Another broadside entitled Eine gewisse/ warhaffte/ doch trawrig und 
erbärmliche Newezeittung/ Von dem betrübten Zustandt/ welcher zu Franckfurt am 
Mayn/ den 9. Martji dß schwebenden 1616. Jahrs geschen, printed by Balthasar 
Hoffmann in Darmstadt 1616 (fig. 6), gives a slightly different image and valuation 
of the revolt.41 The woodcut shows portraits of the four main ringleaders, albeit 
depicted as respectable burghers, whereas the demolition of the house is not shown. 
Their crimes are not explicitly quoted and the revolt is characterised as a quarrel 
(Streit) among the burghers. The delinquents are not presented as ringleaders 
conducting a revolt against the imperial order but as faithful, remorseful sinners 
arousing the compassion of the burghers: “viel leuth hatten groß mitleyden”. In 
consequence the revolt is characterised rather as a religious upheaval of the 
Christian Bürgergemeinschaft against the Jews who achieved imperial punishment 
of the Christian sinners with harsh penalties: “daß soviel unschuldig Christen Blut/ 
vergossen ist durch der Jüden Muth/ darüber geschen groß Wunderzeichen”. 
Though the broadsheet did not explicitly raise doubts about imperial punishment, 
the revolt is presented subtly as a lapse or sin of Christians reacting to the Jews, 
whereas their punishment remains a divine miracle and the secret of the authorities 
(“der Obrigkeit Geheimniß”). In this respect, the broadside demonstrates that other 
representations of revolts – in this case religious, anti-Jewish and with certain 
sympathy for the rebels – existed which at least could help to commemorate the 
revolt not as a political crime, but as failure and sin which could be exculpated. 
Nevertheless, the Darmstädter broadside constitutes an exception, possibly 
influenced by one of the ringleaders, Konrad Gerngroß, who prior to his arrest had 
fled to nearby Darmstadt, the residence of the Lutheran Landgraviate of Hesse. 
 
                                                 
40  Wahre und eigentliche Contrafactur der Kayserlichen Execution so den 28. Febr. Anno 
1616 zu Franckfurt am Mayn an etlichen Aechtern und Handwercksgesellen volnzogen 
werden (Augsburg 1616). 
41  Eine gewisse/ warhaffte/ doch trawrig und erbärmliche Newezeittung/ Von dem betrüb-
ten Zustandt/ welcher zu Franckfurt am Mayn/ den 9. Martji dß schwebenden 1616. Jahrs 
geschen […] (Darmstadt 1616). 
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Fig. 6: Eine gewisse/ warhaffte/ doch trawrig und erbärmliche Newezeittung 
 
On the whole, the public interpretation and popular memorisation of the revolt was 
dominated by the authoritarian view of the imperial punishment of a political crime 
to be commemorated through the erecting of a Schandsäule – a “pillar of shame” or 
“infamy monument” – at the devastated place of Fettmilch’s house. Two more 
illustrated broadsheets, printed in Frankfurt by Conrad Corthoys and again Johann 
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Ludwig Schimmel, depict the Schandsäule; one in combination with the tower 
showing the impaled heads and the imperial eagle, as well as depicting the burghers 
reading the engraved message (in German and Latin): “Sempiternae Rebellionis 
 
Fig. 7: Eigentliche Abcontrafactur/ der auffgerichteten Columnen vnd Säulen […]. 
 
Both broadsides state deterrence and eternal memorisation as the purposes of the 
punishment and the pillar: “zur ewigen Gedächtnuß der Rebellion und jedermann 
memoriae” (fig. 7).  
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zur höchsten Warnung” – “zu ewiger gedechtnuß/ menniglichen zum abschewlichen 
Exempel/ und Vilen zur trewer Warnung”.42 
The actual punishment as well as its representation in the broadsheets conveys a 
distinct image of an urban revolt as the political crimes of crimen laesae maiestatis, 
treason, sedition and conspiracy, instigated through the conspiratorial machinations 
of the ringleaders. Although the image of revolt in the first broadsides was formed 
by the tumultuous actions of the mob and the violent plundering of the Jewish 
ghetto, the later and more numerous broadsheets represented the revolt mainly as a 
crime of ringleaders against the emperor and the legal order of the empire. This, in 
turn, reacts and punishes the ringleaders as “Ächter” (defiers) of the secular and 
divine order, which is re-established not only through imperial punishment of the 
ringleaders, but also by the renewal of the imperial legal protection of the Jews. 
REBELLIONS OF THE NOBILITY 
Images and the elements of the punishment of the Fettmilch-revolt are to be found 
in many other broadsheets covering not only urban, but also rural revolts and 
rebellions of the nobility. The upheaval or resistance of the Bohemian nobility 
against the Emperor is covered in eight illustrated pamphlets, six of them dealing 
only with the punishment of the nobles in Prague in 1621. Though the revolt had 
strong religious motivations, the nobles as well as some of their burgher-associates 
were punished as rebels for the political crime of crimen laesae maiestatis, and the 
woodcuts use the corresponding iconographic elements: the scaffold surrounded by 
the soldiers and a crowd of nobles and citizens watching the punishment of more 
than 40 delinquents, many of them dismembered (at the hand), decapitated, 
quartered and hanged, with some followers and relatives flogged and expelled. The 
heads of the twelve ringleaders are impaled at the gate tower and the quartered 
corpses are exposed outside of town on pillars and gallows. The Eigentliche 
Abbildung deß Process der Pragerischen Execution adds some pictures showing the 
                                                 
42  Eigentliche Abcontrafactur/ der auffgerichteten Columnen vnd Säulen: so auff dem Platz 
Vincents Fettmilchs Kuchen Beckers geschleifften Behausung/ zu ewiger gedechtnuß/ 
menniglichen zum abschewlichen Exempel/ und Vilen zur trewer Warnung/ den 22. Au-
gusti 1617 zu Franckfurt am Mayn ist aufgerichtet Worden, Conrad Corthoys (Frankfurt 
am Main 1617); Eigentliche Abconterfyung Vincentz Fetmilch Kuchen-beckers Seullen: 
Welche auffgericht ist worden/ den 22. Augusti. im Jahr 1617. Auff den Platz seiner ge-
schleifften Behausung/ zur ewigen Gedächtnuß der Rebellion und jedermann zur höchs-
ten Warnung für Augen gestelt, Johann Ludwig Schimmel (Frankfurt am Main 1617). 
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trial and the families begging for pardon.43 The message is clearly depicted and 
stated: “Hieraus liebe Leser kanstu sehen/ was jederzeit die Rebellion guts 
gebracht/ und was die Rebellen für einen Lohn bekommen/ daran sich menniglich 
bespiegeln/ seiner von Gott fürgesetzten Obrigkeit gehorsamb seyn/ zu keiner 
auffwiegelung sich bereden lassen”, as the Extract auß Prag. Wahrhafftige Zeitung 
concludes, referring also to the Austrian peasants’ revolt in 1597 and the Fettmilch-
upheaval.44 
Using similar arguments, the broadside Eigentliche und warhaffte/ und nach 
dem Leben gestalte Bildnussen/ Der ehedessen höchstberühmten Ungarischen 
Grafen/ Nunmehro aber wegen abscheulicher Conspiration wieder Unser 
Allerdurchlauchtigstes und Unüberwindlichstes Römisches Oberhaupt Justificirten 
Rebellen/ Nadasti/ Serini/ Franchipani und Bonis justifies the punishment of the 
magnate-rebels in 1671: “Wer sich Gottes Ordnung hier frevelmütig wiedersetzet/ 
Wieder den Justitia ihr Schwerd ganz rechtmässig wetzet.” It belongs to no less 
than seven broadsheets and illustrated pamphlets dealing with the rebellion of the 
Hungarian nobility (or magnates) in 1670/71. In the second half of the 17th century 
we can observe a slight increase in the popular media dealing with revolts. 
Broadsides on pamphlets (sometimes illustrated) appeared covering the Swiss 
Peasants’ War in 1653,45 the rebellion of the Fronde in France, the Rebellion of 
Stenka Razin in Russia in 1671,46 the rebellion of the Hungarian magnates in 1671, 
followed by the Kurucs- or Tököly-revolt in the 1670s and 1680s, the riot in 
Grafenhaag 1672, in which an organised mob hanged (or executed) the de Witt 
brothers at a “shame-gallows” for alleged conspiracy and treason, the peasants 
                                                 
43  Eigentliche Abbildung der Pragerischen Execution Welcher massen uff befelch der Röm: 
Key: Maytt: die hieunden beschriebenen, Grafen, Herrn, Ritter und Burgerstadts Perso-
nen den 11. (21.) Junii diß 1621 Jahrs zu Praag Iustificirt, und hingericht worden [1621]. 
44  Extract auß Prag. Wahrhafftige Zeitung. 
45  Suter, schweizerische Bauernkrieg, 155 f., 313. 
46  Umständlicher Bericht Von deß grossen Rebellen wider Moßkau Stephan Razins Hin-
richtung. Geschehen in der Stadt Moßkau den 6. Junij st. v. 1671; Kurtze doch Wahrhaff-
tige Erzehlung von der Blutigen Rebellion in der Moscau/ Angerichtet durch den großen 
Verräther und Betrieger Stenko Razin Donischen Cosaken: Wie er wider seinen Käyser 
[…] Alexe Michaloiwits […] Anno 1667. auffgestanden/ Und seine Rebellion continuiret 
biß Anno 1671./ da er gefangen/ und […] am 2. Iunii in die Stadt Moscau eingeführet und 
am 6. drauff offentlich allda gerichtet worden. Enthält außerdem: Copie Des Urtheils/ 
Welchs Dem Stenko Rasin auff dem Richt-Platze in der Stadt Moscau Am 6. Junii Anno 
M.DC.LXXI. Vorgelesen worden, Emden 1671. 
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upheaval in Brussels 1678,47 the rebellion of the Streltsy in Moscow 1682,48 the 
tumultuous assassination of Vizier Cara Mustapha in168349 as well as the urban 
upheavals in Bremen in 1654, in Cologne in 1686 and in Hamburg in 1687.50 
Moreover, some comprehensive popular books on revolts and treason in European 
countries were published, such as, for instance, the Continuirende Rebellion in 
1650, dealing with France and England, or the Europäische- Schand- un[d] Laster-
                                                 
47  Unvermutheter Brüsselischer Land- und Bauern-Auffstand: Mit Eigentlichen Bericht 
derselben Furiösen Eiffers/ samt des Auffstands Ursach/ hitzigen Verlauff/ und vernünff-
tigen Wieder-Begütigung/ Vermittelst Des Herrn Herzogs von Villa Hermosa Excellenz, 
Printzen Vaudemont, und anderer Herren hochreifflichen Zusprechens. Herausgegeben 
Vom 17. (27.) Junij, 1678. 
48  Eigentlicher Bericht wegen des in der Stadt Moßkau Am 15/16 und 17 May Anno 1682 
entstandenen greulichen Tumults/ und grausahmen Massacre. Wie auch; Der augen-
scheinlichen Lebens-Gefahr/ in welche der daselbst befindliche Könichliche Dänische 
Resident/ mittelst dieses Auffstandes/ verfallen […] (Hamburg 1682). 
49  Eigentliche Abbildung derjenigen Execution, welche aus Befehl des jetzt-regierenden 
Türkischen Kaysers, Mahumets des Vierdten, an dessen Groß-Vezier Kara Mustapha 
[et]c. In diesem zu End-lauffenden 1683. Jahr ausgeübet worden, 1683; Wahrhaffte Be-
schreibung/ Was sich seith der entstandenen grossen Empöhrung im Türckischen Läger 
und zu Constantinopel vom 7. Octobr. biß 2. Decembr. 1687. zugetragen (Regensburg 
1688). 
50  Wahrer/ kurtzer Bericht/ Deß in der Stadt Bremen gefärlich entstandenen Tumults und 
Auffstandes/ Am 6. Septembr. Anno 1654 […], 1654; Iusta Divae Themidis Ultio, Oder: 
Gerechte Rach-Vergeltung der H. Gerechtigkeit und wohl-verdiente Belohnung/ Bürger-
licher Untreu und Aufruhrs/ wieder die vorgesetzte hohe Obrigkeit: Zu einem abscheuli-
chen Bey-Spiel/ und billichen Straff-Exempel/ höchst-vermeidlichen Ungehorsams/ und 
auffständlicher Empörung/ verstockter und Halsstarriger Gemüther. Vorgestellet An den 
Cölnischen Executions-Proceß/ Dreyer boßhafftigen Aufwickler und Ertz-Rebellen. 
Nicolaui Gulichs. Abraham Saxens/ und Anthonii Mesthovii. Wie solche .. jüngsthin zu 
Mühlheim den 23 Februarii/ dieses mit Gott tragenden 1686sten Jahrs/ exemplarisch ab-
gestrafft und Executirt worden, 1686; Wahrhafftig-Abbildender Auffruhr- und Empö-
rungs-Spiegel: In welchem Alle unruhige und verwegene Köpffe gahr leicht und eigent-
lich zu erkennen seyn/ beydes Ihnen selbst zu nöthiger Betrachtung/ und allen […] be-
denckenden Gemüthern zu nützlichem Gebrauche vorgestellet. Worbey Eine kurtze Er-
zehlung dessen/ was in Hamburg etliche Jahre hero durch die beyde hingerichtete Haupt-
Redelsführer/ Jastram und Schnitger/ verübet worden (Friedberg 1687). 
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Cronic/ Der vornembsten Stadt- un[d] Lands-Verräthern/ Rebellen/ Meer-Räubern/ 
Ertz-Mördern/ Mord-brennern/ Falsch-Müntzern/ Gottslesterern in 1674.51 
Many broadsheets focussed on rebellions and conspiracies of the nobility, and 
most notably the Magnate-revolt of 1670/71 evoked a strong echo in the popular 
print media all across Europe.52 Newspapers reported, reports and treatises on the 
revolt and the trial appeared, court records and the verdict on the rebels were 
printed, and several illustrated broadsheets covered the revolt. This media-attention 
had different reasons: first of all it was an anti-Habsburg revolt against the Emperor 
Leopold I, led by the prominent Hungarian and Croatian nobles Zrinyi, Frangepan, 
Nádasdy, Rákóczi, Bonis, Nagy and Tattenbach, five of whom were sentenced to 
capital punishment. Secondly, the “confessional”, “national” and “international” 
elements, the involvement of France and the Ottoman Empire, the motives of the 
rebels and its controversial character – a treacherous conspiracy and rebellion or a 
legal uprising and legitimate resistance-movement – did not only arouse the interest 
of the European public, but urged the involved parties to make use of public media 
to demonstrate their positions and legitimate their actions. In this regard, the 
illustrated broadsheets covering the magnate-revolt are an appropriate example of 
the public contention on the media representation of revolts, which again was 
dominated by the responses of the authorities, the trial and the punishment of the 
rebels and the interpretation of the revolt as a political crime. Leaving single 
newspaper reports aside, neither the actual preparation of the upheaval nor the 
short-time outbreak of the armed rebellion in 1670 was covered in popular media. 
The illustrated broadsheets as well as other popular and the semi-official 
                                                 
51  Continuirende Rebellion: Das ist: Gründlicher Bericht/ und kurtze Außführung/ so wol 
der anjetzo newen in Franckreich erweckten Rebellion/ deren Ursachen/ und nochwäh-
renden Mißverstände/ zwischen etlich Parlamenten/ und dem Cardinal Mazarini: Erster/ 
und Ander Theil. Als auch deß Newen Parlaments in Engelland/ nach Hinrichtung ihres 
Königs […], 1650; Johann Georg Schiele, Europäische- Schand- un[d] Laster-Cronic/ 
Der vornembsten Stadt- un[d] Lands-Verräthern/ Rebellen/ Meer-Räubern/ Ertz-
Mördern/ Mord-brennern/ Falsch-Müntzern/ Gottslesterern/ [et]c. wie auch der Weltbe-
schräiten Schandhuren/ Zauberin/ etc. etc. Sampt Deroselben Gerichtlich ergangenem Ur-
tel und Proceß. Vom Jahr 1614. biß 1674 (Ulm 1674). 
52  On the revolt and the trial see: Franz Theuer, Tragödie der Magnaten. Die Verschwörung 
von Muray bis zum Ödenburger Reichstag. Ein historischer Bericht (Wien u.a. 1979), es-
pecially 258-337; Jean Bérenger, “La conjuration des Magnats hongrois (1664-1671)”, in 
Complots et conjurations, ed. Bercé and Fasano Guarini, 317-345. On the echo in popular 
media and the Habsburgian media policy: Jutta Schumann, Die andere Sonne: Kaiserbild 
und Medienstrategien im Zeitalter Leopolds I. (Berlin 2003), 118-128. 
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publications rather focused on the trial, the punishment and the rebels as 
“individuals”. 
At least five broadsheets and some illustrations in the relations display large 
individual portraits of the rebels: The Eigentliche und warhaffte/ und nach dem 
Leben gestalte Bildnussen/ Der ehedessen höchstberühmten Ungarischen Grafen/ 
Nunmehro aber wegen abscheulicher Conspiration wieder Unser Al
lerdurchlauchtigstes und Unüberwindlichstes Römisches Oberhaupt Justificirten 
Rebellen showed the four main leaders, counts Nadasti, Serini, Frangipani and 
Bonis. The Warhaffte Contrafactur und Abbildung, deren ehmals Vornehm-
Berühmten drey Ungarischen Grafen/ Nachmals aber an Ihrer Römischen Kays erl. 
Mayst. höchst-vergriffenen Rebellen, Nadasti, Serini und Frangipani, mit 
beygefügter ausführlicher Beschreibung, was massen selbige, dem billich-
ergangenem Urtheil gemäß zur Execution gezogen as well as the Eigentliche und 
warhaffte/ und nach dem Leben gestalte Bildnussen/ Der ehedessen 
höchstberühmten Ungarischen Grafen/ Nunmehro aber wegen abscheulicher 
Conspiration wieder Unser Allerdurchlauchtigstes und Unüberwindlichstes 
Römisches Oberhaupt Justificirten Rebellen/ Nadasti/ Serini/ Franchipani und 
Bonis (fig. 8) displayed portraits of Nadasti, Frangipani and Serini.53 In addition, 
three more broadsheets or illustrations were published, displaying only Serini and 
Frangipani or single portraits of Nadasti and Count Tattenbach. Beyond this, all 
broadsheets show smaller illustrations of the capital punishment of each of the 
delinquents.54 
                                                 
53  Warhaffte Contrafactur und Abbildung, deren ehmals Vornehm-Berühmten drey Ungari-
schen Grafen/ nachmals aber an Ihrer Römischen Kays erl. Mayst. höchst-vergriffenen 
Rebellen, Nadasti, Serini und Frangipani, mit beygefügter ausführlicher Beschreibung, 
was massen selbige, dem billich-ergangenem Urtheil gemäß zur Execution gezogen, und 
den 30. April dieses 1671. Jahrs vom Leben zum Tod gebracht worden [1671]; Eigentli-
che und warhaffte/ und nach dem Leben gestalte Bildnussen/ Der ehedessen höchstbe-
rühmten Ungarischen Grafen/ Nunmehro aber wegen abscheulicher Conspiration wieder 
Unser Allerdurchlauchtigstes und Unüberwindlichstes Römisches Oberhaupt Justificirten 
Rebellen/ Nadasti/ Serini/ Franchipani und Bonis, Geschehen im Monat April 1671 
[1671]. 
54  Wahre Abbildung beeder Rebellen Peter Serini und Francisci Frangepan, welche zur 
Neustadt in Österreich im Zeughaus enthaubtet worden [1671]; Warhaffte Bildnuß Fran-
cisci Nadasti welcher wegen Aufrührischen Meineyds in den Rahthaus Zu Wienn ent-
haubt worden, den 30. April, vormittag zwischen 8. und 9 Uhr im Jahr 1671 [1671]; Ei-
gentliche Conterfactur und Bildniß deß Rebelle Hannß Erasmi gewesenen Grafen von 
Tättenbach. Welcher im Rahthauß zu Grätz in Steuermarck den 1. Decembris dieses zu 
End lauffende 1671. Jahrs mit de Schwerdt von Lebe zum Todt gerichtet […], [1671]. 
-
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In comparison to former popular images of revolts, we can observe a change in 
the illustrations: The punishment itself faded into the background and the individual 
rebels came to the fore, albeit depicted as a conspiratorial group. Especially the 
broadsheet Eigentliche und warhaffte/ und nach dem Leben gestalte Bildnussen and 
a very similar illustration in the pamphlet Warhafftige und ausführliche Relation, 
Wie die Ungarischen Rebellen Zu Wien in Oesterreich […] Zur verdienten Straffe 
gezogen worden (fig. 9) use a characteristic iconic visualisation.55 The four portraits 
of the conspirers are entwined by two large dragon-like serpents, assaulting the 
enthroned imperial eagle, which holds them off at sword-point. The serpents are 
knotted together by smaller serpents whose tails reach down to the spectators of the 
punishment. The symbolic meaning is quite clear: The revolt was instigated and 
performed by the treacherous ringleaders, forming a viperous conspiracy which, on 
the one hand, was based on the masses (or Hungarian society itself) and, on the 
other hand, strengthened by foreign powers (France and the Ottoman Empire), 
symbolised by the smaller serpents. The emperor reacts by utilising the sword of 
justice, and insofar moves within the ranks of the legal system. To strengthen the 
legality of the imperial reaction and to answer assumptions of unjust persecution of 
legitimate opposition and protestant dissidents, the broadsheets contained lengthy 
remarks on the confessions of the rebels, the verdicts and the execution. Moreover, 
they recapitulated the conviction of the “Räthleinführer” on the ground of “Crimen 
laesae Majestatis & perduellionis”, especially for setting up a “höchstgefährliche 
und weitaussehende Conspiration”, and trying to subjugate Hungary to foreign 
powers by setting up a treacherous alliance. The texts emphasise that the 
delinquents voluntarily confessed and regretted their crimes at the public execution, 
some of them even converting from Calvinism to Catholicism. Thus, the detailed 
depiction of severe public punishment, which included the delinquents’ 
decapitation, dishonourable hanging, dismemberment of the right hand, the 
confiscation of their property, the deletion of their titles and the shaming exposition 
of their corpses, was not only just and equitable, but accepted by them: “ich habe es 
sehr wohl verdienet”, the Warhaffte Contrafactur und Abbildung cites Count Zrinyi. 
Justice, the deterrence of supporters and followers (“dem Volck zum Abschreck”) as 
well as the obliteration of each rebel whose memory was to be utterly destroyed 
(“dessen Gedächntnis von der Welt ausgetilget”) are the clearly stated and depicted 
authoritarian messages. 
 
                                                 
55  Warhafftige und ausführliche Relation, Wie die Ungarischen Rebellen Zu Wien in Oes-
terreich/ Als auch Zur Wienischen Neu-Stadt Und zu Preßburg Am 30. Aprilis Anno 
1671. Zur verdienten Straffe gezogen worden. Nebst dem Nadastischen/ Serinisch- und 
Frangypanischen Urtheil, 1671. 
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Fig. 8: Eigentliche und warhaffte/ und nach dem Leben gestalte Bildnussen 
  
Fig. 9: Frontispiece and title page of the Warhafftige und ausführliche Relation 
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Although all broadsheets and most popular media propagated this interpretation of 
the imperial court in Vienna, the imperial media policy as well as the purposes of 
the actual punishment partially failed. Some members of the noble families 
involved continued their opposition and resistance against Habsburg rule, and more 
revolts such as the Kuruc uprisings were to come, answered again with punishment 
and covered in corresponding illustrated broadsheets.56 A few pamphlets (but no 
illustrated broadside) were published which tried to delegitimise the harsh 
punishments as the repression of legitimate political opposition and the protestant 
religion. Moreover, the broadsides and pamphlets of the magnate-revolt were used 
in Hungary and Croatia to commemorate unjust punishment of “patriotic martyrs”. 
With regard to the European public, the representation of the revolt as the 
treacherous magnate-conspiracy and a serious political crime was largely 
dominant.57 
PEASANTS’ REVOLTS AND RESISTANCE 
IN THE 18TH CENTURY 
Authoritarian media policies and the representation of revolts as political crimes 
also dominated the few illustrated broadsheets dealing with social upheaval in the 
18th century, especially in the case of the Bavarian upheaval in 1705/06 and the 
peasants’ revolt of Horea and Kloska in Hungary in 1785. However, these two 
revolts occurred under specific circumstances, as both of them could also be 
regarded as “resistance movements” against the “foreign” occupation and 
domination by the Habsburgs. Concerning early modern peasant’s revolts, 
historians have stressed that after the military repression of the Peasants War in 
1525, conflicts were increasingly dealt with within a legal framework and by using 
legal procedures.58 The previous remarks have demonstrated that such legal 
responses also included the further criminalisation of social protest, as well as 
criminal justice procedures and subsequent punishment against rioting peasants and 
their ringleaders. In addition, we can observe that in the 18th century, authorities and 
states alike increasingly used military force in matters of “inner security”, the 
prosecution of criminals (especially bandits and gangs) and the execution of severe 
penalties. The illustrated broadsheets dealing with crime, punishment and revolt are 
                                                 
56  Abbildung, welcher Gestalt der Hungarische Haupt-Rebell Picaii, neben 19 andern seiner 
Gehülffen, zur wolverdienten Straff gezogen und hingerichtet worden/ zu Arva den 28. 
Novembr. Anno 1672 [1672]. 
57  Schumann, Kaiserbild und Medienstrategien, 127-128. 
58  Blickle, Criminalization; Schulze, Beobachtungen. 
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in part representative of these trends, most notably in the pamphlets and broadsides 
dealing with the Bavarian revolt against the Habsburg occupation in 1705/06.59 
Several illustrations use the familiar iconic programme in depicting capital 
punishment with quartering and the exposition of the quartered corpses at the 
gallows, and showing portraits of the ringleader Kraus.60 Two broadsheets add a 
new media strategy, enhancing the representations of revolts and the reactions of 
the authorities in popular media with mockery. The illustration depicting the 
arresting of the “Bauernrebell Krauss” shows a peasant hiding fearfully in a hay 
barrel excusing himself to the approaching soldiers with the words: “ich bin ein arm 
verführtes Bäuerlein”.61 
A second broadsheet entitled Das rebellische Bayrn Parlament zu Braunau, 
shows the assembly of the Bavarian peasants and burghers at Braunau in 1705 (the 
so called Landesdefesionskongreß or Braunauer Parlament) as a collection of 
ridiculous figures and animals (dogs and boars), who nevertheless are easy to 
perceive as a conjuration with the Gallic cock in the background window, 
instigating the revolt.62 Though the revolt was bloodily crushed by Austrian military 
forces, killing hundreds of peasants and burghers (the so called Sendlinger 
Mordweihnacht), the following broadsheets depict only the capital punishment of 
the ringleaders for crimes such as the crimen laesae maiestatis, perduellio and 
treason. Furthermore, the emperor published additional reports and pamphlets to 
propagate, “daß der wider die Röm. Kayserl. Majestät und dero höchstlöbl. 
Administration der Chur-Bayerischen Lande von den Unterthanen darinnen 
vorgenommene Auffstand unrechtmäßig, Gewissen-loß und hochstraffbar sey”.63  
 
                                                 
59  Many of them reprinted in: Christian Probst, Lieber bayrisch sterben. Der bayrische 
Volksaufstand der Jahre 1705 und 1706 (Munich 1978), 313, 336, 392, 403, 407; Henric 
L. Wuermeling, 1705. Der bayerische Volksaufstand und die Sendlinger Mordweihnacht. 
Mit einem Prolog von Winston S. Churchill, 5th edition (Munich 2005), 63, 285. 
60  Der Bayrischen Rebellen Rädelsführer Erste Execution Lohn und Warnung, 1706; Wahr-
haffte Abbildung des bayrischen Rebellen Matth. Kraußen Hinrichtung in Kehlheim 
[1706], both reprinted in: Probst, Volksaufstand, 403, 407. 
61  Einer von den verwegensten rebellischen Bauren in Bayern Krauss oder schwartzer 
Jockel genannt […] (Nürnberg). 
62  Das rebellische Bayrn Parlament zu Braunau, Probst, Volksaufstand, 392 f. 
63  Gründliche Vorstellung, daß der wider die Röm. Kayserl. Majestät und dero höchstlöbl. 
Administration der Chur-Bayerischen Lande von den Unterthanen darinnen vorgenom-
mene Auffstand unrechtmäßig, Gewissen-loß und hochstraffbar sey, 1706. Compare the 
comprehensive study of Strasser, Aufstand im bayerischen Oberland. 
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Fig. 10: Das rebellische Bayrn Parlament zu Braunau 
  
Fig. 11 & 12: Two different representations of revolt: the execution of the 
ringleader Kraus (Wahrhaffte Abbildung), and Khlarwein as a Bavarian patriot 
(Rechtfertigung Plinganser, in: Probst, Volksaufstand, 313) 
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Though the Habsburg media policy spread the image of the upheaval as a criminal 
revolt, at least one pamphlet seemed to support the perspective of the “resistance 
fighters” and martyrs for their country.64 Despite the option to use popular media 
for an affirmative representation of revolts, the Bavarian example on the whole 
solidifies that the emperor and the authorities did not only control the public media, 
but used them to communicate the authoritarian representation of revolts as political 
crimes. 
In the course of 18th century, the ambiguous or even “dangerous” options for an 
affirmative representation of revolts and political opposition in popular media 
gained more importance. Social protest movements and revolts made increasing use 
of print media. Likewise, enlightened discourses criticised censorship, political 
oppression and capital punishment. In this respect, the European authorities had to 
deal with a sensitised public that could react differently to the severe public 
punishment of rebels and an authoritarian media policy aiming at the representation 
of revolts as political crimes. The example of the Peasants’ revolt in Hungary 
(Transylvania) against serfdom and the Habsburg regime lead by Horea and Kloska, 
who were executed in 1785, may serve to finally prove this. Habsburg suppressed 
the revolt of the Romanian peasants at the end of 1784 with military force, and an 
imperial commission sentenced more than 30 rebels to death. Joseph II pardoned all 
rebels who renounced the revolt and acknowledged the authorities or mitigated the 
death penalties, with the exception of the three “ringleaders” Horea, Kloska and 
Crisan (the latter one committing suicide prior to the execution). They were 
executed by using the conventional punishment for high treason and lèse-majesty: 
Horea and Kloska were broken on the wheel, disembowelled, decapitated and 
quartered in front of a large crowd of peasants, cordoned off by the imperial army; 
afterwards the quartered corpses and the heads were exposed on pillars. The 
punishment was clearly aimed at retaliation, deterrence and general prevention with 
regard to the assembled peasants and the still ongoing social unrest in the Habsburg 
territories. 
The revolt as well as the capital punishment of its leaders evoked a strong echo 
in the European press and other print media, not least because Joseph II – the 
“enlightened reformer” – was involved, and reforms such as the abolishment of 
serfdom and social unrest constituted prime issues of the enlightened discourses. 
The reactions in the public media were mixed: Many followed the official 
interpretation of the revolt as a political crime that was rightfully suppressed. 
Others – especially newspapers – tried to give more or less “objective information” 
on the upheaval, and some publications showed favour for the causes of the revolt 
                                                 
64  The so called “Rechtfertigung Plinganser”: Probst, Volksaufstand, 313. 
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or dismissed the “barbaric” punishment of its leaders.65 The public dispute on the 
interpretation of the revolts is discernible in the two broadsides, respectively 
illustrations, depicting the punishment of Horea and Kloska. 
 
 
Fig. 13: Hinrichtung der beeden Rebellen Hora und Kloska 1785 
 
The broadsheet Hinrichtung der beeden Rebellen Hora und Kloska 1785, 28. 
Februar, in dem Comitats Karls-Burg, printed in Vienna and published 1785, 
shows the typical scenery of the execution with the wheel, the disembowelment, the 
executioner with the axe ready for decapitation, the pillars and gallows in the 
background to expose the quartered corpses etc.66 Though actually a vast crowd of 
peasants was present (the text says 2000), the illustration over-emphasises the 
                                                 
65  See the thorough (but biased) study of Nicolae Edroiu, Horea's uprising: European 
echoes (Bukarest 1984). 
66  Hinrichtung der beeden Rebellen Hora und Kloska 1785, 28. Februar, in dem Comitats 
Karls-Burg (Vienna 1785). 
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presence of the well-ordered military forces, among them several coaches with 
higher clerics or other officials, depicting the authorities as attending the 
punishment of the rebels in person. The execution platform is surrounded by 
military music (drummers), drowning out the last speech of one of the rebels, who 
shouts: “ich sterbe vor die Nation”. Insofar, the state not only dominates the 
scenery, but is in full control of the peasants as well as demonstrating its power and 
ability to suppress a revolt by using the traditional public punishment of the 
Endliche Rechtstag. The “seduced”, but pardoned “followers” are allowed to attend 
the execution of the ringleaders, who are punished as traitors, but the state prevents 
the rebels from making a last speech to communicate “their” message of the revolt: 
the liberation of the nation. On the other hand, the image is ambivalent: The state 
needs exceptional means like loud music and has to rely on vast military forces as 
well as on “barbaric” punishments to deal with social unrest and upheaval.67  
A second broadside entitled “Vorstellung der Execution”, probably produced by 
the printer Johann David Donnhäuser from Frankfurt am Main, gives a slightly 
different view: peasants trying to enter the platform, a larger crowd of peasants, but 
a smaller number of soldiers and only one drummer in the background.68 
 
 
Fig. 14: Vorstellung der Execution 
                                                 
67  Compare the reaction of Brissot to the capital punishment of the rebells: Leonore Loft, 
“The Transylvanian Peasant Uprising of 1784, Brissot and the Right to Revolt: A Re-
search Note”, French Historical Studies 1 (1991), 209-218. 
68  Vorstellung der Execution, welche an den beyden Wallachischen Rebellen, Horia und 
Klotska, zu Karlsburg vollzogen worden / I. D. D. [d.i. wahrscheinl. Johann David Donn-
häuser] (Frankfurt 1785). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The early modern illustrated broadsheets are an important popular media of a cross-
border, Europe-wide representation of revolts, communicating the image of revolts 
as political crimes and the reactions of the authorities within the legal framework of 
penal justice and punishment. In this respect, the representation of revolts in 
broadsheets and popular media follow the patterns of “Verrechtlichung”. In 
addition, the state and its legal system are placed at the centre of the popular 
representation of revolts, thus communicating that revolts were increasingly 
considered – particularly in penal law and the juristic discourses – as crimes against 
the state (or its representatives), and that the state had to be protected against such 
political crimes. From this point of view, the broadsides and pamphlets reflect the 
development of “Staatsschutz”. I do not suggest that this was a linear development 
or even a process of modernisation, but I would like to stress that the representation 
of revolts in criminal law and public media was closely linked and formed a more 
or less prevailing pattern of perception and reaction within the legal system and the 
legal construction of political crimes. 
Therefore, all types of revolts in different European countries were covered, 
though we can observe a slight preference for the rebellions of the nobility and 
political crimes aiming at the ruler and the state. It seems that peasants’ revolts – by 
sheer quantity – are somehow underrepresented because either the authorities did 
not perceive them as main threats to the order, or could rely on the combination of 
legal process (Rechtsweg) and criminal justice, whereas the revolts of the nobility 
were considered as the more dangerous threat to the state or the system of 
government. On the other hand, it could also be argued that crimes in the sphere of 
the nobility were of higher interest to the public and made a better topic for selling 
broadsheets. Nevertheless, the broadsheets and pamphlets convey no substantial 
difference between the revolts of peasants, burghers or nobles: All of them are 
represented as political crimes with the focus on the legal reactions of the 
authorities, especially on the harsh public punishment of the rebels, depicted as 
ringleaders, traitors and conspirers. Here, the representation of revolts as political 
crimes in popular print media corresponds with the developments in penal law and 
the juristic discourses, using similar elements and symbols: the revolt as crimen 
laesae maiestatis, treason, sedition and conspiracy; the differentiation between 
ringleaders and followers and the public capital punishment of the former with 
quartering, dismemberment, decapitation, the exposition of corpses and heads and 
the appearance of shame pillars. 
Concerning the overall images, symbols and icons, one may discern no 
substantial difference to the representation of ordinary crimes in illustrated 
broadsheets, albeit there are slight variations. The broadsides dealing with ordinary 
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crimes often depict the crime itself or the motifs of the criminals, whereas the 
causes of a revolt or the motivations of the rebels are almost ignored and the actual 
performance of a revolt is very seldomly depicted. In the case of ordinary crimes, 
no authority feared that the public could appreciate the motifs of the criminal, but 
with regard to revolts, popular media could harbour ambivalent effects and help 
spread oppositional ideas or even legitimate causes of social unrest and protest. For 
political crimes, respectively revolts, the legal responses of the authorities are 
related to different Öffentlichkeiten (public stages): The rebels themselves used the 
public and print media and, likewise, penal punishment depended on the public 
theatre of the Endliche Rechtstag. Beyond that, it also required the authorities’ 
public media to distribute the image of a just legal reaction to crime and to enhance 
the desired impact of public punishment: the damnatio memoriae of the rebels and 
the obliteration of political dissidence, as well as deterrence and general prevention 
with regard to followers. 
In this respect, the illustrated broadsheets were clearly influenced by the media 
policy of the authorities and their view on revolts. However, one should not forget 
the commercial interests of the printers and the curiosity of a growing public for 
sensational news: Broadsheets and pamphlets were to be sold to distribute a 
message. Accordingly, they offered limited space for slightly different images and 
representations of revolts. Some broadsheets furnished a revolt with an “individual” 
face in portraits of “ringleaders” who looked like honourable burghers or nobles. 
Rebels could appear as seduced or errant sinners with a righteous cause who had 
pursued the wrong path of violence and insurrection against the authority. Even a 
distinct representation of rebels as criminals who had to be punished with harsh 
penalties could promote their perception as martyrs. 
Thus, the authorities not only needed to control the popular media dealing with 
political crimes by censorship, but, moreover, also had to develop a media policy of 
their own to influence public opinion. This first of all included the publishing of 
“own” pamphlets or their commission and the placing of the legal response and 
public capital punishment at the centre of the message and the image they were to 
disseminate: The suppression of a revolt and the punishment of the rebels as a 
legitimate and just reaction of the state within the legal framework of penal law. 
Viewed in this light, the broadsheets contain and depict crucial symbols and icons 
of penal justice or cite confessions and verdicts as well as emphasising the presence 
of a well-ordered and powerful state. In contrast, the rebels are depicted and 
characterised as traitors and conspirers collaborating with foreign enemies. 
Especially the image of traitors and conspirators – shaped in the public media as 
well as in penal law – seemed to influence the perception and representation of 
political crimes on the whole: Attempted assassination as well as the formation of 
secret “conspirative” groups were regarded as the preliminary stage or the start of a 
revolt against the state. On the other hand, the authorities developed an additional 
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media strategy with regard to the representation of peasants’ revolts: the mocking of 
the rebels and the revolt, however, still using the image of severe penal punishment. 
In conclusion, the effect and function of the broadsheets and pamphlets was to 
disseminate the theatre of public punishment to a wider public and to commemorate 
just legal punishment, thus enhancing the flexible legal responses to revolt: the 
defamation of the ringleaders as traitors and conspirers and their total social 
exclusion and disintegration; the deterrence of seduced or potential followers, as 
well as their reconciliation with the legal and political order, which they accepted 
especially by attending public punishment; the damnatio memoriae and obliteration 
of the revolt particularly with regard to its causes, which were now labelled as 
being purely “criminal”, so that not the slightest reminiscence that the revolt 
occurred under any legitimate reasons or aims remained. 
However, these were mainly the effects the authorities affiliated and desired, 
and it is hardly valid to conclude that illustrated broadsheets and popular media 
dealing with revolts fully obtained such an impact and successfully influenced 
public opinions and attitudes in Europe according to the described representation of 
revolts. For the media, representation of revolts could cause ambiguous effects and 
the broadsheet helped to keep the memory of the revolts themselves alive, as they 
demonstrated that “political crimes”, unrest, dissent and protest had, in fact, existed 
and that the state had to use severe remedies to cope with them. Ongoing unrest and 
potential rebels could make use of broadsheets to memorise “martyrs” of a just 
cause and to demonstrate the “cruel” suppression of resistance and opposition. 
Furthermore, the representation of revolts and political crimes could help spread the 
news of revolt to a wider European public, across the borders, in foreign countries 
with a more sceptical public or even to competing powers. There is still very little 
research on the “productive use” of popular media by contemporaries, as it is even 
more difficult (or perhaps even impossible) to measure the impact of popular media 
dealing with crime for the early modern period than for the present. Still, early 
modern legal as well as public discourses certainly formed a persisting “cross-
border” representation of pre-modern revolts as political crimes against the state 
and its order, planned and committed by conspiracies and criminal groups to which 
the state responded within a legal framework, albeit using all the options of the 
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